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FOSTER ON AUCTION 

A Complete Exposition of the Latest 
Developments of Modern Auction 

With the Full Code of the Official Laws 
and 130 Deals from Actual Play 


by 

R. F. FOSTER 


AUTHOR OF 

" Foster’s Complete Bridge,” “ Auction Bridge for All,** 
M Foster’s Pirate Bridge,” “ Foster’s Complete Hoyle,” 
Inventor of the Eleven Rule and the Self- 
Playing Cards 


WITH THE LAWS OF AUCTION 

Revised to September, 1920 


“FEW RULES :: MANY EXAMPLES ” 


NEW YORK 

E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY 

681 Fifth Avenue 


Copyright, 1918 

By E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY 
Copyright, 1919 

By E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY 


All rights reserved 


first printing, June, 1918 
Second printing, Jan., 1919 
Third printing, June, 1919 
Fourth printing, Nov., 1919 
Fifth printing, Feb., 1920 
Sixth printing, April, 1920 
Seventh printing, Oct., 1920 
Eighth printing, March, 1921 


Gift from 
Robert L Owen 
Nov. 4 , 1931 


Printed in the United States of America. 



PREFACE 


Some persons may imagine that there is nothing new 
to be said on the subject of auction bridge, because so 
much has already been written. So far from this being 
the case, the root of the matter has never been reached, 
and most of what has been published is nothing but theory, 
copied from the theories of older writers. These theories 
are all based on experience with the older game of bridge, 
although the two games have little or nothing in common. 
The principles that govern a declaration that is final, 
and a bid that is largely competitive, are very different. 

As in bridge, so in auction, it has always been the 
custom in the text-books to give a number of illustrative 
hands, or parts of hands, and to point out that because 
they contain a certain number of aces, kings, and queens, 
certain declarations should be made upon them/ 

But all this is theory, as evidenced by the fact that 
the theories have been changed time and again. No 
facts have ever been offered in support of any of them. 
Throughout these many changes one fact remains. 
This is that even after years of experience with the game 
the number of contracts that fail is increasing, instead of 
decreasing, which should be enough to suggest to any 
thinking person that there is something wrong, either 
with the theory of bidding in vogue at the present time, 
or with the laws of the game. 

Many theories are exploded by an examination of a few 
facts. It was the tabulation of the actual results arrived 


v 




VI 


PREFACE 


at by following a certain theory of play in duplicate 
matches for the championship of the American Whist 
League that was the death of the long-suit game, and the 
fetish about always leading trumps from five. These 
had been the pet theories of Cavendish, Pole, and Clay 
for more than fifty years, and were followed by 99 per cent 
of the card players throughout the world, yet they were 
absolutely unsound. 

It is only lately that we have had the same oppor¬ 
tunity to analyze the results at auction bridge, and to 
test out the results of following certain theories in dupli¬ 
cate play. The outcome has been to demonstrate that the 
theories upon which our bids are based are a trifle vague, 
and often misleading, and that the reason so many con¬ 
tracts fail is that players do not know how to value their 
hands. It is all very well to tell a player that he should 
bid a heart if he holds five to the ace-king, even if he has 
not a trick outside. But why should he do so? Why 
should he not bid hearts with seven of them, eight high, 
and two outside aces? 

The thebry which it is the purpose of the following 
pages to explain is not that holding a certain number of 
aces and kings makes a bid, but that certain combinations 
of cards will win a stated number of tricks, on the average, 
and that they will win twice as many trick s in the hands 
of the declarer and dummy as they would in the hands 
of the adversaries. Every hand has a fixed value, for 
attack or for defence, which can be depended on to yield 
a certain return in tricks to the player who understands 
these values and bases his bids upon them. 

Instead of asking the reader to take my word for the 
soundness of any of the principles of bidding advocated 
in the following pages, I have allowed these theories to 
emerge from a series of 130 deals from actual play, which 


PREFACE 


Vll 


are here given in full, almost all of them having been 
gathered in important duplicate matches, where they were 
overplayed at seven, eight, nine, and sometimes twelve 
tables. For suggestions as to the application of the 
observed facts, and their formulation into principles of 
play, I am indebted to so many expert players that it 
would be invidious to mention any of them in particular. 

The truth of the facts stated, especially with regard 
to the trick-taking possibilities of certain combina¬ 
tions of cards, their limitations to those values, and the 
impossibility of forcing them beyond, the reader is asked 
to verify for himself by actual observation of the hands 
he himself deals, bids upon, and then plays. 

I do not pretend to pose as an authority, demanding 
the reader's assent to certain theories. The day of the 
“ authority ” in card matters is past. I wish simply to 
present certain facts, which are the result of the examina¬ 
tion and comparison of a large number of duplicate deals, 
and leave the reader to form his own opinion as to their 
value as a guide to better bidding and sounder play. 

At the end of this work, under the title of General 
Index, will be found an entirely original, and the author 
hopes extremely useful, guide to the illustrative hands. 
This is designed to enable the reader to refer at once to 
cases in which any particular convention of bidding or 
play in which he is interested may be seen in action. 

Should he wish to study the management of queen and 
small second hand, for instance, or how to show support 
for a suit bid, he need only turn to those subjects in the 
General Index, to find one or more deals in which the 
convention is used. 

R. F. Foster. 

532 Monroe Street, 

Brooklyn, N. .Y. 














CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Preface . v 

Historical. 3 

Description of the Game. 6 

PART I 

THE BIDDING. 21 

First Principles. 23 

Attack and Defence. 25 

Intrinsic Card Values.. 27 

Bidding Values. 35 

The Trump Suit. 41 

Major and Minor Suits. 56 

Original, or Free Bids. 64 

Major-suit Bids. 66 

Minor-suit Bids. 75 

Two-trick Bids in Minor Suits. 78 

Shut-out Bids. 87 

Bidding Two-suiters. 95 

No-Trump Bids. 100 

Defensive Bids. 110 

When the Dealer Passes. 119 

The Partner. 125 

Denying Partner’s Suit. 129 

Denying Partner’s No-trumpers. 143 

Major-suit Take-outs. 151 

Rebidding the Hand. 166 

Assisting Suit Bids. 182 

Assisting No-trumpers. 199 

Conventional Doubles.204 

Winning and Saving Game. 222 

Getting Penalties.230 


IX 


































X 


CONTENTS 


PAGB 

The Second Bidder. 238 

The Third Hand. 245 

The Fourth Hand. 248 

Secondary Bids.254 

The Partner’s Silence. 263 

PART II 

THE PLAY. 266 

Leads Against Trump Contracts. 269 

Leads Against No-trumpers. 276 

Subsequent Play. 279 

The Leader’s Partner.280 

The Middle Game. 292 

The Eleven Rule. 302 

Finessing. 307 

The Declarer’s Play. 313 

Playing Trump Declarations. 319 

Playing No-trumpers. 327 

The Official Laws. 335 

General Index .. 353 




















T 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


* 










FOSTER ON AUCTION 


HISTORICAL 

Auction bridge belongs to the whist family of games 
and is the latest development of the 20th century tendency 
to inject the bidding element into all the card games 
that are adapted to it. Any person who will mentally 
review the most popular games of the present day can¬ 
not fail to recognize the prominence of the bidding fea¬ 
ture in all of them. 

After whist had held the centre of the stage for more 
than two hundred years, bridge made its appearance. 
Just where it came from is unknown. A game very much 
like it has long been popular in Holland, and all its ele¬ 
ments are to be found in some one or other of the older 
games of cards. 

The first mention of the game in English appeared in 
a little book entitled, “ Biritch, or Russian Whist,” 
published in London in 1886. This has led many to 
suppose the game is of Russian origin, but there is no 
authority for such a belief. 

The name was soon corrupted into “ bridge,” which 
some players erroneously imagined to refer to the privi¬ 
lege of the dealer in passing or “ bridging ” the make to 
his partner. In its primitive form, bridge was intro¬ 
duced to the card players of New York by the late Henry 
I. Barbey, at the New York Whist Club, in 1893. This 
finally resulted in splitting up that club, those who liked 
3 



4 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


the new game better than whist moving to Brown’s 
Chop House on 28th Street, and afterward to 28 West 
30th Street, where they organized The Whist Club of 
New York, in the summer of 1894. 

It was not until two years after The Whist Club had 
split off from the New York Whist Club in 1893 that the 
game of bridge was officially recognized in the by-laws, 
and it was two years later, in 1897, that The Whist 
Club printed its first official code of laws for the game. 
This code has been kept up to date ever since, gradually 
changing from bridge to auction bridge, and then to 
royal auction, and is to-day the recognized official code 
throughout the United States. By kind permission of 
The Whist Club, the latest edition of the code is given 
in full in this work. 

There was no bidding in bridge. The dealer named the 
trump, or no trump, or passed the privilege to his partner. 
All the opponents could do was to double if they con¬ 
sidered the make better suited to their hands than to 
the dealer’s. The bidding element, which laid the foun¬ 
dation for auction, was the invention of John Doe, an 
English writer who was stationed in India at the time, 
who designed it to make bridge playable by three persons, 
the highest bidder taking the dummy blindfold, as it 
were. 

A description of this game appeared in some of the 
London papers, and the Bath Club took it up and rapidly 
adapted it to four players. Just as bridge gradually 
fell into step with duplicate whist, overtook it, and then 
passed it; so auction overtook bridge, and gradually 
left it behind, although it took the American players 
nearly four years to put auction in its present position 
as the most popular game. 

Probably the final touch, which made auction the game 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


it is to-day, was the adjustment of the suit values, elimi¬ 
nating the double value of the spade suit, and making 
it possible to win the game from love with any of the four 
suits for trump. This was finally adopted in 1914, and 
it is improbable that there will be any further changes 
in the suit values or the method of scoring. Auction, 
as now played, seems to have reached the end of its 
evolution. Pirate will probably replace it. 

The introduction of duplicate play, although at present 
confined to the clubs, where a sufficiently large number 
of players can be gathered to make the game interesting, 
seems to give promise of becoming more popular, but so 
far the objection to it has been that it is not a match 
against the opponents at the same table, but against those 
sitting at other tables, who will hold the same cards against 
players of perhaps very different calibre. 


/ 


DESCRIPTION OF THE GAME 


Auction bridge, or royal auction, or simply auction, 
for it is known by various names, is a card game for four 
persons, two of whom are partners against the other 
two, and is played with a full pack of fifty-two cards, 
which rank from the ace and king down to the deuce 
in play, the ace being below the deuce in cutting. 

Partnerships are determined by spreading the pack 
face downward on the table. Each candidate then draws 
a card, those cards within four of each end not being 
available, and the two highest are partners against the 
two lowest. The lowest of the four has the first deal, 
and the choice of seats (and cards, if there are two packs 
in play, which there should be). His partner sits opposite 
him, and the opponents may take whichever of the 
vacant seats they please. Two packs are really neces¬ 
sary, to mark the position of the deal, and they should be 
of different colors. 

If cards of the same denomination are cut, the spade 
has the preference, then the heart and then the diamond. 
The pack not in play is known as the still pack and is 
gathered and shuffled by the dealer’s partner, who places 
it at his right, on the left of the next dealer. The deal 
passes in rotation to the left until the rubber is finished. 
The play of a hand finished, the next dealer simply passes 
the still pack from his left to his right, to be cut by the 
player on his right, who must leave at least four cards in 
each packet. 

The cards are dealt one at a time in rotation to the 
left until each player has received thirteen, but no card is 
turned up for the trump. Irregularities in cutting, deal- 

6 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


7 


mg, dealing with the wrong cards or out of turn, are dealt 
with in the official laws of the game, which will be found 
elsewhere in this volume. Whatever happens, the proper 
dealer never loses his deal unless it is completed before 
the error is discovered. 

The cards dealt, each player takes up his thirteen and 
sorts them into suits. The object of the game is to reach 
30 points or more, made by tricks alone, and the partners 
who first win two such games win the rubber, so that no 
rubber can be longer than three games, and may be two 
only. 

Anything beyond the 30 points that may be made on 
the deal that decides a game are scored as part of that 
game, so that if the partners who have 27 up and require 
only 3 points to win the game should make 60 on the next 
deal, their total score would be 87; but it would be only 
one game. 

The value of the tricks in each hand played may 
vary according to the nature of the winning declaration. 
Each player in turn, beginning with the dealer, bids for 
the privilege of playing the hand with a named trump 
or at no-trumps, and these bids outrank one another in 
the order of their value in suits or in points. 

The first six tricks taken by the side that makes the 
highest bid do not count. Those are the declarer's 
book. All over six count for him, 6 points each when 
clubs are trumps; 7 for diamonds, 8 for hearts, 9 for 
spades and 10 for no-trumps. Nullos are not recognized 
in the official laws; but when played the bid comes be¬ 
tween the spade and no-trump, and the tricks won by, 
or forced on the opponents, over their first six, are worth 
10 points each to the partners that declared the nullo. 

Any bid of an equal number of tricks in a suit of 
higher rank, or a greater number of tricks in anything, 


8 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


will overcall a previous bid. Two diamonds is better than 
two clubs, but three clubs is better than two no-trumps. 

Any player, in his proper turn to the left, may overcall 
any previous bid, even his partner’s, and there is no 
restriction upon the nature of the bid, so that if the dealer 
says one spade, the opponent on the left may say two 
spades if he likes. The number of tricks bid is the num¬ 
ber over the book, or first six, that the bidder under¬ 
takes to win. The bidding goes round and round until 
three players pass in turn, but the highest bid allowed is 
seven tricks. 

The highest bid made, when passed by three players 
in succession, is known as the winning declaration. The 
partners who made it are the only ones that can score 
toward game on that deal. The number of tricks bid 
is called the contract. The partner who first named 
the suit, or no-trump, is the declarer, and his partner 
becomes the dummy for that deal, no matter what bids 
have intervened since the winning declaration was first 
named by one of the partners who get it. 

The first six tricks taken by the declarer do not count, 
they are his book, but all over six count toward game, 
provided he succeeds in fulfilling his contract. The 
seventh trick is called the odd trick, and all beyond seven 
are so many odd tricks, or so many by cards. The 
opponents’ book is the difference between the number of 
tricks bid and seven. If the winning declaration, or 
contract, is four hearts, the declarer must win ten tricks 
out of the thirteen, therefore his opponents’ book is 
three tricks, and they are entitled to penalties for every 
trick they win over their book, because they must have 
“ set ” the contract. 

No player is obliged to bid. The dealer has the first 
say, to bid or pass. If he bids, he undertakes to win the 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


9 


number of tricks he names in the suit he selects, or at 
no-trumps. If he passes, the player on his left may bid 
or pass, and so on round the table. As soon as any bid 
is made, the player on the left must either pass, overcall 
it, or double. 

The double does not affect the value of the tricks so 
far as the bidding is concerned, so that two hearts will 
still overcall two diamonds doubled. But if the doubled 
bid is the final declaration, all tricks over the declarer’s 
book if he fulfils his contract; or over the opponents’ 
book if he fails, will have a double value. If the double 
is redoubled, the tricks or penalties have four times their 
normal value. 

A player cannot double his partner’s bid, but he may 
redouble in his proper turn if his partner has been doubled, 
or the player who is doubled may redouble on his own 
account when the bid comes round to him. Only one 
redouble is allowed. Players should be careful about 
bidding or doubling out of turn, for which various penal¬ 
ties may be enforced, but there is no penalty for passing 
out of turn. 

Players will sometimes inadvertently make a bid that 
is not sufficient to overcall the previous bid; such as 
three hearts over three spades. If this is corrected before 
the opponents call attention to it, there is no penalty, 
but it must be corrected by increasing the number of 
tricks; or by correcting the denomination of the bid, 
without increasing the tricks. A player cannot correct 
a bid of three hearts over three spades by shifting to 
four clubs, which shifts both tricks and denomination. 

If an irregular or insufficient bid is made, and passed 
by the opponent on the left, without correction, it must 
stand. For instance: The dealer bids two hearts, the 
second bidder two diamonds. If the third player passes, 


10 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


doubles, or bids anything, the bid of two diamonds is 
accepted as better than two hearts, but of course the player 
that bid the two hearts can overcall two diamonds by 
repeating his original bid. 

If either of the opponents immediately calls attention 
to the irregular bid, whether it is his turn to speak or not, 
and the player to the left of that bid passes it after it is 
corrected at the command of an opponent, the partner 
of the player in error is barred from any further bidding, 
and unless the player on his left bids something or doubles, 
the bidding is closed. 

All bids should be made distinctly and in a straight¬ 
forward manner, something like this, beginning with the 
dealer: “ One heart. I pass (or, no bid). One spade. 
Double a spade.” On the next round the dealer starts 
again: “ I pass. I pass. Two hearts. Pass. Pass. 
Pass.” 

Although the highest bid, two hearts, has been made 
by the dealers partner, as the dealer first named that suit 
he plays the hand and his partner becomes the dummy. 
The dealer’s bid on the first round, or the first bid made to 
his left if he passes, is called the original bid, or a free bid. 
If the first bidder is overcalled, and his partner advances 
the bid without changing the denomination, it is called 
an assist. If any player bids more tricks, after being 
overcalled, without waiting for his partner, it is known 
as rebidding the hand. If a player changes his bid on 
the second round, instead of increasing the number of 
tricks in his first bid, or doubling an opponent, it is called 
a shift. Any bid made on the second round, especially 
after refusing to bid on the first round, is known as a 
secondary bid, and has not the same value as an original 
or free bid. 

As soon as three players in succession pass a bid or 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


11 


a double, the player to the left of the declarer leads any 
card he pleases for the first trick and dummy’s cards are 
then laid down, face up and sorted into suits, the trumps, 
if any to the right. The declarer then plays all cards 
from the dummy hand, without any suggestions from his 
partner. 

Each player in turn to the left must follow suit if he 
can, and the highest card played, of the suit led, wins the 
trick, trumps winning all other suits. The winner of the 
trick leads for the next and so on, until all thirteen have 
been played. 

The declarer always gathers the tricks won by his 
side, placing them in front of him in such a manner that 
they may be easily counted. As soon as he gets a book 
of six tricks, he usually shuts them up and lays apart only 
the tricks that count toward his contract and game. 
Either of the opponents may gather for their side, it 
being a common practice for the winner of the first trick 
to take it in, and all others after it. They may bunch 
their tricks as soon as they get their book. 

If the declarer fulfils his contract, he scores all tricks 
over the book at their regular value, no matter whether 
he has bid so many or not. These points are put below 
the line, as they score toward winning games. If the 
declaration has been doubled, and still succeeds, all tricks 
over the book have a double value, hearts being worth 
16, for instance, if there had been a redouble, they would 
be worth 32. In addition to the trick scores, the declarer 
would take 50 in penalties, above the line, for having 
fulfilled a doubled contract, and 50 more for every trick 
over his contract, if any. If he or his partner has re¬ 
doubled, the penalties are 100 instead of 50. 

In addition to the trick values there are certain honor 
scores and bonuses, none of which count toward game, but 


12 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


they materially add to the value of the rubber. None of 
these is affected by doubling. Either side may score them. 

When there is a trump, the five highest cards, A K Q 
J 10, are honors. At no-trumps the four aces are the 
honors. If partners hold between them three of these 
honors in the trump suit, known as simple honors, they 
score the value of two tricks for them; if they hold four, 
the value of four tricks; or five, the value of five tricks, 
so that five honors in hearts between partners would be 
worth 40, and would be entered above the line. If there 
are four or five in one hand, they count double, so that 
four in one hand in spades would be worth 72. Four 
in one hand, fifth in the partner’s, are worth nine tricks. 

At no-trumps, the three aces are worth 30 points, four 
between partners 40; but four in one hand are worth 100. 

In addition to these scores there is a bonus of 50 for 
either side that wins twelve tricks out of the thirteen, 
called little slam. For winning all thirteen tricks, grand 
slam, the bonus is 100. None of these is affected by 
doubling. 

The side that first wins two games adds a bonus of 
250 for winning the rubber. 

In case the declarer fails to fulfil his contract, he 
scores nothing but honors as actually held by himself and 
his partner; but the opponents score 50 points in penalties 
for every trick by which the contract fails, no matter 
whether the declaration was a trump or no trump. Sup¬ 
pose the contract is four hearts, and the declarer makes 
two by cards only. His opponents would score 100 above 
the line as penalty. 

There cannot be any score toward game except by a 
declarer who fulfils his contract. If he has been doubled 
and fails, the penalty is 100 a trick, and if redoubled, 200. 

A revoke is failure to follow suit when able to do so, 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


13 


or failure to comply with a performable penalty when 
demanded by the opponents. The revoking side can 
never score anything but honors as actually held, which 
are not affected by revokes. If the declarer revokes, 
his opponents take 100 points for each offence. If his 
opponents revoke he may take 100 points above the line, 
or take three of their tricks and add them to his own. 
For any second or third revoke in the same deal he must 
take points only, not more tricks. 

If tricks are taken, they are transferred from the 
opponents' side to the declarer's and counted at the same 
value as if he had won them all in play; but penalty tricks 
do not carry any bonus in case the declaration has been 
doubled. For instance: The contract is four spades, 
and the declarer wins two by cards only, but detects a 
revoke. If he takes three tricks, he fulfils his contract 
and scores five odd. If he has been doubled, all five 
of these tricks are worth 18 each, but he does not get 
any bonus of 50, because he did not fulfil his contract 
without the assistance of the penalty tricks. 

Had the dealer made good on his cohtract without 
taking any tricks for the revoke, he would be game with 
four odd in spades, and would not need any more tricks. 
It would then be better for him to take the 100 points. 
If his contract were four spades doubled, and he made 
five, without the revoke penalty, he would score five 
odd at 18 a trick, 50 for his contract and 50 for a trick 
over, to which he would add 100 revoke penalty. 

If the three tricks that may be taken will not put 
the declarer game, he should always take the points. 
Suppose the contract is one no-trump, and he wins only 
five tricks. Three more would still leave him one short 
of game, so he takes the 100 points, and scores honors 
as held. His opponents cannot score anything for de- 


14 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


feating the contract, because they revoked, but they 
may score honors if they held the majority of them. 

The player who has bid a grand slam and fails to make 
more than six odd can still score 50 for the little slam, 
although he is set on his contract. The opponents can 
score slams if they make them, in addition to their penal¬ 
ties for setting the contract. 

The illustration in the margin will show the general 
appearance of a rubber score when added up and balanced. 
The headings of the columns are usually we and they , 
according to the side that keep the score. Players’ 
initials may be placed under these words. The double 
line shows the division between the trick and the honor 
scores. All scores below this line count toward game; 
all scores above it are penalties, honors, and bonuses. 
The tricks are scored downward from the line; the 
honors upward. 


We 

They 


250 


50 


30 

72 

50 

200 

30 

16 

18 

32 



30 


36 

320 

494 


320 


174 


These scores represent the following re¬ 
sults of declaration and play: 

We made four odd at hearts, and simple 
honors, on the first deal; 32 below, with 
a line drawn under it to show the first 
game won, and 16 above the line. 

They bid three spades, were doubled 
and set for two tricks on the second deal; 
but scored simple honors. 200 penalty Tor 
we ; 18 in honors for they. 

On the third deal, they made three no- 
trumps, and held 30 aces. 

On the fourth deal, we bid four spades, 
but failed by one trick, so they scored 50 
penalty, but we got 72 in honors. 

On the fifth deal they made six odd in 
clubs, with five honors between partners; 










FOSTER ON AUCTION 


15 


little slam, game and rubber, entered as 36 below, 30, 
50, and 250 above. Both scores being added up, the 
lower is deducted from the higher, and the value of 
the rubber is found to be 174 points, won by they. 

The usual custom is for each loser to pay the player on 
his right, so that the partners would lose 174 points 
each. 

When the play is continued during an afternoon or 
evening, instead of settling up at the end of every rubber, 
the scores are reduced to even points, taking the nearest 
100, or 50, or 25, as may be agreed, and the names of the 
individual players forming the table are entered upon a 
separate sheet, known as a wash-book, or flogger, and car¬ 
ried out as plus and minus in separate columns; or in 
one column, with a ring round the minus scores. Here 
is an example of a wash-book at the end of four rubbers 
played by six persons at a table. 


Rubber Values: 

2 

4 

3 

4 

Smith. 

+ - 
2 

+ - 
6 

+ - 
6 

+ - 
2 

Kent. 

2 

2 

5 

1 

Jones. 

2 

6 

6 

2 

Green. 

2 

2 

1 

1 

Allen . 


4 

1 

5 

Brown. 


4 

7 

7 


Smith and Kent won the first rubber against Jones and 
Green. Then Kent and Green cut out to give way to 
Allen and Brown for the second rubber. Allen and 
Smith cut as partners and won from Jones and Brown. 
Smith and Jones, having played two consecutive rubbers, 
retired in favor of Kent and Green, who cut as partners 













16 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


and beat Allen and Brown. On the last rubber Smith 
and Jones re-entered; but Brown refused to play fur¬ 
ther, as he was in bad luck, so Kent and Green, who would 
otherwise have sat out, cut for the place and Kent won 
it, playing with Smith against Jones and Allen, who beat 
them. 

When there are only four at a table and no chance of 
any one wanting to cut in, many persons prefer to pivot, 
instead of cutting for partners each time. This insures 
an equal division of the partners during three rubbers, 
so that if any one is in luck, each of the three others 
gets him once. 

The pivot should be the score-keeper, who sits still 
all the time, the others moving round him like the hands of 
a clock at the end of each rubber. The one on his right 
passes behind his chair and takes the seat on the pivot’s 
left. The partnerships and seats being decided by rota¬ 
tion, the only thing to cut for is the first deal and the choice 
of cards. 

In social games, where there is no stake and the play 
is for a prize of some kind, the hostess sometimes likes 
to bring about as many changes in the partnerships as 
possible during the evening. Rubbers are impracticable, 
but if the play is limited to four deals at a table, and 
125 points are added for winning a game, eight individuals 
may be arranged in this manner: 


5 

*8 A 1 
7 


4 

2 B 6 
3 


The pivot, No. 8, who sits still all evening, is usually 
the guest of honor, at table A. At the end of four deals 
each puts his or her score on an individual score slip and 
then moves to the next greater numbered seat. No. 1 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


17 


at table A would go to seat No. 2 at table B, and so on; 
No. 7 going to 1. After the first movement each person 
knows who to follow for the rest of the evening, as each 
takes the place of the one whose place he or she took 
on the first move. At the end of 28 deals every person 
in the game will have had every other for a partner 
once, and for an adversary twice. 

In duplicate auction, when there are players enough 
for a number of tables, what is called the compass game 
is adopted. Trays are necessary to hold the cards, 
which are never shuffled after the first time they are 
dealt at the table at which the tray starts, and there 
must be as many trays as there are deals to be played. 
For seven tables, twenty-eight packs'of cards and trays 
are required. This will give four deals at each table. 

As soon as the fourth hand is finished, the total trick 
and honor scores, which have been recorded just as in 
the ordinary rubber, expect that there are no rubbers, 
125 points being added for each game won, are added up, 
the lower score deducted from the higher and the differ¬ 
ence carried to the score slips provided for the partners, 
as a minus or a plus. These are usually of different colors 
for the partners who sit N and S, to distinguish them 
from those sitting E and W. The names of the players 
are written at the top, with the number of the table from 
which they started. 

The signal is then given to change places. All the 
N and S partners sit still, but all the E and W players 
move one table further away from table No. 1, so that the 
E and W pair at table 2 would go to 3, and so on. The 
four trays just played at each table are taken to the next 
table, but in the opposite direction to the players, so that 
the numbers on the trays shall come in rotation to all 
the N and S pairs. 



18 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


If the number of tables in play is even, it will be 
necessary for the E and W pairs to skip one, when half 
way round, or else there must be a bye set of trays 
which are not in play each round. These methods are 
necessary to prevent the same E and W pairs meeting 
the same hands again. 

At the end of the evening each pair adds up its total 
losses and gains and turns in its card, showing so many 
points minus or plus for the entire twenty-eight deals. 
These are entered on a blackboard, the N and S on one 
side, the E and W on the other. All the N and S scores 
are then added, and divided by the number of tables in 
play to get an average. 

If this average is a plus, those exceeding the average 
are winners. The same is done with the E and W scores, 
which must show as much minus as the N and S scores 
show plus, and if the average is a minus, the pairs who 
have lost the least or have the smallest minus are the 
winners. 

There are a great many ways of playing duplicate 
auction, depending on the number op players, whether 
they are competing as teams of four, as pairs, or as indi¬ 
viduals, but the schedules for such games are too com¬ 
plicated for a work of this kind. 

In large charity games, where the players make up their 
own tables and valuable prizes are offered for the best 
scores, it is impossible to prevent foolish or unscrupu¬ 
lous players from overbidding their hands, doubling 
recklessly, and so forth, so that some one at the table 
gets a tremendous score. 

To avoid this and make the game a fair chance for all, 
the management takes the numbers from 1000 to 1250 
in one envelope; from 1251 to 1500 in another, and from 
1501 to 1750 in another and seals them up, unmarked. 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


19 


After the game is finished and the scores have all been 
handed in and sorted into hundreds, keeping all between 
1000 and 1100 together, and so on, one of the envelopes 
is drawn blindfold, and from it a number is drawn. The 
scores most nearly approaching this number, above or 
below, are the winners. Suppose the number drawn 
was 1240, and the nearest to it were 1236, 1280 and 1196, 
they would win in that order. This is all luck, of course, 
but so is everything else connected with a charity bridge. 
It is at least free from fraud. 



PART I 


THE BIDDING 

After the preliminaries of cutting for partners, seats 
and cards, the next thing is the bidding and the play. 
Each player at the table having picked up and sorted his 
thirteen cards, the first matter to demand attention is 
to settle three things: Which side shall play the dummy, 
with the opportunity of scoring toward game? What 
suit shall be the trump, or shall the hands be played 
without a trump? How many tricks will the partners 
that have the dummy undertake to win, and at what 
value, doubled or not? 

These points are all settled by the bidding. That 
finished, nothing remains to be done but to play the cards, 
to see if the declarer can fulfil his contract. No matter 
how well he plays, his skill is wasted if he has undertaken 
an impossible task by overbidding his hand. The 
foundation of all good play is to start with a sound 
system of bidding. 

The great secret of success at auction is to discover 
the best bid for the combined hands and to carry it to the 
limit of safety when it is opposed. The art of modern 
bidding is to know where that limit lies. Just as much 
may be lost by stopping too soon as by going too far, 
when the opponents’ bids look dangerous. 

The bids at auction may be divided into two classes: 
those which are called free bids and those that are forced. 
Free bids are those that the player is not obliged to make, 
such as the original bid by the dealer, or by some player 
21 . 


22 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


to his left if he passes. Forced bids are those that must 
be made if it is necessary or expedient to overcall a pre¬ 
vious bid. They may be necessary to take the partner 
out of a dangerous situation, or to take advantage of an 
opportunity to show a suit while it is comparatively inex¬ 
pensive to do so. 

In order that the partners may understand each other, 
all free bids must be made on strictly conventional prin¬ 
ciples. They are practically mechanical and never in¬ 
fluenced by the judgment unless there is a choice between 
two bids, both of which are equally sound, or unless the 
state of the score is such that one bid should be preferred 
to another. The big losses at auction all arise from build¬ 
ing up contracts that started with an unsound free bid, 
or an ill-judged forced bid. 

Having thoroughly mastered the princij^Jes of the free 
bid, the player is in a better position to judge of the 
expediency of a forced bid, which is usually made in 
opposition to a free bid, or in anticipation of a take¬ 
out. He is also able to estimate with reasonable accu¬ 
racy how much assistance he can give, if his partner is 
the one that made the free bid. 

The foundation, therefore, of the entire game of auction 
clearly lies in the original or free bid, as all other bids 
rest upon that declaration. It is to this part of the 
game that the attention of the reader is now invited. 


FIRST PRINCIPLES 


Auction is a bidding game, in which certain privileges 
are put up for sale to the highest bidder. There is some¬ 
thing in the play of the cards after the bidding is finished, 
but no amount of skill will make ten tricks out of cards 
that were never good for more than seven. The most 
that skill can do is to get the extra trick that just goes 
game, or sets a contract, or makes a slam. Every con¬ 
test is settled by the bidding; not by the play. Dupli¬ 
cate matches have demonstrated this beyond dispute. 

Before going into the market to buy anything, a person 
should know not only the value of the article he wishes to 
obtain, but how much money he has at his command 
with which to purchase it. Before any player can bid 
understanding^ at auction he should have a clear idea 
of what contract he is trying to get, and how much he 
can afford to put into the venture so as to come out with 
a profit. 

A player can buy any declaration if he does not care 
how much he loses on the transaction. There are poker 
players who call every hand, and there are bridge players 
who want to play every hand. There is no law against 
bidding four hearts without a heart in the hand, but there 
is a law that says it will cost at least 50 points a trick 
for every trick by which the contract fails. 

If two men enter into a partnership to secure a num¬ 
ber of various contracts, they must not only understand 
each other perfectly in each case as to the contract best 
suited to their resources at the time, but each must be 
careful to make no misrepresentation as to his individual 
23 


24 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


working capital, or the combination will find itself bank¬ 
rupt, and one partner will very justly blame the result 
on the false statements made by the other in the bid¬ 
ding. 

The first requisite, therefore, both for securing and 
carrying out the contract, is for the partners to know 
just how much of a load they can handle with the resources 
at their disposal. If one partner in a business imagines 
the other has five thousand dollars to buy a concession, 
or a patent, and then finds he has only five hundred, he 
will feel just as foolish as if he tried to lift a fifty-ton load 
with a ten-ton derrick, yet precisely the same thing 
is done at the card table every day. 

Any one who aspires to be rated as*'a good player or 
a desirable partner should know just what can be accom¬ 
plished with certain holdings, so that if he overbids his 
hand he does it with his eyes open. At the same time, 
one must remember that the strength of a team is always 
that of the weaker member. No player, however skil¬ 
ful, can do much with a partner who is continually over¬ 
estimating, or under-estimating his hand. When auction 
was first brought to the notice of the card-players of 
America, The Whist Club declined to take it up because 
it placed the player so much at the mercy of his partner. 

Good bidding requires two things: 1. A thorough 
knowledge of the trick-taking powers of the high cards, 
according to their combinations, and of the small cards 
in the trump suits. 2. The difference in these values 
when the cards are in the attacking hand, and when 
they are on the defensive. The two top trumps are good 
either way; but what are five small ones worth? We 
must study the trick-taking power of the cards them¬ 
selves before proceeding to bid upon them. 


ATTACK AND DEFENCE 


In order to understand what follows, it will be neces¬ 
sary for the reader to have a clear conception of the 
chief difference between attack and defence, as applied 
to the bidding. 

Attacking bids are those that are aimed at securing 
the most advantageous position, which is to play the hand 
and score toward game. 

Defensive bids are those that prepare the way to meet 
this attack, by saving the game or defeating the con¬ 
tract. 

Original or free bids are both attacking and defensive, 
or they are unsound unless for a large number of tricks; 
such as three hearts, or five clubs. They are both 
attacking and defensive bids if for only one or two tricks, 
because while aimed at securing the contract, they also 
indicate the best defensive suits, in case the contract is 
not secured. 

If you are the dealer and bid a heart on five to the ace- 
king, that is an attacking bid, whether you have any 
outside tricks or not. At the same time it informs your 
partner that he may rely on you for a couple of heart tricks, 
bar trumping, in case the opponents get the contract. 
If the player on your left then bids a spade with nothing 
but five to the king and an ace outside, that is still an 
attacking bid, because he hopes to get the declaration 
away from you; but his partner cannot rely on him for 
two tricks in spades, as it was not a free bid, and forced 
bids do not show defence as clearly as free bids do. 

If your partner shifts from your hearts to no-trumps, 
25 


26 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


that is still an attacking bid, because he is still hoping 
to get the play, but in another declaration, which he thinks 
better suited to the combined hands. If he assists your 
hearts, instead of shifting, that is an attacking bid 
because assists are always attacking, and never defensive. 

But if the dealer and second hand both pass without 
a bid, and the third hand has nothing but five clubs to 
the ace-queen and bids a club; that is a defensive bid, 
because he has no hope of getting the declaration in clubs, 
but anticipates a bid from the fourth hand and wishes to 
show his partner the best defensive lead for his hand, while 
it is comparatively inexpensive to do so. 

If the dealer bids no-trump and the second hand bids 
a suit, or doubles, that is an attacking bid, because it is 
made for the purpose of securing the declaration, in 
spite of the alleged no-trumper on the right. A defen¬ 
sive bid in such a situation would be folly, as the player 
has the lead. 

If the dealer bids no-trump, and the second and third 
hands both pass, the fourth hand may bid a suit or double. 
If he doubles, that is an attacking bid. If he names a 
suit, it is a defensive bid, because in the majority of cases 
he has no idea of being left to play the hand, but wishes 
to show his partner what to lead, in case the dealer goes 
back to no-trumps or shifts to something else. If the 
dealer’s partner gets the declaration the defensive bid 
has shown the suit that will probably be opened against 
it, but it does not guarantee any tricks, as a free bid 
would have done. 


INTRINSIC CARD VALUES 


The author has in his possession 10,000 recorded deals 
of 52 cards, which were contributed to the N. Y. Sun 
on specially prepared blanks some years ago, by volun¬ 
teer dealers in all parts of the United States. When any 
theory is advanced about a bid or play it can be applied 
to a thousand or two of these deals to see how it works 
out in practice. In some hands it may be very fine; 
in others very bad. What we want is a system that will 
beat averages. 

The theories presented in the following pages have all 
been tested in this manner and may be relied on by the 
reader as being sufficiently near the truth for all practical 
purposes. Many persons condemn an idea after trying 
it half-heartedly for one evening, forgetting that there 
is no such thing as a certainty in cards, and that the plays 
that win in the long run do not necessarily win in every 
hand. The point is to stop and analyze the bids that 
lose, and see why they lose. One may sit behind any 
average player and see bid after bid go wrong, yet he 
continues to make them, hand after hand. It never 
seems to occur to such a player to inquire why his con¬ 
tracts fail when he thinks they ought to succeed. It is 
to supply him with this information that this book was 
written. 

Auction is frequently spoken of as a game of aces and 
kings. A player will glance over his hand and see a 
couple of these aces and a king, and mentally figure them 
as good for two or three tricks. But this is only the face 
value of the cards under any circumstances, no matter 
27 


28 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


who plays the hand or what the declaration may be. 
Several things tend to alter these values, just as the state 
of the thermometer alters the value of a barometer 
reading. 

One of the first things it will be necessary to arrive 
at is a proper understanding of the value of the high cards 
in themselves, apart from their combinations with other 
high cards. These might be distinguished by classifying 
aces as sure tricks; kings as probable tricks; queens as 
only possible. This assumes that there are small cards 
with them, of course, even with an ace. 

This rating is based on the theory that an ace should 
always be good for a trick, because there is no reason 
why it should not. But a guarded king will win a trick 
only about half the time by being led up to, and will 
be lost about half the time by being led through or dis¬ 
carded. This would suggest that an ace should be worth 
as much as two kings. 




4 4 

4 4 

4 

Sure. 

© 

*** 

4*4 





4 4 

4 4 

4 



vijn 


9 9' 

9 

Probable. 


9 

9 


2JSSII 

9 9 

9 9 

9 


Possible. 


gy 

«!• f 4* 

* * 

•5* 4 . 

4 . 4 . 

* 1 * * 

HI 

A 

4 . 4 . 

4 . 4 . 


Worth 2 kings 
or 4 queens. 


Two kings 
equal 1 ace. 


Four queens 
equal 1 ace. 


Queens are only possible tricks, even if well guarded, 
or accompanied by the jack, as few suits go round three 
times against a trump, and we are considering the intrin- 






































FOSTER ON AUCTION 


29 


sic values of high cards, regardless of the possibility of 
their being trumps. That will come later. A queen 
bears about the same relation to a king that a king does 
to an ace. It might be assumed that a queen accom¬ 
panied by the jack would be as good as a king, as it then 
stands as good a chance to win a trick if led up to or led 
through. But the difference is that the queen-jack 
combination is not good until the third round, and the 
third round may never come. 

If the king is with the ace of the same suit, such a king 
is clearly worth as much as the ace, as either may be 
played to the trick with the same effective result. In the 
same way, if a queen is with its king, such a queen must 
be worth as much as the king, so far as wanning a trick is 
concerned, therefore the combinations assume a double 
value. Ace and king at the head of a suit is as good as 
two aces, and king-queen at the head of a suit is as good 
as the ace. 


Two sure 
tricks. 


One sure 
trick. 


*> V 
* 

•*« 


0 

0 

0 


0 

0 


Jacks and tens have no value in themselves, but in 
combination with higher cards of the same suit they 
may have. For the same reason that we do not reckon 
the combination of queen-jack as good as a king, we do 
not count upon the third round of any suit as being 
quite as good as the first or second. It might be thought 
that if a king with its ace is worth as much as the ace, 






















30 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


then the queen with both ace and king was also as good 
as an ace. It would be, but for the improbability of the 
suit’s going round three times. Such a combination 
is worth only two sure tricks and one probable, or two- 
and-a-half. 

But if we hold the jack of a suit with the king and 
queen of that suit, the combination is counted as worth 
two tricks, or as much as ace and king. The theory is 
that only one trick can be lost, to the ace. In the same 
way we count the queen and jack with the ace as worth 
two tricks, as only one trick can be lost, to the king. 
There is always the possibility that none of the high 
cards may be lost in either case. With the king-queen- 
jack the ace may be played without having to be forced 
out by leading one of the high cards. With the ace- 
queen-jack the king may be caught. This gives us three 
combinations of cards which are invariably counted as 
worth two sure tricks: 


* * 
* 

* * 


* * 


* 4 


Each worth 
2 sure 
tricks. 



0 

0 

0 0 

@11 

0 

0 

0 

Till 

0 

0 

0 0 



Any combination of high cards which is weaker than 
these cannot be good for two tricks, even if there are three 
honors at the head of the suit. The value of all such 






























FOSTER ON AUCTION 


31 


less valuable combinations is based on the probable 
distribution of the missing cards. Holding ace-queen-ten, 
for instance, if both king and jack are on the wrong side, 
the ace is the only trick in the suit. But such a distribu¬ 
tion of the king and jack is improbable, and half the time 
either the queen or the ten should win a trick, so we call 
this worth a trick-and-a-half. The same is true of ace- 
jack-ten, the improbability being that both king and queen 
are on the wrong side. The combination is therefore 
worth a trick-and-a-half. Add the ten to the king and 
queen, and we have the same factor of improbability that 
both ace and jack will be on the wrong side, and therefore 
the possibility that the ten may win a trick, or the prob¬ 
ability that both king and queen may win. Another case 
of a trick-and-a-half. 





* * 

* 

* 

* 

§! 

*** 

* 

* 

* 

±_ 

* 


Each worth 
1 ^ tricks. 


0 

§ 

0 o 

OoO 
0 0 

0 0 

0 

o o 

o 

0 

0 


m 

H 

4 * 

*** 

V 
♦ ♦ 

* * 

4 * * 

♦ * 

♦ ♦ 


When we get to combinations that are still weaker 
than these we find their highest value is one trick, with 
perhaps a possible trick. None of the following is worth 
more than a trick, the possibility of winning more not 
being sufficiently strong for purposes of appraisement. 












































32 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Each worth 
1 trick 
only. 



pig. 

|9 

9 

^ 9 

9 

9 


r 





* >'V 

9 

9 

2_ 9 

9 



4*J> 

❖ 

* 


* 

4* 


* 

4* 

* 




4- 

JU 

* 

4» 



0 0 

0 0 

0 0 

o 

o 

0 


0 0 

0 0 

0 0 


There are still weaker combinations that are not 
worth anything in a calculation of values, as there is 
little more than a probable trick in them at the best. 


Not worth 
a trick. 


♦ a* 


♦ * 


* * 

* 


A * 

* ♦ 



9 


9 

9 

9 


9 




9 


9 

9 

9 

9 

9 



4* . 4* 

4* 4* 

4* 4* 

n 

4- ! 4* 
* .* 
4-*4- 

4» 4. 

4- 4- 

I* 

1* 


The reader's attention should be particularly called 
to the first of these three, the king-jack-ten, as it is one 
of the most deceptive combinations in the game for bid¬ 
ding purposes. If the queen is on the wrong side, tl 
suit may never win a trick until the third round, which 
reduces it to the same rank as queen-jack-ten. The 
weakness of these combinations will be more apparent 

















































































FOSTER ON AUCTION 


33 


when we come to the play, especially that part of it 
which relates to finessing. 

The trick values attached to the foregoing combinations 
of high cards are based on averages. Take the ace- 
queen-jack, for instance. This will be good for three 
tricks in some cases, in others for two, and in others 
for only one, or perhape in rare cases for none at all. 
One or two of the high cards may be trumped, or perhaps 
discarded or given up to protect something else. 

The point is that although you cannot win exactly 
two tricks every time you hold this combination, ace^ 
queen-jack, you are practically certain of getting 200 
tricks out of it if you hold it 100 times. 

These values are the minimum, under all conditions, 
and are for the high cards alone, regardless of the number 
of small cards in the suit. The combinations enumerated 
are good for the number of tricks specified in each case 
whether you are the declarer, or dummy, or one of the 
opponents. They are good for these tricks, on the 
average, whether the winning declaration is a trump or 
no-trump. 

But under certain conditions these high cards may 
be good for a great deal more than their intrinsic value, 
and this increase in their value may be computed with 
considerable accuracy, provided they are in the hands 
of the partners that get the winning declaration and play 
the dummy. If they are part of a no-trumper, for in¬ 
stance, these high cards may be doubly valuable in pro¬ 
tecting and bringing into play weaker but longer suits. 
In many cases they practically take the place of a trump 
suit and render the selection of such a suit either unneces¬ 
sary or unwise. 

On the other hand, there may be so many small cards 
in the same suit as the high cards as to suggest the 


34 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


designation of that suit as a trump; but it will still be the 
value of the high cards in clearing up the suit in the hands 
of the opponents that will make the remaining small 
cards valuable as trick winners. 

Before proceeding to the principles that underly the 
bidding, it will be necessary to examine this promoting 
power of the high cards and to arrive at an exact under¬ 
standing of its influence on the bidding itself. 


BIDDING VALUES 


The smallest bid that is allowed in the game is to win 
seven tricks- But it is very rarely that the player who 
is called upon to make the first bid has seven sure tricks 
in his hand, yet we continually see such bids made. It is 
true that he has a partner, but he must bid on his own 
cards, and is responsible always for the majority of the 
tricks to be won. Looking over a player’s hand we see 
perhaps two or three sure tricks at the most, yet he fear¬ 
lessly undertakes to win seven. Upon what grounds? 
Does he expect his partner to win four or five? 

The answer is this. He will not be required to win 
those seven tricks unless he is allowed to play the hand. 
If he plays the hand, it will be with a trump of his own 
selection, or at no-trump, and he will get twice as many 
tricks as he would if the other side picked a different 
trump and got the declaration. 

Almost without exception, the bids we see are based on 
experience, and nothing else. The hand looks something 
like many other hands upon which similar bids were made 
and they turned out all right, at least part of the time; 
oftener than they failed perhaps. 

Not one auction player in a thousand knows just what 
any given hand is worth in actual tricks. If he has some¬ 
thing that looks like a no-trumper to him, he bids it. 
Another player would not regard the hand as a no- 
trumper, and would bid something else. Thousands of 
players will bid any suit of five cards without regard as to 
whether it is worth a bid or not. Their suit bids are all 
guesswork, and are based on the assumption that if the 
35 


36 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


suit named is not allowed to be the trump, it does not 
matter. 

Back of all this guesswork, the fundamental fact re¬ 
mains, although not one bridge player in a million may be 
aware of it, that the mere fact of his getting the winning 
declaration doubles the trick-taking powers of every high 
card in his hand. Let us see why this is so. 

The declarer and his partner play the attack. Their 
opponents are always on the defensive. The attacking 
hands are the ones that are trying to go game; the defen¬ 
sive hands are the ones that are trying to prevent it. 
The attack has picked its own battle ground, and usually 
has the larger force of artillery, or trumps, in commanding 
situations. 

While it may be true, as set forth by many writers on 
the game, that the play of the exposed hand is worth an 
extra trick, that estimate refers to the play itself, after 
the winning declaration has been determined. But 
securing the right to play the exposed hand is worth a 
great deal more than that, because it practically doubles 
the trick-taking power of the declarer’s and dummy’s cards. 

Strange as it may appear, this fact seems to have 
so far escaped the attention of every writer on the game, 
yet it is the key to the only rational valuation of the 
hands for bidding purposes. 

Paradoxical as it may seem, it can be demonstrated that 
any sure trick in the hand of the declarer or his dummy 
will produce two tricks in play, on the average. That is 
to say, while an ace is undoubtedly a sure trick, and to the 
average player it is nothing more, it is actually worth two 
tricks to the partners who get the winning declaration 
and play the hand. This is on account of its power to 
promote the value of the smaller cards in the same suit, 
or to bring the dregs of other suits into play. 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


3? 


Any player of experience will tell you that if he holds 
five trumps to the ace-king, he ought to win four tricks 
in trumps. Why this should be so, he does not know, 
but he relies on past experience to sustain him. The 
reason is not that there are five trumps in the hand, but 
| that the two sure tricks at the top of the suit are worth | 
four tricks. Ask him why five trumps to the king-jack 
are not equally worth four tricks, and he can offer no 
explanation but his past experience. The reason is that 
there are no sure tricks at the head of the suit. 

Leaving the trumps out of the question entirely for 
the present, let us take an example of a hand in which the 
tricks have to be won by the proper management of the 
high cards alone, a no-trumper. This will make clear 
to us the promoting power of these high cards. The 
following hand might be typical of hundreds of elementary 
no-trumpers. 


No. 1. 


❖ 

o 

❖ 



Q 

3 






<Q> 

A 

10 3 






0 ■ 

J 

10 9 6 4 

L 





❖ Q 

8 6 





A 10 9 

7 4 


Y 


J 

6 

2 

K 8 2 



\ 'R 

❖ 

9 

7 

4 

K 5 


i 

1 x> 

0 

Q 

7 

2 

J 9 2 



z 

❖ 

K 

7 

5 4 


s? 

K 

8 5 





❖ 1 

Q 

J 6 5 






0 

A 

8 3 






❖ 

A 

10 3 






Z dealt and bid no trump. Upon what sure tricks? 
Two aces are backed up by a probable trick, the king of 



38 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


hearts, worth half a trick, according to the system of valua¬ 
tion already explained. Let us be liberal and call the 
queen-jack suit as good as a king and worth half a trick. 
The total value of Z’s cards is three sure tricks. But 
suppose he insists that his king of hearts or his two honors 
in clubs are almost certain to be led up to, and is opti¬ 
mistic enough to call each of them a sure trick, he has only 
four in sight after all. 

A leads a small heart and dummy goes down. There 
is only one sure trick in that hand, if we estimate its value 
by itself, which we must always do. A very liberal esti¬ 
mate would be to say that there were five tricks between 
the two hands. 

If the theory of bidding values which it is the object of 
this work to explain is correct, these five tricks should be 
worth ten in play, because the partners who hold those 
five tricks got the declaration and are playing the attack. 
In some hands they will produce more than double their 
intrinsic value, in some hands less. All bidding is based 
on averages, and in the long run 100 sure tricks in hand 
will produce 200 tricks in play for the declarer and dummy. 

In the actual play of this hand Z made these ten tricks, 
winning four by cards and the game. This result was 
entirely due to the promoting power of the high cards. 
Let us look the hand over before giving the play. 

Dummy’s suit of five diamonds is worthless in itself, 
but the ace in the declarer’s hand gives him a double 
finesse in that suit and makes it good for four tricks. 
The four clubs in the declarer’s hand would not be worth 
much if left to themselves; a trick in three or four deals 
would be about the average. But the ace of clubs in 
the dummy promotes these four clubs, and makes them 
worth three tricks. 

Here we see that two of the aces are worth not only 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


39 


twice as much as their intrinsic value, but three times, or 
two tricks more than average. If we now go back to the 
correct and sensible valuation of the two hands, we must 
admit that four tricks is nearer the mark than five, and 
that twice four, or eight, should have been their value in 
play. In this case the hand beat averages, and through 
the fortunate distribution of the cards two aces made 
three tricks each, instead of two, and gave the declarer 
four odd instead of only two by cards. Here is the play: 

The queen of hearts from dummy held the first trick, 
and the finesse of the jack of diamonds lost to A’s king. 
A then tried to get his partner into the lead to come 
through Z’s king of hearts, but Z won the king of spades 
with the ace. Then came the finesse of the club jack, 
followed by two more rounds, clearing up that suit, and 
then two rounds of diamonds established the dregs of that 
suit in the dummy. After making his thirteenth club, 
Z put Y in with a spade to make two more diamonds. 

That is the attacking part of the hand. Now for the 
defence. If we turn our attention to the trick values in 
the hands of A and B we shall find that they are worth 
no more than their face value. The ace of hearts is a sure 
trick. Kings are worth about half as much as aces, and 
queens half as much as kings. Add up these values in 
the hands of A and B and three tricks is about the limit, 
and three tricks is just what they produced in play. 

As a further illustration of the application of this 
principle, let us suppose for a moment that A had secured 
the declaration, with hearts for the trump. The A and 
B hands would then be the attacking hands and their 
high cards should accordingly double their value. That 
is, instead of being good for three tricks only, as they 
were in defence, they should be good for six in attack. 

This estimate will be found to be correct, as A must 


40 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


make four heart tricks and two diamonds, and might even 
save the king of spades. 

In order to make what follows clear it will be neces¬ 
sary for the reader to keep constantly in view this double 
valuation of the high cards, depending upon whether 
they are to be used in attack or defence, because that is 
the secret of sound bidding. Every ace is worth two 
tricks for attack, only one for defence. Every king is 
worth a trick in attack, only half a trick in defence. 

These values are reduced only in case the partner denies 
having any length in the suit, showing that there are 
no small cards to promote, except those in the hands of 
the adversaries. The high cards then revert to their 
defensive values, as will be explained in the chapters 
on denying suits, and denying no-trumpers. 

As this method of estimating the trick-taking possi¬ 
bilities of the hand lies at the basis of the player’s ability 
to carry out any named contract, the reader should 
be thoroughly familiar with the principle underlying it, 
so as to be ready to apply it to any combinations of cards 
he may happen to hold, not only in one suit, but in the 
hand as a whole. The bidding values of the small 
cards in the trump suit, especially in the partner’s hand, 
will be dealt with in the next chapter/ 


THE TRUMP SUIT 


While there is no difference between the promoting 
powers of the high cards in trumps or in plain suits, 
because five cards to the ace-king will produce an average 
of four tricks in play, whether that suit is the trump or 
part of a no-trumper, there is a great difference in the 
value of the small cards as they increase in number. 

At no-trumps, six or seven cards to the ace-king are 
worth no more for bidding purposes than five, and for 
purposes of defence they are not worth as much. The 
longer a suit, the less probability that it will go round 
twice without being trumped. This is a matter that will 
be discussed when we come to the difference between the 
major suits, hearts and spades; and the minor suits, 
clubs and diamonds. 

If five trumps to the ace-king are worth an average 
of four tricks in play, six trumps should be worth five 
tricks, because that sixth trump is as good as the ace of 
a missing suit, and the five trumps still remain intact. 
On the other hand, the shorter suit adds materially to 
the trick-taking probabilities of the hand if it is on the 
defensive. If a suit shorter than five cards is to be selected 
for the trump and to play the attack, you must deduct 
something for the loss of numerical value, or make up 
for it by greater strength in high cards. The danger 
of a short trump suit is that the opponents may out¬ 
last you. It is the opponents that will add to their 
41 


42 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


trick-taking powers if they have the majority of the 
trumps between them; but in a no-trumper, length in a 
suit in which you have all the high cards is of no use to 
them. 

This difference between suits that are trumps, and 
those which are part of a no-trumper, or are used to sup¬ 
port a trump suit, is very important. Ten trumps, 
no matter what they are, are absolutely certain to win 
the odd trick, regardless of the rest of the hand. But 
ten trumps can never be certain of winning the game 
unless they are headed by ace-king-queen. 

Ten cards of a suit which is not the trump, even if 
headed by ace-king-queen, may never win a trick if 
the adversaries get the declaration. I have seen eleven 
clubs to four honors lose a grand slam at hearts. 

There are two classes of bids; suit bids and no-trump 
bids, and the suit bids are of two kinds. The player 
who bids no-trump reduces all the suits to the same 
level, and makes a club as good as a spade. The player 
who starts with a suit bid, especially a heart or a spade, 
must be prepared for the possibility of being left to play 
the hand on that declaration. The suit named will 
then be superior to all others, so far as trick-taking pos¬ 
sibilities are concerned. 

When a player names a suit for the trump, he offers 
to promote every card in that suit, whether in his own 
hand, or dummy’s, or the opponents’, and as the trumps 
in the opponents’ hands will be just as superior to other 
suits as those in his own hand, the bidder must be care¬ 
ful to have a reasonable prospect of holding the ma¬ 
jority, so as to be able to outlast his opponents; even 
if he cannot disarm them. 

This consideration forces us to distinguish sharply 
between suit bids and no-trumpers. It is the number that 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


43 


counts in the one; the high cards in the other. The ace- 
king small in three suits, four little cards in the fourth 
suit, is a perfect no-trumper, but to pick any of the four 
suits for a trump would be folly, as the probability would 
be strongly in favor of the opponents having more trumps 
than the declarer, and it is number that counts in trumps. 

In order to secure what might be called a safe working 
margin for suit bids, the declarer should hold either 
five cards of the suit he wishes to establish as the trump, 
or four very good ones; just how good we shall see 
presently. This leads us to lay down as a fundamental 
proposition or a sort of starting point for the bidding, 
that if a player names a suit which he would like to be 
the trump he should hold at least five cards of that 
suit, and these five cards should be headed by a sufficient 
number of high cards to make it reasonably certain that 
the opponents can be disarmed, leaving the declarer with 
the numerical superiority. 

As all free bids in suit are attacking bids, they must 
come up to attacking value. How this value may be 
distributed and what it must total, we shall come to in 
another chapter, but we must first consider the different 
functions of the suits themselves, which varies with the 
purposes to which they may be put. 

While on the subject of trumps, there is one important 
matter to which the reader’s attention will be repeatedly 
called in the following pages. This is the difference in 
value of the small trumps according to their location; 
that is, whether they are in the hand of the declarer or 
in that of some other player. 

In the hand of the declarer, the trumps are worth 
what is bid upon them. Five to the ace-king are good for 
four tricks on the average. The character of the rest 
of the hand cannot possibly affect this valuation in any 


44 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


way. This is a difficult matter for some persons to 
understand. It is the stumbling block with nine out of 
ten teachers of bridge. 

If you hold five good trumps, and an ace-king suit 
besides, that outside suit adds nothing whatever to the 
value of the five trumps, although it makes the hand as a 
whole much stronger. This is easily understood. But 
a great many persons imagine that if you hold five trumps 
and a singleton, or a missing suit, the fact that you can 
ruff one of the plain suits on the first or second round adds 
in some mysterious way to the value of your trumps. 

This is a serious error, although a very common one, 
and it is such an important matter that it may be well to 
discuss it at some length, so that the reader shall clearly 
understand the manner in which trumps affect the bidding. 
Beginners continually excuse the weakness of their trump 
suit by pointing out their weakness in one of the plain 
suits. When their attention is called to the fact that 
they had nothing but six small hearts when they bid 
hearts, they retort, “ But I had a singleton.” 

When a player bids a spade, for instance, on five of 
that suit, hoping it will prove to be the trump, it is 
very seldom that these spades are all tops. What he 
expects is that the smaller trumps will win tricks, after 
the opponents’ trumps are all gone. It should be evi¬ 
dent that the manner in which these tricks are won does 
not matter, but the average player does not see this 
point. The small trumps may be led, and good cards 
in plain suits have to be discarded on them, or the good 
cards may be led by the adversaries, and trumped by the 
declarer. 

Whether this trumping of good cards comes early in 
the hand or late, does not matter so far as winning tricks 
with small trumps is concerned. The mistake con tin- 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


45 


ually made by the beginner is in counting the small trumps 
as worth more than their average value simply because he 
can make them early in the play when he holds a singleton 
or has a missing suit. 

It may come as a surprise to some persons to learn 
that the possession of a singleton may lose tricks instead 
of winning them, especially if dummy happens to have 
that suit. Much depends on how soon the singleton 
suit is led, and an early force may be fatal. 

With a singleton in the declarer’s hand, tricks may 
be lost in two distinct ways. It may be impossible to 
lead the suit twice, in case a finesse in dummy is neces¬ 
sary. It may be impossible to ruff the opponents’ 
suit, because that is not the suit in which the declarer 
is short, and if he has a singleton in one suit he must 
be long in others. 

The root of the matter lies in the consideration of the 
fact that it realty does not matter whether it is the 
first round of a suit or the fourth that is trumped. One 
of the declarer’s trumps must be used in either case, 
and either is a trick won for his side. As long as the 
small trumps take tricks anywhere, their value is demon¬ 
strated. The most striking illustration of the useless¬ 
ness of short suits, as an asset in trump values, is to take 
the six highest trumps in the pack. These are indis¬ 
putably good for six tricks, no matter what the rest of 
the hand. What difference would it make if there were 
a singleton in it? That would never make the six trumps 
good for seven tricks. Take the following hand: 


46 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


No. 2 


❖ 

0 

❖ 


7 962 
c£ A K 7 
0 9 4 3 
J 5 4 3 

7 83 
Q 9 6 

0 Q 10 6 5 
A Q 10 6 



S? AKQ754 
10 4 3 

0 J 

^ 872 


Z dealt and bid two hearts, which held the contract. 
He has six trumps and a singleton. The interesting part 
of this hand is to see what influence this singleton had 
on the result. These six trumps are good for six tricks; 
no more, no less. 

A led two rounds of diamonds, Z trumping the second 
and exhausting the adversaries’ trumps in two leads. 
Now he can start the spades, hoping to make the fourth 
if that suit is split, or he can run off three rounds of clubs 
and let the adversaries play the spades. At some tables 
he did one thing, at other tables another. It does not 
matter which he does, he must lose a diamond, a club 
and three spades, but makes his contract, two by cards, 
because dummy wins two tricks. 

What influence on the result has the singleton, or 
Z’s ability to ruff that suit on the second round? Change 
Z’s hand a little, giving him two diamonds, so that he 
cannot ruff that suit until the third round, and take away 
one of his spades, exchanging with A. Now he loses 
two diamonds, but only two spades, and the inevitable 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


47 


club, still making his contract, which shows that the 
early ruff had nothing to do with it. 

Change the hand again, and give Z three diamonds, 
fco that he cannot ruff that suit at all, and let him hold 
only two cards in each of the black suits. He still wins 
two by cards, as he loses no club trick, but must lose 
three diamonds and two spades. 

But now let us look at the really illuminating change 
in the hand. Give Z no diamonds at all, and distribute 
the black suits in his hand four and three. If it is the 
spades that he has four of he loses four spades and a club, 
after ruffing the diamonds on the first trick, again making 
his contract, two by cards. 

But if we give him four clubs and three spades, he 
will make an extra trick; not because he gets the ruff 
on the diamonds, but because dummy is short in clubs 
and can get in a ruff on the fourth round with the small 
trump he has left. This is not an argument in favor of 
the short suit in Z’s hand, but in favor of dummy’s three- 
trump holding, which is something Z knew nothing about 
when he made his bid. 

Some players imagine that it is quite safe to advance 
the bid when they can ruff the first or second round of 
the suit the opponents are bidding on, because that is 
the suit against which the defence is needed. This is 
true if it is dummy that is going to do the ruffing, but it 
is absolutely false so far as the declarer’s hand goes. 

If the declarer meditates ruffing the opponents’ suit 
on the first or second round, that is equivalent to reducing 
his trump holding immediately. If he can stand the 
ruff, well and good. The situation is then the same as 
if he held either of two things, hearts being trumps, with 
clubs declared against him. Five hearts to the ace- 
king and no clubs; or, four hearts to the ace-king and the 


48 FOSTER ON AUCTION 

singleton ace of clubs, with four small cards in each of the 
other suits in either case. f f '• 

With either holding it is clear that the declarer must 
use his ace of clubs, or one of his trumps, on the first 
trick, if clubs are led. The trick-taking value of the hand 
is precisely the same in either case. The missing suit 
has nothing to do with it. 

But when we come to consider the matter of singletons 
or missing suits in the hands of the other players, the 
circumstances are entirely changed. Let us look at the 
trumps in the hand of the declarer’s partner first, as the 
declarer will not take them out if he sees any better use 
for them than letting them fall on his own high trumps. 

If the declarer’s partner has none of a certain suit, 
no matter which, he can ruff the first round of it. Then 
his smallest trump is as good as the ace of that missing 
suit. If he has only one of the suit, and can ruff the second 
round, his smallest trump is as good as the king of that 
suit. If he has two of the suit only, and can ruff the 
third round, his trump is as good as the queen of that suit. 

These values, especially the ace and king values, 
are very important in estimating the trick-taking possi¬ 
bilities of the partner’s hand for the purpose of assisting 
bids, as we shall see when we come to that subject. As 
all assisting bids are attacking bids, made on the assump¬ 
tion that the suit named will be the trump and that the 
side that is bidding will get the contract and play the 
hand, it should be clear that no matter to what use 
dummy’s trumps may be put they do not interfere in 
any way with the intrinsic value of the trumps in the 
declarer’s hand, which are the trumps upon which the 
original bid was made. The point is this: Is there any 
precise use to which dummy’s trumps can be put? 

If the declarer starts with a bid of one heart on five 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


49 


to the ace-king, and dummy can trump the first round 
of clubs, or the second round of diamonds, the declarer’s 
five trumps are still intact. But if it were the declarer 
that had to trump those suits, and dummy could not 
trump anything, the declarer’s fighting powers would be 
materially reduced. 

It is hardly necessary to point out that every good 
player realizes this, and tries to force the declarer’s trumps 
at every opportunity. If you are opposed to the de¬ 
clarer and can force him twice, while holding four trumps 
yourself, however small, you bring his five trumps down 
to three, and outlast him. These tactics save many a 
game and set many a contract; but if it is dummy that 
can take the force, the declarer is safe. Take this hand 
as an example of the manner in which a singleton in the 
dummy may add to the strength of that hand. 

No. 3 

S? 10 9 7 4 
<$> 6 

0 A J 9 7 2 
7 5 3 

S? Q8 
$ KQ92 
0 K Q 8 3 
K 10 6 

7 A 3 2 
<§) A 8 5 4 
0 5 

A Q J 4 2 

Z bid a spade, which held the contract. At some 
tables A led the king of clubs, at others the king of 
diamonds. It does not matter which he leads, Z goes 




50 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


game in spades; not because he has a singleton; but 
because dummy has one. 

Z won the club, if clubs were led, and gave dummy a 
ruff. Getting in again with the ace of hearts, he gave 
dummy another ruff. Then he led two rounds of dia¬ 
monds, ace first, trumping the second round, and made 
dummy’s third trump. After trumping another diamond 
himself, he must make two of his three high trumps, 
winning four by cards and the game. If A starts with a 
diamond, the result is the same, the only change being 
in the order of the minor-suit leads. 

It will be seen from this that Z makes the average 
expected from five trumps, headed by two sure tricks, 
and no matter how the cards lie in the plain suits, he could 
not make any more. But let us look at dummy’s hand a 
moment. 

Instead of the singleton club, give dummy the six 
and three, and give B the deuce of diamonds in place of 
the trey of clubs. It will now be found impossible for Z 
to make more than two by cards, although his hand 
remains the same. Here is the way the hand would prob¬ 
ably be played, club led. 

Z would win the club and return it, to get dummy 
ready for the ruff. A would play the deuce or the nine, 
and B would overtake the trick and lead one of his trumps 
upon which Z would have to play the ace, or A would get 
a second round of trumps at once. Dummy gets the ruff 
in clubs and Z gets in again, but on the fourth club lead 
B overtrumps Z, and leads a diamond. This holds Z 
down to two by cards. The diamond opening would 
have exactly the same result. Y’s ability to trump the 
second and third round of clubs in this hand is practically 
equal to a king-queen suit. 

When it is the declarer and not the dummy that has to 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


51 


ruff a suit, the result is usually a loss, instead of a gain. 
As already pointed out, a four-trump hand that can get 
two forces on the declarer’s five-trump hand may outlast 
him and bring in the dregs of a suit. For this reason good 
players consider it folly to lead singletons, and invite a 
force on themselves, w T hen they have four trumps, how¬ 
ever small, and a good suit. Here is an instance of the 
power of these forcing tactics when used against a normal 
five-trump hand. The deal was played at seven tables, 
and only two saved the game. 

No. 4 

7 J 9 3 
$ 9 8 5 4 
<> A 8 7 2 

J 6 

s? 8 7 5 2 
<s> A Q J 7 6 
0 3 

<£> A 10 7 

S? A K 10 6 4 
❖ 2 

0 K 10 4 
£ K Q 8 2 

Hearts were trumps at every table, sometimes for 
a contract to make one, sometimes two. In five cases A 
led the singleton diamond, hoping to get in some of his 
little trumps, and Z went game on the hand. He won 
the first diamond trick with the ace, so as to lead the nine 
of trumps from dummy for the finesse, and then he pulled 
every one of A’s trumps before establishing the spades, 
so that he still had a trump left to stop the clubs, B 
winning the last trick with the queen of diamonds. 



Q 

K 10 3 
Q J 9 6 5 
9 5 4 3 



52 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


At the only tables at which A opened the hand cor¬ 
rectly, with the ace of clubs, following with the queen, 
Z was forced to trump the second round. Then he led a 
small spade, to get dummy in for the trump-finesse lead; 
but A put on the ace second hand, so as to make sure of an 
immediate second force on Z. At another table, Z put 
Y right in with a diamond, instead of trying the spade, 
but the result was the same, as A was left with the ace 
of spades for re-entry, instead of the long trump. 

Whether A is left with the long trump, after Z has 
been forced twice, or with the ace of spades after all the 
trumps are gone, does not affect the result, A gets in to 
make the club trick. If Z does not run with the diamonds, 
he^will carry home the ace and A will make two clubs. 
The early force by A saves the game. 

Change this hand a trifle, giving Y the singleton club 
and the four spades to the king-queen, while Z has three 
clubs. In this distribution, dummy with the singleton, 
it does not matter what A leads, Z will win the game, 
simply because the second round of clubs can be trumped 
without weakening the declarer’s trump suit. 

So far, we have been devoting our attention chiefly 
to the declarer’s hand and to the original bids, but there 
are two points about the trump values in the partner’s 
hand which will be continually referred to in what fol¬ 
lows. The first of these is the necessity for the partner 
to warn the dealer that the distribution is not normal. 
The other is to add or deduct values in his own hand, 
according to the number of trumps he holds, and their 
size. 

That the high cards in all suits are worth twice as 
much for attack or defence is equally true whether these 
high cards are in the hand of the declarer or of his part¬ 
ner; but it is not equally true of the small trumps. There 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


53 


is a great difference between the small cards of the 
plain suits and those of the trump suit in the partner’s 
hand. 

If the dealer bids a heart, and his partner holds three 
or four small clubs, those cards are worth nothing at 
all. But if they are three or four small hearts they have a 
distinct value, which every player should be able to 
appraise and bid upon. 

The average trump bid is on five cards, and the average 
holding for the partner is about three small ones; or 
two, one of which is as good as the queen. These are 
either of them worth about half a trick, because it is only 
about half the time that one of them can be used sepa¬ 
rately from the declarer’s trumps before the trumps are ex¬ 
hausted from the opponents’ hands. But if the partner 
holds four small trumps, or three to a high honor, they are 
worth a trick and a half. This is the limit for small 
trumps, or one honor, as five or six are w T orth no more. 

The reason is this: If dummy is going to lay down 
any one of the three top honors, which the dealer feared 
might be against him, and which he might have to lead 
out several rounds of trumps to catch or force, he need 
not make those leads. In the same way, if dummy is 
going to lay down four or more trumps, even small ones, 
any honor that is out against the declarer should be more 
easily caught, as it is unlikely that it is sufficiently guarded 
if there are nine trumps between declarer and dummy. 
But this extra length in trumps is useless if dummy has 
an honor, and several trumps will fall together at the 
end of the hand. 

If there is more than one honor in the dummy, ace 
and jack, for instance, the declarer holding king-queen- 
ten and others, a trick may be added for the extra honor 
if there are four cards in the suit. The ace of trumps is 


54 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


never counted for more than one trick in the partner’s 
hand, as the two-trick estimate is reserved for the plain 
suits and for the trumps in the declarer’s hand. 

The partner’s trumps will often have a double value, 
owing to their performing a double duty. With four 
trumps, for instance, the mere fact of length is valuable 
in saving the declarer from the necessity of leading 
trumps so often to exhaust the adversaries. If, at the 
same time, there is a short suit in the hand, this length 
can be used for ruffing, and the trumps will therefore have 
a double value, as protection and as trick-winners. 

If, on the contrary, the partner holds less than his 
share of the trump suit, he must make some deduction 
from the strength of his hand in the plain suits to balance 
this weakness in trumps. With only two small trumps, 
neither as good as the queen, he should deduct a trick 
from the rest of the hand. With only one small trump, 
he should deduct two tricks, counting them at their 
bidding values, or the equal of two kings, or one ace. 

It is an invariable rule to deny the partner’s suit 
when so short in it, as we shall see presently. But some¬ 
times the declarer has enough himself to ignore this weak¬ 
ness in his partner’s hand in trumps, and wants only out¬ 
side help. This help in the plain suits must still be 
discounted in accordance with the weakness in trumps, 
or the hand is given a false valuation. 

This shows that the small trumps in the partner’s- 
hand have an intrinsic value in themselves, but this value 
depends entirely on that suit being the trump. The 
moment the declaration shifts, or the opponents get the 
contract in some other suit or no-trumps, these small 
cards lose their value and become useless for any pur¬ 
pose. The following table shows the usual valuation 
for trumps in the partner’s hand: 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


(55 


3 small trumps are worth. 

1 honor and 1 small, are worth. 

4 or more small, are worth.... 

1 honor and 2 or more small.. . 

2 honors and 2 small are worth 

For only 2 small, deduct a trick. For only one or 
none, deduct 2 tricks, counting them at attacking value. 
For an unguarded high honor, deduct 1 trick. Remem¬ 
ber that five or six trumps, in the partner's hand, are 
worth no more than four. 


J trick 

i “ 

1| tricks 

11 (C 






MAJOR AND MINOR SUITS 


In selecting a trump suit, one must always have in 
view the possibility of going game. The number of hands 
that win the game with the assistance of a previous score 
is so small, not more than one in twenty-five among 
good players, that this part of the subject may be left 
out of the question for the present. 

It is easier to go game at no-trumps than with any 
other declaration, because it takes only three odd to 
reach the required 30 points. The bald statement of this 
fact, without qualification, has, unfortunately, left thou¬ 
sands of players with a totally false idea of the bid. The 
bane of the average bridge player is the no-trump bug. 

While it is true that one can go game with only three 
by cards at no-trump, it is also true that one must have 
a no-trumper to start with. One of the most common 
faults is trying to make no-trumpers out of hands which 
are much better and safer suit declarations; or which 
would yield a larger profit if reserved for defence against 
an opposing declaration; or out of hands that never 
were no-trumpers. 

It is a common saying that “ almost anything can 
happen to a no-trumper whereas a sound suit bid 
can never go very far wrong. Every no-trumper has 
some weak spot in it, and when this spot is hit by the 
adversaries the result is sometimes disastrous. Take the 
following cards, which were held by one of the best players 
in the leading auction club of America, and on which he 
bid one no-trump originally: 

56 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


57 


^ K9 
C?> Q 10 6 
0 K Q J 10 
4 AKQ2 

The opening lead was a small club and the result of 
the play was that the declarer lost a little slam, the only 
trick he made being the king of diamonds at the end, and 
he got that only by using excellent judgment in discard¬ 
ing all four of his spades. With spades for trumps he 
would have won the game. 

I have always taught my pupils that if there is a good 
major-suit bid in the hand it is never a no-trumper, 
no matter how strong the other suits may be, short of 
four aces, and seldom even then. The foregoing hand is 
a spade bid. 

It is not much more difficult to go game with a major 
suit, hearts or spades, than at no-trump, and the danger 
of being heavily set is reduced to a minimum. But 
when it comes to undertaking a contract to win eleven 
tricks out of the thirteen, with a minor suit, clubs or 
diamonds, for the trump, it is a different matter. The 
adversaries have the lead, and they immediately run 
to cover by making all their sure tricks at once. The 
usual result is that they have the game saved before the 
declarer gets going. 

These various considerations have led good players 
to distinguish three classes of bids—no-trumps, major 
suits, and minor suits, and to bid them upon the following 
holdings: 

No-trumpers are hands that are too strong to pass 
without a bid, but not long enough in either of the major 
suits to declare hearts or spades, and at the same time too 
strong to risk being left in with a minor suit, 


58 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Major-suit bids are made on all hands that have 
sufficient length in hearts or spades to justify the selec¬ 
tion of one or other for the trump, and also sufficient 
strength to win some tricks in that suit in case it is not 
the final declaration. 

Minor-suit bids are made on hands which are not 
good enough for no-trumps, and not long enough or strong 
enough in hearts or spades to justify a major-suit bid; 
but can promise at least two tricks to assist the partner, 
if he has a better bid; or to defend the game, in case 
the opponents get the declaration. 

In their attempts to reduce all suit bids to a uniform 
system, almost all writers on the game insist that every 
suit, major or minor, should be bid as if it were likely 
to remain the final declaration and become the trump. 
This requires the bidder to hold just as strong a suit of 
dabs or diamonds as he would require in hearts or spades, 
and the standard minimum has been fixed at five cards, 
with two sure tricks in the hand, at least one of which 
must be in the suit named. 

I have always insisted that this is a mistake, and that 
if the difficulty of going game with a minor suit is ad¬ 
mitted, it is undesirable to waste the hand on that 
declaration if anything better can be found. This alter¬ 
native is never considered in bidding the major suits, 
therefore the two bids are in a totally different cate¬ 
gory, and should not be controlled by the same considera¬ 
tions. 

No good player ever makes a free bid of one trick in 
a minor suit with the deliberate intention of having that 
suit for the trump. It may turn out to be the best or 
the only declaration for the combined hands after all, 
and the opponents may have nothing to say, but that 
does not mean that the bid should always be started on 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 59 

the assumption that such an unusual state of affairs 
will be found. 

Minor suits are chiefly useful in supporting better 
bids by the partner, and in saving contracts against ad¬ 
verse declarations. They are very useful in telling the 
partner what to lead, or in showing him what will be led, 
in case the opponents play the hand. Here is a deal that 
settled the top score in an important duplicate match: 

No. 5 

7 A 






❖ 

A Q J 8 

4 







0 

9 6 3 








❖ 

J 8 5 2 




K 

Q 

J 10 

8 6 4 

Y 


7 

2 






A T* 


K 

10 6 3 

<0 

J 

10 

2 


■tx 13 

0 

8 

7 5 4 

❖ 

A 

K 

6 


z 

❖ 

Q 

7 3 





9 5 3 









9 7 5 2 








0 

A K Q 








4 ^ 

10 9 4 





Z dealt, but he would not bid a diamond, as he had 
only three cards in the suit. A bid three hearts, after 
which it was impossible for Z to go to four diamonds. 
Not knowing anything about Z’s hand, Y led the ace 
of clubs. A trumped it, put dummy in with a spade 
and discarded a diamond on the club king. This won 
the game, which three diamond tricks would have saved. 

In the major suits, length, as well as high cards, is 
important. In the minor suits, high cards are the chief 
requisite, and length is a secondary consideration, at 
least for free bids. 




60 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


In watching the bidding and recording the hands of 
many important duplicate matches among the best 
players, I have been repeatedly impressed with the 
importance of bidding minor suits on strength, regard¬ 
less of length. The following remarkable hand was played 
at one of the nine-table games at the Knickerbocker 
Whist Club: 

No. 6 

❖ 

0 
❖ 

7 - 

<S> 10 9 

0 A Q J 6 5 4 3 

<J> A K 8 6 

S? 

❖ 

0 
❖ 


A K 9 5 3 2 
Q J 8 5 3 


7 J 7 4 
4> 7 4 
0 K 9 

Q 10 9 4 3 2 

Q 10 8 6 
A K 6 2 
10 8 7 2 
7 



Z dealt, and at several tables would not bid a club 
because he had not five cards in the suit. In some in¬ 
stances this cost him several hundred points, as he lost 
a grand slam in diamonds or spades, according to A’s 
bids. At some tables, when Z passed, A bid three or 
four diamonds, Y hearts and B either more diamonds 
or spades. When played at diamonds, Y, who knew 
nothing about the clubs, led a heart and lost a grand 
slam. 

At some tables, Z passing, A started with a spade bid, 
which is the correct declaration on this hand, as we shall 
see when we come to the chapter on selecting suits. 
The spade is the higher ranking of the two suits, either of 





FOSTER ON AUCTION 


61 


which is a sound free bid. Y went two hearts, B more 
spades and Z more hearts. When it got up to five spades, 

Y quit, as he knew nothing about the clubs in his partner’s 
hand. He led a heart, trumped by A, and lost a grand 
slam. Had he known about the clubs he could have 
saved four tricks and set the contract, which was done 
at one table." 

At the only tables at which Z made the correct declara¬ 
tion on his cards, one club, it had various results, all 
favorable to Z. At one table the assurance of two club 
tricks against them frightened A and B from going beyond 
five spades, and Y, encouraged by the clubs, went to six 
hearts and made it. The difference between winning a 
small slam at hearts, with four honors, and losing a grand 
slam in spades with four honors is 587 points, as a game 
adds 125 in honors at duplicate. This is all due to the 
original club bid. Have you ever seen 587 points lost 
by such a bid? 

At one table at which Z bid a club originally, A bid 
a spade and afterwards overcalled Z’s three-heart assist 
with four diamonds, B going to five spades and A to six, 
which held, doubled. Y led the club, as he felt hearts 
would be trumped, and Z made two clubs and led a 
diamond, which Y trumped, setting the contract for 200. 

At another table they did better than this against 
the spade contract, as B was the declarer. Z led a club, 
and then switched to a diamond, as B had supported 
that suit in the first place, afterward bidding spades. 

Y trumped the diamond and led back the club, getting 
in another trump on the second lead of diamonds. This 
set the contract for 300. 

Countless instances of such hands could be given, 
in which tricks are either saved by showing a minor 
suit, or the partner encouraged to bid because of the 


62 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


announced strength. Take the following as an example 
of this feature: 

No. 7 





7 

A 4 







❖ 

Q 9 8 6 

4 2 






0 

A K 7 







❖ 

10 8 




7 

K 

Q J 

7 5 

Y 


10 

9 3 2 


J 

5 


A B 

<£> 

10 

7 

0 

Q 

J 10 


0 

9 1 

5 5 

❖ 

A 

5 2 


Z 

4^ 

K 

Q J 4 





8 6 






cjb 

A K 3 







0 

8 4 3 2 








9 7 6 3 





At six tables out of seven Z passed without a bid, 
although he held two sure tricks in a minor suit. The 
result was that the hand was played either at hearts by 
A and B, who made two by cards, or went to three clubs 
by Y, who made it. At one or two tables they went 
to three hearts and doubled four clubs, or set the four 
club contract without doubling. 

This is a wasted opportunity for Y and Z. At the 
only table at which Z started with a club bid, A went 
hearts and Y at once bid no-trumps, being prepared to 
shift if B should shift to spades. Knowing what to lead, 
B passed and Y went game at no-trumps, as he calculated 
he must, if Z has the ace-king of clubs. One may judge 
of the consequences of relying on a player in Z’s place 
who will bid a club on five or six to the king jack ten. 

As will be seen, it does not matter what B leads, if 
he cannot make five spade tricks at once. Six clubs 
and three tricks in the red suits are a certainty, even if 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


63 


Z should have no small clubs at all, as Y can get in twice 
on the diamonds. 

Many opportunities to go game at no-trumps are missed 
by players who will not declare a minor suit unless they 
have five cards of it. The length is seldom of any 
advantage, and it may be a serious disadvantage when 
on the defensive. 

Any person who is familiar with the game must be 
aware that the longer a suit, the less the chance that 
it will go round many times without offering a chance 
to trump it. If the adversaries are playing the hand with 
hearts for trumps and you hold five clubs to the ace-king, 
you are much less likely to win two tricks in clubs than 
you would be if you had ace-king alone. You may do 
it once, or twice, or every time for a whole evening; but 
if you do it a hundred times you will find, if you keep 
account of it, that it will go round twice only about 
fifty-three times in the hundred times you try it. If 
the suit is only four cards, it will go around two or three 
times about seventy times in a hundred deals, while 
a three-card suit would go round eighty times. Twice 
out of three times, it will be dummy or declarer that 
will be short in it. 

For this reason I could never see any sensible objec¬ 
tion to the free bid of a club or a diamond when the 
suit is headed by two sure tricks, even if there are only 
three or four cards in the suit altogether. The main 
point is the sure tricks; not the length; because length 
is valuable only in a trump suit, or a no-trumper, and is 
a disadvantage if the hand is on the defensive. 

Having now considered the various principles that 
underlie the values of certain holdings, we are ready 
to go into the question of the bids themselves, beginning 
with the simplest forms, which are the one-trick bids. 


ORIGINAL, OR FREE BIDS 


Every free bid should have two objects constantly 
in view; attack and defence, because one never knows 
upon which side the bidder will eventually find himself. 

A free bid of one trick is very seldom final. It offers 
several alternatives. It may tell the partner what 
the bidder would like to be the winning declaration. 
But at the same time it indicates where assistance can 
be expected, in case the partner becomes the declarer; 
or for defence, in case the adversaries play the hand. 

There must always be this dual object in making a 
free bid, or it is unsound. But after the first bid has been 
made and the competition for the privilege of playing 
the hand started, the bids are largely forced, and the 
players are not so particular about conventions as they 
are about saving the game by bidding anything that 
seems to have a chance. 

Leaving the state of the score out of the question, 
the first bid made by the dealer, or by some player to 
his left if he passes, is the most important in the game, 
and rests upon this principle: 

There are thirteen tricks to be played for, and the 
average would be three-and-a-quarter for each player. 
If any player has more than his share, he has no right 
to assume that his partner has less than the proper share 
of those remaining, and if they have between them more 
than their share, they should get the play of the hand, 
or at least make a bid for it. 

If the average is three-and-a-quarter, any plaj^er 
who has a hand that will produce four tricks, on the aver- 
64 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


65 


age, should declare himself if he has a free bid, provided 
the distribution of those tricks and the length of the 
suits is such that he can make a strictly conventional 
declaration. It is the limits of these conventions and the 
hands that they will fit which we are about to study. 

The requisite four tricks are always counted upon 
their attacking values; but they must be worth at least 
two tricks as defensive values, or the bid is unsound. 
Bids of two, three, or four tricks may be made for noth¬ 
ing but attack, but we are not considering them now. 
All free bids of one trick are strictly for both objects, 
attack and defence. 

This brings us to the consideration of the three classes 
of hands upon which bids are made; those in which all 
the strength is in one suit; those in which it is all in 
two suits, and those in which it is distributed among 
three or four. 

The first and second are suit bids, the third class 
are usually no-trumpers. Each class must be bid in a 
different way, so that the partner shall understand 
clearly, if the bidding meets with opposition, to which 
class the hand belongs, and will adjust his support to 
the circumstances. 


MAJOR-SUIT BIDS 


There are two classes of suit bids, those in the major 
suits, hearts and spades, and those in the minor suits, 
clubs and diamonds. The difference lies in the length of | 
the suit. While the same rules apply to the selection of 
either so far as the high cards are concerned, the major j 
suits demand length, as well as high cards, for the reason 
already explained—that they are more than likely to j 
become the final declaration. 

The standard for a free bid in a major suit is five cards 
headed by two sure tricks. The high cards are for 
either attack or defence; the length in the suit is for 
attack only, and all free bids are attacking bids. 

There are only three combinations of cards that will 
exactly fulfil the requirements for a major-suit bid, 
regardless of the rest of the hand. Stronger holdings 
will of course do so; but weaker ones will not. The 
three are: 



66 



































FOSTER ON AUCTION 


67 


The denomination of any card below the ten is un¬ 
important in this or any of the illustrations given. 

Calculation and experience agree that any one of 
these three combinations will be good for four tricks 
in attack, or two in defence, on the average. That is 
to say, if the suit named is the final declaration and 
becomes the trump, or if the partner gets the declaration 
at no-trump, or even in another suit, these five cards will 
produce four tricks in play. If the suit is not the trump, 
and the opponents play the hand, these five cards should 
be good for two tricks. This is the average value of 
these three standard combinations. They are all one- 
trick bids. 

It is needless to say that if the five cards are headed 
by greater strength, so much the better. Five to the 
ace-king-queen, for instance, is obviously as good, or 
better, for four tricks in playing the attack, or two in 
defence, as any of the three given. They are one-trick 
bids. 

But if we add a card to any of these combinations 
which are good for two sure tricks, so that we hold six 
in suit, they are two-trick bids; not because they are worth 
any more in defence, but because they are worth more in 
attack, and the player must never forget that all his free 
bids are attacking bids, and convey information of attack¬ 
ing values to the partner. With seven cards in suit, 
headed by two sure tricks, such as any of the three com¬ 
binations just given, or better, the proper bid is three, 
and with eight in suit, four. 

On the other hand, if there are not five cards in the 
suit, there must be greater strength in high cards than 
just two sure tricks, to make up for the numerical de¬ 
ficiency. Four spades to the ace-king is not a sound 
major-suit bid, although it would be all right if the suit 



68 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


were clubs or diamonds. But with such strength as the 
following, the player may safely bid one on four-card 
suits: 


© 




*Jr 


* 

4 4 




F?lgL 


Vgk 



<? < 5 > 


The additional strength in high cards makes up for 
the want of length, as it is improbable that the adver¬ 
saries will be able to outlast the attack. They may not 
be able to win a trick against the first combination, and 
more than one against the second is highly improbable. 
At the same time, these combinations are much stronger 
if the partner gets the declaration, adding materially 
to the trick-taking possibilities of his dummy. Greater 
strength, such as the four top honors, does not justify 
a bid of more than one, as all bids for two or three tricks 
must be reserved entirely for indicating length. 

These are the standard combinations, so called because 
they contain in the suit itself all the requirements for 
the initial bid. When there is nothing else in the hand, 
it is conventional to bid all the suit is worth at once. To 
bid one spade when holding six or seven headed by two 
sure tricks, and then to bid more spades if overcalled, is 
bad bidding, for reasons which we shall come to pres¬ 
ently. Bid all the combination is worth at once, and have 
done with it. That is the rule. 

But in the great majority of the hands that a player 
is called upon to bid, no one of these three standard two- 
sure-trick suits will be found, but there may be a number 















FOSTER ON AUCTION 69 


of hands in which the bidder will find five or more cards 
of a major suit without the two sure tricks at the top. 

If the reader will refer to the chapter on Intrinsic 
Trick Values, he will find three combinations that are 
fisted as worth only a trick-and-a-half. Let us suppose 
that each contains five cards. That does not add any¬ 
thing to their trick-taking value, either for attack or 
defence. They fall just half-a-trick below the standard 
required for a free bid. Here they are: 



4*4 

4*4 

* 4 * 






7 

7 


7 

7 7 






7 7 





7 

<? 9 7 


7 _ 

_7 


7 



* 4 * 

4*4 

* 4 * 

4*4 



All three of these fall half-a-trick below average, 
but they are sound original free bids if this half trick is 
to be found in any of the three other suits in the hand. 
This would be a well guarded king. If there is greater 
strength than that, so much the better, but what we are 
investigating is the minimum for a free bid. No matter 
what strength there may be in other suits, never bid more 
than one heart or spade with such combinations as this, 
and an outside king or better. 

But with greater length in the major suit, the bid may 
be two tricks. The strength not being all in the suit 
itself, two extra trumps, or seven in suit, are required to 





























70 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


justify a bid of two; three extra, or eight in suit, to 
justify a bid of three, the outside strength of half-a-trick 
or better being also essential in every case. 

Major suits of four cards only, which are not up to 
the required standard for a bid, may be brought up to 
standard with the assistance of half-a-trick or better in 
some other suit. Take these holdings: 



9 

9 

9? 

9 




* 4 * 

4*4 


With a well guarded king in another suit, or better, 
these combinations are worth a bid of one heart or spade. 

When we come to still weaker combinations, such as 
the following, we find that they are not good for more 
than one trick in the suit itself, and in order to bring 
the hand up to standard for a bid, there must be at least 
one sure trick in some other suit: 






9 

9 


9 9 


9 

9 




9 

9 


9 





v - ? ' ■ V 


9 

9 


9 9 


9 



V 
♦ * 

4 4 


4 4 
4 

4 4 



These are not worth more than a trick, and unless 
there is as good as an ace, or a king-queen suit, or better, 
in the hand to support the major suit, it is not a free bid. 

































FOSTER ON AUCTION 


71 


The defence is not there, and there is not enough in the 
suit itself to justify the player in estimating that he can 
take care of more than his share of the thirteen tricks to 
be played for. If there is not an outside ace in the hand, 
two well-guarded kings would do as well, as they are worth 
half-a-trick apiece. 

Any major suit of only four cards which is headed by 
one of the three standard two-trick combinations, is 
a good free bid if there is at least one trick outside to 
make up for the missing trump. Take these suits: 





J2. 



In a minor suit, clubs or diamonds, a bid of one on 
these holdings would be perfectly correct, as the tricks are 
there; but in a major suit, which may be the final declara-. 
tion, there must be at least one sure trick on the outside 
to justify the bid. This may be an ace, or a king-queen 
suit, or two well-guarded kings. Anything better than 
that makes it so much the better bid. 

When we get down to five-card suits in which there 
is not even one sure trick, they become doubtful bids, 
even with considerable outside strength, unless the 
character of the hand is such that it is doubtful if any one 
























72 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


else will have a bid if the declaration is passed. 


the following: 







“s? 


<y> 

<v> 


" 



s? 






9 




9 



9 


9 


Take 



Size of cards below the 9 are unimportant. 

As we have already seen in the chapter on Intrinsic 
Values, none of these is worth more than a probable 
trick, and they are all worthless for purposes of defence. 
Even with two sure tricks in another suit, such as ace- 
king, or ace-queen-jack, these are bad free bids, because 
the strength of the hand is not in the suit named, and if 
the partner depends on that suit for assistance or defence, 
he is deceived. If the supporting suit is a club or a dia¬ 
mond, it is better to bid that suit. If it is in both, the 
bid may be no-trumps. If it is in the other major suit, 
there is nothing to be afraid of except a no-trumper, and 
then such suits may be declared, because of the danger 
of no one else having a bid, if one hand is so strong in 
both the major suits. Take this hand: 


s? A K 3 
c$jb K 8 4 
0 Q9 

K J 8 4 2 






























FOSTER ON AUCTION 


73 


As between no-trumps and spades, the spade is the 
better bid, because it is safer, and there is nothing to 
fear if the other side gets the declaration at hearts or 
no-trumps, even should the partner lead a spade. 

Any suit which requires an ace or better to support 
it should never be bid for more than one trick unless there 
are eight cards in it. If the danger is from the other 
major suit, three spades or four hearts is the best shut¬ 
out bid; but three hearts will not shut out three spades. 

Length is no justification for an original bid on suits 
which would not be sound bids if they consisted of 
five cards only. Five spades to the king-ten is never a 
good spade bid unless the rest of the hand is a no-trumper, 
and the addition of one or two small spades does not 
change the character of the hand, because the defence 
is not there. All such bids should be held back until 
the second round. They are called secondary bids, 
which we shall come to presently. 

The conditions for the major suit bids may be briefly 
summarized as follows: 

The hand as a whole must be good for at least four 
tricks in attack, or two for defence. This will require at 
least five cards in the suit named, and two sure tricks in 
the hand. 

If all the tricks are not in the suit named, there must 
be enough in the supporting suits to make up for the 
weakness in the declared suit, but at least one of the sure 
tricks must be in the suit named, unless the rest of the hand 
is a no-trumper. 

These are all one-trick bids. 

If there are two sure tricks at the head of a suit of 
six cards, the original bid should be two tricks, regardless 
of other tricks. If there are seven cards in the suit, bid 
three; with eight cards in suit, bid four. 




74 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


If there is no sure trick at the head of the suit, it 
should never be declared for more than one trick, unless 
there are eight cards in it. Then it should be bid for 
three spades or four hearts. 

If there are less than five cards in the suit, there must 
be more than two sure tricks at the top, or as good as an 
ace outside. 

No matter how strong the rest of the hand may be, 
no five-card suit should be bid for more than one trick 
originally, because larger bids show greater length. 

Any hand which contains a conventionally sound 
major suit bid is never a no-trumper. It may be turned 
into no-trumps later, but it is not one originally, because 
a no-trump bid denies any good major suit holding. 

All major-suit bids have three objects in view. 1. 
To get the partner to assist the declaration, and push 
it to the limit of safety if it is opposed. 2. To show the 
partner where he may depend on some assistance in 
tricks if he has a better bid, or is forced to deny the suit. 
3. To show the partner where he may depend on some 
defence, in case the opponents get the contract. 

When the original bid is opposed, or taken out by the 
partner, other considerations enter. If the suit is to be 
pushed, we shall find that dealt with in the chapter 
on Rebidding the Hands. If the partner shifts to some¬ 
thing else, we shall find that part of the subject in the 
chapter on Denying Suits. 


MINOR-SUIT BIDS 


All original or free bids in the minor suits, clubs or 
diamonds, are based upon the hope that the partner will 
be able to do something better. It is therefore advisable 
to make it easy for him to declare himself as cheaply as 
possible. Never force a partner to bid two or three, 
when one should be enough. 

As no good player ever wants to play one of the minor 
suits for the trump, unless it is a game hand, or to the 
score, all minor suit bids have only two objects, instead 
of the three that are common to major-suit bids. The 
first is to induce the partner to avail himself of the assist¬ 
ance offered in the suit named. The second is to show 
him the best defence, in case the opponents get the con¬ 
tract. Unlike the major suits, they never ask the partner to 
assist them, unless he has nothing better in his own hand. 

All the examples given in the preceding chapter for 
the major-suit bids on certain combinations of high cards 
will hold true for the minor-suit bids, with two exceptions, 
which should be carefully noted. 

No minor suit should be declared as a free bid unless it 
contains at least one sure trick and one probable, or the 
possibility of two, and all such weak suits must have a 
least an ace, or a king-queen suit on the outside to sup¬ 
port them. The following are about the minimum, 
and both require a sure trick outside: 



75 















76 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Some players will bid a minor suit with only the ace 
at the top, if they have the ace of another suit, as they 
dislike to pass any hand with two sure tricks in it, but 
such bids are hardly to be recommended, unless, perhaps, 
as second hand, when the dealer has passed without a 
bid. The danger then is that the hand may be thrown 
out unless the fourth bidder is very strong. 

The number of cards in a minor suit is unimportant, 
as we have seen in the chapter on the difference between 
major and minor suits when brought into practical use 
in the play, as well as in their influence on the bidding. 
Length is rather a detriment than a help in minor suits, 
unless they are solid and accompanied by an ace. Then 
they are no-trumpers. Five to the ace-king-queen is 
not strictly speaking a solid suit, but six would be. The 
adverse distribution of three-three is not as probable as 
four-two, which is something the careful bidder must 
not forget. The difference is about 4 to 3 in favor of 
the unequal distribution of six cards. 

Some persons lack the courage to bid no-trumps on 
two suits, even with four sure tricks in hand. They also 
lack imagination, as it should be clear that unless the part¬ 
ner has a Yarborough in both the other suits he must 
get into the lead before long, and then the solid suit 
and the outside ace come into play. 

No matter how strong a minor suit may be, there is 
no necessity to bid more than one trick in it, if that suit 
is all there is in the hand. But if there are eight or nine 
cards in the suit, headed by two or three sure tricks, the 
player might as well bid five clubs or diamonds at once 
and be done with it. If he is left with the contract, he 
has at least saved the game, and cannot lose much. A 
bid of two is never made to show more than a bid of one; 
the two-bid being now conventionally used for a very 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


77 


different purpose. A bid of three accomplishes nothing, 
unless it be to drive the partner beyond his depth in a 
better suit or no-trump. Such bids will never shut 
out a good heart or spade bid from the opponents. 

As explained in a previous chapter, where some illus¬ 
trative hands were given, the function of the minor- 
suit bids is to induce the partner to do something better 
or to show him where he may expect some defensive 
strength, in case the other side plays the hand. 

Never take any liberties with free bids in minor suits. 
Five cards in a major suit, even with only king-jack at the 
top, may be excused if there are two or three sure tricks 
outside; but such bids in minor suits are indefensible. 
They not only lead the partner into traps, but destroy 
his confidence in all future bids made by the same player. 

Free bids of one trick in a minor suit may be roughly 
described as showing a suit with two sure tricks in it, 
regardless of length, or with one sure and one probable 
in the suit named, and at least one trick outside. 


TWO-TRICK BIDS IN MINOR SUITS 


The free bid of two tricks in a minor suit, clubs or 
diamonds, being no longer of any practical use as show¬ 
ing greater strength than a bid of one, it has passed out 
of the field of conventional bidding, and the bid has been 
left lying round loose, as it were. Auction players have 
recently taken a leaf from the pirate text-book, and have 
employed this bid of two in minor suits to feel out no- 
trumpers that have a weak spot in them, or to force the 
partner into a suit bid that he would not otherwise have 
made. 

The bid of two in a major suit invariably shows greater 
length than five cards. There is absolutely no excuse 
for making such a free bid under any other conditions. 
The major suit declarations ask the partner to support 
them, and a bid of two asks him to prefer that suit to 
anything else, relieving him of the responsibility of denying 
the suit, if he is short in it. 

The free bid of two in a minor suit used to be a sort 
of shout for the partner to go no-trumps, and indicated a 
solid suit of clubs or diamonds; either without another 
possible trick in the hand, or without the courage to bid 
no-trumps. If such a solid suit were accompanied by 
an ace; or if one lead would establish the suit, and there 
were two sure re-entries outside, good players invariably 
went no-trumps themselves, instead of shouting to their 
partners to do so. 

This bid is no longer used by good players; partly 
because it is entirely unnecessary; partly because it 
made the partner too optimistic. A partner will go to 
no-trumps, or declare a good major suit, just as quickly 
on a bid of one club or diamond as he would on a bid 
78 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


79 


of two, and the two-bid frequently forces him just a little 
too far. 

The two-bid had its advantages for the opponents, 
but not for the bidder’s side. In the first place, it 
marked the bidder with nothing in the other suits. In 
the second place it often saved them from making a bid 
second hand that would have acted as a warning to the 
third hand. Where they would freely over call a bid 
of one, they might hesitate about a bid of two, preferring 
to wait for the decision of the third hand, as to what he 
was going to do with it. 

The great objection to the shout, as it was called, 
was that it continually led an optimistic partner into 
quite unnecessary risks. Here is an example of it, which 
I watched go the rounds of a duplicate match of seven 
tables: 

No. 8 

7 A J 10 4 2 
4 85 
0 10 6 
£ A K 9 3 

^ K7 
cj J92 
0 A K J 7 4 
10 8 2 

S? Q 9 5 
<g> A K Q 6 4 3 
0 9 3 
£ 64 

Z dealt and at one table promptly bid two clubs. 
Knowing Y would do something with this bid, A passed, 
realizing that to anticipate a no-trump take-out by bid¬ 
ding the diamonds would warn Y of his danger from that 



7 8 6 3 
❖ 10 7 
0 Q 8 5 2 
Q J 7 5 



80 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


suit. Y went two no-trumps, as A imagined he would, 
and he made it. But he did not win the game. This 
happened at every table at which Z started with a shout, 
bidding two clubs. 

At other tables, at which Z bid one club only, A bid 
the diamonds, which made Y more cautious, and he 
contented himself with a heart bid. This held the con¬ 
tract, there being no further bidding. At hearts, with B 
to lead, Y made five by cards by winning the third 
trick with the spade king, after two rounds of diamonds, 
putting dummy in with a club and leading the nine of 
trumps from that hand for the finesse. The finesse held, 
and a small trump dropped the king, so that the queen of 
trumps won the third round and brought in all the clubs. 

Some players, having experienced the bad effects of 
making it too expensive for the second hand to show 
a suit, and so disclose some of the opposing strength, 
try to make the one-trick bid do the duty of the shout. 
This they arrive at by a conventional agreement that 
any bid of one club shall always be a call for a no-trumper. 

The absurdly illogical nature of such a convention 
should be at once apparent. If the opponents know that 
this bid calls for a no-trumper from the third hand, 
will they not be just as shy of disclosing any of their 
defences as if the bid were a shout of two? On the other 
hand, how will the partner know whether the clubs are 
the only support that he will find for a no-trumper, or 
if he may expect a trick or two elsewhere? The shout 
was much simpler, but its disadvantages were too much 
to be outweighed by any possible gain, and the two- 
trick free bids in minor suits, to show stronger holdings 
than one-trick bids, are dead. We shall now proceed 
to consider the resurrection. 

Going back for a moment to the fundamentals, the 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


81 


reader is asked to remember that any five-card suit, 
headed by at least two sure tricks, should be good for an 
average of four tricks in play, if the holder is one of the 
partners that get the declaration. Even if the suit is 
one of only four cards, it should be good for three tricks 
on the average, and if that is not enough to induce the 
partner to make a better bid, it is very unlikely that a 
bid of two would do so. 

In pirate, the original minor-suit bids are freely used 
to feel out the location of a suit that is the only weak spot 
in an otherwise excellent no-trumper. In that game 
a minor-suit bid does not necessarily show sure tricks 
at the head of the suit. It simply asks for assistance in 
the suit named, and is a distinct denial that the suit 
is solid; because all solid suits bid two, in pirate. 

Any player who can win tricks in the minor suit accepts. 
No matter what other bids may intervene from other 
players, the one who originally bid the minor suit to feel 
out a no-trumper takes no part in the bidding until he 
gets an opportunity to say no-trumps. Then the player 
who holds the tops in the minor suit first named knows 
that he is the one wanted for a partner. At pirate this 
is pretty simple, as some one must have the suit wanted. 
The only thing to be done is to locate him, and notify 
him what he is wanted for. 

The auction players have adopted this idea. In fact, 
they have improved upon it. They have resurrected the 
two-trick bid in the minor suits for a double purpose, 
and they find that it fulfils this purpose very well indeed. 
One must understand the convention, of course, like any 
other in the game. 

The use to which this two-trick free bid in clubs or 
diamonds is now most commonly put is to find if it 
would be safe to play the hand at no-trumps. That is 



82 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


the straight pirate idea. If the partner can stop the 
suit twice, he bids two no-trumps, even if he has not 
another trick in his hand. He has the advantage that the 
suit, if opened, must be led up to him, and not through 
him. All he needs is a thorough knowledge of what 
constitutes two sure stoppers in a suit. 

If he cannot stop the suit twice, he is forced to bid 
his longest suit, no matter how poor it is. He does so 
with perfect confidence that his partner can support it, 
or can afford to go to something better. 

It will naturally be urged by those who have not the 
courage to force their partners into a two-trick contract 
at no-trumps that if he can stop the declarer’s only weak 
suit twice, the declarer might as well have bid no-trumps 
himself in the first place. 

This is quite true. The odds are in fact in favor 
of the partner’s being able to protect a suit in which the 
original declarer has nothing. But there is a certain 
percentage of hands in which he cannot do so. The 
two-trick bid in the minor suit is a sort of insurance against 
this margin of loss. Here is an example of it: 

No. 9 

S? J 6 2 

Q 8 6 4 
0 10 6 
0 Q J 7 2 

s? 10 7 5 
<£> J 7 5 3 
0 A K 8 5 4 
3 

7 AQ8 
<?> A K 9 2 
0 7 3 

K 10 9 4 


Y 

A B 
Z 


S? K 9 4 3 
10 * 
0 Q J 9 2 
A 8 6 5 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


83 


The average player would undoubtedly bid no-trumps 
on Z’s cards, be left to play it, and lose five diamonds 
and a spade. This makes his contract, but the hand is 
wasted, and that is one of the things that the modern 
player is always trying to avoid. The secret of success 
at auction is to get the most out of the hands that they 
will produce. This Z signally fails to do if he bids no- 
trumps. 

The hand is a perfect no-trumper, but for the weakness 
in diamonds. The average player takes a chance on that 
suit. The modern idea is to take no chances, when it 
is not necessary to do so. Z bids two diamonds. If his 
partner can stop the suit twice, let him go to no-trumps. 
If he cannot, he must have a four-card suit, and Z can 
support anything he may name. 

A, of course, passes. He knows Y will have to bid a 
suit, and it will be time enough for A to bid after he learns 
what Y is going to pick. Y cannot stop the diamonds 
even once, and as between two four-card suits he selects 
the one of higher value, bidding two spades. On this 
contract he wins the game, by catching the king of hearts. 
Instead of one odd and easy aces, which is the maximum 
under the old style of bidding, Z and his partner get 
four odd, four honors, and a game in. 

That this is not an accident will be evident if we give 
Z any of the three other hands for his partner. Trans¬ 
pose the hands of Y and A, leaving B’s where it is, and we 
find the two sure stoppers in diamonds that Z asks for, 
so the hand is played at no-trumps and makes three 
by cards and game easily. Transpose the hands of 
Y and B, leaving A’s as it is, and the answer to the two- 
diamond bid will be two-no-trumps if B regards four 
to the queen-jack as two stoppers. If he does not, he 
can bid spades with four to the ace; or hearts with 




84 FOSTER ON AUCTION 

four to the king. Take any of these three bids, as your 
idea of the answer to Z’s original bid of two diamonds, 
and you go game on the hand. 

In pirate, as the partner with the missing suit is always 
available, no matter where he sits, the usual result of the 
bidding on hands that are no-trumpers but for their 
weakness in one or other of the minor suits, is that they 
are played at no-trumps. At auction, it seems to be 
in about one-third of the cases only that the final decla¬ 
ration is no-trump, because it is only about once in so 
often that the player in a definite position, opposite the 
first bidder, can stop the missing suit twice. 

The result, therefore, at auction, is much more likely 
to be a suit bid than no-trumps, and the player who 
uses these bids to force a bid from the partner must be 
prepared to support any suit he names, or else to shift 
to a good one of his own. The great danger with these 
bids is that players will make them on hands that do not 
justify them, just as so many players now use the double 
to force bids that they cannot support. 

It did not take the shrewd players long to discover 
that this two-trick bid in the minor suits could be used to 
prevent a partner from going no-trumps, instead of ask¬ 
ing him to do so, and that it could restrict him to a syit 
bid of some kind. 

It is obvious that if the player who bids two in a 
minor suit holds the sure tricks in that suit himself, 
it will be impossible for his partner to go to no-trumps 
on the strength of his ability to stop that suit twice. As 
he must bid something, there will be no alternative but 
a declaration of his longest suit, no matter what it is. 

It takes a shrewd and careful player, with a good part¬ 
ner, to use this convention, but those who tried the 
two-trick bid to get a no-trump response soon discovered 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


85 


for themselves the trick of preventing the no-trumper, 
which is only another illustration of the irrigation prop¬ 
erties of great minds. 

If frequently happens that a player can give excellent 
support to a major-suit bid, hearts or spades, but is not 
long enough, or strong enough, in either of those suits 
to justify a free bid. The usual alternative is to bid 
no-trumps, and take a chance on the one weak suit. 
With the two-trick bid in the minor suits at one’s com¬ 
mand, this risk is quite unnecessary. Let us look at 
a typical hand: 

No. 10 

S? 9 6 3 
<?> K Q J 8 3 
0 9 4 
<£> J 8 2 

V Q J 10 5 4 
4 92 
0 0 8 7 2 

<£> &U5 

7 K 

A 10 6 4 
0 A K J 5 
£ K Q 6 3 

With such a hand as this, Z cannot bid two in his 
weak suit, hearts, to feel out a no-trumper, because it is 
a major suit, and all such bids are reserved strictly for 
the conventional length and strength in such suits. 
The partner would support a bid of two hearts to the limit 
if Z started with such a declaration, but a bid of two 
diamonds he understands perfectly. 

Y cannot stop the diamonds. Although he is in 




A 8 7 2 

<£> 

7 5 

0 

10 6 3 


A 10 7 4 





86 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


blissful ignorance of the fact that his partner is deter¬ 
mined to prevent him from doing what he wants to do, 
bid no-trumps, he is well aware that he must bid some¬ 
thing. Unfortunately, he cannot fulfil his partner’s 
hopes by bidding hearts or spades, so he has to bid three 
clubs, to overcall the two diamonds. 

Suppose he had bid hearts? Then Z goes to no-trumps, 
as the danger from that suit is reduced to a minimum. 
As it is, B cannot afford to overcall a bid of three clubs. 
Z cannot risk a shift, and A is not equal to three hearts, 
so the hand is played at clubs, B to lead. It is a game 
hand at clubs, the only tricks for A and B being their 
two aces. 

This is another example of arriving at the best bid 
for the combined hands. If Z takes a chance at no- 
trumps, he loses six tricks before he gets in. If he takes 
a chance on a spade bid, as one table did, he is forced 
twice on the hearts and makes only the odd trick. 

This hand is no more matter of luck than the other. 
Transpose the hands of Y and A, leaving B’s as it is. 
The answer would be two hearts, with game at either 
hearts or no-trumps. Put B’s cards opposite Z, leaving 
A’s as they are, and the answer will be two spades, the 
higher valued of two equal suits. Again it will be found 
that the combination goes game. 



SHUT-OUT BIDS 


Having mastered the principles that govern the usual 
run of bids, which are for one or two tricks, we come 
naturally to the original bids of a larger number. These 
are usually termed shut-out bids, because the object in 
declaring more than two tricks as a free bid is chiefly for 
the purpose of shutting out a suit that the bidder is afraid 
of, and which may be with the adversaries. 

It is hardly necessary to point out that if the bidder 
is not afraid of any particular suit, or is strong enough 
to overcall it if it is shown to be against him, there is 
no object in the shut-out. On the contrary, it is often 
to the bidder’s advantage with such hands to allow the 
other players to bid; not only his opponents but his own 
partner. If he is satisfied that he is strong enough to 
get the final declaration, or to double and penalize 
anything bid too heavily against him, what can be gained 
by pre-empting the contract on the first bid? 

All shut-out bids are made upon hands that are very 
long in one suit. The theory is that if the full strength 
of the hand is declared at once it will probably prevent 
the opponents from building up a contract that it would 
be dangerous to overcall. If their suit is all in one hand, 
the shut-out will probably fail, as the player holding 
that suit will at once infer it is the suit the bidder is 
afraid of; but if the suit is divided, neither may be strong 
enough to start it, if the first bid had to be three or four 
tricks. 

It has about been settled among experts that three 
hearts will not be very likely to shut out three spades; 

87 


88 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


but that three spades may prove a wholesome deterrent 
for a bid of four hearts. Shut-out bids in the minor 
suits are seldom of any use unless they are for the game; 
five-trick bids. In the majority of cases the bidder does 
not expect to make it, but he hopes to prevent the other 
side from going game in a major suit. If it turns out 
that his partner has either of those suits, or protection 
in both, it should be a game hand in the minor suit. 
Here is a good example of a minor-suit shut-out. Only 
one table out of seven made the bid. 

No. 11 






10 7 

6 3 






❖ 

J 10 

5 






<0 

J 4 







❖ 

10 7 

6 3 




A 

Q 8 


Y 



K J 5 2 

❖ 

K 

6 


A 

“R 

❖ 

9 4 3 2 

0 

8 

7 3 



13 

0 

10 

❖ 

A 

Q J 

8 4 

z 


❖ 

K 9 5 2 





9 4 







❖ 

A Q 

8 7 






0 

A K 

Q 9 6 5 

2 


❖ 


At six tables out of seven at which this deal was 
played, the highest bid made was two diamonds, promptly 
overcalled with two spades and carried to four spades 
later. They made five odd in spades, losing only one 
trick in each of the minor suits, with four honors. With 
the 125 for a game won, this is 206 points. B ruffed a 
diamond and A a club before pulling the last two of Y’s 
trumps. 

At one table Z opened the bidding with five diamonds 





FOSTER ON AUCTION 


89 


and that ended matters. He was set for one trick 
only, losing one club and two hearts, but scored four 
honors. Net loss, 16 points. Net saving by the shut¬ 
out, 190. 

The importance of the shut-out bid as a defensive 
weapon seems to be entirely overlooked by the average 
player. He seems to be afraid to risk it. Any one who 
makes such bids a habit comes to be regarded as 
a rash player, and the croppers he comes attract so 
much attention that the games he saves are entirely 
overlooked. 

The shut-out bid is based on the combination of two 
factors: the full value of the hand itself, and the average 
probability that the partner will take care of two tricks, 
which should always be added to the bid. That is, 
if the hand itself is worth seven tricks, add two, which 
makes nine, and bid to win ten if you are afraid of the 
other suit, and cannot overcall it. If you can overcall it, 
bid the nine. In every case the partner must remember 
that the bid is final, and he must not advance it, should it 
be over called, unless he has more than his share of the 
outstanding tricks, which seldom happens if a shut¬ 
out is over called. 

Shut-out bids at no-trump are seldom of any use. 
The most they can do is to prevent the fourth hand from 
asking for a lead, but they will never prevent the eldest 
hand from leading his strongest suit, even if he cannot 
afford to bid it. Shut-out bids may be afraid of anything 
but a no-trumper. If that is bid or held against them 
the suit named in the shut-out will be the one opened, 
which is something. 

The best shut-out bids are those that are limited to 
the average value of the hand, adding two tricks for the 
dummy. Spade shut-outs are always better than those 


90 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


in any other suit, as it takes a trick more to overcall them. 
Here is a typical shut-out hand: 

No. 12 

S? A 7 3 
eg) 9 8 5 3 
0 10 7 4 

K 8 5 

K Q 10 6 4 2 
c£ 10 6 4 
0 A J 8 2 
❖ - 

V J 

eg) A Q 2 
0 9 5 3 

A Q J 10 7 3 

At several tables Z bid only one or two spades, which 
A overcalled with two or three hearts. Y could not 
assist the spades, as he had only the average two tricks 
and his trumps were of no use for ruffing. When Z bid 
more spades, B assisted the hearts, and at some tables 
carried it to four and made it, or went to five and lost 
one trick only, against which they had simple honors. 
Three tables played it at four hearts, and made 173 
points on it. 

At only one table did Z start with three spades, which 
effectually prevented A from bidding four hearts. Z 
cannot win the game at spades, but he can make his 
contract. That saves the difference between 173 lost 
and 108 won, which is a net gain of 281. Even had 
Z been forced to four spades, he would have been set one 
only as, against 81 honors. Z’s hand should not lose both 
finesses in the black suits, so that he may count it as good 



7 985 
<?> K J 7 
0 K Q 6 
7 9 6 4 2 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


91 


for five trumps and two clubs, or six trumps and one 
club. His partner has just the two tricks he should 
have. 

Here is a good illustration of the difference between 
a shut-out and a sporty no-trumper. All kinds of bids 
were made upon these cards: 

No. 13 

S? 8 2 

cg> 10 9 7 5 3 
<> 10 9 5 
<$> A 8 3 

9 5 

8 

0 Q J 8 3 2 

£,76542 

A K 6 4 
AKQJ642 
0 6 4 
❖ -- 

Those who started with no-trumps on Z's hand allowed 
B to ask for a spade lead, bidding two. Then when Z 
shifted to the clubs, Y went back to no-trumps, as he could 
stop the spades, and B showed his second suit, bidding 
four hearts. This induced Z to stick to no-trumps, 
bidding four. He figured to lose one heart and get a 
discard of one loser on his partner’s spade stopper, no 
matter which of the major suits A led to his partner's 
declarations. 

But A led neither, as he saw that Y and Z between 
them had both those suits stopped, and all the clubs. 
Instead he led a diamond and set the contract for two 
tricks. 




92 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


At some tables they started with two or three clubs 
and carried it to five, only to be overcalled by five spades 
on A’s indication of his preference for that suit, B show¬ 
ing two. The spade contract was set for one trick, but 
had 72 honors. At only one table had Z the courage 
to bid five clubs. His estimate is seven trumps, two hearts 
and two tricks in the dummy. He made a little slam. 
This was one more than he was entitled to, and was due 
to B’s failure to return the diamond so as to clear the 
spades. This gave Z a diamond discard. 

In their anxiety to turn every possible hand into a 
no-trumper, which seems to be an obsession with many 
persons, some excellent opportunities for shut-out bids 
are overlooked. As a curiosity, here is a hand upon 
which a very good player thoughtlessly bid no-trumps: 

7 A 

c?) A K Q J 4 3 
0 K Q J 10 
❖ A 8 

The opening lead was a spade, from four to the king- 
queen-jack, the player on the right having five, and he 
got in with the ace of diamonds to make four of them 
and save the game. It is impossible to lose the game in 
clubs, and if five clubs had been bid at once, one spade 
and one diamond are the only tricks that can be lost. 

The object of the shut-out being to prevent the oppo¬ 
nents from showing each other what they hold, defeats 
its own object if it shuts out the partner, when it does 
not matter whether the opponents bid or not. Careless 
players frequently bid three or four tricks on their hand 
simply because they think they can make it, there being 


93 


FOSTER ON AUCTION i 

no other reason for the bid. They are sometimes un¬ 
pleasantly surprised. Here is an instance* 

No. 14 

- 



❖ 

10 8 4 




0 

A K Q 9 7 3 

2 

<N? 

4 ^ 

Q 7 5 



J 9 5 

Y 

V 

10 8 4 2 

<£> 

A Q 7 6 

A B 


J 9 5 2 

0 

J 10 5 4 

0 

— 

❖ 

10 2 

Z 


J 9 6 4 3 


A K Q 7 6 3 



<£ 

K 3 





8 6 




❖ 

A K 8 




Z bid three hearts, which every one passed. This is 
an entirely useless bid, as Z is not afraid of anything, and 
has a perfectly legitimate second or third raise if he is 
overcalled. Much to his astonishment he did not make 
three hearts. A did not like to lead away from his major 
tenace in clubs, and started with a diamond, which B 
trumped. B led a club and got another ruff. Another 
club and another ruff netted four tricks. When B 
trumped the third round of diamonds, Z had to play 
the queen to beat the eight, which made the jack good 
for a trick in A's hand, and set the contract. 

Had Z started the bidding with one or two hearts, 
Y would have bid the diamonds, and Z could have gone 
to no-trumps, as Y would show that the diamonds were 
not simply a denial of one heart, by bidding three dia¬ 
monds, and if the first heart bid was two tricks, Z would 
know that his partner would not take it out unless he 



94 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


had a very strong diamond suit. It is an easy five odd 
at diamonds, as Y can throw A into the lead at the end 
with the losing diamond and force him to lead up to the 
club king. If A opens with a high diamond, it is a 
grand slam for Z at no-trumps. 


BIDDING TWO-SUITERS 


We have now examined the principles underlying the 
five principal suit bids, each of which is made upon a 
distinct type of hand. No bid should ever be made upon 
a hand belonging to one class that could equally be made 
upon a hand belonging to another class. The object 
of all good bidding is to indicate to the partner whether 
the strength of the hand is all in one suit, or in two, or 
in three. For convenience, these four classes of bids 
may be briefly summarized: 

1. The one-trick bid in a minor suit, showing at least 
two sure tricks in the hand for defence. 

2. The two-trick bid in a minor suit, forcing the 
partner to bid his hand. 

3. The one-trick bid in a major suit, showing at least 
five cards, or four very strong cards, with at leastTwo sure 
tricks in the hand for defence. 

4. The two-trick bid in a major suit, showing greater 
length than five cards in suit, with at least two sure 
tricks in the hand for defence. 

5. The shut-out bid in suit, showing great length and 
strength, and indicating that the hand is good for nothing 
else as the trump. 

In addition to these typical hands, there are a number 
in which the player will find himself with two suits 
which are nearly equal, either in length or strength. 
These are called two-suiters, and they are among the 
strongest attacking hands that the auction player can 
hold. 


95 


96 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


If the distribution is such that either suit would be 
a sound declaration, the choice is governed by the simple 
rule of always selecting the suit of higher rank for the 
opening bid. Take these hands as examples: 


No. 2 


No. I 


V K Q 10 5 3 
« 64 
0 9 2 

A K Q 7 


S? A K 6 4 3 
84 
0 7 

0 A Q 8 5 2 


In No. 1, the greater strength of the heart suit does 
not make the spade any less a perfectly sound bid on the 
entire hand. In No. 2, although there is a card less 
in the spade suit, it is just as strong for bidding purposes, 
as the heart suit, and stronger in defence. 

By selecting the spade suit for the opening bid in 
No. 1, for instance, the player will be able to show his 
heart suit later if he is overcalled. This will offer his 
partner a choice of two suits, and the important point 
is that by having declared the higher ranking suit first 
the partner can make his selection without increasing 
the contract. 

To illustrate. The dealer's first bid on this hand 
is one spade. Second and third hands pass, and fourth 
hand bids two clubs. Now the dealer bids two hearts. 
This bidding invariably shows a two-suiter. If his 
partner prefers the hearts, he lets the bid stand at two 
hearts. If he prefers the spades, he can bid two spades 
to indicate his preference, without increasing the con¬ 
tract. 

On the other hand, if the dealer bids the hearts first 
and overcalls the clubs with two spades, he forces his 
partner to increase the contract to three tricks, if the 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


97 


partner prefers the hearts. This increase would have 
been quite unnecessary if the dealer had opened the bid¬ 
ding on his own hand correctly. 

What is true of the two major suits is also true of 
two minor suits, or of a major suit and a minor suit. The 
first bid must always be on the suit of higher rank; but 
there is a slight difference in the second bid when the 
minor suit supports a major suit. Take these hands 


No. 3 

No. 4 

6 5 

<7 A Q 6 4 3 

<J> A Q 10 5 4 

<$>7 4 

<j> A J 10 7 

0 A K 6 5 3 

❖ 84 

8 

In No. 3, the correct opening bid is a diamond, because 

that is the higher ranking suit. 

The fact that it com 


tains only four cards, while there are five clubs, does 
not alter the case, because length is not the important 
factor in the minor suits. Bid clubs if overcalled. 

In No. 4, the opening bid is one heart; but if the 
bid is overcalled, the next bid is not diamonds, but two 
hearts. This is a very important distinction, as it shows 
the partner that there is more in the hand than the first 
bid indicated, without running the risk of being left to 
play the hand at diamonds. This extra strength shown 
by rebidding the hearts cannot consist of a longer heart 
suit, because that would have been an original two-trick 
bid, the rule being to bid all there is in the hand at once, 
if it is all in one suit. If the player is willing to have 
diamonds the trump, that is another matter. He might 
have four hearts to the ace-king-queen, and seven dia¬ 
monds to four honors. In such a case the shift to the 
minor suit would indicate that it was very much superior 




98 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


to the major suit, in both length and strength. Such 
hands are not common, however. 

When the suits are not equal, estimated by their 
bidding rank, the hand is still a two-suiter, but it is 
not bid on the rank of the suits; but on the rank of the 
bids. For instance: 


No. 6 


No. 5 


AKQJ4 

❖ 8C 

0 6 3 " 

A Q 10 7 5 


7 A K 8 6 5 3 
❖ 64 

0 — 

AK542 


No. 5 is not a spade bid, because there are six cards 
in the heart suit, and as that suit is headed by two sure 
tricks, it is a free bid of two hearts, not one, whereas 
the spade suit is only a one-trick bid. 

In No. 6, while either suit is only a one-trick bid, 
the count for four honors in one hand in hearts must not 
be lost sight of, and that suit should be selected for the 
opening bid, as there may never be a chance to show 
two suits when the hand is as strong as this. 

Two-suiters are often useful in indicating the support 
for a major suit that is too weak for an original bid. Take 
these hands: 


No. 7 


No. 8 


^ 75 
(j AK65 
0 8 4 

<$> K 10 7 5 3 


7 Q J 10 6 4 
(j) 63 
0 A Q J 5 
<0 8 2 


No. 7 is not strong enough in spades to justify an 
original spade bid; neither is No. 8 good for a free bid 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


99 


in hearts. The defence is not there. But if a club is 
bid first on No. 7, and a diamond first on No. 8, with the 
shift to spades or hearts later, the partner will under¬ 
stand that the length was there all the time for the major- 
suit bid, but not the strength for defensive purposes. 
That is in the suit first shown. 



NO-TRUMP BIDS 


When a player who has a free bid finds all his strength 
in one suit, he declares that suit. If it is in two suits, 
he bids the stronger or higher ranking suit first. If it 
is in three suits, neither of the major suits being good 
enough for a bid, he goes no-trumps. 

No-trump bids should be arrived at by a process of 
elimination, after examining the hand for the material 
necessary for a good suit bid. Instead of this, many 
persons seem to look for the no-trumper first, and get so 
into the habit of expecting to find one that they gradually 
get down to bidding no-trumps on an ace and two hopes, 
just because they do not want to disappoint themselves, 
apparently. 

If the opponents have strong hands, they argue, the 
no-trumper will not be left in, and it will take a bid of 
two tricks to get the contract. But this is trusting your 
adversary to rescue you from a dangerous situation when 
your partner cannot do so, which is always a hazardous 
experiment. Nothing is to be gained by making free 
bids that misrepresent the true strength of the hand, and 
no-trumpers that are not up to conventional standard are 
even worse than weak suit bids. 

All free bids should be controlled by the condition 
that the hand shall be above average; that is, it should 
contain at least four tricks for attack, or two for defence. 
But there are a number of hands that are quite as strong 
as this, but offer no legitimate major-suit bid, and at the 
same time are too strong to waste on a minor suit, at the 
risk of being left to play it. To pass with such hands is 
wasting opportunities, because the partner will be left 
under the impression that you have nothing more than 
100 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


101 


average, if that, whereas you may really have the strong¬ 
est hand at the table, and with his help could win the game. 

As already explained, there are thirteen tricks to 
be played for in every hand, so that the average for each 
player would be three-and-a-quarter. If any player has 
more than his share, four tricks, or better, counting his 
cards at their attacking value, he should be able to 
make a bid of some kind, unless the distribution is very 
peculiar or unfavorable. 

The important thing to remember is that all free bids 
are attacking bids, because the bidder expects that 
either he or his partner will play the hand, therefore all 
high cards must be counted according to their bidding 
values, instead of their face values. This will make the 
aces worth two tricks each, kings one and queens half a 
trick. While the various combinations of high cards and 
their values have already been given in detail in the chap¬ 
ter on Bidding Values, for the sake of clearness, the fol¬ 
lowing summary is given here: 


5 Cards 

4 Cards 

Attack 

Defence 

A K Q x x 

A K J x x 


5 

2J 

A K x x x 

A K Q J 



A Q J x x 

AKQ10 

4 

2 

K Q J x x 

A K Q x 



A Q 10 x x 

A K J 10 



A J 10 x x 

A Q J 10 

3 

n 

K Q 10 x x 

K Q J 10 



A Q x x x 

A K J x 



A J x x x 

A Q J x 

2 

i 

K Q x x x 

K Q J x 



K J 10 x x 

K J 10 x 

n 

i 

Q J 10 x x 

Q J 10 x 

i 



102 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


While all bids are made upon attacking values, it should 
be observed that in counting the hand for defensive 
purposes, these attacking values are reduced just one- 
half. If the combination in the suit named by the 
bidder is not up to the four-trick attacking standard, there 
must be enough in some other suit or suits to bring 
the hand up to that standard as a whole, and at least two 
tricks should be in the suit itself. That is why the last 
two combinations shown are not good suit bids, but they 
have their value as supporting suits, especially as part 
of no-trumpers. 

There are a number of hands that are fully up to 
bidding standard, so far as the total strength is concerned, 
but it is so divided up that no individual suit looks like 
a good bid, and the major suits are not long enough. 
These hands are almost invariably no-trumpers, if three 
of the four suits are protected, a protected suit being one 
that the opponents cannot run down against you. 

There are some timid players who will not bid no-trumps 
if any one of the four suits is defenceless. The curious 
part of it is that the shorter the suit the more they are 
afraid of it, whereas they should know that the more 
cards there are to be distributed among the other players, 
the greater the probability that their partner will have 
enough to stop it. This waiting for all four suits to make 
a bid of no-trumps will never win at auction, yet many 
persons who are afraid to go no-trumps on three suits will 
make the most ridiculous suit bids and hope to win on 
them. 

When a player bids a minor suit, he does not partic¬ 
ularly want that suit to be the trump, although it is 
the best he has. He wants his partner to play the hand, 
and offers to help him along with a couple of tricks. 
But when he bids a major suit, he wants to play the 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


103 


hand himself, and asks his partner to support him. In 
both these opening bids the exact location of the player's 
strength is indicated by naming the suit. 

But when a player bids no-trump, holding protection 
in three suits, he gives no indication as to the suit in 
which he is defenceless, but he promises to win more than 
his share of the thirteen tricks, if left to play the hand, 
or to furnish a sort of all-round support for anything 
his partner may think safer than a no-trumper, or equally 
profitable. 

The typical no-trumper is a sure trick in each of 
three suits, and the type usually selected to represent it 
is three aces. But there are a great many hands that are 
perfect no-trumpers which do not contain three aces. 
They are still good opening bids if they can show the 
equivalent of three aces, and three suits are safely stopped. 

For practical purposes the hand that has the equiva¬ 
lent of the aces, instead of just the aces, is often the 
better hand when it comes to the play, and there should 
be no hesitation about bidding such hands. It may not 
be as strong when counted up for its bidding values as a 
defence, but it will often take more tricks in attack. 
Compare these hands: 


No. 9 
y A 4 3 
$ 652 
0 A 7 4 2 
4^ A 10 7 


No. 10 
S? K Q 4 
« 652 
<c> Q J 10 5 
4> A 9 7 


In No. 9 there are three aces, each of which will stop 
a suit and win one certain trick, to say nothing about 
promoting smaller cards in the partner's hand. But 
the king and queen of a suit will also stop it and win one 


104 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


certain trick, just as surely as an ace, and they may win 
two tricks, which is impossible for the ace. The same 
is true of the queen-jack-ten combination, so far as stop¬ 
ping the suit and winning one trick goes. No good player 
will make a free bid on a suit that is only queen-jack-ten 
high, because the defence is not there, but when it is one 
of three suits that are pretty strong, that is another 
matter. He does not name that suit for the trump, 
but bids on the three suits collectively, and relies on his 
queen-jack-ten suit as a stopper; as part of a no-trumper. 
All the no-trump bid promises to do is to stop or protect 
three suits. It does not promise to win three or four 
tricks in any of them. That is the province of the suit 
bids. 

If we examine hand No. 10 and pick out the high cards 
in it, regardless of the suits, we shall find that it contains 
A K Q Q J 10. As there are four of each of the high 
cards in the pack and the share of each player would be 
one ace, one king, one queen, and so on, this hand is clearly 
a queen above average, and that has been established as 
the lowest average for a free bid of one no-trump. 

If we count up the tricks in No. 10 at their attacking 
value, even throwing out the diamond suit altogether, 
we still have four for attack and two for defence, which is 
all that is necessary for a free bid. We cannot bid a heart 
or a spade, because the length is not there. We cannot 
bid either of the minor suits, because the strength is lack¬ 
ing. By this process of elimination we arrive at the only 
bid left, no-trumps, as the hand is too strong to pass 
without a bid of some kind. 

It is not considered safe to bid no-trumps without 
at least one ace in the hand, unless all four suits are 
stopped, but many hands with only one ace are better 
playing hands then if they had two, because the two 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


105 


smaller honors may both win tricks; the ace never more 
than the one. For example: 



No. 

11 


No. 12 


A G 

4 


K J 8 4 

<£> 

A J 

3 2 

❖ 

A J 3 2 

0 

7 2 



7 2 

❖ 

K J 

8 4 

❖ 

K Q 4 


The only difference in these two hands is that instead 
of the ace of hearts in No. 11, we have substituted a 
king and a queen, the king being in hearts, the queen in 
spades. Both hands are alike in attacking values, five 
tricks. Both are alike for defensive purposes, two-and- 
a-half tricks; but No. 12 would probably win more tricks 
in play than No. 11. 

Many players object to bidding no-trumps on hands 
that cannot stand a major-suit bid from the partner, unless 
the hand contains a suit that can be bid in case the part^ 
ner should take out the no-trumper with a major suit. 
They argue, with reason, that some one is sure to bid a 
suit in which they have nothing, if the bid is passed, but 
if they bid no-trumps, the player with that suit will sit 
tight and lead it, if he is an adversary, and will defeat 
the no-trumper. Here are two typical hands: 


No. 13 
7 A 4 2 
<?> K Q 7 6 3 
o K 10 7 5 
❖ 5 


No. 14 
K 6 2 

<S> AKJ74 
0 A 8 6 2 
❖ 5 


In No. 13, if the bid is no-trump, and the partner 
says two spades, he must not be left to play it, as we shall 


106 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


see when we come to the chapter on take-out bids. The 
hand is hardly good enough to go to three clubs or dia¬ 
monds. But in No. 14, should the partner bid the spades 
there is a sound three club bid. Then, if he has the tops 
in spades, he will go back to no-trumps. 

Some players will bid no-trumps on hands that are 
only just average; that is, three tricks at the most 
liberal estimate, especially if they are second bidder and 
the dealer has passed without a bid. This is the best 
possible position for a free bid; one weak adversary 
and a partner who has yet to declare, and good players 


are quick to take advantage of it, 

. Here are 

mens from duplicate tournaments: 




No. 15 


No. 16 

7 

A 5 4 3 


K 7 

❖ 

Q J 7 5 

❖ 

Q 9 3 

0 

K 8 7 3 

0 

K Q 6 

❖ 

4 

❖ 

J 10 9 


If we pick out the high cards in No. 15, we find one 
of each only, and no ten. It is therefore just average. 
Its bidding value is all in the red suits, and is only three 
tricks. If the king-queen of diamonds in No. 16 is 
called equal to an ace, the hand is exactly average in high 
cards. Its bidding value is the same as No. 15. When 
such bids go through, especially if they win the game, 
it will usually be found that the partner had the real 
no-trumper. 

One of the worst faults at auction is bidding no-trumps 
on hands that are good major-suit bids. The two 
following hands were both bid as no-trumpers in a dupli¬ 
cate game of seven tables: 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


107 


No. 17 

9 A K 10 6 5 
<£7 4 


7 A 

<£ Q 10 4 2 
0 A J 6 
£ Q J 7 5 3 


No. 18 


0 A J 10 
<£ A Q 3 


There was no further bidding upon either, but the 
opponents set the contract in both cases. Against No. 17 
they made the queen of hearts, king of diamonds, and five 
clubs. Against No. 18 they won four hearts, three clubs 
and a diamond trick. At every table at which the proper 
declarations were made, hearts on No. 17 and spades on 
No. 18, the bidder went game. 

As a general proposition, no-trumpers may be roughly 
defined as hands in which three suits are stopped, but 
there is no major-suit bid, or the hand is too good to risk 
being left to play with a minor suit for the trump. There 
are some exceptions, of course, which should be explained 
for the benefit of the beginner. 

We have seen that there are some two-suiters that 
start with a bid in a minor suit, because that is the 
stronger, and then shift to a major suit, because it has 
the length, five or six cards; but not the strength. In the 
same way there are a number of three-suiters that have the 
length for a major suit, but not the tops, and which offer 
an alternative; to bid a weak major suit with fine out¬ 
side help, or to bid no-trump. 

These hands are usually in the class which are known 
as too strong to pass. The danger lies in having the hand 
thrown up without a bid if the remaining strength is about 
evenly distributed; or in having the no-trumper fail 
where the suit would have succeeded. Here is a hand that 
went the rounds of seven tables in a duplicate match, 
which is typical of its class: 


108 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


No. 15 


❖ 

0 

❖ 


7 Q 10 5 
<£ K Q 7 4 
0 9 3 
J 6 5 2 

7 
0 



S? A J 3 
eg) A 9 5 

0 Qj 

<g> K 8 7 4 3 


K 8 4 2 
10 8 2 
K 8 6 5 
A 9 


At two tables Z passed without a bid, waiting to 
hear from the others, and the hand was put back in the 
tray without being played. At three tables Z bid no- 
trump, and A led a diamond, winning five tricks in that 
suit and the ace of spades. At the other tables Z bid a 
spade originally and at one of them he went game. The 
others missed the game by one trick, through not leading 
the trump from Y’s hand, going right up with the king 
and returning a small one, which brought down the ace 
and queen together. 

While the general definition of a no-trumper is this 
protection in three suits, and above average in high cards, 
there are a number of hands in which the high average is 
present, but the protection in three suits is not. 

These are popularly known as sporty no-trumpers. 
Experience and calculation agree that if the strength 
is sufficient to make up for the weakness in two suits, 
and there is not length enough for a major-suit bid, 
the best bid on the hand is no-trumps. 

If the ordinary no-trumper can be satisfied with one 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


109 


sure trick in the third suit, the theory seems to be that if 
there are only two suits, they should jointly show strength 
enough to make up for the suit that should have a stopper 
in it. Here are two examples of the more common type of 
sporty no-trumpers: 


No. 19 


No. 20 


^ 7 5 3 2 

A K Q 6 4 2 
0 A 5 3 
❖ - 


S? a K 6 
A K Q 4 
0 9 5 3 
£ 742 


In either of these, the dummy must lay down a Yar¬ 
borough if the adversaries can run down enough in two 
suits to set the contract. In No. 19, if the partner goes 
to spades, or the adversaries bid anything, there is a good 
shift to clubs. In No. 20, if the adversaries get the con¬ 
tract, this hand should at least save the game; or win it, 
if the partner has anything. Some authorities recommend 
bidding no-trumps on two suits that are each only ace-king 
high. This may be all right if the bidder can support 
a major-suit take-out by his partner, but it looks like a 
rash bid, especially against good players. 

The question of following up no-trump bids when they 
are overcalled by the opponents, or taken out by the part¬ 
ner, will be found in the chapters on Denying Partner’s 
No-trumpers, Major-suit Take-outs, and Rebidding the 
Hand, 


DEFENSIVE BIDS 


Returning for a moment to first principles, we have 
seen that the foundation of good bidding depends upon 
restricting the initial or free bid to hands that are not 
only good for an average of four tricks in attack; but 
for two tricks in defence, on the average. 

Auction players of all classes are usually quick enough 
to recognize the attacking value of a hand, but very few 
pay the proper attention to the defensive side of it. If 
each player were an individual, bidding on his own cards 
for his own game, all his bids would be attacking bids 
and no element of defence would be necessary, as in pi« 
nochle, for instance. But when the game is a partnership, 
in which each bases his bids more or less upon the declare 
tions made by his partner, the defensive, or assisting 
element, becomes quite as important as the attack. 

The defensive hand is one that can win tricks against 
an adverse declaration, when the opponents get the 
contract. It becomes an assisting hand if the partner 
gets the contract. The bidder’s hand should be good 
for two tricks, on the average, whichever way the bidding 
goes, even if the suit he names is not the trump. 

This naturally suggests that although the suit named 
in a free bid is practically declared as a trump suit, 
in the first place, its usefulness may be diverted into 
two distinct channels. The tricks shown may be em¬ 
ployed to sustain some other declaration by the partner, 
or to save tricks against a contract assumed by the oppo¬ 
nents. 

If the tricks that should be shown by this initial 
110 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


111 


bid are not there, and the suit named is useless except 
for purposes of attack, it is a bad bid, and should be re¬ 
served for the second round, when it will leave the partner 
under no misapprehension as to its nature. Those who 
constantly indulge in bids that are useless for defence 
are among the greatest losers at the game, and are 
always most dangerous and unreliable partners. Here 
are some examples from duplicate play: 


No. 16 

❖ 

o 

❖ 

<V> 10 9 5 2 
<£> K Q 5 
0 7 

<£> K Q 9 7 3 

7 

0 



A J 8 7 3 2 

5 4 3 

6 5 4 


At some tables, Z bid a club, on the usual excuse; 
“ six trumps and a singleton.” But clubs are not trumps, 
because no one knows what the trump will be until the last 
bid is made. A bid a spade, while he could do so cheaply, 
to show the suit he would like B to lead if Y got the con¬ 
tract. With the spades stopped twice, Y went to no- 
trumps. If Z has two tricks, either both in clubs, or one 
in clubs and one in diamonds, it is a game hand at no- 
trump, if not four odd. 

All that Y could make was the odd trick, although he 



112 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


won the first diamond lead with the ten, because there 
was no way to make more than one trick in clubs, two in 
diamonds, two in hearts, and two in spades. Give Z 
the two sure tricks for defence, or assistance, that his 
bid promised, such as ace-king, or ace-queen-jack, and 
Y goes game in a walk, even if A has three to the queen, 
Z will make five club tricks if he has both ace and king, 
by ducking the first round, as we shall see when we come 
to the chapters on playing the hands. These, with 
two spades and two hearts, win the game, even if the 
diamonds are all lost. 

At some tables Z went back to the clubs when his 
partner went no-trumps, and one table made two odd, 
with honors against him. At another table he was set a 
trick by a rather clever play of A’s, who led the singleton 
diamond and trumped the third round with the king, 
instead of the five. This led Z into a foolish finesse of 
the jack, after Y had won the spade king, and let B ruff 
the third spade. 

At the only tables at which this hand was correctly bid, 
Z passed. A bid a spade and Y passed, he having no 
legitimate bid if his partner has nothing to show. This 
is an excellent example of defensive play. There is no 
hope of game if Z has not a bid in his hand, but the ad¬ 
versaries cannot go game either. Then let them play 
the hand. 

At some tables B let the spade bid alone, and it was 
set for one trick. In one case B denied the spades with 
two diamonds, was left with that contract and set. At 
another A tried the hearts when the spades failed, and was 
set. No matter what bids were made by A and B, the 
penalties for Y and Z were more than could have been 
made by two odd in clubs, with simple honors against. 
If A passes the bid, as some might do, although his hand 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


113 


is as good as two aces, Y will bid hearts and Z will deny 
the hearts with two clubs and make it. 

Here is another example of bidding for attack only, 
and neglecting the defence: 


No. 17 





s? 

A J 5 







AKQJ 






0 

9 3 






❖ 

10 8 7 5 



K Q 

10 

9 7 

Y 

7 

8 6 4 2 

❖ 

10 6 

2 


A "R 

❖ 

8 7 4 

0 

A Q 

5 


A Jj 

0 

8 4 

❖ 

9 3 



z 

❖ 

K Q J 4 




3 




❖ 

9 5 3 






0 

K J 10 7 

6 2 





4^ 

A 6 2 



Z started with 

a 

diamond, under the 

old excuse, six 


trumps, a singleton, and an outside ace. But the dia¬ 
monds never were trumps in this hand, and all Z had for 
defence was the ace of a suit he never mentioned. A bid 
a heart. As Y could stop the hearts twice, and had four 
solid club tricks, he thought he could trust his partner for 
two tricks in diamonds. If they could pick up another 
trick anywhere, it was a game hand at no-trumps, so he 
bid it. 

B knew that Y must be able to stop the heart, so he 
avoided that suit and led a spade, forcing dummy's 
ace on the second round. The ace of hearts won the 
queen, and Y had to lead a diamond, finessing the nine, 
which went to the queen. Two rounds of hearts cleared 



114 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


them up, and dummy never made a trick in the suit he 
bid, diamonds. 

Give Z a sure trick in diamonds as well as one in spades, 
or two sure in diamonds, and it is a game hand. This was 
proved by giving Z the ace-jack-ten of diamonds, and A 
the king-queen-five. Z won the second round of spades, 
and led a heart. Four clubs followed and then one of 
the equals in spades. B returned the spade and Y led 
the nine of diamonds, passing it up. A’s hand is now 
down to three diamonds to the king-queen, and the king 
of hearts, or two diamonds and two hearts. No matter 
which it is, Y makes three odd and game at no-trump. 

The same weakness in the matter of defensive bids 
frequently develops in the second hand, when the dealer 
passes. Here is an example of it. This deal went the 
rounds of seven tables in a duplicate game: 


No 18 


7 

❖ 

o 


9 

J 4 2 
8 6 3 
K Q 7 6 


A Q J 10 6 5 

<S> 10 

0 K J 10 9 
❖ 9 8 

7 K 7 
<S> A K Q 6 3 
0 A Q 7 5 2 

<£> 3 

8 4 3 2 

9 8 7 5 

0 4 

4> A J 10 5 



Z passed, A bid a spade on the same old excuse, and Y 
said two hearts. A is looking at his spades from the 
attacking angle only, counting them as trumps. But 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


115 


they never were trumps on this deal and A never took a 
trick. B, trusting this partner for two spade tricks, 
went two no-trumps, Z supported the hearts, bidding 
three, which, as it happens could have been made. A 
went to three spades, and Y, who wanted to save the 
score for 64 in honors, bid four hearts. 

Now B stops to count. The king of hearts is a sure 
trick, A promises two tricks in spades, the clubs will 
very likely drop, and as Y must have some diamonds 
along with the hearts, the tenace in that suit should be 
good for two tricks. That is ten tricks altogether, so 
B bids four no-trumps. Z, who knew that B was lean¬ 
ing on a broken reed in the spades, doubled, and they set 
the contract for 200, just because A did not have the two 
tricks for assistance or defence that his bid promised. 
It was by just those two that the contract failed. 

Z led the heart and Y went up with the ace and led 
another round. B put dummy in with the jack of clubs, 
so as to finesse the diamond. Although this finesse suc¬ 
ceeded, he could not get A in again, as Z put up the ace of 
spades second hand and led another heart. Had B led 
the spade first, instead of the club, the result would have 
been the same, as all the hearts must make the moment 
Y or Z gets in. 

At one table Y was left to play the hand at four hearts, 
and was set for only one trick, against which he had 
64 in honors to score. The play was rather instructive. 
B led two rounds of clubs, Y trumping the second. Two 
rounds of trumps followed, B winning the second. He 
tried the spade, hoping to get his partner in to lead the 
diamond, but Z put on the ace and led another club, 
which Y trumped, keeping A out of the lead. The king 
of diamonds forced the ace and got dummy ready to 
ruff that suit. B led another club, on which Y discarded 


116 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


the losing spade, instead of trumping. Z trumped the 
next round. Then Y trumped a spade and led the 
jack of diamonds through B, allowing Z to trump the 
queen. Now the trump and the ten of diamonds win 
the last tricks. 

Some players consider it quite legitimate to bid a 
suit in which they have no defence, if they have unusual 
length, such as six or seven cards. Then they start with 
a bid of two, which they consider a warning to the part¬ 
ner that the har 1 is good for nothing if that suit is not 
the trump. That is to say, the weaker the hand the larger 
the contract they undertake with it. With a hand above 
average, good for four tricks in attack or two in defence, 
they undertake to win the odd. With a weaker hand they 
assume a contract to make two odd. This is bad bidding, 
because there is no way to distinguish a bid of this char¬ 
acter from the conventional bid of six cards or more 
with the sure tricks at the top. Take this deal as an 
example: 


No. 19 


v 

<?> 

0 

❖ 


<$> 

0 

❖ 

K 

K 8 3 2 
A Q J 7 5 3 
A 4 


Q 10 
A 10 
K 8 6 2 
K Q 8 5 3 

❖ 
0 


■Y, 

A B 
Z 


9 8 7 
J 9 6 5 4 
4 

J 10 9 7 


7 A J 6 5 4 3 2 

❖ Q 7 

0 10 9 

£> 62 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


117 


Z started with two hearts, A bid three diamonds, and 
it finally got to four hearts, but Z could not make more 
than three odd, in spite of dummy’s wonderful hand 
because he lost the trick to the king of hearts by finessing, 
after B had trumped the king of diamonds and led a spade 
which A won and returned. 

When Z passed without a bid, A went no-trump, and 
at one table B tool: him out with two clubs. At others 
B left the no-trumper alone. In either case Z bid two 
hearts. This left Y under no misconception as to the 
strength of his partner’s heart suit, and when A shifted 
to three diamonds, Y doubled. When A pulled himself 
out of the double with four clubs, Y doubled that also. 
The club contract was set for 200, the diamond contract 
for 200. 

The table that played the hand at diamonds brought 
out some instructive tactics. Y led the queen of hearts 
and the ace dropped the king. Z returned the deuce of 
hearts. This shows careful play, because if Y has the 
ten, he can shut out dummy’s nine. If he has not the 
ten, he can trump. A trumped the heart, and led 
the queen of trumps, which held. Then he followed with 
the ace and jack, Y winning the third round with the 
king, while B discarded two clubs and Z a heart. 

After pulling one of A’s trumps, Y led the king of 
spades, and A returned the suit, getting two club dis¬ 
cards on the jack and ten of spades, but losing two clubs 
at the end, as Y would not lead clubs after winning the 
second round of spades. 

One of the most common results of leading the partner 
to believe that the original bidder has two tricks in his 
hand is to induce a double that is unsound, when the 
double seems better than bidding higher. Here is an 
example of it: 


118 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


No. 20 


0 

<$> 


K Q 10 
A Q 8 
8 

A Q 2 



s? 

❖ 

0 

❖ 


S? 3 
$ K9 
0 9 6 4 3 
<> K J 10 8 6 4 


8 6 2 
J 6 4 3 
J 10 7 5 2 
9 


Z bid a spade, A two hearts and Y two spades. When 
B and Z passed, A went to three hearts, Y three spades 
and A to four hearts. Y now figured up the situation as 
he saw it. He can make two heart tricks, has three top 
diamonds, and his partner has a couple of spade tricks. 
It looks like what they call a free double, as A goes gam<* 
anyway, if he makes four hearts. A also thought it 
looked like a free redouble, so he made it, and won four 
odd in hearts, worth 369 points. 

Y led two rounds of diamonds, A trumping the second. 
Y won the king of trumps and led his partner’s spad* 
suit, so as not to establish a diamond for B. If Z can 
win a spade trick it sets the contract; but A won it, and 
gave B a ruff. A then made two clubs on the finesse and 
led the queen of trumps. The only trick after that was 
the jack of hearts for Y. Give Z just one sure trick in 
his whole hand, in spades or clubs, and it makes a differ¬ 
ence of 553 points. If Z had two tricks, 753. 

The defensive bid may also come into play when the 
partner, especially if that partner is the dealer, has passed 
without a bid, as we shall see in the next chapter. 



WHEN THE DEALER PASSES 


When the dealer refuses to bid, the second player 
should be governed by the same principles as if he were 
the dealer, and the first to speak. The only difference, 
perhaps, is that a little more latitude is allowed in the 
matter of no-trumpers, because it may be assumed that 
there is one weak adversary, on the right, while the part¬ 
ner of the one who is bidding has yet to speak. 

The dealer assumes an equal distribution of the winning 
cards among the three hands. If he has a hand that 
is good for four tricks or better in play, there is no appar¬ 
ent reason why his partner should not have his share of 
the remaining nine. But when the dealer passes without 
showing any such strength, the second hand may take a 
reasonable chance of finding most of the outstanding 
strength between the third and fourth hands, and bid 
accordingly. 

But this refers only to no-trumpers. There is not 
the slightest excuse for a suit declaration by the second 
hand which would not be equally sound if made by the 
dealer. 

When the dealer and second hand both pass, the third 
hand is not in any such favorable position as this, because 
if his hand is only average, there must be considerable 
strength on his left. I have found it a pretty safe rule 
for the third hand, when called upon to make the first 
bid, never to declare no-trumps unless he can win at 
least six tricks himself, because he has no right to depend 
upon his partner for two assisting tricks, when that part- 
119 


120 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


ner has passed without a bid. This optimistic calling 
on a confessedly weak hand to produce a number of 
winning cards is a common failing. 

Some players insist that if the third hand is a trick 
stronger than would be required for the dealer’s declara¬ 
tions, it is enough to justify a bid. In applying this 
principle to suit bids and no-trumpers indiscriminately, 
I think they make a mistake. A no-trumper should be 
much stronger than this, and should have at least six 
tricks for attack and three or four for defence, with no 
legitimate suit bid. 

In the matter of suit bids, on the contrary, this extra 
strength is not necessary because the player is prac¬ 
tically on the defensive, his principal care being to pro¬ 
tect himself against a big hand on his left. With a view 
to this protection, the third bidder should invariably 
seize the opportunity to show any suit that he thinks 
might be led to advantage, so that the weak partner, 
who has passed without a bid, may be in no doubt as 
to the best defence, in case the fourth hand gets the 
contract. 

Any suit that is good for two quick tricks in defence 
should be named under such circumstances, and always in 
preference to a no-trumper that is not almost a certainty, 
even if the hand looks good enough for that contract. 
This rushing to no-trumps with all the strength probably 
on the left is a dangerous experiment. 

These third-hand bids on suits frequently turn out 
to be useful in reopening the bidding without any serious 
risk, and may give a partner who has passed with a good 
secondary bid in his cards a chance to declare himself. 
Unless the fourth hand is unusually strong, he may refuse 
to bid if the third hand passes, and the deal will be thrown 
out, Here is a case in point: 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


121 


No. 21 


S? 

cjb 

0 


S? J 10 3 2 
$ AQJ6 
0 10 9 3 

0 Q 3 


Q 6 
K 8 4 
J 8 7 2 
A 9 4 2 



^ K 8 7 5 4 
<?> 10 9 3 2 
0 Q 

0 K 10 6 


A 9 
7 5 

A K 6 5 4 
J 8 7 5 


Z dealt and passed. A had not the courage to bid 
no-trumps and Y passed, on the old theory that he 
should be at least a trick stronger as third hand than 
would be necessary as dealer or second hand. B wisely 
refused to open the bidding, for fear of letting in a 
secondary bid of some kind that might take him beyond 
his depth, so the deal was passed on without being 
played. 

This happened at several tables, but when Y very 
properly made a defensive club bid third hand. B over- 
called it with a diamond and Z with a heart. This was 
carried up to three hearts, and Z went game on the con¬ 
tract. A led a small spade, and dummy put on the queen 
second hand, leading the jack of trumps to coax a cover. 
Not getting it, Z played the king and returned a small 
trump, knocking the ace and queen together. B led 
one round of diamonds and then returned to the spades. 
Z put the king on the jack, A won the trick with the 
ace and came back with the diamond. Z trumped this 
trick, ran the nine of clubs through and went game. A 



122 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


diamond opening from A’s hand originally works out the 
same way. 

A very common mistake is for the third hand to over¬ 
call a second hand bid with an attacking bid when he is 
not in a favorable attacking position, the dealer having 
passed without a bid. Here is an example of this fault: 


No. 22 


S? 

❖ 

0 

❖ 


❖ 

0 

4^ 

J 8 3 
10 6 2 
A K J 8 2 
8 5 


9 4 

A Q J 5 
Q 3 

K 10 7 4 3 

c§> 
0 
❖ 


K Q 10 6 2 
9 7 4 
6 4 
A Q J 



S? A 7 5 
<s> K 8 3 
0 10 9 7 5 

4> 9 6 2 


Z passed and A bid a diamond. Y overcalled this with 
a spade and B said two hearts, which held the contract. 
This is a bad spade bid in Y’s position, as he is clearly 
on the defensive, his partner having a hand below aver¬ 
age, and one adversary showing a good suit, which the 
other adversary is sure to take advantage of. Y’s first 
thought should have been to show a suit in which he could 
offer some defence to the impending attack. He should 
have bid two clubs. 

As Y had indicated the spades, Z led the nine, and 
B won it with the jack, put A in with a diamond to lead 
another spade through Y, and then discarded one of 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


123 


dummy’s clubs on the third spade. Another round of 
diamonds dropped the queen, and a small diamond set 
up the suit, as B overtrumped Y and led a trump, which 
A won with the jack. Two rounds of diamonds followed, 
Z being allowed to trump the last, while B got rid of two 
clubs, so that two trumps and a club was all Z could make. 
If Y had bid his hand correctly, for defence, reserving 
the spade suit for a secondary bid, if necessary, he saves 
the game at once, as Z will lead the club, and the ace 
of trumps must make later. 

When the bid is passed up to the fourth hand, he 
should be unusually strong to make a bid of any kind 
or he is liable to run into a trap by opening the bidding 
to the opponents, who may get started on some strong 
secondary bid, which will carry the fourth hand beyond 
his depth. 

Good players think six or seven tricks the minimum 
for the fourth hand to justify a free bid. In the first 
place, he has a weak partner, a partner who has passed, 
although in the best possible position for bidding on an 
average hand. In the second place, unless he can go 
game he is running the risk of being set, or overcalled 
and losing points, when he might have thrown up the 
nand and had a new deal by his partner. While it is 
true that a fourth hand bid will often score, the few points 
made upon some occasions are not worth the risk of loss, 
and if there is not a fair prospect of game, with even 
moderate assistance from the partner, it is better to 
throw up the hand. 

The fourth hand bids on the bidding, not on his cards. 
As we shall see in a future chapter, the fourth hand is in 
the best possible position to bid, as he can take full 
advantage of the information afforded by preceding 
bids; but when there are no such bids he surrenders this 


124 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


advantage to the enemy, without any compensating 
benefits, unless he can go game. 

Bids made in any of these positions, second, third, or 
fourth hand, after bidding has been started by another 
player, will be dealt with in a future chapter, devoted 
to that part of the subject. 


THE PARTNER 


Leaving out of the question for the present the reasons 
for the bids made by the opponents, after a free bid 
has started things, let us confine our attention to the 
player sitting opposite to the one who makes the first, 
or original free bid. For the sake of clearness, we shall 
assume that this bid is made by the dealer, and that we 
are learning the duties of his partner. If the first bid is 
made by the second hand, the dealer having passed, the 
position occupied by the fourth hand is much the same 
as that of the third hand, when the dealer bids; but 
if the third hand makes the first bid, the situation is 
entirely changed. That part of the bidding will come 
later. 

The first thing for the partner to remember is that the 
dealer cannot make a declaration to win less than seven 
tricks out of the thirteen. But he constantly and con¬ 
sistently bids to win those seven tricks when he has only 
four in his own hand. He is bidding on the average ex¬ 
pectation that his partner will win three of the remaining 
nine, because until the bidding demonstrates that this 
expectation will not be fulfilled, there is no reason to 
believe that his partner will be any weaker, or any 
stronger, than any of the three among whom the nine 
outstanding tricks are distributed. 

The next thing for the partner to remember is that 
his average share of the outstanding nine tricks is already 
included in the dealer’s bid. This is the important 
point. 


125 


126 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Sometimes the partner will have more, sometimes less 
than his share. It therefore becomes his duty, under 
certain circumstances, to tell the dealer which it is. 
If the partner advances the bid, he must hold more than 
his share of the tricks, otherwise he is practically 
bidding the same tricks twice over, or rebidding the 
tricks that the dealer has already included in the original 
bid. 

With this elementary but important point firmly fixed 
in mind, we are ready to consider the partner’s duties 
when the dealer makes the first bid. These duties may 
be roughly divided into three groups: 

1. To assist him when he has started aright. 

2. To warn him when he is in wrong. 

3. To accept the assistance he offers, if you have a 
better declaration. 

The first of these comes into play only after the dealer 
has been overcalled by an opponent, because if the 
dealer gets the contract without opposition, he will 
learn all about your assistance quickly enough when you 
lay down dummy’s cards. One of the greatest mis¬ 
takes is to increase the bid when there is no object in 
doing so, but it is a common error. One constantly 
sees players going two no-trumps when their partner 
has bid one, although no one has overcalled and there 
is nothing to be afraid of. When this is done on hands 
that do not quite justify it, and the dealer turns out to 
have what is known as a border-line no-trumper, the 
contract often fails by just that one trick. When it is 
done on suit bids, it may result in losing an opportunity 
for gathering valuable penalties or information, or even 
shutting out proposed secondary bids. Here is a curious 
example of it: 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


127 


No. 23 


❖ 

0 

❖ 


Q 9 8 2 
A Q 
0 A 7 

9 8 6 3 2 


J 7 6 4 
7 4 3 
K J 9 5 
A Q 



0 

❖ 


S? A K 10 5 3 
« J5 

0 Q 

0 K J 10 7 4 


K 10 9 8 6 2 
10 8 6 4 3 2 
5 


Z bid a spade, the higher ranking of two equal suits. 
When A passed, Y enthusiastically bid two spades, and 
B passed. In the face of this unexpected support, which 
looked as if Y’s hand was good for nothing but spades, 
and that he -was afraid of an adverse heart bid, Z passed, 
and A led the hearts, to avoid leading away from the 
minor tenace in diamonds. B trumped and led a diamond, 
queen, king and ace falling. A trump from Y went to 
A’s queen. On this trick B discarded the ten of clubs, 
and A led a club, so that B made the king and saved the 
game. B would overcall one spade, but Y bid two. 

If Y lets the spade bid alone, he can support it if 
B bids hearts. Had he passed, Z would have bid two 
hearts and made game, or perhaps even five by cards if 
A opens with a diamond, as the lone queen wins the first 
diamond trick, and all the trumps can be caught. 

The second and third of the partner’s duties may be 
brought into play either with or without an intervening 
bid from the opponents. 

The great secret of success in auction being to dis- 



128 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


cover the best bid for the combined hands, and to carry 
it to the limit of safety when it is opposed, the art of 
modern bidding is to know where that limit lies. One 
may lose just as much by stopping too soon as by 
going too far. 

Probably the most important and certainly the most 
neglected duty of the partner, is to warn the dealer when 
he is upon unsafe ground, or appears to be so. Every 
free bid is made on general principles, and assumes normal 
distribution. No one makes a bid on the assumption 
that some unusual distribution of the cards will be found 
in the other hands. If the distribution is normal, any 
conventional free bid is safe. But if the distribution is 
not normal, a perfectly sound bid may get the player into 
serious trouble. Any one will bid a spade on five to the 
ace-king, and will continue to make that declaration as 
long as one plays auction, no matter how often it turns 
out badly; but no one expects to find seven or eight 
spades in one hand against the bid. 

It is the duty of the partner to warn the dealer when 
the distribution is not normal, if it is unfavorable; to 
support him if it is not normal, but favorable. 

There are two classes of warning bids: One is abso¬ 
lute and unmistakable; the other is only a suggestion. 

The first tells the dealer to quit his original idea of 
the hand. The second suggests something better, or 
at least safer. The absolute warning may be against 
a suit, or against persisting with a no-trumper. The 
suggestive warning is almost invariably against the 
no-trumper. 

We shall now proceed to consider these three classes of 
the partner’s duties separately, beginning with the warn¬ 
ing bids, which are usually called denials. 


DENYING PARTNER’S SUIT 


Continuing, for the sake of clearness, the supposition 
that the dealer makes the first bid, and that the reader 
occupies the position of third hand, or partner, in what 
follows, it will still be true that these principles would 
apply equally to the fourth hand if the second hand made 
the first bid. It is to avoid the interchange of the term 
partner that the terms dealer and partner are used 
throughout. 

As the majority of one-trick bids are made upon 
five-card suits, especially in the major suits, hearts and 
spades, the bidder’s partner is supposed to have his share 
of the remaining eight, which would be nearer three than 
two, therefore two is distinctly below average, while 
three may be called average. 

These three may be all small ones, and still be con¬ 
sidered as average holding. But if the partner has only 
two, one should be as good as the queen to bring the hold¬ 
ing up to average, on the old principle of high cards mak¬ 
ing up for shortness in the suit, which we have seen to hold 
true in all bidding. 

Failing three small cards of the dealer’s declared suit, 
or two, one of which is as good as the queen, it is the part¬ 
ner’s duty to warn the dealer that the distribution of 
that suit is not normal, and that he will probably find 
four in one hand against him, as the odds are in favor 
of the distribution being 4-2, or 5-1, rather than 3-3. 
This warning is conveyed by bidding some other suit, 
if the partner holds one W'orth bidding. This would be 
any suit that he would have declared as a free bid, or 
129 


130 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


perhaps a trifle weaker if there are five cards in it. To 
bid such a suit must always be for the purpose of deny¬ 
ing the dealer’s suit, or it must indicate a suit that is so 
much superior to the average one-trick bids made by the 
dealer that it is the better suit for the combined hands. 

These bids are all called take-outs. Whether the 
take-out is only a warning, or is a better suit, the hint to 
the dealer is the same; to drop his declaration, unless he 
is prepared to find his dummy without average support 
for the contract. If the dealer bids a heart, for instance, 
and his partner finds himself with five spades to four 
honors and an outside ace, he should certainly bid the 
spades, even if he has three or four hearts, because the 
spade holding is much superior to any average heart bid. 

These denials of a suit may arise at any stage of the 
bidding and may be carried through more than one suit 
if necessary. The principle remains the same; a prompt 
warning against a contract that the opponents will prob¬ 
ably penalize, and a suggestion of a safer or more re- 
numerative contract. This frustration of their plans, 
or the blighting of their hopes, will frequently induce 
them to start a series of bids on their own account, which 
may carry them beyond their depth. They may make 
these bids with a view to getting something out of their 
cards, after the prospect of penalties has vanished, 
or of pushing the original bidders up a bit. In all such 
tactics, they are at a disadvantage, as their hands were 
better suited to the dealer’s original declaration than 
anything else, if they could defeat his contract. 

The situation is very common, and the effect of a 
prompt warning by the partner, while it assumes a cer¬ 
tain risk on his part, usually results in shifting the risks 
of the bidding to the shoulders of the opponents. Here 
is a typical case: 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


131 


No. 24 


❖ 

0 

❖ 


^ 84 

cj> A Q 9 5 3 
0 9 8 5 4 
❖ 53 



9 3 
K 8 4 
Q J 10 6 2 
KQJ 


Z bid a heart and Y denied the suit with two clubs. 
B at once inferred that A had the hearts stopped if both 
Y and B are weak in that suit, so he bid two diamonds. 
Z accepted his partner's warning about the hearts and 
supported the clubs, bidding three. A went to three dia¬ 
monds, marking him with at least ace or king, as he can¬ 
not have much in clubs or spades; or at least not enough 
to justify him in supporting diamonds, so B went to three 
no-trumps when Y passed, and was set for two tricks and 
30 aces. 

If B had not gone to no-trumps, he would have been 
safe on the three-diamond contract, but Z would have 
overcalled it and made four clubs. The interesting point 
in the hand is that if Y does not warn Z about the hearts, 
B will bid two diamonds, and Z will go to two hearts, 
as he has the outside tricks to justify it. When A sup¬ 
ports the diamonds, Y will have to go to four clubs, just 
to deny the hearts, which is a risk that no player would 
take. Knowing nothing about A’s protection in hearts, 
but being rather afraid of that suit, B would let the three 



132 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


diamond bid stand, and as Z would go no further B 
would make his contract, with five honors. 

Taking out a suit with another suit that is better than 
the average one-trick bid does not require more than 
just enough to over call, if the take-out is in the other 
major suit, but if the take-out of a major suit is in a minor 
suit, there should be a sharp distinction between warning 
and strength. Two clubs, for instance, simply denies 
the hearts; but three clubs would show a better club 
suit than any average heart declaration, and would also 
hint at a possibility of game, either in clubs or no-trumps; 
or perhaps even at hearts, if the partner is strong enough 
to go back and take the chance on finding some hearts 
in the big club hand. Take this deal, which was left at 
hearts at four tables, two others failed to go game, as they 
shifted to no-trumps after the take-out: 


No. 25 


S? A 9 6 
10 5 

0 AKQJ62 
<J> J 5 


10 8 7 4 2 
9 8 4 

o — 

c£> A 10 9 8 3 


2 - 1 7 - 


3 Z 1 <£> K Q 6 4 


A B $ KQJ62 


0 9 7 5 3 


<n? KQJ53 
<?> A 7 3 
0 10 8 4 
❖ 72 


Z bid a heart and was left to play it. Ace and a 
small spade put B in. At two tables, he shrewdly guessed 
that Z might have to lead trumps several times to exhaust 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


133 


them, as B had none, and the thing to do was to kill the 
diamond suit by exhausting Z’s power to lead it, if pos¬ 
sible. A trumped the diamond, which held Z down to 
four odd and four honors, worth 189 points. The take¬ 
out is a laydown for five odd and nine honors in dia¬ 
monds, worth 223. Those who went to no-trump on 
the strength of the big diamond bid lost five spades. 
This hand is an example of bidding that might go back to 
the hearts, after the take-out, and still go game, as dummy 
has three good hearts; but that is a chance. Some players 
vary this play when there is an intervening bid by first 
supporting the hearts, and bidding the big suit next 
time, if they get the chance. 

I have always maintained that if the partner is unusu¬ 
ally weak in the dealer’s suit, such as one small card 
only, he should deny the suit with anything that has a 
sure trick in it, even if it is only four cards. Here is a 
deal that went the rounds of a duplicate match and not 
a single player denied the spades, although two went to 
no-trumps on a chance of that being better than spades: 

7 9 4 3 2 
<$> A J 9 7 
0 10 9 5 4 

❖ 3 

K J 6 5 
Q 8 
A K 

Q J 10 8 7 

7 Q 8 

<§> 10 4 3 2 
0 QJ 
£ A K 6 4 2 



No. 26 


s? 

❖ 

0 

❖ 



134 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Z bid a spade. Y should have denied the suit with 
two clubs. This leaves the opponents with no bid on 
which they can win the game. Instead of that Y either 
passed or went to no-trumps. At no-trumps all he could 
make was five tricks, so that take-out cost him 100 points. 
When left to play the hand at two clubs, Y could have 
made his contract. When left with the spade contract, 
Z lost 100 points and simple honors. 

When the take-out is in turn denied by the dealer, 
the situation sometimes leads to some interesting bidding. 
Here is a case in point: 


No. 27 


7 

❖ 

0 

❖ 

s? Q J 10 5 

<?> o 

0 9 4 3 2 
J 9 6 5 


6 4 

Q 10 7 5 4 
A Q J 8 

7 3 

❖ 
0 
❖ 


Y 

A B 
Z 


9 3 

A 9 8 2 
K 7 6 5 
K 8 2 


A K 8 7 2 
<f> K J 3 
0 10 

A Q 10 4 


The only table that bid this hand correctly won the 
game. Z began with a heart, A passed and Y took the 
dealer out with two diamonds. B passed the diamond 
bid and Z denied the suit with two spades, which A passed. 
Y denied the spades with three clubs, which held the con¬ 
tract. 

B led the heart through the denied suit. Z put on 




FOSTER ON AUCTION 


135 


the king and led the king of trumps. B won it and 
led another heart, hoping for a ruff, but Y was able to 
pull all B’s trumps and lead a spade, finessing the queen. 
Dummy led the ten of diamonds and Y passed it up. 
This diamond and the ace of trumps were the only tricks 
that Y lost. 

Five tables played this deal at no-trumps, sometimes 
with Y as the declarer, sometimes with Z, but only two 
of them won the game. The play that stopped two of 
the others was B’s holding off the clubs. The third 
lost his opportunity by overtaking the ten of diamonds, 
instead of passing it up. 

Whichever hand had the lead, A or B, started with a 
heart, the denied suit. Z won and started the clubs, 
B holding off until the third round, hoping his ace-nine 
might become a tenace. B then led another heart, and 
Z led the diamond, overtaking with the jack, so as to get 
the lead and make his two clubs. B won and led a small 
spade. While Z successfully finessed the queen, he had 
to give A two heart tricks, after which he won the king 
of spades with the ace and lost two spades after making 
the long heart. The student will see that if Y is going 
to depend on the spade finesse for two tricks, he should 
have put the ace of diamonds on the ten and made his 
clubs. As it was, he carried this ace home with him. 

It is equally important to deny the minor suits as 
it is to deny the hearts or spades. Many players urge 
that it is quite unnecessary to defend such a contract from 
loss, as the hand will not be played on that declaration. 
If there is no good major-suit bid between the two hands, 
they say, the opponents are sure to bid something. While 
this is true in a measure, the warning may be useful in 
other ways, especially in directing a lead when the oppo¬ 
nents get the contract. Take this case: 


136 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


No. 28 


7 

❖ 

0 

4 


A 


Q 

3 


Q 


^ J 10 

<S> 9 7 
0 A 9 8 5 4 
4 10 8 5 2 

Q 7 3 
J 8 6 5 

J 7 



S? 9 8 4 2 
<4 A K 4 3 
0 K J 6 
4 9 4 


K 6 5 
10 2 

Q 10 7 2 
A K 6 3 


Z bid a club and Y did not deny the suit. B bid a 
spade. Not knowing anything about the diamond 
situation, Z led the king of clubs and B went game. It 
does not matter what Z leads next, as B can clear the clubs 
in one round. In the actual play Z led a heart, dummy 
played the ace, and led another club. Z led another 
heart and B won it, exhausted the trumps and put dummy 
in with a heart to make all the clubs. 

When Y took his partner out with a diamond, to deny 
the clubs, B still went to spades, as no-trumps looked 
impossible against two minor suits. But in this case 
Z led the king of diamonds and followed with the small 
trump, which A won with the queen of spades. B put 
himself in with a heart to give dummy the diamond 
ruff. Then he led a small club from A’s hand. Z led 
a third diamond, which is as good as anything, and again 
A trumped. Another club cleared that suit for A, who 
had the re-entries in hearts. Z put him right in with a 
heart. 

Now what is A to do? If he leads a club, Y trumps 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


137 


with the eight, and if B over-trumps, the ten is good, and 
brings in two diamond tricks. If B over-trumps and 
leads a heart, Y ruffs and leads two rounds of diamonds, 
and Z makes the nine of trumps. Six tricks against the 
contract either way. 

There are many cases in which a suit that has been bid 
to overcall the opponents must be denied in some way, 
especially as such suits are often merely forced bids, and 
not to be trusted for the same strength as free bids. This 
should be all the more reason for warning the partner 
against them. Take this deal, which went the round 
of nine tables: 


\No. 29 




7 5 2 




<?> 

9 8 




0 

6 5 2 




❖ 

A Q 9 i 

§ 7 


7 

9 

Y 


K 10 6 

❖ 

A K Q J 

A B 

FT 

❖ 

10 7 6 2 

0 

K Q 7 

0 

J 10 9 4 3 

❖ 

K 6 5 4 2 

Z 

6 

3 


A Q J 8 4 3 



❖ 

5 4 3 




0 

A 8 




❖ 

J 10 



Z bid a 

heart and A 

a spade. 

The spade suit itself is 


not up to standard, but the supporting hand is very strong. 
At some tables A availed himself of the double, asking 
his partner to go no-trumps if he could stop the hearts, 
which B did, and Y doubled. As the contract was for 
only one trick, A did not see how it could fail, and re¬ 
doubled, which cost him 400 points, as Z would not lead 



138 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


the hearts, but started with the spades, which had not 
been mentioned when A doubled instead of bidding 
spades. Had A covered the spade jack, he would have 
lost a little slam, which would have cost him 1280 points. 
As it was, Y overtook the spade to lead a heart through, 
and got in on the second spade to lead another heart, 
making nine tricks against the no-trumper. 

The astonishing play was when A bid the spade over the 
hearts and B failed to deny the suit, when he should have 
jumped at the chance to bid two diamonds, simply as a 
warning. 

Y’s partner having refused to assist him in hearts, Z 
declined to rebid his hand. The silence of the partner 
is sometimes as potential as a bid. At one table Z did 
go to two hearts and A went to two spades. When Z 
started with a two-heart bid, A went to two spades. When 
played at spades, Y opened with his partner’s hearts, and 
the jack won the ten. Z led the jack of trumps up to 
weakness in the dummy, and A covered with the king, 
naturally expecting another heart lead. His astonish¬ 
ment may be imagined when Y proceeded to take out 
every one of his trumps before leading the heart, winning 
86 points for a little slam and four honors, with 250 or 
300 in penalties besides, according to whether the con¬ 
tract was one or two. 

If B takes his partner out with two diamonds, they can 
make four odd. If Z goes on with the hearts, all he can 
make is three by cards. 

A suit bid by the dealer will frequently be overcalled 
second hand by no-trump. In that case if the partner 
passes, or bids some other suit, it will be enough to 
deny the suit. As a rule, it is better to sit tight and say 
nothing. The opening bid has shown what to lead and 
has promised some defence in that suit. 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


139 


Many persons make the mistake of refusing to deny 
a suit because they have nothing they consider good 
enough. One may often hear the remark, “ I could not 
deny your suit, as I had no five-card suit myself.” 
The partner is not asked if he has a five-card suit, but 
if he can support the suit named, and he may have 
to answer that question with four cards only. Take 
this deal, which was played at all kinds of declara¬ 
tions and with all sorts of results. The table at which 
the double denial took place made the top score, 
although the last denial was made with a four-card suit, 
ten high: 

No. 30 

7 4 

<§> A J 3 2 

0 10 7 2 
A Q J 5 2 


7 

Q J 9 

5 3 

Y 

7 10 7 


K Q 


A B 

<§> 8 7 5 

0 

K J 8 


0 A Q 6 4 


8 7 3 


Z 

£> 10 9 6 4 



A K 8 6 2 



❖ 

10 9 6 4 



0 

9 5 3 




❖ 

K 


Z bid a 

heart. 

When left to play it, he went down 


one. At some tables Y took him out with a spade, and 
when Z left him in, holding a good honor as an excuse, Y 
went down one. At one table only did Y deny the hearts 
and Z in turn deny the spades, bidding two clubs, which 
held the contract. The result of the play certainly as¬ 
tonished the opponents. 



140 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


A led through the denied spade suit, and the king won. 
Z led the ace of hearts and followed with a small one, 
which Y trumped. Y then led three rounds of spades, 
giving Z three diamond discards. A trumped with the 
queen, and immediately led the diamond, but too late, 
as Z trumped and led a small trump, catching A’s king. 
The fifth spade from Y allowed Z to overtrump B, and a 
small heart from Z gave Y a ruff with the jack of trumps. 
Now Z makes his last trump on the diamond and leads 
the king of hearts, on which Y discards, so that the 
only tricks A and B make are the queen and eight of 
trumps. This is an example of good bidding combined 
with a little luck in the play. 

We have seen in the chapter on Bidding Values that 
the high-card combinations double their intrinsic trick¬ 
taking powers, if they are in the attacking hand, because 
of their utility in promoting the smaller cards of the same 
suit. In the trump suits, this presupposes that the part¬ 
ner will hold his normal share of the thirteen cards. The 
moment he denies the suit, showing only two, or less, this 
estimate of the promoting power of the high cards must 
be revised. 

It is obvious that if it is the opponents, and not the 
partner, that hold the majority of the small cards in a 
suit, it is their cards that will be promoted by the play 
of the high cards. This fact is familiar to every player 
who understands the value of establishing the dregs of a 
suit by forcing out the commanding cards held against 
him b3 r the declarer in a no-trumper. 

This consideration leads us to formulate this simple 
rule: The moment your partner denies a suit, the high 
cards in that suit fall automatically into the defensive 
class, and must be reckoned at their face value. This will 
reduce aces to one trick instead of two; ace-king suits. 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


141 


or ace-queen-jack, to two tricks instead of four, and 
so on through the list. 

Take the first example hand in this chapter, No. 24. 
The moment Y denies the hearts that suit is no longer 
good for four tricks and must be rated as two only, even 
when counting it up as part of the attacking hand; be¬ 
cause it is no longer possible to take four tricks in hearts 
with five to the ace-queen-jack, if the adversaries hold 
six or seven hearts between them, which is the fact con¬ 
veyed by the partner’s denial. 

When Z shifts from his original intention to have 
hearts for trumps, and supports the clubs, he makes two 
very important revisions in his system of estimating 
the trick-taking possibilities of his hand. The heart 
suit is now worth 2 tricks only, but the spades remain at 
2, because there has been no denial of that suit. The 
clubs, at first worth nothing, are now worth lj as trumps, 
and there are two ruffs in diamonds, worth an ace and a 
king, or 3 tricks. These ruffs are always estimated at 
defensive values, as they simply destroy the adversaries’ 
attack. They do not promote anything. As an assist¬ 
ing hand, for clubs, Z can reckon on 8| values. Y’s 
club bid is forced, and all he has in his hand is 1^ in clubs. 
But add this to the 8J in Z’s hand, and we reach a total 
of 10, which would indicate that they should be able to 
win four odd, with clubs trumps. 

Take hand No. 27, the moment Y denies the hearts, 
the values in Z’s hand fall from 4 to 2. When Z in turn 
denies the diamonds, that suit drops from 4 to 2, although 
both suits are still in the attacking hands. The spade 
values in Z’s hand remain, as that suit has not been denied. 
He adds 1 for the extra honor in trumps, if clubs are to 
be trumps, and has also a king-value ruff, total 8|. The 
diamonds in Y’s hand reduce to 2, and his clubs, although 


142 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


declared, have no intrinsic value, therefore there is nothing 
to double, yet the combined hands show 10J values, and 
should win 10 or 11 tricks, at clubs. 

The reduction of values in the partner’s hand when he 
is unable to use his trumps will be dealt with in the chap¬ 
ter on Assisting Suit Bids. 

One point to which attention should probably be called 
is that the declaration of a major suit does not neces¬ 
sarily deny the minor suit already declared by the part¬ 
ner, and therefore does not reduce its value. Original 
bids in clubs or diamonds offer assistance for any better 
declaration that the partner may have, and this offer 
will be just as readily taken advantage of with length 
or strength in the minor suit as without it. Take this 


hand as an example: 


(y A3 

V KQJ852 

<$> 10 9 5 

<?> 7 3 

0 A K 9 8 4 

0 Q J 6 

9 8 5 

❖ 73 

A’s Hand 

B’s Hand 


Z deals and bids a spade, A two diamonds, Y passes 
and B says two hearts. Z rebids the spades. A assists 
the hearts with 4J values. His hearts drop to a § in 
value as trumps, but his diamonds retain their original 
value of 4, making the hand still worth 4^ as an assist. 
It was worth 6 as a declaration in diamonds. 


DENYING PARTNER'S NO-TRUMPERS 


Continuing, for the sake of clearness, to consider the 
dealer as the first bidder and the third hand as the partner, 
although the principles of bidding are the same if the 
second hand bids first and the fourth hand is the partner, 
we come now to the duties of the partner when the dealer 
starts out with a bid of one no-trump, and the second 
player passes. 

Every bid at auction requires an answer. Every dec¬ 
laration requires some expression of approval or dis¬ 
approval from the partner. One of the most important 
of these expressions is silence; another is the take-out. 
We shall come later to the assist. 

There are two principal situations. Those in which the 
partner is afraid that the contract will fail, unless the 
dealer's hand is unusually strong, and those in which the 
partner is in a position to suggest something better, or 
safer. If the dealer starts with no-trumps and his 
partner takes him out with a suit, it must be a minor or 
a major suit, and the difference between these two marks 
the distinction between a warning and a suggestion. 

On account of the great difference between going 
game with three by cards, and working to make five odd, 
there is a well-recognized prejudice in favor of no-trumpers, 
and no good player will ask his partner to shift from a 
no-trumper to a club or a diamond while there is any 
thance that the no-trumper will succeed, if not in winning 
the game, at least in making the contract. 

All authorities are therefore agreed that if the partner 
takes the dealer out of a no-trumper with two clubs 
or two diamonds, it must be with a hand that belongs to 
143 


144 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


one of two classes; a minor suit that is so strong that game 
is reasonably certain if the dealer has a no-trumper to 
put on the table for a dummy; or, a hand that is so much 
below average that it is very doubtful if the dealer can 
fulfil his contract at no-trumps. 

In either case, the dealer must accept the bid of a 
minor suit as a warning, a request for him to drop his 
no-trumper and support the suit. If he goes back to 
no-trumps, he does so on his own hand. Just how weak 
the partner should be in order to take out a no-trumper 
with a bid of two in a minor suit is a close question, but 
the usual answer is that it should be a hand without a 
quick trick in it. That is, without an ace, or a king-queen 
suit, or even a couple of kings. Queens are of little use, 
unless accompanied by the jack and ten of the same suit. 

Good players bid no-trumps more with a view to 
showing general assistance for a safer declaration, if the 
partner has one, than with any fixed idea that the hand 
shall be played at no-trumps, and nothing else. If 
nothing else is the dealer’s view of it, he should start 
with a bid of two no-trumps, as many make a practice 
of doing when they hold 100 aces. An original no-trump 
bid also shows that the dealer is prepared to save the game 
against any bid the opponents may make, unless they 
have phenomenal hands. Bids are based on beating 
averages; not freaks. 

If it is true, as asserted by all good players, that noth¬ 
ing short of winning or saving game is worth playing 
for, it should be clear that there is not much hope of win¬ 
ning the game on a bid of one no-trump if there is not a 
trick in the dummy. If the dealer has bid the no-trumper 
on an average hand, with protection in three suits, but 
nothing wonderful in any of them, he is in a bad way both 
for assistance in the suits he has and weakness in his fourth 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


145 


suit, if dummy is going to lay down a Yarborough, or 
nothing above a jack. 

The rule for the partner when holding a trickless hand 
is to call any five-card suit, major or minor, simply as a 
warning. In the chapter on trump values, we have seen 
that five trumps headed by two sure tricks are good for four 
tricks in play, on the average. Any five trumps, without 
the tops, in the attacking hand, are good for an average 
of two tricks in play. If the partner has three trumps of 
any kind, the average for the five may be nearer three. 
If he has not as many as that, and no tops, that suit 
will not be the trump, as we have seen in the chapter on 
denying suits, therefore we may count the average value 
of five small trumps as nearer three tricks than two. 

Apply this to the bid of any five-card suit as a warning 
against the no-trumper, and we arrive at this position. 
If dummy has a trickless hand, which is of no assistance 
to a no-trumper, but can turn that hand into one which 
is good for two or three tricks, without impairing the value 
of the cards in the dealer’s hand, what can he lose by in¬ 
creasing the contract one trick? 

Suppose the dealer’s hand to be worth six tricks in play, 
and the dummy’s hand worth nothing. The combined 
hands are not good enough to win the odd trick. Advance 
the value of dummy’s hand to two or three tricks, and the 
value of the combinations goes up to eight or nine, which 
is enough, or more than enough, to fulfil the contract. 

That this is true, all authorities agree, but they restrict 
their agreement to the minor suits, although it must be 
equally true of the major suits, so far as advancing 
the trick-taking powers of the dummy hand are concerned. 
The reason for restricting the weak take-out, or rescue, 
as it is usually called, to the minor suits has been already 
explained. It is invariably a warning to drop the no- 


146 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


trumper, either because the minor suit is very strong, or 
because the whole hand is hopelessly weak. 

If the clubs or diamonds in the partner’s hand are 
strong, but not strong enough to be almost certain of game, 
it would be very bad policy to bid them over the dealer’s 
no-trumper. Suppose the partner holds six solid tricks in 
clubs. Two of these, as we have already seen, are 
included in the dealer’s original bid, leaving four extra. If 
the no-trumper is an average hand, good for three tricks, 
one in each suit, that is game at no-trumps the moment 
he gets into the lead; but he will have to find two more 
tricks somewhere to win the game in clubs or diamonds. 
With seven or eight cards in the dummy’s suit, it should 
be a game hand, if not a little slam, and the bid is then 
perfectly legitimate, even if the suit is not solid. With 
only five or six, even with the tops, the take-out in a minor 
suit is bad bidding, because that is probably the very 
thing the dealer wants to fill out his no-trumper, and the 
minor-suit take-out may frighten him off. Here is an 
example of it: 

No. 31 






9 

7 3 







6 

4 2 






0 

A 

K Q 

8 7 





❖ 

9 

3 



7 

8 

6 4 



Y 


A J 10 

❖ 

Q 

J 10 

7 

A 

p 

❖ 

K 9 

0 

J 

10 


A 

12 ) 

0 

6 5 4 3 2 

❖ 

K 

Q 8 

2 


z 


10 6 4 



K 

Q 5 2 





& 

A 

8 5 3 






0 

9 







❖ 

A 

J 7 5 





; FOSTER ON AUCTION 


147 


Z bid no-trump and Y two diamonds. Having nothing 
in diamonds, and supposing the bid to be a warning, Z 
bid two spades. As Y knew Z could not have more than 
four spades, or he would have bid that suit in the first 
place, Y went to three diamonds, and Z abandoned the 
matter, imagining Y to be very strong in diamonds. 
This is bad bidding on Y*s part. He should have gone 
back to no-trumps when Z denied the diamonds. He 
did not make his contract, two odd being all there was in 
the hand at diamonds. At every table at which Y passed, 
Z went game at no-trump, whether A led the top club or 
the small spade. This is 185 points won, instead of 36 
lost. 

The point of the minor-suit bid is this: Whether it 
is from extreme weakness or great strength, it asks the 
partner to drop the no-trumper unless he can do it all 
himself. If the dealer is strong enough to go back to 
no-trumps after the warning, well and good. Such hands 
are not uncommon. Even five small cards of a suit in 
the dummy may be enough to guarantee the dealer that 
his opponents will not be able to save the game by leading 
that suit. 

If we examine the construction of the hands on which 
no-trumpers are usually bid, it will be seen that they are 
largely built on the minor suits, because the major suits 
in them are not long enough to declare. That is one 
reason for avoiding the lead of a minor suit up to a no- 
trumper, if possible, as we shall see when we come to 
the opening leads. The warning take-out in a minor 
suit will frequently find the dealer with more support 
for that suit than for anything else, and he will be 
glad to avail himself of the shift. Here is an example 
of it: 


148 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


No. 32 

<S> 

❖ 

^ K4 

(§> K Q 10 7 4 2 

0 8 

K J 8 3 

<£ 

0 

❖ 

Z bid no-trump. A passed, realizing that there was 
little chance of going game against a no-trumper without 
an ace in his hand, even if he could get the contract at 
clubs, but he might easily save the game or set the no- 
trump contract. At some tables Y passed, and Z was 
set for three tricks, less 30 aces, as A cleared the clubs, 
and B led hearts, after winning the third diamond. 

The student will probably be interested to know that 
at the only tables at which A overcalled the no-trumper 
with two clubs, Y felt relieved from the necessity of warn¬ 
ing Z, but Z bid the diamonds and A went on with the 
clubs, bidding three, which he made. Y led the trump 
and Z got two rounds. Instead of leading the spade, 
dummy led the heart, and the finesse of the jack on the 
return lost a trick. Game is impossible against good 
play, as A cannot get the spade through twice and make 
the hearts. Had A passed, Y could have bid and made 
two diamonds, if left to try it. 

Some of these border-line no-trumpers, a a they are 




FOSTER ON AUCTION 


149 


called, have a demoralizing effect on the opponents, and 
when they are afraid of the take-out they will often refuse 
to bid. Here is a case in which they were frightened out 
of a game hand at five different tables: 

No. 33 

S? 

<£ 

0 
❖ 

S? A J 10 8 7 

<§> Q 

0 9 7 5 
0 K 8 7 4 

0 
❖ 



Counting the jack of clubs as a stopper, Z bid no- 
trump. A passed and Y bid two clubs. Although B 
had two sure tricks in clubs, he did not see much chance 
for game in spades with a no-trumper on his left, which 
he counted for tricks in all the other suits, so he passed, 
and Y made his contract. It is an invincible game hand 
at spades for A and B, no matter what Z leads, even if 
Y ruffs the third diamond. 

A no-trumper should always be ready to deny a suit 
or to go back to no-trumps. No matter what the nature 
of the take-out, the dealer should deny it if he cannot 
support it, because the same principles apply to these 
take-out bids as to any other suit bids. Here is a good 
example: 



150 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


No. 34 


S? 

❖ 

0 

❖ 





8 

7 5 






8 

7 5 4 

3 2 




0 

6 

4 3 





❖ 

7 




K 

9 4 



v 

V 

10 6 3 2 

A 

K J 



JL 

❖ 

Q 10 9 

10 

7 


A 

B 

0 

Q 8 5 

A 

Q 10 

9 5 


Z 

❖ 

8 3 2 



A 

Q J 




❖ 

6 





o A K J 9 2 
K J 6 4 


Z bid no-trump, A passed, and Y bid two clubs, which 
B passed. At some tables Z trusted his partner to stop 
the clubs and went back to no-trumps, overlooking the 
fact that a take-out in a minor suit absolutely denies 
any tricks in spades or hearts. A doubled. Y said 
nothing, having given all the warning he thought neces¬ 
sary, and Z naturally expected any lead but a club. 
A led the king of clubs to have a look, and as B played 
his second-best, the queen or no more was marked in his 
hand. The lead of the jack allowed B to lead a spade 
through, and the only spade trick Z made was the king, 
so that he was set for 300 points. It is rather curious 
that when A overcalled the clubs with two spades, he was 
set. When he went two spades over Z’s one no-trump, 
the result was the same. 

The preceding examples are all warning bids. We come 
now to the major-suit take-outs, which are suggestive 
chiefly. 



MAJOR-SUIT TAKE-OUTS 


When we come to bidding two tricks in a major suit as 
a take-out for the partner’s no-trumper, we find a great 
difference of opinion among all classes of players, some 
insisting that the bid should never be made as a rescue, 
with a weak hand, but only with strength, and strong 
probability of game. When their reasons for wishing to 
make this distinction are carefully examined, it will in¬ 
variably be found that they are weak in one of two ways. 
They are entirely based on theory, the objectors to the 
weak rescue having had no practical experience with it; 
or, these players are entirely ignorant of the modern sys¬ 
tem of denying suits. If neither of these is the reason, 
then they must have some pet private convention that 
the bid interferes with. 

In the minor suits, they agree. That is always a warn¬ 
ing, whether the partner bids on weakness or on strength. 
In the major suits, on the contrary, the partner may be 
gladly availing himself of the help offered by the original 
no-trump bid, if he is strong in either hearts or spades, as 
they are much safer contracts then no-trumps, and require 
only one more trick to win the game. 

But if the partner is in the habit of bidding two hearts 
or spades with only five small ones, and perhaps a trick¬ 
less hand, how is the dealer to distinguish such a take¬ 
out from the bid on strength? Is it a rescue or a game 
hand? If it is from strength, it is very desirable to leave 
it alone; if it is a rescue, it may be better for the dealer 
to go back to no-trumps, or bid something else. 

Many persons make a mountain out of this difficulty, 
as if there were no way to get over it. We find writers 
151 


152 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


on the game who ought to know better expressing the 
opinion that the only solution of the problem is to aban¬ 
don the weak rescue in the major suits, and to confine 
the take-out to strength. This leaves the partner in 
no doubt as to which it is. 

This sounds well, but I have failed to find in any of 
these writers anything about the losses that arise when 
the no-trumper is abandoned to its fate. In these days, 
when players bid no-trumps on an ace and two hopes, 
the old adage is truer than it ever was at bridge, “ Any¬ 
thing can happen to a no-trumper.” No losses that 
can result from a weak rescue can approach those that 
constantly arise from no rescue at all. 

There is no necessity whatever for eliminating the 
rescue simply on the ground of its ambiguity, as we shall 
see presently, because there should be no difficulty in 
finding out to which class the take-out belongs, weak or 
strong, if the original no-trumper is sound, and the players 
understand the science of denying suits. The modem 
player eliminates the no-trumper that cannot stand a take¬ 
out, which solves the problem at once. Of course, there 
are some players who have the mania for bidding no- 
trumps to such an extent that they cannot keep their 
hands off it, although it is the most dangerous bid in the 
game against good players. Against dubs, one may 
bid almost anything with impunity. The worse the bid, 
the greater certainty that they will take you out of it. 
But these pages are written for the careful player, not 
for the gambler, for he gets as much satisfaction and ex¬ 
citement in being set as in going game, apparently. 

There are two arguments advanced in favor of aban¬ 
doning the weak rescue in the major suits. One is that 
if the no-trumper is only average, and unable to take 
care of itself, while the partner’s hand is below par, the 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


153 


fourth hand will almost surely make a bid. This argu¬ 
ment presupposes that you are playing with children, 
or depending on your opponents to play your game for 
you, as neither you nor your partner are able to arrive 
at a safe declaration yourselves. 

It also overlooks the strong probability that it is the 
player on the left of the no-trumper that is strong, 
but will not declare while he has the lead against an 
alleged no-trumper, and can probably beat it. If the 
strength is in the fourth hand, and it is not vital for him 
to have a specified suit led in order to save the game, 
why should he bid? He is not going to run the risk of 
being left to play the hand, with a no-trumper over 
him on the left, if there is any chance of saving the game 
as it is. A bid in such a position simply warns the dealer 
to bid something safer, or to sit tight and beat the fourth 
hand. Here is a hand that went the round of seven tables, 
and only one player sat tight and said nothing fourth 
hand: 

S? Q 7 5 
10 

0 K 7 5 

A K J 9 6 5 

The dealer bid no-trump, second and third hands 
passing. At every table at which B asked for a spade 
lead, bidding two, the dealer at once shifted to diamonds 
and won the game. When the fourth hand said nothing, 
his partner led the jack of hearts from jack-ten-nine and 
others, and the dealer won it with the king. A diamond 
finesse let in the six spade tricks and set the contract. 

Perhaps one of the most remarkable reasons for ask¬ 
ing a partner to eliminate the weak rescue in the major 
suits, is the dealer’s assertion that he does not want it, 


154 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


even if it is safer. If his no-trumper is going to be set 
he says, he is willing to take his medicine. 

This is certainly a charmingly egotistical way of 
putting it; but what about his partner, who has to pay 
just the same amount of the loss. Why should he be 
obliged to swallow the medicine when it is not his disease? 
If the dealers who refuse to allow the weak rescue were 
forced to pay all the losses on their no-trumpers, we should 
soon hear the end of it, even if they could take all the 
gains. The balance on the wrong side of the ledger would 
soon impress itself upon attention. Why should not the 
partner have as much right to protect himself against 
no-trumpers that he cannot support, as against suit 
bids? No one objects to those take-outs. 

As pointed out in the chapter on No-trump Bids, all 
such declarations should be able to support one or both 
the major suits, or have a good secondary bid in reserve, 
in case the partner’s take-out has to be denied. Given 
a partner whose no-trump bids are sound, and this may 
be laid down as the one absolute rule in auction to which 
there is no exception. 

Never leave your partner in with a bid of one no-trump 
if you have five hearts or spades. 

This rule admits of no exceptions upon the first round 
of bids, the second hand passing. It does not matter 
what the five cards are, whether they are only nine high, 
or headed by four honors. Neither does it matter whether 
there are two or three sure tricks in the rest of the hand 
or none at all. 

I have followed this rule for years, and watched its 
working through countless duplicate games. I have 
also gone through two or three thousand of my 10,000 
recorded hands, and picked out those in which one player 
has a no-trumper and the opposite hand has five hearts 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


155 


or five spades. I spent an entire summer on this investi¬ 
gation, and the analysis shows thax with only average 
skill in the play, the take-out is worth about fifty points 
a deal on the average. For every occasional hand that 
will not reach game with the trump suit, but would have 
done so at no-trump, there are a dozen that save the game, 
win it, wind up with a better declaration than either the 
no-trump or the take-out, or get penalties. 

* Here is a deal that is historical in the club in which 
it occurred. It shows what may happen to a player 
who insists that his partner shall let him alone to “ take 
his medicine ” when he bids no-trump, if he has nothing 
but a weak rescue in a major suit: 

No. 35 

S? 10 7 2 

<£> - 

0 87432 
J 9 8 5 3 

A Q 8 4 

<j> A J 9 8 5 4 2 
0 A 
£ 4 

K9 

<£> Q 10 6 
0 K Q J 10 
A K Q 2 

Z bid no-tramp, and Y followed instructions, refusing 
to bid the spades. A led a small club and made seven 
tricks in that suit, although he expected to find the 
king with Z. On the last of the clubs, B’s first discard 
was the trey of hearts, then two diamonds and a spade, 
while Z discarded his three top spades, and then, feeling 
sure that A would not lead a heart to his partner’s first 





156 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


discard, he unguarded the king. Having nothing more 
to make, A laid down his ace of hearts, intending to fol¬ 
low with the ace of diamonds, but on catching the king 
he led another heart, and lost the last trick of all to the 
jack of spades. Little slam and 30 aces, worth 380 points. 

At spades, there is some pretty play to go game, if 
B leads a heart. After winning two heart tricks, A’s 
best play is a trump which Z wins and returns, finding A 
has no more. Then he leads a diamond. A heart forces 
Z, who makes three diamonds after pulling B’s last trump. 
Now Y makes the two last trumps and the fifth diamond. 

One point to be remembered is, that if the dealer 
does not like his partner’s take-out, he can deny it, either 
by going back to no-trumps or bidding some other suit. 
There must be something in which the two hands fit. 
The result is invariably to show the dealer whether the 
major suit take-out was from weakness or from strength. 
Here are two examples, each with a different ending: 


No. 36 


<$> 

0 

❖ 


7 95 , 

❖ 764 
0 J 7 

<j> A K 9 5 2 


K 8 2 
J 10 9 5 
A 10 8 5 2 
4 



❖ 

0 

❖ 


7 A Q 7 

A K Q 3 2 
0 K Q 9 4 
❖ 3 


J 10 6 3 

8 

6 3 

Q J 10 8 7 6 


Z bid no-trumps and Y two spades. As Z cannot 
support the spades he has the choice of going back to 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


157 


no-trumps or bidding his best suit. It is invariably 
better to bid a secondary suit, and to leave it to the part¬ 
ner to say whether the no-trumper should be the final 
declaration or not. 

When Z starts with a bid of one no-trump, Y has no 
idea of how good his hand is, or what suits were strongest. 
Y’s inference from the three-club bid is that while Z was 
protected in three suits, the spades were his weakest and 
clubs his strongest. This bid also asks Y if his spades 
are of any use as part of a no-trumper; if not, to let it 
stand at clubs. Y bid three no-trumps, and A led through 
the denied suit, Z winning four by cards. Had A led 
anything else, Z would have made five odd. 

Here is the other situation, in which not only is the take¬ 
out of no use to support a no-trumper, but the partner 
has to deny the dealer’s take-out of the first take-out. 
The hand illustrates in a remarkable manner the methods 
by which two good players will eventually arrive at the 
best declaration for the combined hands, neither of their 
opponents making any sort of a bid to guide them: 

No. 37 

cjb 
0 
❖ 

^ A 7 
(?> J 10 3 
0 8 7 6 3 
K Q 7 4 

❖ 

0 
❖ 


Q 9 6 4 3 
A 7 6 4 
5 

9 5 2 


Y 

A B 
Z 

5 

K Q 8 2 
A Q J 9 4 
A J 10 


V K J 10 8 2 

4> 95 
0 K 10 2 
6 863 



158 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Z bid no-trump and Y two hearts. Z denied the hearts 
with three diamonds, and as Y’s hearts were not of much 
use at no-trumps, if Z had none, and Y could not support 
the diamonds, he had to bid four clubs. At clubs Y won 
the game, making five odd. B opened with a heart and 
A returned the king of spades, so as to avoid the diamonds. 
A trump put Y in to lead a diamond for the finesse. The 
ace and nine followed, Y trumping the third round, after 
discarding a heart. The diamonds being set, Y led 
out the trumps, made the rest of the diamonds and estab¬ 
lished the ten of spades. 

Some writers have been at great pains to enlarge 
upon the possibilities of loss from leaving a weak rescue 
to play the hand, but in every instance these writers betray 
their ignorance of the modern system of denying suits, 
because the force of their arguments rests on leaving 
the partner to play a trump that the original no-trump 
bidder cannot support. 

Here are three hands, given by a well-known writer on 
the game, that were bid no-trumps originally, taken out 
with two spades, and failed to go game at spades, although 
they were all game hands if left alone at no-trumps: 


No. 1 

S? A 10 x x 
$ KQJ 
0 K Q x x x 
❖ x 


No. 2 
<v> A K x x 
cj) Ax 

0 K Q J x x x 
<i> x 


No. 3 

S? KlOxx 
A J 10 x 
0 Q J x 

<$> XX 


No. 1 would have made three to five odd at no-trumps. 
No. 2, five odd. No. 3, four odd. One to three odd at 
spades was the maximum, game being out of the question. 

If the reader has followed what has been said in pre¬ 
vious chapters in this book, he will readily see that this 
argument is simply sophistry, as no good player would 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


159 


leave his partner to play any of these at spades, but would 
deny the suit on No. 1 or 2; and take chances by going 
two no-trumps on No. 3. As they appear to have been 
all strong hands at no-trump, it is clear that the partner 
must have had some tops in spades, and in answer to the 
denial of that suit would have gone back to no-trumps. 

Here is a hand from a large duplicate game which is 
so nearly like No. 2 that it may serve as an illustration 
of the manner in which such a major-suit take-out would 
be handled: 

No. 38 

S? 10 8 4 
❖ 8 

0 J 7 4 2 

❖ A K 8 6 4 

^ 965 
<§> 5 

0 A 10 8 3 
❖ Q J 10 7 5 

S? A Q J 2 
eg) A K 10 6 4 3 
0 K Q 

❖ 3 

Z bid no-trump, and Y two spades. Instead of leaving 
the spade contract to be slaughtered, which would be the 
advice, apparently, of the writer whose examples have 
just been quoted, Z promptly denied the spades with three 
clubs, and Y went back to three no-trumps, to show that 
if his spades are not wanted as trumps, they are still 
valuable as part of a no-trumper. The result was that 
Z made four odd, whereas neither the spade nor the 
club contract would have reached game. 

When the dealer is one who is in the habit of bidding 



s? K 7 3 

* Q J 9 7 

0 9 6 5 

❖ 92 



160 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


all sorts of no-trumpers, the weak rescue is sometimes 
very useful. All those who passed up the bid on Y’s 
hand in the following situation lost 180 points: 


No. 39 


S? 

❖ 

0 

❖ 





Q 8 7 5 






❖ 

5 






0 

8 5 2 






❖ 

Q 10 8 < 

6 2 



J 

10 


Y 


K 

4 2 

Q 

4 2 


A R 

❖ 

A 

10 7 3 

A 

J 7 

6 4 3 

ii JJ 

0 

K 

Q 10 

5 

4 


z 

❖ 

A 

9 3 




A 9 6 3 





❖ 

K J 9 8 

; 6 





0 

9 






❖ 

K J 7 





Z bid no-trump, and at every table at which this 
bid was made those who held Y’s cards and did not 
believe in the weak rescue were set for three tricks and 
30 aces. Those who took the dealer out with two spades 
and were left to play it, made three odd and four honors, 
63 points plus. 

At one table, Y, who is strongly opposed to these weak 
rescues, was driven to it by A’s foolish bid of two dia¬ 
monds. The curious thing about this hand is that it does 
not seem to have occurred to any one to go to no-trumps 
on B’s cards, even after A had shown the diamonds. 

The bidding will sometimes continue for some time 
after the take-out, because an opponent who will not bid 
against a no-trumper while he has the lead, may be quite 
willing to bid one suit against another after the no-trumper 
has been abandoned. In such cases it is invariably a 
mistake to return to no-trumps if the take-out can be 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


161 


supported, because the bidding of the opponents shows 
that they are afraid of the suit take-out, but were not 
afraid of the no-trumper. Here is a remarkable illustra¬ 
tion of this mistake, which was one of the deals played 
in the duplicate match for the championship of the United 
States at Spring Lake in 1916: 


No. 40 

7 K 9 8 7 6 3 2 
<?> 3 

0 K Q J 6 3 

S? A 

c?) 9 6 2 
0 A 10 8 7 5 2 
4> A Q 5 

S? Q J 5 
c?) A K J 8 4 
0 9 

<J> K 8 4 3 

Z bid no-trump and Y two hearts. Z passed this up, 
showing he could support the take-out, and A bid three 
diamonds. This Y doubled, to show his support for the 
heart bid. B took his partner out with three spades, 
which Z doubled, to show his stopper in that suit. When 
A passed, Y went to four hearts, and A doubled that bid, 
hoping to frighten Z back to no-trumps. In this he 
succeeded, and A doubled, and set the contract for 100 
points and 30 aces. Y should have redoubled the hearts 
or Z should have done it for him, or bid five clubs to force 
him back to hearts. The hand is a lay-down for five 
odd at hearts. The mistake is in the return to no-trumps. 

This Spring Lake hand introduces an element that is 
absent from all the preceding examples, the interference 




162 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


of a bid from the opponents. There is another variation 
that may come up, and that is a double, instead of a suit 
bid, from the adversaries. Here is a rather interesting 


case: 


No. 41 


<?> 

0 

❖ 


7 3 

<§> J 8 4 2 
<C> 10 8 4 
£ J 7 5 4 2 


10 8 6 4 
A 7 5 3 
Q 6 2 
9 3 



S? 

0 

& 


K 9 7 5 

K 7 5 3 
A K Q 10 8 


S? A Q J 2 
c$b K Q 10 9 6 
0 A J 9 
❖ 6 


Z bid no-trump, A passed and Y took out the no-trumper 
with two spades, which B doubled. The double did not 
affect Z’s bid in any way, as he would have denied the 
spades without this hint, bidding three hearts. A passed 
again, and Y denied the hearts with four clubs. When this 
got round to A, he did not think Y could make four 
clubs, and doubled, but Y did make it, losing only one 
trick in each suit but hearts. 

This looks like a very lucky club bid, quite apart from 
the luck of going game on the double. At every table 
at which Y passed, B bid two spades, asking for a lead, 
was left with it and made his contract, with 72 in honors. 

At one table, when Y denied the no-trumper with the 
spades and B doubled, Z bid the clubs, and B went to 
three spades, being set one, but having the 72 honors to 
score, so that he came out 22 ahead on the bidding. 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


163 


It was then too late for Z to bid four hearts. A good lesson 
on bidding the higher ranking suit first; hearts, not clubs. 

One of the besetting sins of the beginner is the desire 
to play every hand himself, especially at no-trumps. 
This leads him to persist in that declaration even after 
his partner has warned him against it, or has suggested 
something much safer. The theory seems to be that if 
the player can make all the tricks in the hand at ten each, 
that is better than scoring them at eight or nine only. 
Here is a curious example of this logic: 

No. 42 

S? 10 987532 
❖ 6 

0 A K 7 2 
❖ 4 

S? Q 

<?> A 10 9 5 

0 Q 8 5 3 
A 8 6 2 

7 A K 6 
<S> Q 8 3 2 
0 j 10 

<£> K Q 7 5 

Z bid no-trumps, Y two hearts, and Z went back to two 
no-trumps, figuring that if his partner had a long heart 
suit, five at least, they should be able to make them all at 
ten a trick. In this he succeeded, as all the hearts made, 
but not before A and B had taken home four club tricks 
and the ace of spades, saving the game. 

At another table, Y would not bid the hearts, because 
he figured that if Z had three suits stopped, one was not 
the diamond, so he did not mention the hearts, and there 
also A and B saved the game. All those who bid the 



<v> J 4 

<£> K J 7 4 
0 9 6 4 
& J 10 9 3 



164 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


hearts and played the hand at that declaration made 
either five odd or a little slam. At one table Y took out 
the no-trumper with three hearts, so as to make it em¬ 
phatic, he also figuring Z for protection in all the suits 
except diamonds, and therefore some top hearts. This 
is good bidding. 

In conclusion, my experience with those who are 
opposed to the invariable take-out with five cards of a 
major suit, regardless of their strength or of the rest of 
the hand, has been that they never gave the bid a fair 
test, and therefore know nothing about it from a practical 
standpoint. They will all take-out with six cards, but 
not with five. 

There is one phase of this take-out bid that is not 
as common now as it once was, and that is refusing to bid 
the suit because the hand is so strong that it is better to 
have the tricks worth ten apiece than eight or nine. This 
is on a par with bidding no-trumps originally on hands that 
should be major-suit bids. Here is a classical example of 
a hand that is too good to shift from no-trumps: 


No. 43 


<?> 

o 

❖ 


0 

❖ 

10 5 

8 4 

K Q J 9 3 2 
K 7 2 

S? 

❖ 

0 

❖ 


A Q J 6 4 

9 5 3 
A 8 

8 6 4 

❖ 
0 
❖ 

K 8 2 
KQ7 

10 6 4 
A Q J 3 


Y 

A B 
Z 


9 7 3 

A J 10 6 2 
7 5 

10 9 5 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


165 


Z bid no-trump. Y assumes that hearts must be Z’s 
weak suit, and with three or four sure tricks in his hand, 
why should Y reduce their value to eight, when they 
might just as well be ten. Played at no-trumps, A cleared 
the diamonds, got in on the spade finesse after Y had 
made all the hearts, and held the contract down to the 
odd trick. It is a game hand at hearts. 

Any person who will take the trouble to deal out a 
hundred hands and will pick out any of the four that 
is good enough for a sound no-trumper, and will place 
opposite this hand any of the three others that contains 
a five-card suit, will find an astonishing percentage in 
favor of the take-out. Even if it be a minor suit, clubs 
or diamonds, weak or strong, assume that it was a major 
suit and note the result. 

The moment one makes any attempt to define the 
line that shall separate strength from weakness in the 
major suits, by enumerating the number of kings, queens, 
or jacks that are essential to remove the hand from the 
stigma of being a rescue, one opens the gate for all kinds 
of border-line bids that are open to argument, and lead 
to confusion and mistrust. 

The simplest rule to follow is to bid these take-outs 
straight. If the no-trumper cannot support them, it 
should be able to deny them, either by going back to no- 
trumps or by bidding a suit. If the hand is not good 
enough to do either of these, it is the original no-trump 
bid that is at fault; not the take-out. 



REBIDDING THE HAND 


Under the old style of bidding, the character of two 
hands might be entirely different, yet the sequence of 
bids made upon them exactly the same. Which of 
several possibilities was the actual holding, the partner 
was left to guess. How often, when your partner bids 
a suit twice, can you name with any certainty six or 
eight of the cards in his hand, and their rank? On the 
other hand, how often have you nothing beyond a hazy 
idea that he has a big heart bid of some sort? 

This style of bidding inevitably leads to confusion and 
misunderstanding, which is the first thing that the modern 
bidder tries to avoid. He insists upon each holding being 
bid in such a way that the partner shall be presented with 
a fairly accurate photograph of the hand as a whole by the 
time the bids have been round twice. The first bid should 
show the genus; major-suit, minor-suit, or no-trumps. 
The next bid should show the species; all one suit, two 
suits, or which three of the four. 

There are two very common mistakes made by the aver¬ 
age player, which lead to continual friction between part¬ 
ners. One is trying to get the contract too cheaply, 
and the other is offering to pay too much for it. The 
conventional rules for the original bids should never be 
departed from under any circumstances. Then there will 
be no possibility of any misunderstanding on the part of 
the player opposite you if the opponents start something. 
As we have seen in the chapter on Original Free Bids, 
two simple rules govern the opening. 

If all you have is in one suit, you should bid it all 
at the start, and say no more about it, no matter what 
166 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


167 


happens. But if there is more in the hand than can be 
shown by the first bid, you should be ready to advance 
the bid until you have shown the limit of this outside 
strength. Here are examples of the three ordinary 
classes of bids: 


No. 1 

S? A K 8 4 3 
<$> Q 2 
0 J75 
8 6 4 


No. 2 

S? A K 8 4 3 
A 2 

0 j 7 5 
8 6 4 


No. 3 

S? A Q J 6 4 2 

Q 2 

0 j 7 5 
❖ 64 


In No. 1, the original free bid is one heart. No matter 
what bidding follows this, you have nothing more to say. 
You have bid all there is in the hand, and need not even 
deny your partner’s suit if he shifts. You are in the posi¬ 
tion of a man that goes into a partnership with the state¬ 
ment that he has a thousand dollars to put into it. No 
matter how much the other partner may talk, you can 
never make your thousand look like fifteen hundred with¬ 
out deceiving him. 

In No. 2, the first bid is one heart, but you are prepared 
to advance the bid to two, which will indicate that 
you hold a minimum of two more tricks for attack, in 
addition to the original heart bid. You are now in the 
position of a partner who has a little real estate, or a trade 
acquaintance, in addition to his thousand dollars, to put 
into the business. 

In No. 3, the original bid is two hearts, because you 
have six in suit, one more than necessary for a bid of one. 
In order not to confuse this holding with a hand that has 
tricks outside the suit named, you must bid the two at 
once. This is as if you said you had fifteen hundred to 
put into the business, but no real estate or trade affilia¬ 
tions. Having made that bid, you have nothing more 


168 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


to say, no matter what bids may follow. It is not even 
necessary to deny your partner’s suit if he shifts to spades, 
because a partner that will take-out an original two- 
trick bid must be very strong, and well able to take care 
of himself in that suit. These original two-trick bids 
in the major suits indicate that you do not care much 
whether your partner has his share of the trumps or not. 
Such bids not only relieve him from the necessity of deny¬ 
ing the suit, but they ask him not to run any risks with 
no-trumpers. 

One of the commonest mistakes made by the beginner 
is in starting with a bid of one in a suit of six cards or 
more, such as No. 3, and then advancing the bid to two 
tricks on the second round, if overcalled. Bid all there 
is in the suit itself at once. With seven cards to the ace- 
king, ace-queen-jack, or king-queen-jack, for instance, 
bid three, and with eight in suit bid four. 

Many players believe in bidding two if they have a 
suit of seven cards of a major suit that is not headed by 
two sure tricks, provided it requires no more than a king 
to fill up the hole in the suit. This is to avoid rebidding 
the hand that does not contain an ace outside. With 
eight cards of such a suit, they bid three, and with nine 
bid four. Here are examples of such hands, each re¬ 
quiring a king outside: 

A Q 10 x x x x 
A J 10 x x x x 
K Q 10 x x x x 

Any weaker combinations than these are never more 
then one-trick bids unless they are shut-outs. 

It is a mistake to start with a bid of two or more 
because of outside strength. This class of hands must be 
held in reserve for secondary bids. To bid more than one 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


169 


just because you can make it is nothing but bombast, 
and never accomplishes anything, unless the bid is in¬ 
tended as a shut-out for the other major suit, although 
such bids are very common with untaught players. Why 
should you start in an auction by bidding two dollars 
for something that you may get for one? If you are 
willing to pay two, wait until you are forced to do so. 
Such bids give the partner a wrong impression of the hand 
and may lead to serious loss. Here is a case in point: 


No. 44 


0 

❖ 


8 5 
J 9 4 
J 10 9 
J 9 3 


7 4 

10 7 5 2 
0 K 4 

<5> A K 8 7 6 2 

S? K 9 7 6 2 
c?) 8 6 3 
0 A Q 6 2 
❖ 5 
s? A Q J 10 3 
c?) A K Q 
0 7 5 
0 Q 10 4 



Z bid two hearts, which induced his partner to let 
the bid alone, and the result was that Z lost two diamond 
tricks immediately and B made two tricks in trumps 
later, saving the game. If Z starts with one heart, Y 
bids two spades, having six in suit. At the tables at which 
this was the bidding, B led through the denied suit, and 
Y made a little slam, with four honors. The heart con¬ 
tract, even with four honors in one hand, netted only 88, 
while the spade contract won 265. Overbidding a suit 
just because there are four honors in it is quite unneces¬ 
sary. 



170 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


The importance of differentiating sharply between 
these two classes of hands—those in which everything is 
shown by the first declaration and those in which out¬ 
side tricks are shown by rebidding the same suit—will 
be better understood if we pass to the other side of the 
table and examine the partner’s side of the bidding. 
Here are two hands in which the partner held almost 
precisely the same cards, but in one hand, with a bad 
bidder for the dealer, he is led into a serious loss, while 
in the other, with a good bidder for the dealer, he saves 
more than a hundred points: 

No. 45 

7 Q 10 9 3 
cj 10 4 2 
0 A J 10 
10 6 5 

^ 86 
c?) AK3 
0 9 7 4 
<i> KQJ82 

<s? A K J 7 5 2 
<S> j 7 
0 8 6 3 
9 4 

Z bid one heart, A a spade, and Y two hearts. When 
B went two spades, Z rebid his hand to three hearts, and 
A said three spades. When both Y and B passed Z 
went to four hearts, to save the game. A bid four spades, 
and Y went on to five hearts, which A doubled and set 
for 400. Y knew that he would be set, but he never im¬ 
agined it would be for so much. He is completely de¬ 
ceived by his partner’s rebids, which indicate outside 
tricks. It is true that A would have made five odd in 



Q 9 8 6 5 
K Q 5 2 
A 7 3 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


171 


spades, four honors, and 125 for game, but that is only 
206 points, so that Y and Z lose 156 by not letting them 
play it at spades. Here is the other hand: 

No. 46 

7 Q 9 8 2 
<?> A Q 6 
0 J 9 3 
10 5 3 

7 5 3 
<£ 4 2 
0 K Q 10 
cj> A Q J 9 4 

A K 10 6 4 
<£ K J 10 9 
0 7 5 2 

❖ 7 

The bidding was precisely the same as in the first 
hand given. Z started with one heart, A a spade, Y two 
hearts, B two spades and Z three hearts, rebidding the 
hand. A bid three spades, which both Y and B passed, 
and Z went to four hearts. A four spades, and Y five 
hearts, which A doubled. 

In this case Z’s rebid is sound. When Y assists the 
hearts, Z can count upon him for more than his share 
of the tricks, probably two in one of the minor suits, 
as we shall see when we come to the chapter on Assist¬ 
ing Bids. Z is therefore willing to take a sting to save 
the game, as he cannot be set more than a trick or two. 

Y does not know whether it is Z or A that is overbidding 
the hand to save the game, as both cannot be right. What 

Y is certain of is that Z has some tricks outside hearts, 
and they are not in spades, so Y bids five hearts. 

A led two rounds of spades, which allowed Z to ruff, 


Y 

A B 
Z 


S? 

❖ 

0 

4 * 


J 

8 7 5 3 
A 8 6 4 
K 8 6 2 



172 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


exhaust the trumps and give Y a diamond discard on 
the fourth club, so that he was set only one trick, less four 
honors, net loss 68. Had A been left at four spades, he 
could have made it, with four honors and game, total 197. 
This shows that Y saved 129 points by taking the sting 
to save the game, Y being confident that it would not be 
a large penalty if Z’s bidding was sound. Had A gone 
to five spades he would have been doubled and set. 

These two hands contain a double lesson. They not 
only illustrate the difference in bidding on one suit and 
on two, but they show that it is entirely unnecessary to 
make any mention of the supporting suit. No greater 
mistake can be made than for a player to start with a bid 
in a major suit and then shift to the supporting suit, 
unless his partner has denied the suit first named. Such 
bidding at once places the declarer at the mercy of a shrewd 
adversary, who can instantly place the other suits if he 
knows which two are in the hand of the first bidder. Take 
this deal, which was thought to be a reversed score, or 
the tray turned the wrong way, until it was explained: 

No. 47 

7 

o 

❖ 

A Q J 9 4 
<?> 9 6 
<0> 10 8 4 3 2 

❖ 10 

❖ 

0 


10 5 

J 10 7 3 2 
Q 9 

Q 7 6 2 
Y 

A B 
Z 

8 6 
A K Q 4 
7 5 

A K 9 5 3 


7 K 7 3 2 
c£ 8 5 
0 A K J 6 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


173 


Z bid a spade, A two hearts, Y and B passing. At 
every table but one, Z rebid his hand, two spades. A and 
Y passed, B went to three hearts, and Z to three spades, 
which held. B knew his partner had nothing but the 
heart suit, but they should be able to save the game at 
spades, which they did, but Y and Z scored 45 points 
plus on the hand. 

At one table, instead of rebidding the spades, Z bid 
his supporting suit, three clubs. This immediately opened 
A’s eyes to the situation, and when B assisted the hearts 
and Z went to three spades. A bid four hearts. He sees 
that B must be assisting on at least two tricks in diamonds, 
and if that suit makes, all that A can lose is two clubs 
and a spade. If he is set one more trick, it may save the 
game. On the play, A made five odd, as Y led two rounds 
of spades and B got a club discard on the fifth diamond. 
Nothing could have stopped A from making four odd. 
This shows a net loss of 242 points through Z’s mention¬ 
ing his supporting suit. 

It is hardly necessary to point out that this applies 
only to hands that start with a suit bid. As explained 
in the chapter on No-trump Bids, it is often necessary to 
show a suit, instead of bidding more tricks at no-trumps. 

When a player starts with a bid of one in a major suit, 
hearts or spades, and afterwards bids more, it does not 
matter whether his partner has assisted him in the 
meantime or not. The rebid shows the outside tricks. 
One of the striking features of modern bidding is the cer¬ 
tainty with which these outside tricks may sometimes 
be named by the partner, although the suit has not been 
even mentioned. A good player, with confidence in 
his partner’s bidding, can often take advantage of situ¬ 
ations that would be absolutely beyond the average player. 
Take this hand as an example; 


174 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


No. 48 


<s? 

* 

0 


❖ 

0 

❖ 

10 

A K J 6 4 2 
8 

10 8 7 6 2 

V 

❖ 

0 

❖ 


K J 3 
Q 8 7 
K 9 7 6 
K 9 5 

❖ 
0 

❖ 

A Q 8 6 2 
10 9 
3 2 

A Q J 4 



9 7 5 4 

5 3 

A Q J 10 5 4 
3 


Z bid one heart. The high spades are more than enough 
to fill up the hole in the heart suit. A bid two clubs, and 
when Y assisted the hearts B shifted to three diamonds. 
Z advanced his bid to three hearts and A passed. At 
every table but one Y let the three heart bid stand, 
and Z made his contract, but he could not reach game, as 
A led a diamond, ruffed the return and made two clubs. 

At one table Y shifted to three no-trumps and won 
the game. Here is his reasoning: From his own cards, 
Y knows that Z cannot have better than ace-queen-ten 
of hearts. Anything in clubs or diamonds seems impos¬ 
sible, yet Z rebids his hand, showing that he has more 
than the filler for his heart suit. Then he must have ace- 
queen-jack, or ace-queen-ten of spades. He might as 
well lay the cards on the table. He cannot have five 
spades, or he would have bid that suit first. 

Counting his partner’s hand in this way, Y sees that 
he can stop either diamonds or clubs, and should make five 
hearts and three or four spades the moment he gets in. 
B led the club and A came through with the diamond, Y 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


175 


playing the nine. B put A in with another club, but A 
could not lead the diamond again, so that Y made four odd. 

There are two situations that require attention: those 
in which the player rebids his hand without waiting for his 
partner, or after his partner has refused to assist him, and 
those in which he rebids after his partner has assisted him. 
The reasons for the partner’s assists interlock with the 
reasons for the rebid, but they must be studied separately. 
The rule is this: 

If the original bid is made upon a hand that contains 
only one sure quick trick outside the suit named, the suit 
itself being good for the bid, the hand is worth one rebid, 
but no more, even if the partner has refused to assist, or 
has yet to speak. This assumes that the partner’s hand 
is still average, there being no reason to think other¬ 
wise, and the original bidder has an extra trick, which is 
good for two tricks in attack. To rebid a second time, 
there should be at least two sure tricks in the supporting 
hand, good for four tricks in attack. Here are two 
illustrations: 

No. 49 

0 

y 10 8 7 
<£> A J 10 2 
0 9 8 5 
Q J 3 

V 
❖ 

0 

❖ 



5 3 
K Q 
J 10 6 4 
A K 10 7 2 



176 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Z bid a heart, A and Y passed, and B bid a spade. Z 
said two hearts, without waiting for his partner, as he 
has a clear trick outside a legitimate heart bid. A assisted 
the spades. As Z is strong enough to rebid his hand, 

Y assists once, and B goes to three spades, holding an 
outside king-queen suit. Now Z and Y are done. They 
would have saved money if left to play the hand at three 
hearts and set one. Count up the A and B hands and they 
are good for nine tricks, in attack, and that is just what 
they made, both sides being bid correctly, A in the assist 
and B in the rebid. 

Just for the sake of illustration, let us change this 
hand a little, so as to give Z two outside tricks, leaving 
his partner’s hand as it is: 

No. 50 

S? K 9 4 
<?> 9 8 7 3 
0 K Q 7 
8 6 4 

S? 10 8 7 
cS> 10 6 4 2 
0 A J 10 
Q J 3 

S? A Q J 6 2 
A K 5 
0 6 3 2 
❖ 9 5 

If Z bids a heart, A and Y will pass, and B will bid a 
spade. Z bids two hearts and A assists the spades, 

Y going to three hearts, as before. Now B has no right 
to rebid his hand, because there is nothing in it but the 
spade bid. If he went to three spades, he would be 
doubled and set for 200, because Z knows to a certainty 




FOSTER ON AUCTION 


177 


that Y is assisting on diamond tricks. If left to play 
it, Z makes three hearts, but neither side can win the game. 

We therefore arrive at this rule for all rebid hands: 
Granted that the original bid should have four tricks for 
attack or two for defence, there should be two more for 
attack to rebid the hand without the partner’s assistance. 
To rebid the hand a second time, without the partner’s 
assistance, or in the face of his refusal to assist, there should 
be four more tricks for attack, counting the cards at their 
promoting value. This is to make up for the weakness 
of a partner that cannot assist, even after one rebid. 

But if the partner has assisted once, before the hand 
is to be rebid, the dealer does not require so much out¬ 
side strength, because he is informed that he will find 
more than average assistance in his partner’s hand. 
Even an outside king may be enough to justify a rebid, 
after an assist. Here is an example: 


No. 51 


v 




V 

10 3 







& 

9 8 , 

5 4 






0 

A J 

9 3 






❖ 

K 7 

3 




K 

Q J 

6 4 

Y 



A 9 

8 2 

Q 

J 10 


A 

B 

❖ 

A 6 

2 

Q 

8 



0 

10 7 

6 4 

9 

6 2 


z 


❖ 

J 4 





7 5 






❖ 

K 7 

3 






0 

K 5 

2 






❖ 

A Q 

10 

8 5 




y Z bid a spade, and A two hearts. Y assisted the spades, 
bidding two, and B went to three hearts. Z’s spade suit 



178 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


has a hole in it, which one of his kings is enough to fill. 
The other king, although worth only one trick in attack, 
is quite enough to justify a rebid after he has been assisted, 
so Z bids three spades. 

This is the limit of safe bidding. A has no rebid, and 
B cannot assist again without the risk of being set. He 
knows that A’s first bid is forced, and therefore not to be 
credited with the full strength of an original or free bid. 

Rebidding after an assist is always a continuation of 
the attack, and therefore based on attacking values. If 
two outside or extra tricks, such as an ace, or a king- 
queen suit, or two kings, are enough to justify a rebid 
without waiting for the partner’s assistance, or in spite of 
its absence, then half that strength will be sufficient, if 
the partner shows that he holds the other half, or better. 

Rebidding no-trumpers depends upon the same prin¬ 
ciples with regard to the number of tricks in the hand 
in excess of those required to justify the original no- 
trumper. As a normal no-trumper is worth about four 
or five tricks, it may be rebid with six or seven, even 
without the partner’s assistance, provided it is worth 
while to rebid it at all. 

Before any question of rebidding a no-trumper can 
arise, there must have been a bid from one or other of the 
opponents overcalling it. This is quite a different matter 
from the partner’s take-outs. The object of the opposing 
bid and the prospect of going game at no-trumps in spite 
of it, as compared with the possibility of substantial 
penalties, may complicate the situation. The usual 
outcome of being over called is a shift, instead of a rebid, 
and the mere fact of being driven into the shift is some¬ 
times very fortunate for the no-trumper. Take this 
case, which is one of the most instructive that ever came 
under my notice: 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


179 


No. 52 


❖ 

0 

❖ 





7 

6 2 





4- 

J 

10 5 





0 

7 

6 2 




K Q J 


Q 

J 10 5 



A 

10 3 


Y 


8 5 4 

9 

A 

6 

8 3 


A 

B 

<?> 

0 

2 

10 9 5 4 

8 

4 



Z 

❖ 

9 7 6 3 2 



_ 

9 







A 

K Q 8 

i 7 4 

3 



0 

K 

Q J 





❖ 

A 

K 




Z’s hand is a laydown for game in clubs, but he in¬ 
cautiously bid no-trumps. When the player on his left 
said nothing, but led the hearts, the no-trumper was set 
for 50 points, aces easy. When A thoughtlessly, or pur¬ 
posely, bid two hearts, Z took another look at his hand 
and went to five clubs. All he can possibly lose is one 
heart and one diamond, unless diamonds or spades are 
trumped immediately. 

A’s excuse was that he had five honors in one hand, 
worth 80 points. As the result proved, what he actually 
held was five losing hearts, and no honors at all. 

Almost all questions of rebidding no-trumpers are 
referred to the partner, unless the no-trumper has a very 
good secondary bid. It is then for the partner to show 
whether he can stop the adverse suit or not, and if not, 
whether he has anything of his own. This is part of the 
assisting hand, which we are about to discuss in the next 
chapter. 

An important point about rebidding hands, which 
will be illustrated in the next chapter, is this. If the 



180 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


first bid is forced, that is, more than would have been bid 
if it had been free, due allowance must be made for this 
when it comes to advancing the bid. 

For example: Dealer bids a heart and second hand 
holds a good spade bid. He is not forced to bid any more 
spades than if he had made a free bid. But reverse the 
situation. Dealer bids the spade and the second hand has 
a good heart bid. In this case he must bid two, to over¬ 
call the spades. This is a forced bid, and even if he 
would be willing to bid two hearts later had he started 
with one, he must not forget that he has already overbid 
his hand at the start. 

Keeping in view the rule that no matter how strong the 
hand, it should not be overbid unless it is conventionally 
strong enough to start with two or three, or unless it is a 
shut-out, the player is nevertheless prepared to go on 
rebidding as long as he finds any opposition. It will 
sometimes happen that two players will rebid their 
respective hands in this manner without a word from their 
partners. Take this case: 

No. 53 

❖ 
o 
❖ 

10 8 5 4 
10 9 7 
0 Q 9 5 
<j> 10 3 2 

0 
❖ 



K Q 8 4 2 
8 7 6 

AKQJ4 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


181 


Referring to our table of bidding values, we shall 
find that Z’s hearts and B’s spades are each worth 5. 
Although Z also holds 3 values in diamonds, and has a hand 
worth 8 tricks, he has no justification for bidding more 
than one heart at the start. You cannot shut out a spade 
bid with less than four or five hearts, if the opponents are 
strong enough in that suit to bid it. A passed this and 
all the following bids, as his hand was so much below 
average. Y passed because it was never necessary for 
him to assist until the last round. 

B bid one spade. He has 2 tricks in clubs, good for 
two rebids with his spade strength, but he went to four, 
and when Z stopped, Y went to five hearts. To save 
game, B bid five spades and was doubled and set for 300, 
less 81 honors. 


ASSISTING SUIT BIDS 


If you will watch the bidding that leads up to the 
majority of the contracts that fail, you will probably 
discover that the most frequent losses are due to one of 
two things: an unfortunate tendency to turn every hand 
into a no-trumper, or ignorance of the science of the 
assisting bid. With ninety-nine players out of a hundred, 
the assist is largely a mixture of guess-work and hope. 

Although the assist is the most critical part of the 
bidding in many hands, most of the text-books dismiss 
it with a few paragraphs. Those that enlarge upon it 
at all do not go beyond the first round of the bids, and 
confine the attention to cases in which the overcall 
comes at once from the second hand. Some writers 
recommend assisting with two tricks; others require 
three, and none of them tell us what constitutes a trick 
in the assisting hand, as distinguished from tricks in 
the original bid. 

The science of the assisting bid rests upon two general 
principles, which have already been explained in previous 
chapters. These are: The value of high cards in attack, 
and the trick-taking power of trumps that are not in the 
declarer’s hand. These fundamentals may be briefly 
stated afresh. 

Combinations that are good for four tricks in attack 
are good for only half that number in defence. For 
example: Five hearts to the ace-king will win four tricks 
on the average if hearts are trumps. If the opponents 
get the contract, these five hearts are not worth more than 
182 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


183 


two tricks, on the average; because they are now defen¬ 
sive; not attacking. If these five cards are part of a 
no-trumper, the same values hold true. 

Assisting bids are always for attack, and never for 
defence. Therefore all the tricks in the partner's hand 
should be counted at their attacking values. This refers 
equally to trumps and no-trumpers. 

In the trump declarations, we have already seen that 
a short suit adds nothing to the value of the declarer’s 
hand. If he has the six highest trumps they are good for 
six tricks, whether there are any singletons in his hand 
or not, and no way of playing them will make them win 
seven tricks. If he counts the trumps and then counts 
the suit he can ruff, he is simply counting the same trumps 
twice over. 

But in the partner’s hand a short or missing suit may 
add very materially to the trick-taking powers of the 
dummy-to-be. We have already seen that the ability to 
ruff the first round of a suit is equal to an ace, and a ruff 
on the second round should be equal to a king. Counting 
a ruff on the third round is a little too remote for practi¬ 
cal purposes. 

We come now to the application of these principles by 
the partner, when he is called upon to make an assisting 
bid. There are a number of complications of the situ¬ 
ation, and in order to be a first-class player one should 
understand the rule to be applied to each, the principle 
being common to all. For convenience we shall continue 
to call the bidder the dealer and the assisting hand the 
partner, although the same remarks would apply if the 
second hand made the first bid, and the fourth hand 
were the partner. 

The partner may be called upon to assist, shift, pass, 
or double, under any of the following conditions: 


184 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


1. When the second hand overcalls the dealer. 

2. When second hand passes, fourth hand over calls, 
and the dealer passes; refusing to rebid his hand, or 
double, or shift. 

3. When second hand passes, fourth hand overcalls, 
and the dealer rebids, the second hand passing. 

4. When second hand passes, fourth hand overcalls, 
the dealer rebids and the second hand assists the fourth 
hand. 

5. When the second hand passes, fourth hand overcalls, 
and the dealer shifts, or doubles. 

It is only in the first case that the partner is required 
to assist on general principles, if able to do so at all. 
In the second case, the partner must recognize that he 
will be assisting a hand that is good for nothing but the 
original bid. The third and fourth cases require a knowl¬ 
edge of the principles that govern rebid hands, which 
have been explained in the preceding chapter. Let us 
take the simplest case first, when second hand overcalls. 

The dealer having started with a bid of one trick, may 
have either of two objects in view. If it is a minor suit, 
he hopes to encourage his partner to a better declaration. 
If it is in a major suit, he would like to secure his partner’s 
assistance. As a major-suit bid must either be denied or 
assisted, we shall confine our attention to the assist for 
major-suit bids for the present. 

The dealer’s hand should be good for four tricks, 
if he is going to play the hand, and he expects his partner 
to hold his share of the remaining nine, which is three. 
The partner should also hold his share of the outstanding 
trumps, which would be three; or two, one as good as the 
queen. 

The first thing for the partner to remember is that 
all this is included in the dealer’s bid, as he does not bid 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


185 


the four tricks in his own hand alone, but has to bid 
seven. Consequently, the partner should never assist, 
or increase the bid, unless he holds more than the average 
that he is normally expected to hold; more than what is 
already included in the dealer’s declaration. If he does, 
he is bidding his cards twice over. 

The first thing, therefore, for the player to learn, 
is to count up the attacking value of his hand in tricks 
when the second hand overcalls the dealer. If he cannot 
find anything beyond average, or less, he must refuse to 
assist. We have already threshed out the subject of 
denjdng suits, so that part of it need not enter into this 
discussion. The normal trump holding is assumed. 

But if the partner holds an extra trick, he should 
assist the dealer once. He may be called upon to assist 
again, when more tricks will be necessary, but there is no 
necessity to bid more than just enough to show assistance 
the first time. If the reader has assimilated the prin¬ 
ciples set forth in the chapter on trump values, it should 
be an easy matter to appraise all such hands as the 
following: 


No. 1 
Q 6 4 

<?> a J 7 5 
❖ 4 

<£> 8 6 5 4 2 


No. 2 

7 6 5 4 2 
$ 97 
0 7 4 2 
K Q 10 6 


In each case let us suppose the dealer has started 
with one heart, overcalled by second hand with two dia¬ 
monds. Remembering that all assisting bids are attack¬ 
ing bids, and assuming that the dealer’s suit will eventu¬ 
ally prove to be the trump, we find that No. 1 is good for 
1| tricks in hearts; 2 in clubs, and a king value for the 
xuff in diamonds. The total is 4J, or one more than the 



186 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


3| normally expected, so it is good for one assist, but no 
more. 

In No. 2, the spade suit alone is good for 3 tricks, 
and the four trumps for lj more, although there is no 
ruff until the third round, which is too remote to be 
depended on. Here again the total is 4§, and good for 
one assist, but no more. 

It may perhaps be necessary in this connection to 
warn the reader again that trumps are always counted at 
trump values, therefore three to the ace is worth no 
more than three to the queen. Aces of plain suits are 
worth two tricks in play, but not the aces of trumps. 

With one original bid and one assist, if neither can 
go further, it will usually be found that the hand has been 
bid to the limit. There are occasional hands, of course, 
in which some fortunate distribution will win more, 
or some unlucky distribution will win less; but we must 
bid on averages. Take this hand. It is just a fair every¬ 
day distribution, and as such furnishes us with a good 
example of the sound original bidding and assisting that 
marks the limit of safety: 

No. 54 




7 

9 7 0 






❖ 

A J 10 






0 

K 8 7 3 






❖ 

J 9 6 





5 2 


Y 


K 

Q 8 

❖ 

9 5 2 


A B 

❖ 

Q 

8 6 4 

0 

6 4 2 


0 

A 

J 9 5 

❖ 

A K 8 

7 2 

Z 

❖ 

Q 

4 




A J 10 4 

3 





❖ 

K 7 3 






0 

Q 10 






❖ 

10 5 3 






FOSTER ON AUCTION 


187 


Z started with a heart. His king of clubs is just enough 
to fill the hole in the heart suit, and his hand can be counted 
as worth about four tricks; three in hearts, one in clubs. 
A bids a spade, holding a typical suit of five, headed by 
two sure tricks. It is now Y’s turn to assist, shift, 
double, or pass. 

His club combination is w~orth 3 tricks in attack 
and he has 1 in diamonds. His three small trumps are 
worth only half a trick and he cannot ruff anything. 
Still, he has 4J values, enough for one assist, but no 
more, so he bids two hearts. 

B's hand is also above average. He has 2 in each of 
the red suits, and half a trick in trumps. His queen and 
one small is vorth no more in spades than Y's three small 
ones in hearts. He cannot ruff anything, but he has one 
assist, and bids two spades. 

Z cannot rebid his hand, even after the assist, because 
he has nothing in it but the original bid. Neither can 
Y assist again, as he has only one trick above average. 
If our system of estimating the value of hands is correct, 
should either side go further, the contract would fail. 
Analysis will show that this is the case. Y and Z can make 
two odd at hearts, but no more. A and B can make two by 
cards at spades, but no more. The moment either side bids 
three, it should know that it cannot be made, unless there 
is something unusual about the distribution or the play. 

When the partner assists a dealer who has refused to 
rebid his hand he is in no worse position than if he 
assisted before he knew whether the dealer could afford 
to rebid or not, therefore he does not require any greater 
strength for an assist in one case than in the other. But 
when the dealer rebids his hand, either without waiting for 
his partner, or after his partner has refused to assist him, 
the partner's assist may be made with less than 4J tricks. 


188 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


As we have seen, the dealer who rebids his hand has 
enough to make due allowance for the fact that his part¬ 
ner has only average, therefore he must hold enough to 
justify his own bid, and to provide the extra trick that 
was hoped for, but not forthcoming, in the partner’s 
hand. 

The dealer having shown that he holds tricks enough 
for both bids; an assist that was not given, and his own 
advance, it should be obvious that the partner can now 
assist with less strength than would have been necessary 
for a first assist. A dealer will not rebid his hand without 
two tricks outside his bid; but if his partner has assisted 
him, he will rebid with one outside. 

As an example of this, take the following hand, in 
which the dealer rebids, and which also illustrates the point 
that if a player has been forced to bid a trick more at 
the start than he would have done with a free bid, he 
must make allowance for this over valuation if he is 
called on to rebid the hand. This point was touched 
upon lightly in the chapter on rebidding: 

No. 55 

v 

0 
❖ 

y A 8 4 
<§> 9 6 4 2 
0 K Q 10 
<$>8 7 2 

‘S’ 

❖ 

❖ 




FOSTER ON AUCTION 


189 


Z bids spade. A and Y pass, and B overcalls with two 
hearts. Z rebids his hand, two spades, and A assists the 
hearts, going to three. Before we consider Y's bid, let 
us count up the other hands. 

Z*s hand is good for 6 tricks; 4 in spades and 2 in 
clubs, enough to justify a rebid without waiting to hear 
from his partner. B’s hand is also worth 6 tricks; 4 in 
trumps and 2 in clubs, if hearts are to be trumps. Had 
he been able to make a free bid at the start, he would 
have said one heart only, but, like Z, would have been 
strong enough to rebid his hand on the second round. 
But his two-heart bid is a forced bid. His suit is not a 
free bid for more than one at the start. The spade bid 
forces him to go to two. 

When Z rebids the spades, A counts up his hand and 
finds it is good for 1J in trumps and 3 in diamonds. 
This is enough for one assist on general principles. He 
knows nothing about what his partner has in hearts and 
outside tricks, but he is bound to assist him as long as he 
has an assisting hand. He bids three hearts. 

Now we come to Y. His hand is just average, 1| in 
trumps and 2 in diamonds. Had his partner passed the 
two-heart bid, Y would have passed, as he has not enough 
to justify an assist. But when Z rebids his hand it 
shows that Z has not only the trick for his own advance 
but for the trick that Y might or might not have. This 
is about the same thing as if Z had loaned Y that extra 
trick, and if Y had it in his hand he would have assisted. 
Therefore, with only average, 3| tricks, Y goes to three 
spades. With less than average, of course, he would 
have passed. 

It is now up to B to go to four hearts or pass. Were 
it not that he had overbid his hand a trick at the start, 
he would now advance the heart bid, after A’s assist- 


199 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


ance. But as he had to start the bidding with an extra 
trick, it is about the same thing as if he had borrowed 
that trick for the time being, and had bid it on the first 
round instead of the second. If he goes to four, he is 
overbidding the hand. 

Analyze this hand in the play and it will be found 
that each side has correctly estimated and reached the 
limit of safety. Y and Z can make their three spades, 
but no more, showing that Y’s assist with only average 
was sound. They must lose two hearts, a club and a 
diamond. A and B could make three hearts, but no 
more, as they must lose two spades, a club and a diamond. 
In the actual game, at one table, both overbid their hands, 

Y going to four spades after Z refused to overcall B’s 
four hearts. The loss was the difference between 50 in 
penalties and four honors; not much either way, but 
the second assist by Y cost 32 points. 

It has already been pointed out in the chapter on deny¬ 
ing the partner’s suit, that if the second-hand overcalls 
the dealer’s suit bid with a no-trumper, there is no need 
for the partner to deny the suit. Passing or shifting 
would do that, although it is better to sit tight and lead. 

But if the partner has a legitimate assist for the dealer’s 
bid, that is, a hand good for 4| tricks at attacking value, 
he must not let any intervening no-trump bid scare him 
off. If the dealer has a legitimate bid and the partner 
a legitimate assist, they may as well bid it, and at least 
push the no-trumper up a bit. 

In the following hand, Z bid a heart, A no-trumps, and 

Y two hearts. B felt called on to bid three diamonds, as 
a warning against the no-trumper, although there seems 
to be no need for it after Y’s bid. But when Z went on 
to three hearts A went three no-trumps, was doubled and 
set for 330, as Y held off the diamonds until the third 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


191 


round. Z could have made two hearts, but B could not 
make three diamonds. 

No. 56 






8 7 6 4 







❖ 

7 3 2 








A 7 3 







❖ 

K 7 3 




9 

K 

J 

2 

Y 


3 


❖ 

Q 

J 

9 

A "R 


8 

6 5 

0 

K 

Q 

2 

£1 JD 

0 

J 

10 9 8 6 

❖ 

A 

9 

8 4 

z 

❖ 

Q 

10 6 5 





A Q 10 

9 5 






❖ 

A K 10 

4 






0 

5 4 







❖ 

J 2 





Just as a player may rebid his hand twice, so the partner 
may assist twice, if he has the strength necessary to do so. 
It is useless to stop bidding while one has the cards to 
justify going on. Take this case: 


No. 57 


o 

4 > 


❖ 

0 

❖ 

10 5 

9 6 

10 5 3 2 

A K 10 6 3 

❖ 

0 

❖ 


Q J 7 2 
A J 7 5 
A 9 6 4 
4 

❖ 
0 

A K 8 6 4 
10 4 3 
Q 7 
9 8 7 



9 3 

K Q 8 2 
K J 8 
Q J 5 2 




192 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Z bid a heart and A a spade. Y has 1 \ tricks in trumps, 
if hearts are to be trumps, to which he adds a 1 for the 
extra honor, 2 in clubs and 2 in diamonds. Then he 
can add one for the king value in spades, ruffing the sec¬ 
ond round. That is 7\ tricks for attack, so he bids two 
hearts. B has the same values in spades that Y has in 
hearts, 2 in clubs and 1 in diamonds, total 5, so he assists 
the spades. Z and A both pass. 

Y is now in the position of a partner when the dealer 
refuses to rebid his hand after one assist, showing that 
there is nothing in the dealer’s hand but the bid. To 
assist a second time, the partner must have enough to 
make up for what the dealer lacks, just as a dealer who 
rebids must have enough to make up for what his partner 
lacks, when no assist is forthcoming. This Y has, so he 
goes to three hearts. B may as well stretch things a bit, 
and add a \ for the possibility of ruffing the third round of 
hearts, although these queen values are a trifle remote. 
He bids three spades. 

Both Z and A pass, as neither can go any further, even 
after a second assist from their respective partners. They 
bid all there was in their hands at the start. But Y still 
has those 7\ values, and goes on to four hearts. 

This hand was played at both declarations. A could 
not make more than three spades, but that seems to indi¬ 
cate that B’s two assists were justified. At most tables 
Y and Z made their four odd at hearts, which goes to 
show that Y was right in assisting three times. 

We have already seen, in this chapter on denying suits, 
that if the partner has less than three trumps, or two as 
good as the queen, he should deny the suit if the dealer 
bids one only. But if a bid intervenes, he can deny assist¬ 
ance in the dealer’s suit by passing, or by shifting to a 
suit of his own. It is when the bidding continues beyond 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


193 


this point that we come to the question of assisting with 
less than average in trumps. 

The rule in all such cases is to deduct a trick for less 
than average trump assistance, or two tricks if there is 
only one small trump, and then to compute the rest of 
the hand as usual. Here is an example of this method: 

No. 58 

S? Q 8 4 
Q 7 6 2 

0 5 

K Q 10 5 2 

A K J 10 7 
<£ 5 

0 j 9 6 2 
<2> 9 8 4 

^ 962 
cj) AK98 
0 10 8 3 

❖ J73 

Z bid a club, A a heart and Y a spade. B has 5 tricks 
in diamonds, 2 in spades, but he must deduct 1 for the 
shortness in hearts, which he is asked to support for the 
trump. This leaves him 6. Although thr is above 
average he cannot assist the hearts, as that would give 
his partner a false impression of their distribution. His 
first duty is to deny the hearts, but at the same time to 
show that he is still in the running, so he bids two dia¬ 
monds. 

Z bids two spades, showing that he can support that 
suit. He has already shown where his outside strength 
lies. A drops the hearts and supports the diamonds, 
bidding three. At hearts, A can count his hand as good 
for only four tricks. As a support for a diamond bid, it is 





194 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


worth 6J. Y can now drop the spades and support the 
clubs, or pass. He cannot rebid the spades, even after 
the assist. His hand is worth a great deal more as an 
assist to clubs than anything else, as he will not be the 
declarer when he has to ruff the diamonds. 

At one table they carried the bid to four clubs, which is 
bad bidding, as Y’s cards do not justify two assists; but 
Z was not left to play it, as B went to four hearts. The 
point in the hand is that no matter what Y did after Z’s 
assist, B went back to the hearts after having denied them 
by his diamond bid, bidding whatever was necessary to 
overcall. At one table B doubled the two-spade bid, so 
as to remove his diamond bid from the defensive to the 
attacking class. This piece of tactics is a little too deep 
for the average partner to understand, but in this case A 
understood it to show a sure spade trick, as well as the 
diamonds, so he went to four hearts. 

At either spades or clubs, Y and Z would lose three 
hearts, a diamond and a spade. At hearts, A loses one 
heart, one club and one spade, but goes game. In this 
case A goes on with his suit in the full knowledge that his 
partner has not average strength or length, so that he 
will not find more than two small trumps in his dummy, 
perhaps only one. 

The rule for rebidding the hand without the partner's 
assistance requires two more tricks than those shown by 
the original bid. The rule for the assist, either when the 
dealer refuses to rebid, or has yet to speak, is to advance 
the bid one trick for every trick in the hand more than 
average. As the average is 3| for suit bids, we get this 
table: 

With 4J, assist once only. 

With 5J, assist twice. 

With 6J, assist three times. 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


195 


The minor suits are assisted on the same principles 
as the major suits, but such assistance carries with it the 
information that the partner is unable to avail himself of 
the assistance offered by the minor suit for a better declara¬ 
tion. In the last illustration, we see that Y used the 
clubs to support his spade suit, as he had no legitimate 
spade bid in his own cards, but the opposing hands 
were too strong for him. Y could have made two 
by cards at spades, with the assistance of his partner's 
clubs. 

This system of denying a suit and then supporting it 
leads to some of the most interesting bidding situations 
in the game. The player whose suit is denied must 
always be ready for the partner's possible return to it 
later. 

There is one part of the assisting bids in which I find 
more general tendency to error than in any other, and 
that is assisting on trumps alone, apart from the use to 
w r hich they can be put. In the chapter on trump values 
we have seen that six or seven trumps in the partner’s 
hand are worth no more than four, as trumps. If there 
are singletons, or missing suits which can be trumped, 
that is another matter. But in such cases you are count¬ 
ing a ruff on the first round as equal to an ace; on the 
second round as equal to a king. You would count these 
values if you had only three trumps. The fact that you 
have six or seven does not increase them a particle. 

So little is this fact recognized that one may see players 
who are very much above the average in other respects 
singularly remiss in this. In the best card clubs you will 
find players with great reputations who have absolutely 
no idea of how to value a hand that contains an unusual 
number of small trumps. One illustration may suffice, 
Y is considered a very fine player: 


196 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


No. 59 

❖ 

0 
❖ 

s? 6 3 
<8> 9 8 5 4 3 
0 7 6 3 
4> K Q 7 

❖ 

0 
❖ 

Z bid a diamond, which A and Y passed. B bid one 
heart. There are 2 values in hearts, 1 in clubs and 2 in 
spades; not enough to rebid unless the partner can assist. 
Z and A passed, and Y went two diamonds. This assist 
is perfectly sound. Y holds 1? values in diamonds if they 
are to be trumps, 2 in clubs, and a king value in hearts, 
worth 1. This is a total of 4|, just enough for one assist, 
but no more. The fifth trump has no value. 

B bid two hearts. This is a trick more than his cards 
justify. He should have waited to see if A could assist. 
A would have to deduct 1, for his shortness in trumps, from 
his spade values, leaving him with too small a total for 
even one assist. His net total is one trick. When Z and 
A passed the two hearts, Y went three diamonds, B three 
hearts and Y four diamonds. This looks as if Y had over¬ 
bid his hand two tricks, as he assists three times with 
values enough for one assist only. 

The result proved this to be true, as Z was set for two 
tricks. He could have made two diamonds had Y stopped 
after one assist. B would have been set two tricks if left 


10 

A Q 6 
10 9 8 5 2 
J 9 8 6 

7 K Q 9 7 5 2 
c£> K J 2 

0 QJ 
0 A 10 

A J 8 4 
10 7 
A K 4 
5 4 3 2 


Y 

A B 
Z 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


197 


to play the hand at two hearts, as the combined hands are 
good for just what we have estimated them, six tricks. 

At diamonds, A led a heart, and Z led three rounds of 
trumps. Y led a spade, and B put on the ace and led the 
ten, to avoid the clubs and hearts. A won the spade 
and led a club through dummy’s ace-queen, and the jack 
won. Now B must lead the king of hearts, which Y 
trumps, and establishes the fourth spade, but he must lose 
a club at the end. 

At every table at which B was left to play the hand at 
hearts, in some cases after a very speculative no-trump bid 
from Z to start things, he was set. At one table it went 
this way, which is probably typical. 

Z led three rounds of diamonds, to force the strong 
hand. B led ace and small spade, to get A in for a trump 
lead through, and lost the queen to the ace. Z put dummy 
in with a spade, to get another trump lead up to his jack. 
When Y renounced to the trumps, B saw that Z had the 
major tenace jack-eight, over his nine-seven, but he had 
to lead the trump to save the club. Z won two rounds of 
trumps and led the fourth spade, so that B lost his two 
clubs after all, winning only six tricks. 

We have seen that when the declarer bids a suit, with 
the view of having it for the trump, he expects his partner 
to have his share of the outstanding cards, which is an 
average of three. We allow the partner to count a ^ for 
three small trumps, or two trumps, if one is an honor as 
good as the queen. This is based on the probability that 
about half the time one of three small trumps can be used 
for ruffing before trumps are drawn. 

If it is obviously impossible for the partner’s trumps 
to be put to any such use, as when he has three cards of 
each of the other suits, he must revise this estimate, and 
deduct this \ from his trump values, whatever they are. 


198 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


In such cases the only practical value of three small 
trumps is to make it more probable that the adversaries’ 
trumps can be exhausted in three leads. 

In Hand No. 54, for instance, if we count up Y’s we 
must allow nothing for his trumps, as he cannot ruff any¬ 
thing, so that all he has is 3 in clubs and 1 in diamonds. 
Combine these 4 values with Z’s 4, and we get 8 tricks, 
which is just what they make with hearts for trumps. 

In Hand No. 55, a careful estimate would reduce the 
normal value of the assisting spades, 1J for king and two 
small, to 1 only, as there is no suit that Y can ruff. This 
puts his hand down to 3, which is below average by a §, 
but after a rebid it is close enough for one assist. In 
Hand No. 56 we make the same reduction on Y’s hearts, 
for a close estimate, and count the four small ones as 
worth only 1; not 1§, because there is no ruff. There 
is no reduction in No. 57, as the ruffs are not only pos¬ 
sible but highly probable. 

If the second hand overcalls the dealer's no-trumper 
with a suit, the third hand should not be deterred from 
making any advantageous bid that he would have made 
had the second hand passed. Suppose the dealer bids 
no-trump, and second hand says two diamonds. If the 
third hand holds five hearts or spades, it costs him no 
more to bid those suits than it would have done had 
the second hand passed and said nothing about the dia¬ 
monds. Even if the third hand could stop the diamonds 
twice and had a justifiable double, which is highly im¬ 
probable, the major-suit take-out will usually offer a 
better chance for game, and give the dealer a better 
line on the situation. Five of a major suit and two sure 
in diamonds is very strong. 


ASSISTING NO-TRUMPERS 


The mere fact that the partner is called upon to decide 
whether or not to assist a no-trumper, shows that it has 
been over called. There are three varieties of the situa¬ 
tion, and any of them may be started by either opponent. 
He may double, bid a suit, or go two no-trumps. It is 
with the first only that we have to deal in this chapter. 
The others belong to the chapters on doubling and second¬ 
hand bids. 

If it is the second player that bids a suit, the rule for the 
dealer’s partner is very simple. If he can stop that 
suit twice, even if it is to be led through him, and holds 
anything outside to justify an assist, even a king, he should 
double. Never, under any circumstances, should a player 
in this position go two no-trumps unless he has enough 
in his own hand to go game, after making due allowance 
for the fact that original no-trumpers are not always what 
they are cracked up to be. 

The double shows the stoppers in the adverse suit and 
gives the dealer the choice of letting it stand and getting 
penalties, or of going back to no-trumps, which he can 
always do without increasing the contract. The dealer 
alone knows what he had when he bid no-trumps originally. 
He alone knows whether it is better to go on with it or 
drop it. If he has bid no-trumps on two suits, he will be in 
a bad way if his partner goes two no-trumps on nothing but 
stoppers in the third, as the fourth suit will surely be led. 

Shrewd players frequently take advantage of those who 
are too ready to assist no-trumpers by laying a trap for 
them called the shift. This consists in bidding a suit that 
they know will be stopped in the third hand, or the dealer’s, 
which will induce them to go on with the no-trumper, 
199 


200 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


thinking that suit will be led. When the leader holds a 
suit that is good for six tricks, but not for seven, if he 
can get the contract up to two tricks he can defeat it. 
Here is an example of it: 


No. 60 




7 

A 10 9 5 





❖ 

J 9 4 





0 

9 3 





❖ 

A 9 6 4 



V 

K 7 6 


Y 

7 

8 4 


10 3 


A B 


Q 7 6 2 

0 

A K Q 

7 4 2 

0 

10 6 5 

❖ 

10 5 


Z 

, 4* 

J 7 3 2 



Q J 3 2 





A K 8 5 





0 

J 8 





❖ 

K Q 8 



Z bid no-trump. 

A can probably 

save 

the game 


says nothing and leads out the diamonds; but if he can 
get the bid advanced to two no-trumps, he may set the 
contract, so he bids two hearts. To bid the diamonds 
would simply warn the dealer that his no-trumper was 
unsafe. Y assisted the no-trumper bidding two, and 
A set the contract. 

Had Y doubled, and B left him in, A would have been 
obliged to pull himself out with three diamonds, or be set 
for 500. When he goes to diamonds, Z goes to three 
hearts, and makes four, as A’s scheme is then exposed. If 
the diamond contract is left in, it will be set for 200. 

When the partner cannot stop the opponents’ suit twice, 
he must either pass or bid some suit of his own. Under 
no circumstances should he risk increasing the no-trump 
contract, although many players are rash enough to do 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


201 


so with only one stopper in the suit that overcalls the 
dealer. The reason they do not suffer for it is that their 
opponents are not good enough players to take advantage 
of their weakness. 

Many players are in the habit of overcalling no-trumpers 
with a major suit, but will not do it with a minor suit. 
The argument is that such weak no-trumpers are bid 
these days that game may be made against them with a 
suit bid. The answer to this is that the weaker the no- 
trumper, the worse it can be beaten. If the second player 
can see almost game in his own cards, or game with one 
trick from his partner, the bid may be excused, even as a 
pusher, but the average player does not wait for any such 
strength as this. As a rule, even if the suit can go game 
against the no-trumper, it is at a loss, as the penalties 
would have been worth more than the game is worth. 
Here is a case in point: 

No. 61 

7 4 

$> Q J 10 6543 

0 10 4 

❖ Q 7 6 
A Q 10 7 2 

<?> 9 
0 J 7 5 
A J 10 8 

^ KJ5 

<£ K 8 7 2 

0 A Q 8 2 

❖ 9 2 

Z bid no-trump, A two hearts. His hand is good for 
just six tricks, three in each of the major suits. Then 
his partner must have four tricks, or more than average, 





202 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


for A to win the game at hearts. The point is this: 
If A can go game at hearts, Z cannot go game at no- 
trumps. If Z can make his contract at no-trumps, A 
cannot win the game at hearts. At every table at which 
A sat tight and said nothing, if Y did not bid the clubs 
the no-trumper was set for three tricks, as four hearts, 
four spades and the ace of clubs made against it, and 
nothing could stop them, A opening with a small heart. 
B got in with the club, came back with the hearts, and 
then caught dummy’s spade queen when A led the jack 
and ten through it. 

When A bid the hearts and Y the clubs, B went to 
three hearts, and Z doubled. They set the contract for 
100, as Y opened his short suit, to get a ruff. Y’s hand 
not being exposed, A lost the advantage of seeing the 
queen, and put on the spade king to get a trump lead 
from B’s hand for a second finesse, after the ace of clubs 
was gone. Y could have made three odd in clubs. 

Here is a rather curious hand, in which either side can 
win the game; the original no-trumper; or the opponent 
who overcalls it with two spades: or the diamond take-out. 

No. 62 


o 

❖ 


7 6 5 2 
Q 8 7 

K Q J 10 


Q 4 3 
J642 
0 A K 9 8 2 

❖ 
0 
❖ 

c$> A K 10 5 3 
0 Q 10 6 3 
❖ A3 


❖ 6 



^ A8 


K J 10 9 
9 

J 7 5 4 
9 5 4 2 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


203 


Z bid no-trumps and A two spades. Y bid three 
diamonds, B assisted the spades, and Z went to three no- 
trumps. A took a chance on four spades, to score the 
honors, and went game. This he accomplished by leading 
a club and ruffing that suit twice, winding up with the 
heart finesse. Three no-trumps would be the limit for 
Z, but Y could have made five diamonds. 

Unless the partner has enough to go game himself with 
a very average no-trumper opposite him, the best rule 
is to bid a suit if the dealer’s no-trumper is overcalled, 
or else to pass up the bid. This will warn the dealer that 
there is nothing in his prospective dummy worth showing. 

There are many hands in which the partner is not 
afraid of the declared suit, and passes it up without 
doubling. There are other cases in which it is the fourth 
hand that bids the suit, which is in the nature of asking 
for a lead, in case the dealer goes back to no-trumps. If 
the dealer passes, the partner must be very strong to go 
back to no-trumps, as the declared suit will be led through 
him. If he cannot double, and has no suit worth show¬ 
ing, it is better to leave the suit bid alone. The dealer 
may have substantial penalties in view. 

The general view of the situation is that if the opponents 
think they can go game against a no-trumper, they 
should be allowed to try it, if the no-trumper’s partner has 
anything. If he has nothing, the no-trumper is well out 
of it. 

To sum up; never assist a no-trumper. Double, or 
bid your best suit, if you are too strong to pass. 


CONVENTIONAL DOUBLES 


The principle of the modern double applies to every 
position at the table, so that it should be examined before 
we go into the matter of subsequent and forced bids. 

In the old days, when auction was young, the double 
was supposed to be used for one of two purposes only; 
to increase the penalties, or to frighten a bidder out of his 
last declaration into something more easily defeated. 
There was also what is still called the free double, which is 
simply a gamble, used only when the contract is as many 
tricks as it takes to go game from zero. The theory is 
that if the declarer can make his contract, it will not be 
on account of the double value of the tricks; whereas if 
he fails, the penalties might as well be 100 as 50. It is 
a bad double unless reasonably certain, as the odds are 
against it. Double four spades, and set the contract, 
and the double wins an extra 50. Let the contract suc¬ 
ceed, and you give the declarer 86; if he makes five odd, 
you hand him 145, and all you would have won was an 
extra 100. In both cases you would have got your 50 a 
trick without this risk of enriching the declarer. 

There are now four doubles in common use. The 
most important are the two that force the partner to bid 
when he would not otherwise do so. A third is to show a 
sure trick in an opponent’s suit, after having made some 
other bid or assist. The fourth is to defeat the contract, 
and usually comes at the end of some spirited bidding. 

There are two forms of the forcing double, both of 
which demand that the partner shall say something. 
These are the double of a suit bid and the double of a 
204 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


205 


no-trumper. Instead of the old indication that the 
doubler thought he could defeat the contract, the double 
shows that he is afraid of the contract he doubles, and 
wants it squelched. 

Doubling a suit bid shows that the doubler would bid 
no-trumps but for the fact that the adversaries would lead 
the declared suit and save the game, as there is no stopper 
for that suit in the doubling hand. The double is there¬ 
fore a conventional way of asking the partner if he can 
stop that suit. If he can, he may safely bid no-trumps. 
If he cannot, he must bid his own best suit, no matter 
what it is. Under no circumstances should he leave the 
double in. It is no excuse for leaving the double in that 
the fourth hand is very strong in the doubled suit, because 
the stronger he is and the oftener he can stop that suit 
the better the no-trumper, and the more chance for going 
game. To leave the double in is to go back to the old 
idea of doubling for penalties. 

Doubling a no-trump bid has precisely the opposite 
meaning to the suit double. The double in suit asks the 
partner to go no-trumps; the no-trump double asks him 
to bid his best suit. This double shows that although 
there is an alleged no-trumper on the player’s right, he 
thinks he is strong enough to play a suit against it, but he 
does not want to guess at the suit, and would like to know 
in which of the four his partner has the best support. 

It should be obvious that but for the encouragement 
offered by the double the fourth hand would very rarely 
have a bid, because there would not be much left for him 
to hold if the dealer and the second player each have some 
sort of a no-trumper. But there is this difference between 
the answer to the suit double and the doubled no-trumper. 
It may happen that the fourth hand can see more in 
penalties by letting the doubled no-trumper stand, 


200 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


especially if it be the first game of the rubber. In these 
days, when dealers bid no-trumps on an ace and two 
hopes, it is not uncommon for them to go down several 
hundred points. Leaving the double in is better than 
going into a minor suit, if the fourth hand is strong in two 
or three suits. The worst that can happen is to have the 
dealer pull himself out with a suit bid, and that may be 
doubled to advantage, and with greater certainty. 

The chief interest in this question of doubling one- 
trick bids lies in the problem presented to the partner of 
the one who is doubled, and who sits between the double 
and the answer. There are two courses open to him. 
One is to pass the buck, saying nothing until he hears 
from the fourth hand. The other is to anticipate the 
answer to the double by making a bid himself. This is 
usually an increase of the doubled bid if it is in suit, or a 
re-double, either of a suit or no-trumps. 

Suppose the dealer bids a spade, second hand doubles, 
and the third hand holds four or five spades and a single- 
ton, with a trick somewhere. He should bid two spades, 
just as if he were assisting. If he passes, and two hearts 
are bid fourth hand, the dealer would be in doubt as to 
what to do. 

These various doubles and the answers to them, with 
the possibility of an intervening bid by the third hand, 
can best be illustrated by examples from actual play. 
The trouble with the doubles as they are now used at 
auction is that they are open to the objection lying 
against all conventions, which is the danger of their being 
worked to death by persons who like to play with them, 
just to see the wheels go round. With the strength 
behind it to justify the attack, the double is a very useful 
weapon; but when it is dragged into situations that do 
not justify it, it is usually a boomerang. As no modern 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


207 


player now uses a one-trick double with any idea of defeat¬ 
ing the contract, that declaration was left lying round 
loose, like the free bid of two in a minor suit. As a forcing 
bid, it has been brought into the game again; but it 
should not be made to work overtime: 


No. 63 


7 

❖ 

0 

❖ 


7 

❖ 

0 

❖ 

K 10 7 5 4 
A K 10 9 
A J 6 4 


S? 

❖ 

0 


Q J 

Q 7 6 5 
10 5 

K 10 7 6 5 

cjb 
0 
❖ 

A 9 8 2 
J 

9 8 7 
A Q J 4 3 



6 3 

8 4 3 2 
K Q 3 2 

9 8 2 


Z bids a spade. Instead of bidding two hearts, A 
doubles. Now it is perfectly useless for Y to redouble, 
as that does not in any way affect B*s answer, nor make 
it any more expensive. Although Y has a number of 
spades, he is not strong enough to assist, and should wait 
to hear from B. At one table Y went to two spades, 
which seemed to relieve B from the necessity of declaring 
a minor suit; but A doubled again, and then B had to 
show his diamonds, which they bid up against the spades 
and made four odd by establishing the hearts. 

At one table the bidding started in the same way, with 
a spade from Z, doubled by A and two spades from Y, 
upon which B refused to go as far as three diamonds. 
Instead of A’s pursuing the tactics with which he started 
and doubling the two-spade bid, so as to force B to say 



208 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


something, he bid three hearts. This is simply a leap in 
the dark and is the very thing the double seeks to avoid. 
Now B is worse off than ever, as he would have to go to 
four diamonds to deny the hearts, so he left A to play the 
hand at hearts, and saw him set for two tricks. This 
cost A 304 points. He could have won 188 at diamonds 
by forcing his partner to show that suit, whereas he lost 
116 at hearts. 

Modern practice has decided in favor of the following 
rule. If there is an intervening bid, instead of a redouble, 
the fourth hand need not answer the double if he has 
nothing better than a moderate four-card suit; but if he 
has any suit of five cards he should bid it. 

From this it follows that the doubler is advised by his 
partner’s silence that there is no suit of five cards in that 
hand, nor anything worth while in four cards. But if the 
doubler feels strong enough to insist on being shown any 
suit of four cards, no matter how weak it may be, he 
should double a second time. For example: Z deals and 
bids a heart, which A doubles. Now if Y says two hearts, 
instead of redoubling, and B passes, A should double the 
two-heart bid if he can stand a bid on any four-card suit 
from his partner. 

If there is any intervening bid by the third hand when 
the second player doubles the dealer’s no-trumper, it is 
usually a redouble. That is generally accepted as the 
best defence, because it does not betray the hand, but 
makes it absolutely certain that the fourth hand will bid. 

We have seen in the chapter on assisting bids that when 
the partner has more than average assistance for the 
dealer’s suit, he assists it, if it is overcalled, by bidding 
more in the same suit. We have also seen that if it is a 
no-trumper that is overcalled second hand by a suit, 
the third hand doubles, or bids a suit of his own. When 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


209 


we come to the situations in which the second hand doubles 
the no-trumper, it is impossible to judge upon what suits 
he is relying to get the contract. But by combining the 
two rules for the third hand’s guidance when the second 
hand overcalls with anything but a double, we get at a 
simple rule to guide him for a redouble, which is this: 

If the dealer bids no-trump, and is doubled by the 
second hand, the only way the thnd hand can show that 
he has more than average ass stance or the no- trumper, 
without increasing the contract, is to redouble. To bid 
two no-trumps would be folly. Why play for three odd 
at 10 a trick, when one can play for one odd at 40 a trick 
with the same result so far as going game is concerned? 

The unfortunate in this situation is the fourth player, 
and if his partner is one of those who likes to double just 
to see the wheels go round, there is likely to be trouble. 
Take this case: 

No. 64 

❖ 
o 
❖ 

<7 K J 10 
<§>8 5 4 
0 A 10 9 5 
A Q 3 

<£ 

0 
❖ 

Z bids no-trump and j 
a suit, as it is obvious that he cannot support a no- 
trumper if Y has all those high cards and A can double. 



t doubles. If Y passes, B will bid 




210 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Then, when it comes round to Y again he will have to bid 
at least three clubs, which is retreating to a minor suit. 
To avoid this, Y redoubles, to show that he can assist the 
dealer’s original declaration. This puts it up to A and B 
to defend themselves, as they dare not leave the redouble 
in, or the odd trick goes game. Z would win 585 points 
if left in. If B shows the hearts, Z might bid his only 
four-card suit, spades. He can go game at spades. 
Hearts would be set for 400, as either Z or Y would double 
that contract, probably Y, to show the stopper in hearts. 

The defence to the double of a suit bid is to distinguish 
between support for the suit and nothing in it. The best 
rule has been found to be this. With support in the suit, 
either go to two, or pass. With nothing in the suit, but 
excellent support outside, such as would suggest denying 
the suit by going to no-trumps if the second hand passed, 
the best defence is the redouble. Take this example: 

No. 65 

S? Q 7 4 3 
K 10 6 2 
0 K Q 9 7 
0 8 

S? K J 10 9 
<$> A Q J 
0 A J 10 
^ 632 

7 A62 
(?) 95 
0 8 5 3 
<£> KQJ95 

Z bids a spade, A doubles. Y is so weak in spades that 
if he passes, B may leave the double alone and defeat the 
contract, and Z will not know which way to jump to get 


Y 

A B 
Z 


7 

❖ 

0 

❖ 


8 5 

8 7 4 3 
6 4 2 
A 10 7 4 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


211 


out of the double. A doubles to show that he is weak in 
spades, but strong elsewhere. Y doubles for precisely 
the same reason. If Y had anything in spades, he would 
pass the buck, and allow B to show a suit or go no-trumps. 

The redouble does not obstruct B in any way, and as 
he can stop the spades he does as he is told and bids no- 
trump. Now we come to the value of the redouble as a 
defence. It shows Z how to play the hand, and warns 
him that B is the one that can stop the spades, therefore 
not to lead that suit, but to get Y in to lead through B, 
who is set for two tricks. 

It is urged by some players that this redouble by the 
partner tends to warn the fourth hand not to rely on 
anything but an ace to stop the doubled suit, and there¬ 
fore not to bid no-trumps, but to show his best suit. This 
may require him to make a pretty stiff bid, but as good 
soldiers must obey orders, he should not shrink from it. 
The doubler is responsible for the outcome of his double; 


not the fourth hand. Take this case. The hand 

much like the last: 



No. 66 




K 9 4 2 


❖ 

A 7 5 2 


0 

Q 10 8 6 

4> 

9 


7 AQJ 

Y 

10 7 6 3 

<?> K Q J 9 

A B 

<£> 10 8 4 3 

0 A K J 


0 7 3 

<£> 743 

Z 

<j> Q 10 5 


8 5 


❖ 

6 


0 

9 5 4 2 


❖ 

A K J 8 6 2 




212 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Z bids two spades, holding a six-card suit, headed by a 
combination good for five tricks in attack. A doubles, 
and Y redoubles. B must know that Z will not lead a 
spade more than once, if at all, and that his queen is not 
to be considered a stopper, as Y shows he is strong enough 
to get in and lead spades through. This leads B to name 
the higher ranking of two equal suits, and he bids three 
hearts. Z, of course, passes. He bid all he had at the 
start. 

Now look at A’s position. If Y is short in spades he 
is going to ruff that suit, and he must have some tricks 
in the other suits to redouble, but A cannot deny the 
hearts or do anything to shift the bidding back to Y or Z. 
He must let the heart bid alone. Y did not double, but 
he discarded the seven of clubs on the second round of 
spades, which induced Z to lead that suit at once and he 
get a ruff on its return. Now Y gets the ruff in spades and 
Z makes his remaining trump on the clubs, and the king of 
trumps is still a sure trick in Y’s hand. This sets the 
contract for three tricks, so that the warning conveyed 
to B did not do him much good. Had B taken a 
chance at no-trumps, Z would have opened the diamonds, 
and the no-trumper would have been set for two 
tricks. If he guessed hearts, it would have been set for 
three. 

When the first bid made is a suit, and a player with an 
otherwise fair no-trumper doubles, the proposition looks 
simple enough, but some persons find it difficult to see 
that if the bids are reversed, the meaning is the same. 
That is to say, if the first bid is no-trump, and it is over¬ 
called by a suit, usually fourth hand, to ask a lead, a 
double of the suit bid by the no-trumper would mean 
precisely the same as if the suit had been bid first. Take 
this example: 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


213 


No. 67 



7 

K 9 6 4 





J 7 6 




0 

8 4 




❖ 

10 8 6 5 



9 

10 5 3 

Y 

7 

A Q J 8 7 2 

❖ 

Q 9 5 

a R 

❖ 

10 2 

0 

K 9 6 5 3 

..I D 

0 

Q 2 

❖ 

J 4 

z 

❖ 

K 9 3 


V 

— 




<S> 

A K 8 4 

3 



0 

A J 10 7 





A Q 7 2 




Z bid no-trump, A and Y passed, and B bid two hearts. 
Z doubles. If it were the partner of the no-trump bidder 
that doubled, we have seen that it would show he could 
stop the hearts twice, if the dealer wished to proceed with 
his no-trumper. In this case it asks the partner if he can 
stop the hearts once, and if so, to bid no-trumps. This 

Y cannot do, as he will not be the original no-trump bid¬ 
der. A anticipates Y by bidding three hearts, which 
relieves Y from the necessity of taking Z out of the double, 
so he passes. 

But this does not suit Z, who doubles again, and Y 
is forced to bid his four-card spade suit. B was encour¬ 
aged by A’s assist to go to four hearts, but Z went four 
spades, and made it by a rather peculiar piece of luck. B 
led the ten of clubs, and dummy passed it up. A put on 
the queen and went back with it, thinking it a singleton. 

Y held the trick with the jack and led the trump, getting 
the finesse and a third round at once. B led a diamond 
and Z ducked it, A winning and leading the heart, which 
dummy trumped. Now all the rest of the dummy’s 



214 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


cards are good. B could not have made more than the 
odd at hearts, but he could have set Z’s no-trumper if he 
got a heart lead by winning the first trick, if Y covered 
the ten, and leading a diamond to dummy’s weakness. 

As already pointed out, the objection to these doubles 
is that they are not to be trusted in the hands of opti¬ 
mistic players who do not know how to value a hand. 
There should be at least seven tricks, at attacking values, 
to double, or the bidding may go to disastrous lengths. 
Here is a hand which is exactly average, one card of each 
denomination down to the six, yet the player doubles. 
This is a fair example of the way some players who are 
supposed to be adepts at the game will take liberties 
with it: 


No. 68 


7 

❖ 

o 

❖ 


V 

0 


A 9 7 2 
Q 10 2 
KJ83 
6 3 


❖ 

0 

❖ 


A K J 8 7 6 
A 10 7 5 
J 8 2 



7 

<s> 

0 

❖ 


K Q J 6 4 
3 

Q 2 

K Q 10 5 4 


10 8 5 3 
9 5 4 
9 6 4 
A 9 7 


Z bid a spade, and A doubled. With such a powerful 
hand Y did not see any need to say anything until he had 
gratified his curiosity as to B’s bid. As the convention 
demands that B should go no-trumps if he could stop the 
spades, B did so. This bidding heads off Z’s original 
intention, which was to show his two equal suits. With 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


215 


the lead against a no-trumper he passed, but Y doubled. 
This informs Z that he can go ahead with his spades, in 
spite of B’s stopper, if he wishes to do so, or he can sit 
tight and beat the no-trumper. This is a good example of 
the double use of the double, giving the partner a choice 
of two lines of play, just like the double of a suit bid that 
overcalls no-trumps. 1 

The double shook B’s confidence in A’s no-trumper, 
and he thought it better to bid two hearts. This Z 
doubled. Upon thinking it over, A concluded that if 
his partner had the spades stopped, and a fair heart suit, 
the no-trumper was still the better bid, and as it did not 
increase the contract A went two no-trumps, and was set 
for 600 after Y’s double. The result would have been the 
same, with simple honors added to the disaster, had B 
been left in with the doubled heart contract. This is the 
result of A’s trying to force a hand beyond its powers. 

The more difficult situations to handle in doubling are 
those in which the double has a double meaning; as when 
it shows the doubler thinks he can defeat the contract, but 
at the same time would like his partner to try for the game 
on some other declaration. To some persons this seems 
rather anomalous bidding. Why, they ask, should a 
player indicate that the best he can do is to defeat the 
opponents on their contract, and at the same time in¬ 
timate that he would rather not be left to try it? 

Yet there are many situations in which this kind of 
double can be used to better advantage than any other 
bid, because it conveys to the partner the most valuable 
of all privileges, the choice of two lines of play, depending 
on which better suits his hand. It has the further ad¬ 
vantage of indicating the control of a suit. When the 
only thing to do is to persist with the first declaration or 
throw it up altogether, one frequently does the wrong 


216 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


thing; but when there is a choice between two good 
things, as against the opponents’ one, mistakes are not so 
common. 

There are many hands in which the double might give 
the partner a choice between two declarations, and sug¬ 
gest that he go on bidding, while at the same time it 
assures him that if his original bid shows two sure tricks 
for defence, the opponents’ contract should be set. Take 
this case: 

No. 69 






A 

Q 9 7 






❖ 

Q 

9 8 6' 

4 3 





0 

A 

5 4 











7 

K 

J 

8 5 4 


Y 


6 3 2 

❖ 

A 

2 


A 

■R 

<?> 

K J 10 7 5 

0 

J 

8 



13 

0 

9 

❖ 

K 

J 

9 4 


z 

❖ 

8 6 5 2 




10 






❖ 








0 

K 

Q 10 7 6 3 

! 2 




❖ 

A 

Q 10 7 

' 3 



Z bids the higher ranking suit first, a spade. A knows 
Z cannot go game in spades, and bids two hearts, hoping 
to drive Z beyond his depth, if he cannot get the contract 
at hearts. Y doubles. This double has the conventional 
double meaning. It denies assistance in the spade suit, 
and expresses confidence in defeating the heart con¬ 
tract. Y cannot shift to three clubs, as that would look 
like a strong suit, which is not true, as he has not a trick 
in clubs, and would be a retreat from a strong attacking 
position to a minor suit. 

Whether B bids the clubs or passes, Z is going to bid 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


217 


his twosuiter, showing the diamonds. Now A cannot 
go on, in the face of Y’s double and B’s silence, so Z 
makes a grand slam, 302 points altogether. The heart 
contract would have been set for 216 only. The interest¬ 
ing point about Y’s hand is his ability to support anything 
but spades, even no-trumps if Z has the tops in spades. 
At the same time he suggests that unless Z can see game 
in the hand, it would be better to defeat the heart con¬ 
tract, or anything else A or B may bid to get out of the 
double. 

The double to defeat the contract usually carries with 
it the denial of the dealer’s suit. If the suit is assisted, 
and a double follows on the next round, it shows the sure 
trick in the opponent’s suit. This is the most useful of 
all the doubles that come up later in the bidding, but it 
must not be confused with the double to defeat the con- 


tract. It is an encouraging double. 

Here is an example: 

No. 70 


A 10 4 




❖ 

J 4 




0 

4 3 




❖ 

A 9 6 5 3 2 



Q 9 3 

Y 

7 

8 7 6 5 2 

❖ 

K 9 6 3 

A B 

❖ 

10 8 7 

0 

A K Q 9 

0 

J 10 7 6 5 

❖ 

10 4 

Z 

❖ 

— 


K J 




❖ 

A Q 5 2 


* 


0 

8 2 




<$> 

K Q J 8 7 


Z bid a 

spade, and 

A doubled. Y assisted the spades 


bidding two, but B responded to his partner’s double and 



218 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


bid three hearts. This Z and A passed, but Y doubled. 
Coming after the assist, this cannot mean that Y wants 
to defeat the heart contract, but it is the only way in 
which Y can indicate to Z that his outside trick, on which 
he assisted the spades in the first place, is the ace of 
hearts. The opportunities for this form of the double are 
very numerous, but seldom availed of, except by the best 
players. 

Now B has to show his second suit, bidding four dia¬ 
monds. With the assurance that Y must have the ace 
of spades and ace of hearts in his hand, Z bids four 
spades. If A had the spade ace, he would not have 
doubled. If B had it, he would have gone no-trumps 
in answer to A’s double. It is a game hand at spades 
for Z. 

One of the most dangerous doubles, and therefore in¬ 
frequently used, is the bluff. The most remarkable result 
I have ever seen in the matter of points won, saved, or 
lost, was due to a bluff double. Here is the hand. It was 
not played in a duplicate game: 


No. 71 


7 

❖ 

0 


7 

❖ 

0 

❖ 


7 4 3 

9 6 4 2 
6 5 4 

10 8 2 


Q 9 6 5 2 


<?■ 

❖ 

0 


Q 8 3 2 
IC 9 6 3 



V A 

<§> A Q 10 7 3 
0 K J 7 
A Q J 7 


K J 10 8 
K J 8 5 
A 10 9 
5 4 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


219 


Z bids no-trump, A and Y passing, and B doubling. 
This is a weak double, as it is on the wrong side of the 
strong hand. Z passes, and A bids two clubs. Y bids 
two hearts and B supports the clubs, going to three. 
Z now sees his chance to camouflage his hand, and instead 
of doubling the clubs, bids three hearts, as if he were 
afraid of clubs. But when B goes to four clubs, Z doubles. 
Being a foxy player, and realizing that he is in wrong, 
B makes a bluff at it and redoubles, hoping to frighten Y, 
in which he succeeds. Z is perfectly satisfied, so is A, 
but Y falls into the trap, and misled by Z’s original assist 
for the hearts, mistakes the club double for encourage¬ 
ment, showing a sure trick in that suit, and bids four 
hearts. This B doubles and sets for 100 points and 
simple honors, net 116. Y should have known four 
clubs was impossible if Z had a no-trumper and could 
double clubs. B would have been set for 1612 points at 
clubs. 

One of the most frequent errors in the use of the double 
is that of position. While the partner has yet to speak, 
he may have anything from a no-trumper to five honors 
in one hand, and there is no objection to trying him out 
with a double. But if he has passed up an opportunity 
to make a free bid, it is a dangerous experiment to 
ask him to produce three or four tricks in answer to a 
double. 

If the dealer has bid no-trumps and second hand has 
passed, that is another matter, as good players will pass 
up a strong hand in that position. But when both dealer 
and second hand have passed, the fourth hand is in the 
worst possible position for a double, and should either 
bid his suit or sit tight and try to save the game. Take 
this case: 


220 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


No. 72 


i A 

7 

A 6 





K J 7 4 2 



0 

Q J 5 2 





Q 9 



s? 

K 8 4 3 

Y 

7 

7 2 

❖ 

9 8 6 5 

A R 

<£> 

A Q 10 3 

0 

K 3 


0 

A 7 4 

❖ 

10 5 3 

Z 


K J 6 4 



Q J 10 9 5 



❖ 

— 




0 

10 9 8 6 




❖ 

A 8 7 2 




When Z and A passed, Y bid no-trump and B doubled. 
But for the double, Z would have taken out the no-trumper 
with two hearts. As it was, he passed, and A’s best suit 
being hearts he bid it, and was left to play it. Y led 
the queen of diamonds, which A won, and seeing nothing 
better in the hand, returned it and trumped the third 
round. Then he finessed the queen of clubs, and Z 
trumped it and led trumps catching the king and exhaust¬ 
ing them. After putting Y in with a diamond he refused 
to ruff the top club, winning three more tricks, as B had 
to lose three in the black suits. This sets the contract 
for four tricks. 

Some players seem to balk at the use of this conven¬ 
tional double when the bid to be doubled is more than 
one trick, and I have several times been asked whether it 
should not be confined to doubling one-trick bids, as 
higher bids are too risky. 

This question, it seems to me, is very easily answered, 
Scotch fashion, by asking another one. What are you 
playing for; game, or a few points on the score toward 
game, or penalties? If you are playing for game, and 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


221 


think you can make it, why not bid game, or force your 
partner to bid it for you? I have seen countless games 
pulled out of the fire by doubling free bids of two. One 
must not forget that there are many such bids made that 
are unsound, some of the old school still believing that the 
less you have at the top of a suit that is longer than aver¬ 
age, the more you should bid. Such players know noth¬ 
ing about the defensive element in the bidding. Here 
is a case in which a player doubled a free bid of three with 
excellent results: 

No. 73 

S? A K Q 2 
A Q 8 5 4 2 

0 J 8 
Q 

7 10 8 4 
7 

0 A 2 

A 10 76543 

S? 6 5 
cj> J 9 6 3 
0 Q 10 5 4 
K J 9 

Z said no bid, A three spades, and Y doubled. B passed 
the buck, waiting to hear from Z, who followed orders and 
bid three no-trumps, as he could stop the spades. All he 
lost was a club, a spade and two diamonds. A led a heart 
and Y played ace and small in clubs. Then A passed up 
the first spade lead from B’s hand, which saved a trick. 
B echoed in diamonds on the clubs, and A kept two dia¬ 
monds and the ace of spades. If A gives up the ace of 
spades on the first lead of that suit, he loses four odd 5 
instead of three. 




WINNING AND SAVING GAME 


There seems to be a good deal of misunderstanding as 
to the importance of winning or saving a game, and a 
good deal has been written about the player’s equity 
in certain situations, of which there are four. The 
first is when neither side can go game; but it may be 
better to score a few trick points and honors than 
to let the other side do so. The second is when 
there is a chance that the hand will go game, but no 
fear of the opponents’ doing so. The third is when 
game may be saved by bidding up the hand beyond 
what it is worth, so as to prevent the opponents from 
going game, when it is highly probable that they will 
do so. The fourth is when either side seems likely to go 
game unless forced to bid more than game to get the 
contract. 

All these conditions but the first are complicated by a 
consideration of the value of a game as part of the rubber, 
under some one of three conditions. These are: Neither 
side having yet won a game; one side having a game; 
both sides having won a game. What is the game worth 
under any of these conditions? 

In duplicate, it is fixed at 125 points, and as there are 
no rubbers, this is an invariable value, attached to any 
game won, whether in one deal or several. With regard 
to its value in the ordinary rubber, some very learned, 
extraordinary, and contradictory opinions have been 
expressed by writers on the subject. A perusal of these 
opinions leads only to the conclusion that they are all 
guesswork. 

There are some undisputable facts to go upon, how- 
223 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


223 


ever, and some well-known axioms in the laws of chance 
are borne out by these facts. The most important is 
that 3 times out of 4 the side that wins the first game 
will win the rubber. Another is that if both sides have 
won a game, each has an equal chance for the third, no 
matter which side won the first game. In spite of this, 
which is borne out by the records of 1500 rubbers, col¬ 
lected from the general run of play in several of our largest 
card clubs, no one seems to recognize the importance of 
winning the first game, all the emphasis being laid on the 
third, or rubber game. 

Another point which is settled is that, under the pres¬ 
ent system of scoring, the average rubber is worth 400 
points. Here the experts disagree. Some say this shows 
that the difference between winning and losing a rubber 
must be 800, while others insist the difference is only that 
between winning the 250 rubber points or losing them, 
which is only 500. The difference is that the 800 school 
base their figures on a rubber in which there is as yet no 
score at all. The 500 school base their calculations on a 
swing one way or the other of 250 points to be won or 
lost in addition to the score as it stands when the game 
that may decide the rubber has already reached the bid¬ 
ding stage. 

Both these entirely ignore a consideration which I 
consider vital, which is that there will be another rubber 
after this one is decided. To appreciate this, we must 
first look at the statistics which we have as to the value of 
certain scores at various stages of the rubber. 

We have authentic records of the results of 1500 rub¬ 
bers, 500 of which are under the old count, when the 
spade suit had a double value, the other 1000 being under 
the new count, all played during the winter of 1916-1917, 
and compiled from score-sheets gathered at the Knicker- 


224 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


bocker Whist Club of New York. A brief summary of 
the results was published in the N. Y. Sun on November 
18, 1917. 

It took 5173 deals to decide these 1000 rubbers, and the 
average value was 379 points. The most interesting 
facts, as they relate to game values, were these: Out of 
these 5173 deals, 2342 went game by scoring 30 or more 
points on each of them. Of the remainder, 1613 failed 
to fulfil the contract, leaving 1218 that stopped short of 
game. Of these 1218, 156 were useful in winning a game 
by the aid of a previous score that had been accumulated 
by one or more of the remaining 1062 of these 1218. 
How many of these 1062 were on the score-sheet when one 
of the 2342 game hands finished the business without the 
assistance of the previous score is not stated. 

The most important point in connection with our 
first condition, when neither side can go game, is the 
value of a partial score. If we assume for the present the 
duplicate game value, 125 points, and it is only 156 times 
out of 1218 that this partial score will be of any use, its 
value is about one-eighth of 125, or hardly 15 points more 
than the trick and honor score actually recorded. Take 
the maximum trick score, short of game, 28, and add the 
average honor score, which is about 32, to which we add 
the 15 equity in a game, and we get a total of 75 points. 
This is a liberal allowance for honors, as hands which do 
not go game usually have the smallest honor scores, 
much below average. It is also an exaggerated trick 
score. In fact it is the limit, in both trick and honor 
score. 

This would suggest that in case it is manifestly impos¬ 
sible or highly improbable that either side can go game, 
it is imperative to stop bidding the moment the limit 
of safety is reached, because then your contract cannot be 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


225 


defeated, while the opponents’ may be. If you go be¬ 
yond this limit, it must be at the risk of being set 50, less 
honors held, so as to prevent their scoring an average of 
75 points in tricks, honors, and equity. If this reasoning 
is correct and the risk of being doubled and set 100 
instead of 50 is negligible, the limit of safety is to go one 
trick beyond the true attacking value of the combined 
hands, on the double chance that you may save the dif¬ 
ference between losing 50, less honors, and losing 75 
straight; or that you may set the opponents for 50 or 100, 
less their honors, if they go too far with their contract. 

When we come to situations in which one side or the 
other, or both, can probably win the game, we find a 
good deal of curious logic in the writings of those who 
have given us figures on this subject. For example: 
We are told that if A-B can win the first game, they should 
not take less than 300 in penalties for letting Y-Z play the 
hand, and in the same breath we are told that Y-Z should 
not pay more than 200 in penalties to save that game. 
How are A-B to collect 300, if Y-Z will not pay more 
than 200, unless it is that Y-Z do not know how to value 
their hands? 

Again we are told that if it is the second game of the 
rubber, the side that won the first game should not accept 
less than 300 in penalties to forego winning the second 
game, if they feel confident they can win it. At the same 
time we are told that the side that has lost the first game 
should not pay more than 100 to save the second. How 
are A-B to collect 300, if 100 is the limit that Y-Z will 
risk? 

When each have won a game, if A-B can win the third 
game and rubber, they should not forego the contract for 
less than 400. At the same time Y-Z should not risk 
more than 300 to save it. If the rubber value is figured 


226 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


on the basis of the difference between winning and losing 
250 rubber points, these figures are reduced, but the same 
proportions hold good, and the one side is advised never to 
accept what the other side is willing to pay. 

All this may be true if there is never to be more than 
one rubber in a lifetime; but the majority of those who 
play auction do not get cold feet so quickly, and will play 
six, eight, or more rubbers at a sitting. I have always 
insisted that the right way to look at this question is not 
to think of a rubber as an average of five games; but to 
consider thirty games as an average of six rubbers. 

Leaving the duplicate game out of the discussion, and 
confining our attention to the ordinary rubber, in which 
the difference between winning or losing the 250 points 
bonus is admittedly 500, the following facts would seem 
to be obvious if we keep in view the idea of playing thirty 
deals, instead of five. In order to make the matter con¬ 
crete, suppose the trick and honor scores to be always the 
same, three odd and 30 aces, at no-trump. Contrast 
these two scores: 


We 

They 

We 

They 


250 

250 


300 

30 

30 


30* 

30* 

30* 

30* 

30* 

30* 



30* 

30* 


30 

30 


360 

370 

370 

60 


The eight entries marked with asterisks are the same 
in each, as we and they have each won a game. In the 
















FOSTER ON AUCTION 


227 


first score-sheet, on the left, they paid 300 penalty to save 
the rubber, and on the next deal they won it. The rubber 
is worth nothing to either side. In the second score-sheet 
they let the rubber go, and we won it. This shows that 
they saved 300 points by taking the “sting” shown on the 
first score-sheet. So far so good; but that is confining 
our view of the situation to these few deals. 

If you save a rubber at the expense of 300 penalty, 
which is all you are advised to pay by either school, the 
500 or the 800, and win the next game and rubber you are 
not 300 ahead, because you have not won anything; but 
you have saved 300, which you would otherwise have lost. 
Now let us suppose that you lost that 300, but still won 
the next game as shown by the score-sheet. This would 
be the first game of the next rubber, which everyone agrees 
is equal to odds of 3 to 1 that you win the rubber. This 
is three-quarters of 400, which is 300. Now you have 
got back the 300 you lost on the last rubber, which 
is all you could have done by taking a sting of 300 and 
then winning it. Now look at this score-sheet, in the 

In this case, the first four scores entered 
are the same as before, each side having 
won a game. They take a sting of 300 
to save the rubber, as before, but they 
do not win the rubber on the next game. 
The result is that they are now 600 behind, 
as 550 is now reckoned as a 6 game in the 
clubs. It is useless to throw 300 more 
after the first 300 to save the rubber 
again, because even if it was won on the 
next deal they would still be 300 behind, 
yet players will try that experiment all 
the time. 


margin: 


We 

They 

250 

30 

300 

30* 

30* 

30* 



30* 

30 


610 

60 









228 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


The moral of this is that when you get 500 or 600 
ahead, never overbid the hand under any circumstances. 
If they can win the game and rubber, let them do so, but 
do not let them get back any of your velvet by penaliz¬ 
ing you. That is one of the greatest mistakes a player 
can make, trying to win more when he already has the 
big end in his fingers. 

It is a well-known mathematical fact, borne out by the 
analysis of the 1000 rubbers referred to, that if each side 
has won a game, either side has an equal chance to win 
the third game. This forces us to take into consideration 
the probability that half the time the side that takes a 
sting to save a game will not win the third game. Then 
they incur a loss of about 600, instead of coming out even, 
which no equity that lies in winning the first game of the 
next rubber can balance. 

Summing up these facts, which are supported by all the 
statistics at our disposal, there is nothing to be gained 
by paying 300 to save a rubber, even if you can win it on 
the next deal, while that deal might be equally applied to 
the first game of the next rubber. On the other hand, 
there is everything to be lost if you fail to win the rubber 
that you have paid 300 to save. So firmly have I been 
personally convinced of these facts that for several years 
I have never made any attempt to save a game or rubber 
by overbidding my hand more than one trick, although 
I have had the pleasure of seeing my partners take stings of 
several hundred, and gloat over the fact that they eventu¬ 
ally won the rubber. I confess I am unable to see the 
value of a rubber that loses points when regarded as part 
of a series of rubbers, and not as an individual. 

My advice to all my pupils is to treat all cases alike, 
just as if neither side could go game, and never to bid 
more than one trick beyond what the hands are worth, at 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


229 


their attacking value, no matter who wins the game or 
rubber. 

Having been fortunate in having ample opportunity for 
watching the methods of some of the most successful 
players, I am convinced that it is much more important 
to save the games in the play than in taking stings of 
several hundred points. It is the player that can just 
squeeze the trick that stops the other side from going 
game; or that can go game himself, where the average 
player would just miss it, who is the big winner in the 
long run. 

In the big duplicate games I have frequently seen a 
player bid two or three tricks more than his hand could 
possibly be worth, and get doubled and set for two or 
three hundred, just because he was afraid the other 
side would go game. At another table, holding the same 
cards, the player would allow them to play the hand 
against him, and by skilful management hold them down 
to three odd, when they needed four. Few players realize 
that just missing a game by a trick, or losing it by the same 
margin, makes a difference of at least 130 points. The 
same error, repeated a few times, is the difference between 
the top score and a large minus. 

We have seen that if the score stops short of game 
it is only about once in eight times that such a score will 
be of any value, therefore it may be classed as a deal 
thrown away, an opportunity wasted, just like a bad 
approach shot at golf, which leaves you no better off than 
you were before 


GETTING PENALTIES 


One of the surest marks of the beginner and the un¬ 
taught player is the desire to play every hand, whether 
there is any chance of going game on it or not. Such 
players never stop to consider what chance their oppo¬ 
nents have of making their contract, if they are bidding, 
and have little regard for their own partners, except as an 
assistance. 

There is always the double possibility when the oppo¬ 
nents are bidding; to penalize them, or to go game against 
them. One of the most difficult things seems to be to 
get this class of players to think clearly about the other 
hands, and not so much about their own. To illustrate: 

No. 74 




7 

Q J 10 






A K 7 5 

2 




0 

9 8 4 





❖ 

10 4 



V 

A K 7 

6 2 

Y 


8 5 


10 4 


A 13 

❖ 

8 6 3 

0 

A 7 2 


I\ 1 ) 

0 

10 6 3 

❖ 

6 5 2 


z 

❖ 

K J 8 7 3 




9 4 3 






Q J 9 





0 

KQJ5 





❖ 

A Q 9 




230 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


231 


Z bids no-trump, A two hearts. These bids are very 
frequently made by players who presume upon the rash¬ 
ness of their opponents. A is confident that he will not 
be left in. Without stopping to consider the improbabil¬ 
ity of A’s being able to make his contract, and the impos¬ 
sibility of his going game if Z really has a no-trumper, 

Y bid three clubs. This relieved B, and Z could not go 
to three no-trumps, with nothing to stop the hearts, so 

Y played it at clubs, and smiled blandly at his partner 
when the hand was over, remarking that he not only 
made his contract but had four honors to score; adding, 
by way of emphasis, that Z could not have done as well at 
no-trumps, which is quite true. 

But suppose Y had thought for a moment about Z’s 
bid, and had doubled the two hearts, he would have set 
the contract for 316. If he passes without saying any¬ 
thing, which is better, he will set it for 166, unless B goes 
to the rescue with two spades, which Z will double and 
set for 318, unless A gets frightened and goes to three 
hearts, if Y has not doubled two hearts. Then Y can 
safely double and set the hearts for 416. All this is 
wasted just to score 42 points. 

The situations that require the most care are those 
in which the game is very improbable for your side, but 
penalties are rather promising if the other side plays the 
hand. The typical case is when one has the lead against 
a no-trumper, with a hand which is tempting enough for a 
bid. If it is a game hand, with the assistance of only 
one trick from the partner, there may be some excuse for 
making a declaration, but otherwise there is none. If 
you cannot go game, the most you can make is 28 points 
and a few honors. If you are as strong as that, you 
should be able to defeat the no-trumper, and would then 
be playing for 50 a trick, instead of 7, 8, or 9. You should 


232 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


at least be able to save the game, otherwise you are wasting 
your time bidding. Take this hand: 

No. 75 

0 
❖ 

S? A 6 4 
(§>9 5 
0 Q4 

KQJ984 

s? 

<§> 

0 
❖ 

Z bid no-trump and A two spades. This led Y to show 
the clubs, but B supported the spades, and Z declined 
to support the clubs, as he thought he could save the game 
against the spade contract. At some tables Y said noth¬ 
ing, and B denied the spades with three hearts, set for 
one, less simple honors. At another, Y passing and B 
bidding hearts, A went back to the spades and made 
three odd. At five tables out of seven A overcalled the 
no-trumper with two spades, and the most he could 
make was 45 points at any of them. At the two other 
tables A passed, led the spades, and set the no-trumper for 
250 points. 

Z won the second round of spades and led ace and 
another club, which put B in to lead a heart. On the 
four good spades B discarded four hearts, and A led the 
queen and another diamond, discarding the losing cards 
on the king of clubs and the top diamond. 


Q 9 

Q 8 6 3 2 
J 9 8 2 
6 3 

S? 10 8 5 3 2 
c?> K J 10 
0 A K 3 
^ 5 2 

A 7 4 
10 7 6 5 
A 10 7 


Y 

A B 
Z 

K J 7 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


233 


In such hands as this, it should be clear to the leader 
that the no-trumper must make game in the two minor 
suits, with the ace of the leader’s suit. If that is his 
strength, game in spades is practically impossible, and 
the play should be for penalties. The great danger of 
disturbing a no-trumper lies in warning it to get into safer 
quarters. An example of this has already been quoted, 
when a no-trumper that was overcalled with two hearts 
immediately bid five clubs and laid down an invincible 
hand for the game. 

I have found, after examining 100 no-trumpers, that 
more than 70 per cent of the tricks are won in the minor 
suits, which suggests the danger of a shift to one of those 
suits if the no-trumper is overcalled. The third hand 
will not mention a strong minor suit if the second hand 
passes; but the moment the no-trumper is overcalled, 
the third hand bids. Take this case, very similar to the 
last example, so far as A’s hand goes, but here he wakes 
up the wrong passenger; 

No. 76 

S? 6 



❖ 

A Q J 10 6 2 



0 

10 8 6 5 




❖ 

K 4 



V 

K Q 9 

Y 

7 

10 8 

<?> 

8 4 

A B 

❖ 

7 3 

0 

A 4 

0 

7 2 

❖ 

AQJ732 

Z 

❖ 

10 9 


A J 4 



❖ 

K95 




0 

K Q J 9 3 



❖ 

8 6 





234 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Z bid no-trump and at six tables A bid two spades. 
With only one stopper in spades, which might be led 
through, Y bid four clubs. B passed, so did Z, but A 
went to four spades. Instead of doubling, Z bid five clubs 
and Y made game, losing only one spade and one dia¬ 
mond. In this case the only table that passed with A’s 
hand did not set the contract, but it saved the game at 
no-trumps, as Z could not hold the lead long enough to 
make three odd after dummy won the second round of 
spades. 

The greater number of opportunities to play for penal¬ 
ties instead of trying to make a few points by playing 
the hand, arise when one knows that there is a weak part¬ 
ner opposite, from whom little or no assistance can be 
expected. The weakness of doubling to force a partner 
to bid who has already passed up an opportunity has 
already been mentioned. It is equally bad policy to ask 
such a partner to assist. Here are examples of both 


errors: 



No. 77 




A Q 7 5 3 


9 7 2 


0 

A 


4 * 

10 9 8 4 


7 K 9 6 2 

Y 

v — 

<£> Q J 4 

A R 

<£> A K 8 3 

0 10 9 8 

/i J3 

rj 

0 K Q J 5 3 

<£> 7 5 2 

Z 

K J 6 3 

V 

J 10 8 4 


<§> 

10 6 5 


0 

7 6 4 2 


❖ 

A Q 




FOSTER ON AUCTION 


235 


Z and A both passed and Y bid a heart. At some tables 
B doubled, at others he bid two diamonds. Both are 
clearly mistakes, yet at the seven tables at which this 
deal was played, not a single player in B’s position passed 
up the heart bid. 

The situation is this. Y’s partner had no bid; neither 
did B’s. It is highly improbable that Y can go game 
in hearts, but if he can, there is no use bidding against 
him, as he must have a two-suiter to do it, and all the top 
hearts. On the other hand, it is equally improbable that 
A will turn up with tricks enough to enable B to make 
five odd in diamonds, or to win the game at no-trumps, 
even if he can make that bid in answer to B’s double. 
Both bids were tried. 

Here is what happened when B doubled and A went 
no-trump, according to orders, as he could stop the 
hearts, or thought he could, with four to the king. Y did 
not lead a heart up to the declared stopper, but opened 
with the spade ten, which B covered and Z won. A cov¬ 
ered the jack of hearts with the king, but Z got in again 
on the spades and Y made four hearts. Still holding the 
ace of diamonds, Y forced out the king of spades, as 
dummy was down to two diamonds and three clubs. 
This set the no-trumper for three tricks. 

B could have made two diamonds, but Z overcalled 
him with three hearts. Only one table in the room went 
game on hearts. This is how they did it. B led three 
rounds of clubs, and A led the diamond. Y led a spade, 
making both queen and ace at once. Then he led the 
trump from dummy and ruffed Z with a spade, trumping 
with the eight. A diamond allowed Y to trump in and Z 
trumped the fourth spade with the ten, leading the four. 
All the others misplayed the hand and failed to go game 
through leading trumps out, before ruffing the spades. ; 


236 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


There are countless hands in which one knows that 
game is hopeless for the other side, if one would only 
stop to think about it for a moment. In such cases 
great care should be taken not to overbid one’s own hand, 
but at the same time to go as far as necessary to get what 
there is in it, in case the opponents stop bidding. It is 
useless to let them score two odd and simple honors when 
you could have made two odd yourself. The dangerous 
situation is when you overbid your hand and risk being 
penalized, when you might have collected penalties 
from the opponents, and could not possibly lose the game. 
This hand was played at seven tables: 

No. 78 

y K 8 3 
KJ5 

0 K Q 8 6 
^ 875 
<v> A J 7 4 2 
<S> S 6 
0 A 3 
K 10 9 3 

S? 10 6 
c£> Q 10 3 
0 9 5 2 
£ A Q J 6 2 

Z bid a spade, and at every table but one A bid two 
hearts. He has a legitimate one-trick bid, but not two 
and if his partner assists on average holding, the hand 
will have gone a trick beyond its value. On the other 
hand, what chance has Z to go game in spades? If he 
and his partner are strong enough to make four odd, A 
is wasting his breath bidding two hearts. At each table 




FOSTER ON AUCTION 


237 


Y assisted the spades, and B went to three hearts. Both 
these assists are sound, as either hand is good for 4§ tricks 
in attack. 

Z had no more to say, and Y passed, so the hand was 
played at hearts and set for one trick less simple honors; 
net loss 34 points. At the only table at which A passed, 
Z made the odd at spades, and simple honors 27 points. 

Now let us suppose that A’s hearts were spades and 
Z’s spades were hearts. Then A could have over called 
Z’s opening bid of one trick with one trick, and the same 
assists would have followed, but with this great difference, 
that A would not have overbid his hand to start with, 
and could make two odd if left to play it. If Y bid two 
tricks, Z would be set if he or Y went to three tricks after 
B’s assist. 

The great point in playing for penalties is to avoid 
having to pay them yourself. Some persons are very 
fond of “pushing them up a bit,” as they express it, hoping 
the other side will overbid their hands and get hurt. 
This is all very well if you are “playing with children,” 
but it is not sound auction, and more closely resembles 
poker, in which game the fate of the bluffer is proverbial. 


THE SECOND BIDDER 


This term is applied to the one who sits on the left 
of the first bidder, but a sharp distinction must be made 
between the player who sits on the left of the dealer's 
opening bid, and the third hand, whose partner has passed 
without a bid. The second bidder, when on the dealer's 
left, is still in an attacking position, as his partner has yet 
to speak, and may have a very strong hand. But if the 
third hand is the second bidder, when the dealer has 
passed, he is usually, but not always, in a defensive posi¬ 
tion, with a weak partner. 

If the dealer passes, the second player becomes the 
first bidder, and his declarations are governed by the 
same rules as if he were the dealer, with the possible 
exception that he may go no-trumps on only average 
hands. This is the best possible position for a free bid, 
and no opportunity should be lost to make it. 

The situations with which we have now to deal are 
those in which the dealer makes a bid of some kind, and 
the player on his left becomes what is technically known 
as the second bidder. 

We may dismiss at once from consideration all those 
hands that have a legitimate free bid, which is enough in 
itself to overcall the dealer. With a normal heart or 
spade bid, for instance, one can overcall a club or a dia¬ 
mond, just as if no such bid had been made. If the dealer 
bids a heart, and the second bidder has a one-spade bid, 
he is not required to overbid his hand to overcall the heart. 
In the same way, of course, if the second hand has a two 
or three bid in either of the major suits, he can over call 
anything but a no-trumper. 

238 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


239 


In the last chapter we have dealt with cases in which 
the second bidder should not overcall his hand if it is 
obvious that the dealer cannot go game on his declara¬ 
tion ; unless there is such a large score for honors that the 
second hand can well afford to be set for 50 or 100 points. 

Because of the advantage of the second hand in having 
a partner who has yet to speak, and who may have a 
pretty strong hand, many modern players make it a point 
not to overcall the dealer’s major-suit bids with two in a 
minor suit, unless they can assist the other major suit, or 
are willing to have the partner go no-trumps if he can 
stop the dealer’s suit. This convention is suited to a 
much larger number of hands than the double would be. 

The theory is that if the second hand has nothing but 
a few tricks in a minor suit he might as well sit tight and 
try to save the game by leading that suit. But if he has 
iome support for the other major suit, but not enough 
to bid it, and is willing for his partner to bid it on four 
cards only, with a couple of honors, he should indicate it. 
Here is an illuminating example of the use of this con¬ 
vention: 


No. 79 


7 

<s> 

0 

❖ 


7 Q J 7 2 

Q 10 

0 10 7 5 4 2 

❖ Q 7 


8 

9 6 5 2 
A K Q 9 
K 9 8 3 


Y 

A B 
Z 


7 

0 


A K 10 6 5 
<§> J 8 7 
0 8 3 

10 6 5 


9 4 3 
A K 4 3 
J 6 

A J 4 2 



240 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Z bid a heart. At every table at which A passed, Z 
made his contract, the odd trick and five honors. At the 
tables at which A bid two diamonds and B did not under¬ 
stand the convention, leaving him to play it, Y led the 
hearts and forced him. At one of these tables, after 
three leads of trumps, A incautiously led a third round of 
spades, and carried home the ace or the king of clubs. 
At other tables, seeing his danger, A made his two club 
tricks, and saved his contract, winning two by cards. 

At the two tables at which B understood the minor-suit 
bid over the major suit as showing support for the other 
major suit, B bid two spades, and made a little slam, 
losing nothing but the first heart trick. 

The foregoing are all attacking bids. We cross the line 
into the province of defensive bids when it is probable 
that the dealer will go game on his declaration, or that his 
partner may be encouraged to make a better one and go 
game. Now the second hand must put up some kind of a 
fight. The chief difference between any bids he may 
make in this defensive position, curiously enough, is that 
they do not show the same defensive strength that a free 
bid would show. 

This is because he cannot wait for sure tricks at the 
head of a suit, but must bid what he has. If the dealer 
starts with a heart, the second hand must bid a spade, 
even if he has only five to the queen and an outside trick 
somewhere. He cannot lie down and let his opponents 
walk over him with a one-heart bid, while there is any 
chance to get the contract away from them, or push them 
beyond their depth. 

In such positions, the partner must make allowance 
for the possibility that the second bidder is not as strong 
as would be required for a free bid, and therefore must 
pot credit him with the defensive strength that an orig.- 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


241 


inal or free bid would indicate. The situation usually 
arises when a major suit is overcalled by the other 
major suit, as in the following hand. 


No. 80 


S? 

< 8 > 

0 

❖ 


8 3 
Q 7 5 
K 3 
Q 9 7 


S? 

0 

❖ 


6 4 

❖ 

0 


J 9 7 4 
K 9 6 
Q J 7 2 
K 3 

* 
0 
❖ 

K Q 10 6 5 
10 8 
A 10 6 
10 8 5 



A 2 

A J 4 3 
9 8 5 4 

A J 2 


Z bid a heart. At four tables out of seven, A passed 
without a bid, and B could not see anything beyond saving 
the game. At hearts, Z made his contract, the odd trick 
and four honors. When A bid a spade second hand, B 
supported it over Y’s assistance to the hearts, and A went 
game, as B won the first trick with the ace of hearts and 
led a low club, forcing the king with the queen. Y then 
tried a small diamond, and the ace won that trick. The 
king won the next and the trumps all fell on the finesse of 
the jack by dummy, losing one heart at the end. 

The double of a no-trumper has already been discussed 
in another chapter. It may be well here to observe 
that this is now universally admitted to be a better bid 
than going two no-trumps over the dealer’s one no-trump. 
The partner is then free to show a suit for a bid of two, 
and if the second hand does not like it he can bid two no- 



242 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


trumps, which does not increase the contract. That he 
might just as well have gone two no-trumps in the first 
place does not alter the fact that he might have found his 
partner with a big major-suit bid, and perhaps a slam hand. 
Here is an example: 

No. 81 

s? 

❖ 

0 
❖ 

^ A8 
c£> K Q J 4 
0 A J 10 
^ 10 9 6 5 

V 
❖ 

0 
❖ 

Z bid no-trump. At the tables at which A bid two 
no-trumps, B had nothing to say, and Y led a spade, so 
that the king won the third round and A went game. 
At the tables at which A doubled, B bid two hearts, and 
A, making allowance for the possibility that it might be a 
suit of four cards only, went two no-trumps, and went 
game. B would have been set on the two-heart contract. 

The two principal situations that continually present 
themselves to the second bidder depend on whether the 
bid on his right is in a major or a minor suit. If it is in 
a minor suit, it is more than probable that the third hand 
will avail himself of the assistance offered and will make a 
better declaration. There are some players who will not 
bid a minor suit originally except as an invitation to their 


10 9 2 

9 8 3 
8 6 5 
A J 8 4 



K J 5 3 
A 6 5 2 
K Q 4 
Q 3 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


243 


partner to go no-trump. This is a very foolish restriction 
to put upon the bid, as there are countless hands in which 
it is most important to show a couple of tricks for defence, 
which are far from being two-thirds of a no-trumper. 

A minor suit on the right puts the second bidder on the 
defensive, and he should seize the opportunity to show 
any suit he would like to have led, while he can do so 
cheaply, even if he has not the strength for an original 
declaration of two tricks. This is in the nature of a 
forced bid, like A’s spade in the last example. It is only 
a chance; but it is a chance that must be taken when the 
player is on the defensive. Here is a case: 


No. 82 


❖ 

0 

❖ 


s? 

❖ 

0 

❖ 

J 7 2 
A K 10 5 
10 6 4 
K 7 3 


A 9 8 3 
9 6 

J 9 8 7 2 

❖ 
0 
❖ 


A Q 



V Q6 

<§) J 8 3 2 
0 A K Q 5 
« J54 


K 10 5 4 
Q 7 4 
3 

10 9 8 6 2 


Z bid a diamond. At every table at which A was un¬ 
willing to bid two clubs Y went no-trump, and won the 
game, and he must win it whether B leads a heart or a 
spade. 

But at the tables at which A bid two clubs, Y usually 
supported the diamonds. At one he went no-trumps on 
the theory that B would think he had the clubs stopped 



244 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


and would not lead them; but B had long since learnt to 
trust his partner and not his opponents, and they set the 
no-trumper, as they made four clubs, a heart and a spade. 

At other tables, when Y supported the diamonds, B 
usually regarded the defence as being established by 
keeping the contract in a minor suit. Game in diamonds 
was impossible, as the play at some tables proved. At 
one table, B mistook the bid as showing support for a 
major suit and guessed spades. He could have made 
two spades, but Y went to three diamonds. It is only 
when a minor suit is used to overcall a major suit that it 
shows assistance for the other major suit, as then there 
can be no mistake as to which suit it is. 


THE THIRD HAND 


The principles that govern the declarations of the 
third hand, when the dealer makes the first bid, have 
been already fully dealt with. We come now to situations 
in which he is either first or second bidder. 

If both dealer and second hand pass, the third hand 
should be wary about going into no-trumpers, as he will 
probably find all the strength over him on his left and a 
weak dummy opposite him. Some persons imagine that 
the third hand should be a trick stronger than the dealer 
in order to make a declaration of any kind. This assumes 
that his bids are all to be in the attacking class, which is 
not the case. The thing to be particularly avoided is 
any declaration that is not defensive, as well as attacking. 
The conventional two sure tricks are imperative, because 
this is a peculiarly defensive position, it being more than 
probable that the fourth hand will make a strong bid for 
the contract. Then it may be important for the dealer 
to know just what t< 

No. 83 ^ 

❖ 

o 

9 7 3 
<?> K 7 4 
0 Q 6 4 
4> A 9 7 4 

V 

0 

❖ 


) lead. 



A K 10 5 4 
8 5 2 
A K 10 
K Q 



246 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


When the bid was passed up to B fourth hand, he bid 
a heart, Z led the diamonds, and B went game by getting 
a club discard on the ace of spades. Some pairs made five 
odd. But when Y put in a defensive club bid, although 
B got the contract at hearts just the same, he could 
not win the game, as he lost three club tricks immediately 
on Z’s lead of the club ten, after which Y or Z must make 
a trump. 

There are some hands in which the third hand must 
take long chances in defending himself against an im¬ 
pending bid by the fourth hand. If the defence is useless, 
they will go on, so that nothing is lost, but the dealer 
knows what to lead. Take this case: 

No. 84 




7 

10 7 5 2 







A K 6 3 







8 6 4 







7 2 




7 

A 

CO 

00 

Y 


Q 

J 


Q 

J 10 9 

A R 

❖ 

7 

5 2 

0 

A 

K Q 7 

13 


J 

10 5 2 

❖ 

8 


z 

❖ 

Q 

J 9 6 




9 6 4 




❖ 

8 4 






0 

9 3 







A K 10 

5 4 : 




Z bid two spades and A doubled. At every table at 
which Y passed, B bid two no-trumps and went game. 
Z opened with a heart, hoping to get Y in to come through 
B’s stopper in spades. After making four tricks in each 
of the red suits, dummy led the queen of clubs and Y had 
to make his two tricks before he led the spades, as Z had 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


247 


only one club left, so that Z had to lose a spade trick at the 
end. 

At one table Y felt pretty sure that B would be able 
to stop the spades and would go no-trump, or that he 
would not be able to go game in anything else, so he bid 
three clubs, to direct a lead. This effectually shut off 
the no-trumper, and B had to be content with a three- 
diamond bid, against which Y and Z took home four 
tricks immediately by leading the clubs, ruffing the third 
round and making the spade. The same thing happened 
when A took out the three diamonds with three hearts. 
The game was saved in the first four tricks. This is due 
entirely to Y’s defensive bid. 


THE FOURTH HAND 

The fourth hand bids on the bidding, more than on his 
own cards. 

Some players consider this the most advantageous 
position at the table, but it is also the most dangerous. 
If there have been preceding bids, especially doubles, 
denials, or take-outs, the fourth hand has a fund of in¬ 
formation at his disposal. But when no bid of any kind 
has been made, discretion would suggest throwing up 
the hand. 

If the bid comes up to him, the three others passing, 
he should be very strong to venture a declaration of any 
kind, seven or eight tricks at least, otherwise he is almost 
sure to run up against a snag of some sort and find that 
he has cleared the way for a flood of secondary bids that 
may swamp him. He must remember that his partner, 
although in the best position for a free bid, has refused to 
make one, and will probably turn out to have little or 
nothing. If there are preceding bids, no matter by whom 
made, the whole situation is changed. 

One of the first things for the fourth hand to consider 
is whether or not it is worth while to overcall a dealer’s 
no-trumper in order to direct a lead. If the suit named is 
solid, the no-trumper no longer exists, as it will be imme¬ 
diately abandoned if helpless in that suit. But if the 
fourth hand has a suit that the dealer can probably stop 
at least once, it may still be played at no-trumps. 

The usual rule is to bid any suit that will probably save 
248 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


249 


the game, such as one of five tricks, with a re-entry, if 
the partner has anything as good as the jack to lead. 
Even if the partner has no such card, the player may be 
fortunate enough to find it on his right and be able to 
finesse against it. If the dealer has the suit stopped 
twice, he will go back to no-trumps, and nothing is lost by 
having made the bid fourth hand. Many good players 
think that any hand that is good enough for an original 
or free bid should be good enough to ask a lead fourth 
hand when the dealer says no-trump. The hand is over¬ 
bid only one trick. Here is a case: 

No. 85 

S? K 8 6 
cj> Q 9 3 
0 J 8 3 
10 6 4 2 

S? Q 9 4 2 
<?> 6 2 
0 9 4 2 

K 9 7 3 

A J 10 
K 7 5 

0 KQ105 
<£> A Q J 

Z bid no-trump, A and Y passing. Disregarding any 
distinction between major and minor suits, as all are alike 
in no-trumpers, B has a hand that is good for a free bid of 
one, therefore he can afford to bid two clubs to ask for a 
lead. At some tables Z passed, to see what his partner 
would do, and his partner did nothing, so Z led the king of 
diamonds and set the contract for two tricks, less simple 
honors. 




250 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


If B does not show the clubs, A will open one or other 
of the major suits and Z will win the game, by forcing out 
the ace of diamonds before the clubs are cleared. At one 
table Z went back to no-trumps on the supposition that 
A would not lead the clubs after Z has shown he could 
stop them. But A had more confidence in his partner 
than in his adversary, and led the suit asked for. Z 
cleared the diamonds and B led a spade, hoping for an¬ 
other club lead through dummy’s queen. Although 
Z took a long chance to make three hearts by leading the 
jack and made his three diamonds, he could not win the 
game. This shows that the club bid, although it stood to 
lose 88 points, actually saves 67, which would be lost if 
A is left to lead a heart, or 77 if he leads a spade. 

There are many hands in which it is dangerous to ask 
for a lead fourth hand, unless prepared to save the game 
against any possible shift. Many persons overlook this, 
and simply warn the dealer that his no-trumoer is no 
good. Take this hand: 

No. 86 

7 
❖ 

0 
❖ 

^ 2 

<?> J 10 9 5 4 
0 J 5 3 

10 9 6 3 

V 
0 



A K 10 9 
K Q 2 
7 6 

AKQ2 


6 5 4 3 
A 6 

K Q 9 8 2 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


251 


At every table Z started with no-trump. It is a better 
spade; but let that pass. At every table but one, B 
asked for a diamond lead by bidding two. Of course Z 
dropped his no-trumper immediately and bid the higher 
ranking of his two major suits, intending to bid the hearts 
if his partner denied the spades. He can go game with 
either for the trump. 

At one table, when this no-trumper came up to B, he 
reasoned that in order to go game at no-trumps, it must be 
all done in the two major suits. This requires Y or Z to 
hold five cards in one or the other. If Z held them, he 
would have bid the suit. If Y held them, he would have 
taken Z out. 

Such a situation being improbable, it looks as if B should 
get into the lead in time to save game, so he says nothing. 
As it happened, A’s long suit was clubs and B got home 
seven tricks at once, not only saving the game but setting 
the contract. This is fourth hand bidding on the bidding. 

Among the surest marks of a fine player are these 
fourth-hand bids upon the bidding, especially if he has 
a partner opposite him that he can depend on, without 
which all auction is a guess game. We have already 
mentioned the convention used by the second hand in 
over calling a major suit with a minor suit only when he 
can support the other major suit, even if the fourth hand 
has but four cards of it, with a couple of honors. But 
suppose that instead of holding that suit the fourth hand 
can stop the dealer’s suit? 

It is in such cases that we realize the importance of 
sound bidding; because if the fourth hand is going to 
build up a contract on material promised, which cannot 
be produced when called for, he is bound to lose by it. 
Here is an example of what may be done by partners 
who can depend on each other. The deal was played at 


252 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


seven tables, and only one pair got the right bid fourth 
hand: 


No. 87 


❖ 

<0 

❖ 


7 

cg> 

0 

Q 6 
8 7 3 
A K Q 2 
A Q 4 3 


8 

9 4 2 

10 8 7 4 

J 10 9 7 2 

❖ 
0 
❖ 



s? A K 10 5 2 
cg> A K 6 
0 9 3 
eg 8 6 5 


J 9 7 4 3 
Q J 10 5 
J 6 5 
K 


Z bid a heart and A two diamonds. This relieved Y 
from the duty of denying the hearts. After a little delib¬ 
eration B bid two no-trumps. If you came into the room 
and heard this bid, without hearing what had preceded it, 
and saw B’s cards, you would probably think his no- 
trumper about the limit. But B is bidding on the bidding, 
not on his cards. He cannot bid the other major suit with 
the singleton king, but he can stop the hearts and the 
clubs, and his partner has the diamonds and the spades. 
There is no way for Y and Z to make more than the two 
aces and two kings in Z's hand, so B goes game. 

While it is true, as urged by some players, that when 
the second hand is the first bidder, the fourth hand is in 
the same position as the third hand would be if the dealer 
bid first, there is one important difference. When the 
third hand bids, the fourth hand is still to be heard from 
and he may have the suit that has not been mentioned; 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


253 


but when the bidding comes up to the fourth hand, every 
one has had a chance to show that suit. 

This leads good players to take a chance of finding one 
major suit split up, when no one has declared it. I have 
seen some of these bold bidders get away with some 
remarkable no-trumpers that were bid solely on this pos¬ 
sibility of a split suit. Here is oae of them, which is a 
good example of fourth hand’s bidding on the bidding: 

No. 88 

s? 

❖ 
o 
❖ 

7 J 10 

c£> 10 5 3 
0 A K J 4 2 
<$> A 8 2 

❖ 

0 

Z bid a club and A a diamond. When Y passed B bid 
no-trump. He reasons that his partner has something 
worth showing in diamonds. B can stop the dealer’s club 
suit, and no one has mentioned the spades, so that suit is 
probably split up. 

Z led the club to have a look, and then went through the 
spades in the dummy. A put the ace right on and led out 
the diamonds for five straight tricks, after which the heart 
finesse won the game. 




SECONDARY BIDS 


Secondary bids are all those made by any player who 
has passed up an opportunity to make a free bid, or who 
shifts to another suit after his first bid. 

Any suit that is bid on the second round, but not on 
the first, shows that while it might be considered a good 
trump suit so far as length is concerned, it is purely an 
attacking bid, and not to be depended on for defence. 
These are very seldom game-going hands, even if they 
get the declaration, unless the secondary bid is made in 
answer to a strong bid from the partner. The chief use¬ 
fulness of secondary bids is in advancing the opponents’ 
contract, or inducing them to shift to a minor suit. 

With poor partners, these secondary bids are the most 
dangerous declarations in the game, because the moment 
you overcall the opponents with one of these bids, your 
partner imagines you have been in the high grass with a 
wonderful hand, and he will carry you to the ceiling; 
whence you will probably drop about 400 in penalties. 
The biggest losses in auction start with secondary bids. 

It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between bids 
made to deny a suit, and secondary bids. As a rule, the 
meaning of both is the same, that the suit has no defensive 
strength, or it would have been shown as a free bid, and 
that the partner will therefore not find much assistance 
in his prospective dummy for his own declaration. Some 
players refuse to make any secondary bids in the minor 
suits except as denials, confining their secondary bids to 
the major suits, as attacking bids. Their opinion seems 
254 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


255 


to be that weak minor suits that have to be shown at an 
expense of at least a two-trick bid, are not worth the risk. 
This is not always true, as some secondary bids are worth a 
bid of three, even in minor suits. 

There should be no difficulty in distinguishing between 
the two classes of bids, denial and secondary, if one thinks 
of the conditions under which the bids are made. Sup¬ 
pose the third hand makes a bid after the dealer has 
passed without a bid. If the fourth hand passes and the 
dealer bids, that is invariably a denial. But if the fourth 
hand overcalls the third hand, or if the third hand has not 
made any bid, the dealer's declaration is a secondary bid. 

The most glaring error made by untaught players is in 
turning good secondary bids into free bids. This vio¬ 
lates the first principle of correct bidding, which demands 
that all free bids shall indicate the defensive possibilities 
of the hand, as well as its attacking values. Here is a 
deal in which there was all kinds of bidding at seven tables, 
which shows that very few persons know how to bid a 
hand, even after years of experience at the card table. 


No. 89 


0 

❖ 


J3 

<£> A 10 5 
0 J 9 8 7 2 
❖ 

7 

J 9 4 3 2 
Q 3 

J 10 8 4 3 


K 5 2 



7 

❖ 

0 

❖ 


<v> K 10 9 4 2 
❖ 86 
0 10 5 

❖ A Q 9 7 


A Q 8 6 5 
K Q 7 
A K 6 4 
6 



256 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


At the tables at which Z started with a free bid of one 
heart, he got into all sorts of trouble. At some tables Y 
let it go, and Z was set for one or two tricks, according 
to the skill with which the hand was played. At one 
table Y denied the hearts with two diamonds. This led 
A to try a secondary bid of two spades, instead of leaving 
his opponents in with a minor suit, which would have been 
set for three tricks. Fortunately for A, his partner took 
him out with two no-trumps and made it. 

At one table Z, A and Y all passed, and B bid a heart. 
A denied the hearts with a spade. B recognized the nature 
of this bid and went no-trump. But in this case Z knew 
nothing about Y’s diamonds, and avoided the hearts by 
leading a small spade. The result was that B made only 
the odd trick, 10 points, whereas Z’s original heart bid at 
other tables cost him anywhere from 50 to 150. 

A free bid second hand, which should have been re¬ 
served for a secondary bid, may be very dangerous in 
deceiving the partner as to the defensive value of the hand 
in the suit named. Here is a typical example of this error: 

No. 90 

V 
❖ 
o 
<£> 

7 9 2 
<?> 10 9 8 
0 KQ962 
5 4 3 

7 

<S> 

0 

<£> 


Q 8 

A J 5 2 
8 7 

A K 7 6 2 

7 A K? 

K64 
0 J 3 

<£> Q J 10 9 8 
J 10 6 5 4 3 
Q 7 3 
A 10 5 4 


Y 

A B 
Z 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


257 


When Z passed, waiting for the second round to bid 
the hearts, A bid a diamond and Y a spade. Trusting his 
partner for at least two tricks in diamonds, B said no- 
trump, which closed the bidding, as there was no need for 
Z to deny the spades nor bid the hearts. Z led a heart, 
as he had no spades, and set the contract for two tricks, 
establishing the hearts after getting in with the ace of 
diamonds, and making them by getting in again with the 
queen of clubs. Give A the ace and king of diamonds, 
instead of king-queen, and B makes his contract easily 
enough. A's premature bid cost him 120 points. 

There are many cases in which a secondary bid follows a 
free bid. The distinction between a secondary bid and 
a two-suiter, in which both suits were equally good for a 
free bid, lies in the reversal of the rank of the suits. In 
a two-suiter, it is always the higher ranking suit that is 
bid first. In a secondary bid, it is the lower ranking 
suit that is always bid first. This sometimes leads to 
interesting situations. Take this case: 

No. 91 


❖ 

❖ 

❖ 

y 8 5 2 
<$> 7 5 
0 KQJ64 
« A76 

❖ 

0 

❖ 


Q J 8 6 4 2 
A 

K Q J 5 

7 A Q 10 6 4 3 
<$>9 3 
0 10 7 5 2 

❖ 4 

9 7 

A K 10 

9 8 3 

10 9 8 3 2 




258 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


At some tables, Z did not bid anything, as he belonged 
to the old school, that will not bid a minor suit unless it 
contains five cards. The consequence was that A bid a 
diamond, Y two clubs and B three hearts, which ended it, 
and B went game very easily. This is the result of bad 
bidding on Zs part, as shown by the result at another 
table. 

Here Z started with a club, which is the correct bid, 
having in view the shift to the secondary bid in the major 
suit. Then, when A bid the diamond, Y went no-trump, 
as he could trust his partner for two tricks in clubs, ace- 
king, which looks like seven tricks laid down, even if the 
diamonds were led and established against him at once. 
Now B passes, as he has the lead, and Z goes two spades. 
This marks him with a secondary spade bid, probably 
without the ace, or he would have bid it originally with 
two tricks outside. 

A passes, so does Y. Now B must bring his hearts into 
the spotlight, as the no-trumper has left the stage. The 
result was that the hearts and the spades were bid up 
to four tricks. When the hearts ventured to five, they 
were doubled and set for 100. Z would not go to five 
spades, as he knew he must lose some tricks in the red 
suits. 

As a rule, secondary bids in minor suits are pretty 
strong in the matter of length, or they are not worth a bid. 
The bidder must remember the difficulty of going game 
in the minor suits, and if it is improbable that the other 
side can go game, secondary minor-suit bids should be 
avoided if they are not reasonably sure of at least the 
contract. They are frequently useful in pushing the 
opponents a little beyond their depth without running 
any special risk in so doing, but the partner is not sup¬ 
posed to support such bids, unless he is very sure of his 



259 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 

4 

ground. He need never deny a secondary bid in a minor 
suit. Here is an example: 


No. 92 


9 

❖ 

0 


S? 10 9 4 
Q J 10 5 
0 4 

<£> K J 10 6 
6 3 

A 7 6 3 2 
A 9 5 
A Q 5 



4 

0 

❖ 


K Q J 7 2 
K 9 8 4 
Q 6 
7 2 


A 8 5 
eg) - 

0 K J 10 8 7 3 2 
9 8 3 


Z passed and A bid no-trump. Y passed and B bid 
two hearts. Now Z bids three diamonds. This is a per¬ 
fectly sound secondary bid. If A goes back to no-trumps, 
Y knows what to lead. If either A or B goes back to 
hearts, the diamond bid is void, that is all. If Z is left 
with it, he cannot lose the game; that is certain. 

At one table A took a chance and went back to his no- 
trumper, as he had only two small hearts, and was set 
for three tricks, as Y led the diamond and the suit cleared 
up at once. At another table A passed, and B went to 
three hearts, but was set one, because Z would not lead 
the diamonds, but opened the spade. After passing 
one round of trumps, another spade put Y in to lead 
the diamond through B. At another table A went to four 
clubs and was set one, and simple honors against him. 

The curious thing about the hand was that at the 
only table at which Z was left in with his three-diamond 



260 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


bid he made four by cards by winning the first heart 
trick and leading the spades through A, so that Y should 
lead the trump. 

There is a type of hand in which there is no legitimate 
free bid in either of the major suits, but one of them may 
have the length without the tops, and the other the tops 
without the length. All such hands are peculiarly sec¬ 
ondary bids, because there is nothing to be afraid of, 
unless the opponents are strong enough to go game in a 
minor suit, in which case no sort of bidding would stop 
them. 

The player who has the patience to wait for the second 
round will often be pleasantly surprised to hear an oppo¬ 
nent make the bid that was being held in reserve. Take 
this hand: 


No. 93 


❖ 

o 

❖ 


<§> 

0 

❖ 

9 6 4 
A K 8 2 
8 

A Q J 5 4 

S? 

<?> 

❖ 


7 5 
Q 7 3 
K J 7 6 5 
9 6 2 

❖ 
0 
❖ 


K 10 8 7 3 


Y 

A B 
Z 

A K 3 
J 10 5 
10 4 


Q J 10 8 2 
9 6 4 
A Q 9 3 2 


At every table at which Z started with a spade, A 
passed, and both Y and B passed, so that Z was set for 
two tricks. When Z passed, as he should do, waiting for 
the opportunity to make a secondary bid, A bid the spades 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


261 


and B denied them with two hearts, which every one 
passed. B made his contract, but not the game. Z led 
the jack of clubs, and Y eventually got in on the third 
round and led the jack of diamonds, upon which B put 
the ace, so as to ruff dummy with a small diamond, in¬ 
stead of risking the finesse. 

The best rule for the partner, in considering the advis¬ 
ability of assisting secondary bids in the major suits, 
is to count the hand as worth an ace less than would 
be necessary for a free bid. The situation is much the 
same as those in which a player is forced to bid one trick 
more than his hand is really worth in order to overcall a 
previous bid when he is not the first bidder. Here is an 
illustration of this point: 


No. 94 


7 

❖ 

o 

❖ 


7 

A Q 3 



❖ 

J 10 7 5 4 


0 

Q J 4 



❖ 

9 5 



10 9 2 

Y 


6 4 

9 6 2 

A TK 


A Q 

A K 8 7 

A r> 

0 

10 6 

7 6 4 

Z 

❖ 

A K 


K J 8 7 5 


<?> 

K 8 



0 

9 5 3 




Q J 3 




Z passed, A bid a diamond and B a spade. Now Z bids 
two hearts. This shows that he had some sort of a heart 
bid all the time, but had not the defensive element. A 
passed, having bid his hand at the start, but B rebid the 
spades. Y’s hand is quite good enough for one assist for 



262 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


a free bid, but is not strong enough to assist a secondary 
bid, if he is careful to make allowance for the fact that the 
dealer is at least an ace weaker than a free bid. The 
play, therefore, is for Y to pass, and save the game. B 
can make two spades, but no more. If Y goes to three 
hearts, he will be set, but will have 32 in honors to score. 
This he does not know when it is his turn to bid. The 
possible difference is not worth the risk. 


THE PARTNER’S SILENCE 


One of the important elements in the bidding, and one 
that is probably most neglected by the average player, is 
the silence of the partner. When you are bidding against 
the other side, and your partner has nothing to say, it 
may be for either of two reasons: he is powerless to help 
you, or he has the opposing declaration all sewed up. 
Here is an example of what one may see every day: 


No. 95 


V Q 10 9 6 4 
K 4 2 
0 9 

A K 7 5 

<? K J 8 7 5 3 
A Q J 
0 — 

4> 10 8 6 4 

7 A 2 
<S> 9 7 5 3 
0 A K Q 7 5 3 

Q 



- 

c£> 10 8 6 

0 J 10 8 6 4 
0 J 9 3 2 


Z bid a diamond, A a heart, Y and B passed. Y’s fail¬ 
ure to assist made no impression on Z, who went to two 
diamonds, A to two hearts, and then Z to three diamonds 
and A to three hearts, Y and B passing each time. Now it 
begins to look as if it were time for Y to double three 
263 



264 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


hearts, but if he does and A makes it, he goes game, so Y 
waits for the free double, if A goes to four. Z went to 
four diamonds, and A stopped. 

The diamond contract was set for two tricks. Had Z 
paid a little more attention to his partner’s silence they 
would have set the three-heart contract for four tricks. 
Had A paid more attention to Y’s silence, he would have 
stopped bidding after one round. Y’s failure to assist 
the diamonds and A’s having none himself should have 
suggested giving B a chance to say what he thought 
about the heart contract. Then B’s silence would have 
indicated that he preferred the diamonds, and they would 
have saved the game, instead of being placed in a position 
that might have cost them 400 in penalties had Y doubled 
three hearts. 

Here is a hand which is interesting from the fact that 
one of two very fine players who held Y’s cards kept quiet, 
while the other went no-trumps. Z remarked after the 
hand that he “listened” to the silence of his partner in the 
first case: 

No. 96 






A Q 9 6 

5 4 





❖ 

K J 5 






0 

9 7 3 






❖ 

3 



K 

10 8 

7 3 2 

Y 

' V 

- \ 

<s> 

A 

Q 6 


A "R 

❖ 

10 9 4 2 

0 

A 



A 15 

0 

10 8 6 5 3’ 

❖ 

Q 

5 4 


Z 

❖ 

9 7 6 2 




J 





❖ 

8 7 3 






0 

K Q J 4 






❖ 

A K J 10 8 




FOSTER ON AUCTION 


265 


Z bid a spade and A two hearts. Y and B passed. As 
Z was quite strong enough for a rebid, he went to two 
spades, and A to three hearts, Y and B again passing. 
At this point Z listened to his partner’s silence, and all 
that A made was four tricks, being set for 266. Z could 
not have gone game in spades. 

At the other table Y did not keep silence, but went 
three no-trumps over three hearts, as soon as Z rebid his 
hand. Y made four odd, but that was only 165 points, as 
the aces were easy. 


















\ 
















% 




J 
























PART II 


THE PLAY 

As soon as the final declaration is made, the next thing 
is to play the hand, in order to see if the declarer can 
make his contract. The objective of his opponents is 
to save the game. That being safe, setting the contract 
becomes a secondary consideration. In some cases, when 
neither of these is possible, the chief care must be to save 
extra tricks and slams. 

The declarer is always playing the attacking end, and 
his adversaries must always consider themselves on the 
defensive. As it is the adversaries that have to start the 
play by an opening lead we shall consider their side of the 
game first. 

There are three elements in the play which pertain to 
the defence. Bad judgment in the bidding may be for¬ 
given, but the plays are conventional and mechanical. 
These three are: the leads, which require the selection of a 
suit and a certain card in that suit; the echoes, by which 
the partner shows what he holds in the suit led; and the 
discards, vrhich indicate protection in suits which have not 
been led or declared. 

These three conventions are again divided into two 
distinct sets, according to whether the partners are playing 
against a trump or a no-trumper. Against a trump suit, 
in which the declarer is invariably both long and strong, 
the object is to get home as many tricks as possible early in 
the play, before the declarer gets in, draws all your trumps 
267 


268 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


and makes his own or dummy’s long suit, upon which 
he will discard his losing cards in your suits. Then 
some of your high cards may be trumped, through being 
held back too long. If you will watch a number of trump 
contracts, you will readily see that very few tricks are 
won from the declarer with any card below a queen, and 
that many cards higher than 'a queen go to sleep. 

But the declarer himself will frequently win a number 
of tricks with inferior cards by taking your trumps out, 
so that you cannot stop the suit; while he still has trumps 
enough left to ruff the inferior cards of your suits. If he 
had to use up all his own trumps to catch yours, one side 
would have just as good a chance as the other with the 
smaller cards of the plain suits. 

This shows that when there is no trump suit to start 
with, the object of both sides is the same, to make tricks 
with the smaller cards, as the aces and kings are good any 
time. For this reason the opponents of a no-trumper 
should be in no rush to get home their sure tricks, as they 
would be when opposed to a trump declaration, but 
should keep those high cards for purposes of re-entry, 
after they have forced the intermediate cards out of their 
way. 

The point for the player to remember is that it does 
not matter who holds those intermediate cards, the 
partner or the declarer. The thing is to get them out. 
If the declarer holds them, they must be forced out or 
caught. If the partner holds them, they should be given 
up, willingly and at once. 

These are the general principles. We are now ready 
to examine the conventional plays by which they are 
carried out, confining our attention for the present to the 
defence, or the play against the declarer. 


leads against trump contracts 


The first consideration is the selection of the suit, 
which may depend on what bids, if any, have been made 
by the leader or his partner, or both. Three simple rules 
govern this, the trump lead being excluded. 

If you have any suit headed by both ace and king, 
lead the king, regardless of what the bidding has been. 
For the second trick, if your partner has declared a suit, 
lead the best card you hold in it. Then he knows just 
what high cards are against him in the hand of the de¬ 
clarer, and he also knows you hold an ace, with which he 
can put you back into the lead at any time. 

Having no ace-king suit of your own, lead the best 
card of your partner’s declared suit. 

If he has not declared anything, lead any suit headed 
by two or more touching honors, such as king-queen, or 
queen-jack, and always lead the higher honor of the two 
when neither of them is the ace. 

It is always well to avoid, if possible, all suits headed by 
honors that do not touch, such as ace-queen, king-jack, 
or queen-ten. If all three plain suits are of that nature, 
the best defence is to lead the trump. Then your part¬ 
ner will know that he can lead up to dummy with con¬ 
fidence that you can take care of any of the plain suits. 

Having selected the suit, the next point is the card. 
The object of leading certain cards when others would 
apparently do just as well, is to affirm or deny the pos¬ 
session of certain other cards in that suit. Sometimes the 
lead affirms only; at others it denies only; at times it 

zm 


270 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


does both. There are three rules that govern all the 
opening leads of high cards. These are: 

The lead of a king shows that the ace or the queen is 
behind the king; or both ace and queen. 

The lead of an ace denies the king. 

The lead of a queen or jack denies any higher card 
in the suit, and invariably shows the card next below. It 
is useless to lead a queen without the jack, or a jack 
without the ten, unless it is the partner’s suit. 

When there is no high-card combination from which a 
high card should be led, the rule is to begin with the, 
fourth-best, counting from the top of the suit. From 
K 8 7 6 4, for instance, lead the 6. This is called the 
card of uniformity, and its uses will be explained when we 
come to no-trumpers. From any suit headed by the ace, 
without the king, the ace should always be led if that suit 
must be opened at all. 

Some persons do not think it makes any difference 
which card is led, so that it will win the trick, but every 
now and then a situation comes up which shows it does. 
Take this case as an example: 


No. 97 


❖ 

o 


7 10 3 2 
❖ — 

0 8 6 5 3 2 
A Q J 7 6 


7 5 

A K J 7 3 
K 9 7 
10 8 4 



7 

0 

❖ 


A K Q J 9 
<?> 10 9 8 5 
0 AQ 
3 2 


8 6 4 
Q 6 4 2 
J 10 4 
K 9 5 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


271 


Z got the contract at hearts, and A led the ace of clubs. 
This denies the king, and in B’s view marks that card 
as with Z. Now let us see what consequences flow from 
this deception. Z gets out the adverse trumps. If he 
can finesse the spades successfully, he can get in again 
with the ace of diamonds, without that finesse, and go 
game. When B wins the spade he sees that if he leads a 
club Z will get right in and go game with the established 
spade suit, which must drop in two more leads if Z has a 
spade. The only chance, therefore, seems to be to lead 
up to dummy’s weak diamonds. Z puts the ace right on 
and goes game with five by cards. If A had led cor¬ 
rectly, the return of the club would have saved the 
game. 

Here is an illustration of the advantage of leading the 
trump in preference to opening undersirable plain suits. 

No. 98 






10 9 7 







❖ 

Q 3 







0 

10 8 5 







❖ 

A 10 8 6 

4 




8 

3 


Y 

7 

K 6 

4 


K 

J 

9 

A R 

cf> 

10 8 

7 5 4 

0 

A 

J 

6 2 

A JD 

0 

Q 7 

3 

❖ 

K 

9 

7 3 

Z 


J 5 





V 

A Q J 5 

2 






❖ 

A 6 2 







0 

K 9 4 







❖ 

Q 2 





The contract is in hearts, A to lead. When A opened 
with a small spade, Z won with the queen, returned the 



272 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


suit and finessed the ten. Then he exhausted the trumps, 
catching the king on the third round. A small club to 
dummy’s queen, and A put on the king, leading one of his 
equals in spades dummy held up the ace, and Z trumped. 
A small club put dummy in to make his two spades and 
give Z two diamond discards, five odd and game. A 
diamond opening gave Z four odd at another table. 

The trump opening killed B’s king on the first trick. 
Z led a small club and A passed it up. At one table 
Y returned the club and got a ruff, at another he led a 
small spade and A made the king. The moment A gets in 
he leads another trump. Now Z can kill the king of clubs 
and lose three diamonds at the end, or A makes the spade 
nine and Z loses two diamonds. In no way can Z go 
game gainst a trump lead. 

Some persons object to this opening, as it may kill an 
honor in the partner’s hand. The answer to this is that 
the partner need not play the honor if he can save it; 
but that if he cannot save it by holding it up, he could not 
have saved it if dummy led the trump. This hand went 
the round of seven tables, and only two players saved the 
game, by a trump lead in both instances. ' 

The card to lead for the second round is governed by 
the same rules whether playing against a trump suit or 
a no-trumper, so the reader may be referred to those in 
the next chapter. -•■ ” 

It is considered bad policy to lead a singleton, for a 
ruff, when you have four trumps, no matter how small. 
Lead your best suit. If you can get one force on the 
declarer he may be down to your level on the trumps, 
with only four left, and another force may kill him, leaving 
you with the long trump and a suit. Even if the long 
suit is a tenace suit, it is the best opening. 

Here is a deal in. which every player who opened with 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


273 


the short suit or the singleton lost the game, and every 
one that led his long s 

No 99 

<v> 

0 
❖ 

S? Qj 

$10 6 4 
0 Q 7 6 4 2 
$ K86 

V 

<?> 

0 
❖ 

Z bid a club, which went round to B, who bid a heart. 
When Z leads the diamond, his partner knows that it 
must be a singleton, as it is not the suit Z named in the 
bidding, so he puts on the ace and returns it. Now it 
does not matter what Z leads. At some tables he led a 
spade through dummy’s king, at others the clubs. If a 
club, B is forced on the second round, but he can pull all 
Z’s trumps and still have one left. Dummy gets in with 
the spade king and on the fifth diamond B discards his 
losing spade. Four odd and game. 

When Z opened with the clubs, B was forced on the 
second round. When he led the diamonds, he was forced 
again and then if he tried to drop the trumps he stopped 
at two by cards. If B tried to drop the trumps before 
leading the diamond, the result was the same, two odd 
only. 

When Z opened the hand with a spade, he lost five odd. 


uit saved it: 


9 5 

K 7 5 2 
A J 9 

10 5 4 2 



8 7 6 3 
A Q J 9 
8 

Q J 7 



274 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


as B exhausted the trumps and took the diamond finesse, 
after winning the first trick in spades himself with the ace. 
A short-suit opening, with four trumps, is as bad as a 
singleton. 

It is considered poor play to open with a singleton, 
unless you can stop the trump lead at once and try to get 
your partner in on some other suit, in case the declarer 
wins the first suit you lead and starts the trumps. If you 
cannot stop the trump lead, you may find that you have 
killed a good honor in your partner’s hand and set up a 
suit for the declarer, at the same time being compelled 
to discard much of the protection you had in other suits. 

Some very good players make it a rule never to open a 
two-card suit unless it is the one their partner has named 
in his bidding. They maintain that this enables the part¬ 
ner to distinguish instantly, in many cases, between suits 
that can be ruffed and suits that will go round three times. 
With ace-king only, the rule is to lead the ace first, and 
then the king. This shows no more, and a willingness 
to be ruffed. 

When either the leader or his partner has named a 
suit, that suit should invariably be led. When a suit has 
been named and is not led, the card that is led should be 
an absolute singleton, and invite a ruff. 

Those opposed to a trump contract must keep con¬ 
stantly in view the declarer’s objective in the majority of 
such hands, which will be to get out the trumps and then 
discard his losers on the established cards of some other 
suit. This naturally suggests that it is unwise to estab¬ 
lish any such cards for the declarer or the dummy if one 
can help it. 

One situation is very common, and is continually mis- 
played. On the second or third round of the leader’s 
suit it looks as if the declarer might still have one, or he 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


275 


might not. If going on with a high card will leave dummy 
with the best of the suit, it is usually bad play if there is 
any doubt about the declarer’s being able to follow suit. 

If the leader is sure that the declarer can follow, and 
making sure of the trick may be vital, no harm may 
come of it, as the declarer could lead the suit again him¬ 
self and force out the high card if it is not led at once. 
But if there is any doubt about the matter, it is always 
better to shift. Then, if the partner can get in, he will 
come through the declarer with that suit. If it is not 
trumped, the high card in the leader’s hand wins. If it 
is trumped, the high card is held back, and still controls 
the suit, as against dummy. Here is a typical case: 

No. 100 

0 
❖ 

^ J 10 9 4 
<?> A K 10 9 
0 8 7 4 
❖ 10 2 

V 
❖ 

0 
❖ 

Z bid two spades, and A three clubs, showing he could 
support hearts, but Y headed B off by bidding three 
spades. At every table at which A led two rounds of clubs, 
Z went game, by ruffing the second round, and leading 
a heart, dummy playing the ace and giving Z a heart 
discard on the queen of clubs. 


A 7 3 
Q 8 6 5 
K 9 3 
9 8 5 



Q 6 
2 

J 10 5 2 
A Q J 6 


4 3 



LEADS AGAINST NO-TRUMPERS 


Against no-trumpers, your partner not having shown 
anything, select length in preference to high cards in 
picking a suit for the opening. With five to the ace in 
one suit, and three to the king-queen in another, lead the 
fourth-best card of the five. If your partner has bid a 
suit, lead the best you have of it, unless you have an ace- 
king suit of your own, in which case, show the ace by 
leading the king, and then lead his suit. 

When your partner has not shown any suit, lead your 
own, and the longest you have. If there is a close choice 
between two suits, prefer the major suit to the minor, as 
almost all no-trumpers are bid on strength in the minor 
suits. It is very seldom that a player will run into a 
strong major suit in the declarer’s hand, but to open a 
weak minor suit, such as four to one honor, may be fatal. 

There being no fear of losing your high cards by having 
them trumped, it is the rule not to lead from less than three 
honors at the head of a suit, unless you have at least six 
cards. From five to the ace-king, even, lead the fourth^ 
best. The object is to leave your partner with one 
of the suit to return, in case he gets in before you do, 
which is highly improbable if you lead out three rounds 
at once. You will lose the first trick probably, but you 
would have lost it in any case if the declarer has it stopped. 
Starting with the small card, you may make four tricks 
later. » 

Holding three honors, the same rules apply as for the 
leads against a trump. The king shows ace or queen or 
both. When there is no sure trick in any other suit, it 
276 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


277 


is best to get any intermediate high cards out of the way 
at once, so as to leave the partner with some of the suit to 
return. 

With ace-queen-jack, for instance, lead the queen 
against a no-trumper, so as to get the king out at once, 
but with an outside re-entry, lead the ace first. With 
ace-jack-ten, lead the jack first if there is no re-entry in 
another suit. 1 

The second lead from three honors depends on what 
happened on the first lead. With ace-king-queen, having 
led the king, your partner knows you have the ace, as your 
king wins. Never tell him anything he already knows if 
you can tell him anything he does not know. Follow 
with the queen. To follow with the ace denies the queen. 
Make these two leads even when holding ace-king-queen- 
jack. 

Holding king-queen-jack, if your king wins, your part¬ 
ner may have the ace, or the declarer may be holding it up. 
Follow with the jack, which denies the ace. Your partner 
knows you have the queen. 

Holding king-queen-ten, if the king wins, it is often 
better to shift, as the declarer is very likely to hold up the 
ace-jack for what is called the Bath coup. If you do go 
on, lead your original fourth-best. 

Some players lead the jack from king-jack-ten, but it 
confuses the lead with that from ace-jack-ten, and the ten 
is the better opening, if the suit must be led. It is one of 
the worst combinations to lead away from. 

It is sometimes objected that these interior leads are 
confusing, but this is not so in practice. Such leads 
are never made except against no-trumpers, and any 
high card shows the partner that the leader holds three 
honors. Take the case of the queen lead from ace-queen- 
jack. This denies the king. The only other combina- 


278 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


tion would be from queen-jack-ten. The return will 
show which it was. 

When the declarer has bid no-trumps after you have 
named a suit, he usually has that suit stopped. You 
cannot help this, as you cannot catch his stopper unless 
you have the ace and other honors, such as ace-queen. 
In that case you may take a chance on some other suit, 
hoping to get your partner to come through the king. If 
his stopper is the ace, it is better to have it out of your 
way at once. 

If it is your partner who has bid a suit before the final 
no-trumper, and you have no high card in it that would 
catch the declarer’s stopper, there is nothing to be gained 
and everything to be lost by not leading your partner’s 
suit at once. If you lead anything else, you may kill his 
only re-entry before he can get his suit cleared. Some 
players will bid no-trumps without any protection in a 
suit, as a bluff, thinking it will not be led. Trust your 
partner in all such cases; as he has no object in deceiving 
you. 


SUBSEQUENT PLAY 


After the opening lead, everything depends on what 
turns up in the dummy and what cards fall from the 
various hands. It is impossible to go into all these details 
in a text-book, but a few general suggestions may be 
useful. 

It is always better to lead through dummy’s strong 
suits than through weak ones, provided the high cards in 
the dummy are not touching honors. That is, lead 
through an ace-queen suit, or a king-jack, but not through 
ace-king, or king-queen-jack. 

Leave it to your partner to lead up to dummy’s weak 
suits, which he is sure to do when in doubt how to go on. 
This will enable you to save any secondary honors you 
may hold in such suits, such as guarded kings, or to make 
tenaces, such as ace-queen, or king-jack. 

If you have led a king from king-queen and others, 
and the king wins, do not jump to the conclusion that 
your partner has the ace if the jack is alone in the dummy. 
Lead your queen, to make sure that the ace and jack do 
not make separately against you. 

It is usually bad policy to exhaust a suit in the dummy, 
while dummy has any small trumps, as you get him in a 
good position to ruff that suit. You should also avoid 
going on with a suit if it will obviously establish one or 
more cards of that suit in dummy. Do not follow the 
king with the ace if dummy has the guarded queen, 
unless you have reason to believe your partner can trump 
the queen. 


279 


THE LEADER’S PARTNER 


The duty of the leader is to show what cards he holds or 
does not hold in the suits he leads. The duty of the 
partner is to supplement this information by showing 
what he can do in those suits. The method varies in 
tramp contracts and no-trumpers in the matter of play on 
high cards led, but it is the same all through on small card 
leads, so it may be well to dispose of these first. 

When a small card is led and dummy plays small, the 
play of the third hand is the same whether the declaration 
is a trump or no-trump, and the rule governing it is always 
the same: 

Never pay a dollar for a trick that you can get for fifty 
cents. 

Many auction players seem to have imbibed the old 
whist maxim: “Second-hand low; third-hand high,” 
which is one of the most misleading attempts to abbreviate 
a rule that was ever grafted upon a game. The terms 
high and low in this maxim refer to the distinction be¬ 
tween high cards and low cards; not to the top and bot¬ 
tom cards of the suit. Unfortunately, those who are in 
the habit of guiding their play by such maxims as this 
take it for granted that “third-hand high” means the 
highest card they hold. 

If the third hand holds ace-six-deuce, his play is the 
ace, which is a high card as distinguished from the six 
and deuce, which are low cards. But if third hand holds 
ace-king-deuce, his play is the king; not the ace. He is 
280 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


231 


still playing third-hand high, but he is not paying a dollar 
for a trick that he can get for fifty cents. 

A much more comprehensive rule for the third hand is to 
win the trick as cheaply as possible, estimating the cost 
by the rank of the card required. If a player wins the 
first round of a suit with the nine he naturally remarks, 
“That was a cheap trick.” If he has to put up an ace to 
beat a seven, he considers it expensive. If we call aces 
worth a dollar, kings fifty cents, and queens a quarter, we 
get a working idea of values to start with. So far as 
winning the trick is concerned, it does not matter whether 
you play the ace or the king if you hold both, but if you 
pay a dollar for a trick that you could have had for fifty 
cents, you deceive your partner as to the value of the 
remainder of your hand. He thinks you have exhausted 
your capital in that suit, when you actually have a dollar 
left. 

Following out this principle, the third hand should 
play the lowest of any sequence of touching honors. 
From king-queen-jack, play the jack; from queen-jack- 
ten, the ten; from king-queen and others, the queen. If 
dummy holds the intermediate cards and does not play 
them, you must be careful to count them as part of your 
sequence. Holding king-jack, for instance, the queen in 
dummy, play the jack if dummy keeps the queen. If you 
put on the king, you deny the jack. 

If the leader is a good player, and watches the fall of 
the cards carefully, the denial of certain cards in his suit 
may influence his play just as much as the denial of the 
suit might modify his bidding. Suppose the lead is from 
five to the king. Dummy has nothing, and third hand 
plays the queen, won by the declarer with the ace. This 
marks the declarer with the jack. But if third hand 
plays the jack, won by the ace, third hand is marked with 


282 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


(the queen, because the declarer would not pay a dollar 
for a trick that he could get for a quarter, and at the same 
time promote the leader’s king to the command of the 
suit. 

Beginners often insist that it does not matter whether 
they win a trick with the ace or the king, if they come 
right back with the other winning card. But it does 
matter, because to win a trick with the higher of two 
touching honors and lead the other is a conventional 
way of showing no more, and a desire to ruff that suit. 
Here is an example of the trouble that one improper play 
third hand may lead to: 

No. 101 

^ A3 
c?) 10 7 5 
0 Q J 9 8 7 2 
❖ K 6 

7 K92 
c?) J 9 8 6 4 
0 K 5 
<*> Q J 7 

V 7 6 5 4 
c?) A 2 
0 A 4 3 
£ A 10 9 5 

Z bid no-trump and A led the six of clubs, upon which 
B played the king and Z the ace. A at once infers that B 
had to play the king, which denies the queen, so that card 
must be with Z, and if A leads clubs again, he loses tricks 
to both queen and ten. Two rounds of diamonds put A 
in. He sees that if he leads a heart all the diamonds 



Q J 10 8 
KQ3 
10 6 
8 4 3 2 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


283 


make. If he leads a club, the same thing. The only- 
chance seems to be a spade through dummy’s king. That 
may be Z’s weak suit. 

On the diamonds, Z sheds two hearts and a club, and A 
has to unguard something, but is afraid to unguard the 
clubs while Y has the heart for re-entry and Z has the club 
queen, so he let go a spade. Now Z makes three spade 
tricks, and A has to discard a heart, thinking dummy would 
blank the ace and make the ten of clubs. This gave Z 
the last trick with the seven of hearts, little slam. If B 
plays correctly to the first trick, A will lead another club, 
and four clubs, with the king of diamonds, save the game. 

Passing now to the third hand’s play on high cards, we 
have to make a sharp distinction between trump con¬ 
tracts and no-trumpers. All plays by the third hand 
that make no attempt to win the trick, are called echoes. 
Two simple rules govern this part of the game: 

When there is a trump suit, show your partner whether 
or not you can ruff the third round of his suit. This is 
called the down-and-out echo. 

When there are no-trumps, show how many high cards 
you have in your partner’s suit. This is known as the 
Foster echo. 

With a trump, if you hold only two cards of your part¬ 
ner’s suit, and make no attempt to win the trick, play 
the higher card first, unless it is as good as the jack. 
When the lower card falls, he will know you have no more 
and can ruff. With one as good as the jack, this is unnec¬ 
essary, because if your partner leads two winning cards, 
king and ace, for instance, it is obvious that you have the 
queen or no more, if you have to drop the jack on the 
second round. 

But with three in the suit, play the lowest, when you 
are simply following suit. This will mark you with two 


284 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


more at least, or no more. The leader may be able to 
tell which. In the majority of cases the use of this echo 
leads to nothing more than the leader's confidence that 
his partner can save a small trump by ruffing and will get 
the lead up to dummy. With four trumps, or any reason 
for not wishing to be forced, the partner will avoid the 
echo, even with only two of the suit. There are occa¬ 
sional deals in which this echo is very effective, especially 
if both partners can use it, each on a different suit. Here 
is an example: 


No. 102 


7 

❖ 

0 

❖ 


^ 543 
<g> KQ752 
0 10 5 

<$> 10 8 7 

Q 8 2 
J 8 4 

A K Q 4 2 
9 2 



S? A K 10 9 6 
eg) A 
0 J 9 7 6 

<g> Q J 3 


J 7 

10 9 6 3 
8 3 

A K 6 5 4 


Z and Y carried this to three hearts on Y's assist after 
B had bid the spades. A’s assist is excusable but Y's is 
not. By good play at one table Z set the spade contract, 
as he led the queen of trumps after getting rid of the ace 
of clubs and making one heart trick. Then he gave up 
the jack on the chance that Y had the ten for re-entry. 
Y must have assisted on clubs. 

The usual play was against the hearts, when A led two 
winning diamonds, king then queen, got an echo from B, 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


285 


and ruffed him. Then B led king and ace of spades, got 
an echo from A and ruffed him. Then A led the small 
diamond, so as to be sure B would trump it, if Y passed, 
as that must save A’s queen of trumps if B leads another 
spade. This set the heart contract for four tricks. 

Some players use this echo to show they can win the 
third round with a high card. They call it the “ come-on, ,, 
or encouraging echo, and the idea is that it shall prevent 
the leader from shifting. As they use the same echo to 
show they are down-and-out, it is bad practice. Any 
play that has a double meaning is false in principle. 
Sometimes it does not matter, but at times the game may 
hang in the balance, and the leader does not know what to 
do if his partner’s plays have a double meaning. Here 
is an example: 

No. 103 

❖ 
o 
❖ 

7 7 6V 

<S> A Q 7 2 

0 A K 9 4 2 

K 8 

7 
❖ 

0 
❖ 

Z bid a heart, A doubled, and Y said two hearts, so 
B passed. A led the king and ace of diamonds, upon 
which B played the eight and trey. If this means no 


K 10 9 
6 5 \ 

J 7 5 
A Q 9 3 2 

7 5 4 2 
<£> K 9 8 4 3 
7 Q 8 3 
❖ 5 4 

A Q J 8 3 
J 10 
10 6 

J 10 7 6 




286 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


more, B can ruff, and as he must lead a club up to dummy, 
the game is safe. But if it means that B has the queen, 
and that it is Z that will ruff, the only chance is to lead 
the clubs now. At the tables at which B did not echo, A 
led the clubs, and saved the game. At the tables at 
which A was in doubt, he went on with the diamonds and 
lost the game, as Z got a club discard on the fifth spade. 

In playing against no-trumpers, the object of the echo 
is to show the leader just how many high cards are in the 
hand of the declarer, in that suit, and at the same time 
to make sure that the third hand does not obstruct or 
block a suit in which the leader is longer than third hand. 
If one hand holds five or six cards and the partner three, 
the three should be so played that the five or six have a 
clear field. I have always insisted that this can best be 
carried out by the Foster echo, which I have advocated 
for years. The rule is this, the third hand being the 
leader’s partner. 

When the third hand makes no attempt to win the 
trick, he should play his second-best card of the suit, 
regardless of number or value. 

This accomplishes both objects in the defence against 
no-trumpers. It makes sure of unblocking the partner’s 
suit by keeping a small card to the last, and it shows the 
leader what is against him. In addition to this, it instantly 
exposes any attempt by the declarer to deceive the leader 
as to the number of high cards in the concealed hand. 

The only difficulty beginners have with this play is due 
to inattention to the question of whether or not they 
are making any attempt to win the trick. If third hand 
holds king-queen small, and dummy puts on the ace 
second hand, the third hand certainly cannot make any 
attempt to win the trick. In such cases he must play his 
second-best card, the queen. Suppose the lead is a 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


287 


queen, and third hand holds king-nine-deuce, dummy 
having only small cards. Third hand should play the 
nine, as it is not necessary for him to win his partner's 
queen, and the nine is the third hand’s second-best. If 
the third hand held the ace, but not the king, he would 
put it on, so as not to let a possible lone king win the first 
trick. 

In case the player who has started this echo as third 
hand gets into the lead himself, before his partner has 
any opportunity to continue the suit and see the com¬ 
pletion of the echo, the rule is to lead the best card he 
holds of his partner’s suit. Having played the ten from 
jack, ten small, for instance, on his partner’s original 
lead of a king, he would lead the jack; keeping the 
small card to be sure of unblocking the suit. The 
strength of this echo is in enabling the leader to miss 
the smallest cards of the suit in many instances, and 
count them as in third hand. 

The first part of this echo shows the situation with 
regard to the higher cards of the suit. The completion of 
the echo indicates number. The rule is that after having 
played the second-best to the first round, the lowest card 
of the suit shall always be kept until the last. If there 
are only three cards in the suit, such as eight, six, four, 
the six being played to the first round, the eight must be 
played to the next, keeping the four to the end. 

But with four in suit, the remaining second-best should 
be played to the second round. With eight, six, four, 
deuce, for example, after the six, play the four. As the 
rule is to keep the smallest card to the last, there must 
be a smaller card than the four still in hand, and one above 
the six. It is impossible to confuse these plays, one 
showing three in suit, the other four. The only uncer¬ 
tainty is between two cards and three, unless the first 


288 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


played must be the smallest possible. This part of the 
play is chiefly useful in showing the leader whether or not 
the declarer’s cards can all be caught or forced out. Here 
is a simple case: 


No. 104 


7 7 6 

c$> K 10 7 6 2 
0 Q 5 4 
£ 9 5 

7 A K 9 5 4 2 
<$> J 
0 K 7 
Q 8 7 2 

7 Q8 
C$5 A Q 5 
0 A J 10 9 6 
<$> A K J 



Z bid no-trumps and A led the king of hearts, on which 
B played the three, instead of the ten. On the ace of 
hearts, the queen drops, but B blocks the suit with the 
jack, and must win the third round. When he leads a 
spade, Z wins with the king and makes his five clubs. On 
these A must throw away all his hearts to keep a guard 
for the diamonds and the spades. After Z gives him th& 
spade trick, he must lose two diamonds, so that Z goes 
game. If B had played his second-best heart on the first 
trick, and kept the trey for the third round, the six hearts 
in A’s hand would have saved the game. 

This echo should be used on all suits led by the partner, 
whether they are the first suits opened or not. A little 
carelessness in this respect may miss an opportunity. 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 289 

Here is a curious example of the value of this echo to a 
sharp player, who can trust his partner: 

No. 105 

S? 

4 * 

0 
❖ 

S? 7 5 4 
<S> 7 
0 9 8 6 

A Q J 7 4 2 

S? 

❖ 

0 
❖ 

Z passed without a bid, A one spade and Y no-trump, 
ti listing to four spades to the ten to stop the suit, with 
the probability that B will be afraid to lead spades. B 
led the spade king, and A saw that either he had no more 
and Y had the suit stopped if A overtook the king, or B 
had another, so he let the king run. B then led the ace 
of diamonds, on which A played his second-best, the eight. 
This marks him with the nine or king, and apparently the 
missing six. B therefore leads the seven of diamonds 
and Y wins with the king, A playing the nine. 

There is no way for Y to make the hearts unless he 
first clears the clubs. As they do not drop in two rounds, 
he goes on, and B is in, A having discarded two hearts, so 
as to keep the diamond to lead to B. Instead of making 
his three diamonds and then losing all the rest of the 
tricks, B leads the deuce of diamonds, A wins it with the 


K Q 

A K 10 8 6 
K J 

10 9 8 6 

S? J 9 3 2 
4) Q93 
0 A Q 10 7 2 
£ K 

A 10 8 6 
J 5 4 2 
5 4 3 
5 3 




290 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


six and makes five spade tricks. This is pretty close work 
for the average player, but it shows what can be done 
when two players give accurate information as to their 
hands. 

If a player has absolute confidence in his partner, there 
are many hands in which advantage can be taken of this 
echo which would be otherwise impossible. Here is a 
hand on which Z went game at every table in the room, as 
none of the player’s holding B’s cards used the echo, or 
else those holding A’s hand did not know how to use it. 


No. 106 


7 

❖ 

o 

❖ 


0 

❖ 

9 

A K 6 5 
8 5 3 

A Q 10 8 2 

<s? 

0 

❖ 


5 4 2 

9 4 3 

A K Q J 2 
4 3 

7 
❖ 
0 
❖ 

A K 7 6 3 
8 7 

10 7 

K J 7 6 



Q J 10 8 
Q J 10 2 
9 6 4 
9 5 


Z bid a heart, A a spade, and Y two diamonds, B going 
to two spades. As no one mentioned the clubs and Y 
seemed to deny the hearts, Z went two no-trumps. 

As A’s spade suit was not solid, and Z must have it 
stopped, he had the king of clubs first, to have a look, but 
chiefly to show B his re-entry. Following the usual cus¬ 
tom, B played the deuce of clubs, and A continued with 
the eight of spades, and Y made five diamonds, upon which 
B discarded a club and a heart, A two small clubs, Z three 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


291 


small hearts. After making his two hearts and finding 
A had none, Z put him in with the club and made the last 
trick with the king of spades, going game with three odd. 

If B plays the jack of clubs on A’s first lead, A must 
read him for the queen, or no more, which is impossible, 
if Z has five hearts and the spades stopped; and besides, 
the deuce is missing. To get the spade lead through Z, 
A can safely lead a small club, win Z’s spade, and lead 
another small club, getting another spade lead from B, as 
B will have won the second club lead with the ten, which A 
does not know he holds. This sets the contract. 

There are some unblocking plays at no-trumps which 
are comparatively obvious. If the leader starts out with 
the ace of a suit, for instance, and third hand has king or 
queen and only one small, he should give up the higher 
card at once, so as not to block the suit. The leader must 
have three honors, or a very long suit. Help him to clear 
it up by giving him the right of way. Many good players 
lead the ace first, when holding seven in suit to the ace- 
king. This is to induce the partner to give up the queen 
at once if he has it, to show that the declarer does not hold 
it. With three in suit, the second-best will do as well, of 


course. 





THE MIDDLE GAME 


After the first trick, when dummy’s cards are exposed, 
various situations arise, which the partners opposed to the 
declaration must be prepared to meet. Among these are 
the many hands in which they will be forced to discard, 
perhaps several times. The player who can always keep 
the right card until the last trick is an expert. 

There has been a good deal of discussion about the 
discard. Some believe in making it a universal rule to 
discard from weakness; others always from strength. 
Time and experience have about settled this controversy 
in favor of the discard from the suit you are not afraid of, 
and holding any suit that has a possible stopper in it. 
Apart from this, the only matter to be attended to is to 
avoid betraying the partner’s hand by going void of a 
suit altogether before it is led. 

If you are fortunate enough to have a suit that you 
are not afraid of, such as five cards to the ace-king-jack, 
and another of three to a jack, you may be sure it is 
not your strong suit that the declarer is going to attack 
when he has done with the suit on which you have to 
discard, but your little jack-high suit. 

It is an axiom that queen in one hand, jack in the other, 
either twice guarded, will stop a suit, no matter how the 
ace-king-ten and others lie or are managed, provided the 
queen or jack is never played second hand or led away 
from. Any person can take a pack of cards and demon¬ 
strate the truth of this statement, which suggests the 
importance of keeping either part of the combination 
292 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


293 


intact, in the hope that the partner may have the other 
part. Here is an example of bad discarding, as it violates 
this rule: 

No. 107 

s? 

<£> 

0 

4 ^ 

9 Q 10 9 6 4 
<?> Q 7 4 2 
0 Q8 
4> Q 8 

s? 

❖ 

0 
❖ 

Z bid no-trump and A led a small heart, which Z won. 
The return of the suit made the jack in dummy. Dummy 
led a spade, and the finesse of the ten went to A’s queen. 
Then A cleared the hearts. On this trick B discarded a 
small diamond, instead of a club. The second finesse in 
spades held, but Z could not drop the king, so he started 
the diamonds and made a little slam. If B discards the 
suit he is not afraid of, and keeps three to a jack, hoping 
his partner may have the other end of the protection, the 
queen, he saves not only the slam but the game. 

This is a protective discard, but the discard is largely 
used to indicate a suit to the partner. There are two 
varieties in common use, the encouraging discard and the 
reverse discard. Any card above a six is supposed to show 
protection in that suit, and encourage the partner to lead 
it, or at least to trust its protection to the one who makes 



A 7 3 


A K 7 6 4 2 
A J 10 4 





294 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


the discard. The reverse discard practically demands 
that the suit be led as soon as the partner gets in, unless 
he has some tricks of his own to make first. 

These discards are sometimes valuable in showing the 
partner who is in doubt as to which of two suits to keep, 
that he may abandon one of them entirely, and trust 
his partner to protect it. Here is an example: 

No. 108 



7 

K 9 7 5 




❖ 

Q 9 5 4 2 



0 

8 6 5 





8 



7 

Q4 

Y 

7 

A J 10 8 

❖ 

J 10 3 

A R 

❖ 

8 7 

0 

J 10 9 4 3 

xl -L> 

rw 

0 

Q 2 

❖ 

Q 10 3 

Z 

❖ 

K 7 6 4 2 



6 3 2 




<5* 

A K 6 




0 

A K 7 




❖ 

A J 9 5 




Z bid no trump and A led a diamond, which Z won. 
Five club tricks followed. B’s first discard was the eight 
of hearts, and the next was the seven of spades, then the 
small diamond. A smaller spade would have been a 
command to lead spades, which he must avoid. These 
discards encouraged A to let go both his hearts. Z dis¬ 
carded a diamond and a heart and then led the spade, 
finessing the jack. A cleared the diamonds, B discarding 
the ten of hearts. Z led ace and another spade, hoping 
to throw the lead to B, but A's ten held, and he made 
three diamond tricks, saving the game. 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


295 


It is sometimes important that the partner should lead 
the right suit at the right time, and that he should be in 
no doubt about its being the only thing to do. In such 
cases the reverse discard comes into play. This discard is 
also used, but sparingly, when there is no card above a 
six available for the single encouraging discard. The 
reverse is seldom used in trump contracts, but often 
against no-trumpers. Here is an example of it: 

No. 109 

S? A Q 6 3 2 
c§> Q 7 6 
0 J 6 5 
❖ K 9 

S? 9 7 5 
# K 3 
0 A K Q 7 
Q 8 3 2 

s? K 10 
(J 984 
0 8 2 

<> A J 10 7 5 4 

Z bid a spade and A led three rounds of diamonds. Z 
trumped, led a small trump to dummy's king, and played 
the ace on the return. Then he led the jack, to prevent 
A from making his small trump, if possible. 

At all the tables at which B had discarded a small club 
and then the diamond, A led through dummy's hearts, 
and Z went game, after pulling A's eight of trumps, so 
that A was disappointed in his hope of saving game with a 
club trick. At every table at which B used the reverse 
discard and played the five and deuce of clubs on the 




296 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


trump leads, A led the king of clubs and discarded his 
fourth diamond on the third round. After making his 
three club tricks, B led the ten of diamonds. Now there 
is no way to prevent A from making his eight of trumps. 
Instead of going game, the spade contract is set for one 
trick. 

There are a number of situations in which the partners 
will be called upon to defend themselves against suits led 
through them. If the lead is from declarer to dummy, 
there should be no difficulty, the rule being to beat dummy 
if you can, just as if your partner led the suit. When 
there is a trump suit, it is very dangerous to allow dummy 
to win a trick with a singly guarded queen if the second 
hand holds the king, as the declarer may win the second 
round with the ace and dummy may trump the king. 

The best rule for the second hand, when the lead of a 
small card comes from dummy, is to play a high card 
from any combination from which a high card would be 
led. That is, to play high as distinguished from low. 
With ace-king, play the king, or with king-queen, play 
the queen, with queen-jack, the jack, always trying to 
win the trick as cheaply as possible. Just as leads from 
ace-queen suits are avoided, so it is advisable to avoid 
playing them second hand. Play small, and hold the 
tenace overTthe declarer. 

Cover an honor with an honor is a good rule, but it is 
useless to put the queen on a jack if you hold both ace and 
queen. Play the ace or pass it up. That is the only 
chance to make both ace and queen. With king to four 
it is so improbable that the honor can be caught, that it is 
uesless to play it. If the declarer can catch it, make him 
do so. Do not give it to him. 

Always cover with a fourchette. This is the card above 
and the one below the card led. The queen-ten is a four- 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


297 


chette over the jack, led through it. Even a nine on an 
eight, when holding the seven also, may save a trick. 
Some players always cover with an imperfect fourchette, 
which is the card above and the next but one below the 
card led. The king-ten and others is an imperfect 
fourchette over the queen. The queen-nine over the 
jack. 

It is very important to force the declarer to play two 
honors to win one trick, whenever possible. Weak players 
frequently lead a queen to an ace, or ace-jack; or a jack 
to an ace-queen suit, without the ten. We shall come to 
this in the declarer’s play. When such a lead is made, the 
second hand must play the king if he has it, even though 
he sees it is lost, or the declarer gains by his bad play. 
The object is to make the ten good in the partner’s hand, 
if he has it. If he has nothing, nothing is lost by covering, 
any more than if the declarer held the ten, as well as ace- 
queen-jack. Here is an example of this error in failing to 
force the declarer to play two honors to get one trick: 

No. 110 

❖ 
o 
<$> 

K 7 4 
K 5 4 
0 3 2 

K J 9 8 7 

❖ 

0 
❖ 



Q 10 9 
10 3 2 
J 10 9 7 
Q 6 3 



298 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Z bid no-trump and A led a spade, which Z won. He 
then tried to drop the diamonds in three leads. Failing 
in that, he shifted to the queen of clubs. A looked at 
dummy for a moment and saw that his king was lost if he 
played it, so he passed. The queen held, and the nine 
followed, the jack winning. Now Z makes four by cards 
and the game. If A covers the club queen B stops the 
suit with the ten, and the ace of hearts is the only remain¬ 
ing trick for Z. 

Finessing against the partner is a fault which will 
be dealt with in the chapter devoted to finessing in 
general. 

It is important in the middle game to lead up to 
dummy’s weak suits and through his strong ones. This 
has already been referred to in a general way; but there 
is one point that needs attention. 

In leading up to dummy, always beat the best card of 
his weak suit if you can. If dummy holds nine and two 
small, lead some card that will beat the nine, or your 
partner may have to put on the ace or king to shut it out. 
If the card led beats the nine, such as the ten led from ace- 
ten and others, the declarer will have to play an honor or 
lose the trick, and your partner may be able to kill that 
honor, or he may have a secondary honor, such as the 
queen, made good. 

Do not lead up to a very strong suit in dummy unless 
you can trump the return. Lead up to ace and small ones 
in preference to king and small ones. If dummy has the 
queen of a suit in which you hold ace-king-jack, it is good 
play to lead the king and shift, hoping your partner can 
come through the queen later. 

In playing against no-trumpers, there is not much 
danger of losing high cards by holding them back, but 
some judgment must be used in the matter. This is 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


299 


something to be learnt from experience, rather than from 
a text-book, but here is a deal in which both sides tried it: 


No. Ill 


7 10 2 
(?) J 10 3 
0 KQJ73 
« 942 


s? 

0 

❖ 


K Q J 9 5 
5 4 
8 5 

Q J 6 3 



7 

0 

❖ 


6 4 3 
Q 9 8 
A 6 4 
A 10 7 5 


S? A 8 7 
<£> A K 7 6 2 
0 10 9 2 
❖ K 8 


Z is playing a no-trumper. A leads two rounds of 
hearts, which Z allows to win. The third round exhausts 
B. Then Z starts the diamonds, and as B sees dummy 
has no reentry for that suit, he holds up the ace for two 
rounds. At some tables the diamond suit was abandoned 
and Y led the jack of clubs, the queen covered with the 
imperfect fourchette, and the ten became a reentry for the 
diamonds. At other tables a third round of diamonds 
made B lead the spades, but did not go game. If B does 
not hold up, anything goes game, as Z will jump in with 
the spade king to shut out the hearts. 

A danger point that it is necessary for the partners 
to watch is when it is too late to force. Many games are 
lost through inattention to this detail that might have 
been saved. The usual situation is when dummy has a 
set-up suit, or when the declarer has led a suit and 



300 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


cleared it up, with trumps to defend it. Here is an ex¬ 
ample: 


No. 112 


7 

4 

0 

❖ 


7 9 6 
c£> J 9 6 3 
0 AKQ94 
4 10 8 


A 5 

A K 10 5 
J 7 3 
K J 9 2 



7 

4 

0 

❖ 


7 4 2 

Q 8 7 4 2 

8 2 

A Q 6 


7 K Q J 10 8 3 

4 

0 10 6 5 

4 7 5 4 3 


Z bid two hearts, and A three clubs, to show he can 
support the other major suit. Y headed B off by going to 
three hearts. At five tables out of seven Z went game, 
because of A’s play at the fourth trick. He did not 
realize that it was too late to force. 

Z trumped the first club and led a small trump to 
dummy’s nine, which held. A won the return of the 
trump, and led another club, with the idea of putting 
another force on Z. He should have seen that it was too 
late to force, as Z’s bid shows six trumps and dummy has a 
set-up diamond suit, on which Z discarded two of his 
losing spades, and went game. At the two tables at 
which A saw that it was too late to force, and led the 
spades, he held Z down to his contract, two by cards. 

There are many situations in the middle game in which 
it may be a guess what to lead. In such cases, Hoyle’s 
old rule is about as good as any. “When in doubt, lead 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


301 


trumps.” Unless dummy holds such cards as would 
probably kill any honor in the partner's hand, a lead up 
to dummy's trumps may prove useful. 

If the declarer has been in the lead and has made no 
attempt to lead trumps or get them out, there must be 
some disadvantage to him in the trump lead, and he is 
either weak in the plain suits, or is planning a cross-ruff. 
In either case, the adversaries will usually find it to their 
advantage to lead the trumps themselves, the moment 
they get in. Even if they accomplish nothing beyond 
knocking the trumps together, that may save the game, 
when separating the trumps was the only way the de¬ 
clarer could win it. 


THE ELEVEN RULE 


Almost every one has heard of the eleven rule, but 
very few know how to take proper advantage of it. Its 
object is to indicate to the partner the number of high 
cards that are out gainst the leader, when he cannot give 
exact information as to their denomination. 

When honors are led, the first card shows the genus, the 
next lead the species. A king may be led from several 
combinations. It is followed by ace, queen, or jack, to 
show what the leader still holds, and what honors are 
against him. The king-jack lead shows some one is 
holding up the ace if the king wins the first trick. 

When the leader has no combination from which it is 
right to lead a high card, there is no way of showing that 
the ace is against him, or the king-ten, or anything of that 
kind. The best he can do is to inform his partner as to 
the number of these high cards. This is the object of 
the card of uniformity, or the fourth-best lead. Some 
players do not use it except against no-trumps, others 
use it in all cases. 

Many years ago, while studying whist leads, I had 
occasion to tabulate all the high cards that might be in 
the hands of the adversaries when the leader did not begin 
with a high card, but led his fourth-best. What im¬ 
pressed me was that in every case, if a card of a certain 
denomination was led, the number of higher cards out 
against the leader was always the same. 

The reason I found to be this: If we number the cards 
higher than the ten, calling the jack eleven, and so on, it 
302 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


303 


will be evident that if no attention were paid to the 
selection of certain high cards, such as the king or ace, 
and the lead were always the fourth-best, there would be 
none higher out against the leader if he began with the 
jack, which is No. 11, but if he began with the ten, there 
would be one; the difference between the spots on that 
card and 11, higher than the ten that was not in his hand, 
and so on down. 

All that is necessary, therefore, is to deduct the spots on 
any fourth-best lead from eleven, and the difference is 
the number of cards, higher than the one led, that are not 
in the leader’s hand. It is immaterial what these cards 
are. When they are out of the way his suit is established. 
To illustrate: 



The seven is led, dummy lays down the queen-eight- 
three, and the leader’s partner holds the king-ten-deuce. 
Deduct the card led, 7, from 11, and the remainder is 4, 
cards higher than the 7. These are in sight, two of them 
in the dummy and two in the third hand. Then the de¬ 
clarer, whose hand is concealed, cannot possibly have any 
card higher than the seven, in that suit, and if dummy 















304 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


does not put on the eight, the seven will win the trick, as 
third hand can play the deuce. 

It is one thing to understand this simple fact, but it 
requires close attention and quick thinking to apply it 
in play. Here is an example of its possibilities: 

No. 113 







K 

9 2 








❖ 

10 

7 5 4 

3 







0 

Q 

8 7 








❖ 

9 < 

6 




7 

Q 

J 

8 

7 5 


Y 


A 

10 4 3 

<$> 

Q 

9 

8 


A 

B 

❖ 

J 


0 

6 

4 



XlL 

0 

J 

10 5 

❖ 

A 

4 

3 



Z 

❖ 

Q 

J 8 7 2 





6 









A 

K 6 2 








0 

A 

K93 

2 







❖ 

K 

10 5 





Z bid no trump and A led the seven of hearts. When 
Z knew the eleven rule he covered with the nine, and when 
A also knew it, he covered the nine with the ten, as he 
could see, deducting 7 from 11, that the declarer had no 
higher card. Then, by leading the queen of spades, so as 
to cover dummy’s nine, he forced Z to cover with the im¬ 
perfect fourchette, and got A in to come through the 
king of hearts with the queen. Y would not cover, hoping 
B would have to block the suit, but B had a fourth heart 
and the rest of the heart suit saved the game. 

Those who carelessly put the ace on the first trick 
gave Z the game, as the king won the second round of 
hearts, and on the five diamond leads A discarded down 
to the ace of spades, three clubs and two hearts. When 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


305 


the club lead dropped the jack, Z put A in with a spade 
and forced him to lose two club tricks at the end. 

The eleven rule is sometimes useful in connection 
with the bidding if the partner is alive to the importance 
of remembering the bids that precede the final declara- 


tion. 

Here is a case in point: 



No. 

114 


10 8 4 2 





❖ 

Q 8 4 





0 

7 6 4 





❖ 

A J 9 





9 5 

Y 


A K 6 


❖ 

J 6 3 

A B 

❖ 

A 5 2 


0 

Q J 9 5 2 


A K 


4 ^ 

K 6 5 

Z 

❖ 

10 8 4 



Q J 7 





K 10 9 7 





0 

10 8 3 





❖ 

Q 7 3 




Z passed without a bid. That is the thing for Y to 
remember. A and Y passed and B said no-trump. Z 
led the seven of clubs. Those who carelessly played the 
queen lost the game, because after B had got rid of the 
ace and king of diamonds there was no way to stop the 
jack of clubs from bringing in the three diamonds in A’s 
hand, and then two hearts won the game. 

When Y stopped to consider the situation for a moment 
before playing to the first trick, he saw that three of the 
four cards out against his partner, higher than the seven, 
were in sight. Z could not hold both ace and king, or he 
would have had a free bid of one club, as dealer; there¬ 
fore the one higher card in B’s hand must be the ace or the 



306 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


king. That being the inference, Y played the four; not 
the queen. This kills A’s only reentry for the diamond 
suit, and holds B down to five tricks, or a loss of 100, less 
30 aces, instead of giving him the game. 

All that is needed to become an expert in the use of 
the eleven rule is to practice it on every hand, whether it 
wins anything or not. 


FINESSING 


As the element of finessing enters largely into what 
follows, it may be well to explain its principles before 
going into the play on the declarer’s side of the table. 

A finesse is any attempt to win a trick with a card which 
is not the best you hold in that suit, nor in sequence with 
it. The type is the ace-queen in one hand, small cards 
in the other. If the king is on the right of the ace-queen, 
two tricks can be made by the finesse of the queen if the 
lead comes from the weak hand to the strong. In the 
same way, leading a small card to the king-jack and others, 
if the queen is on the right, a trick may be made with 
the king by finessing the jack; two tricks, if the player 
holds king-jack-ten. 

As all finesses are uncertain, they are chances that 
should not be taken unless they are necessary to accom¬ 
plish some special object, such as getting a much-needed 
extra trick, making two reentries, or keeping a certain 
player out of the lead. 

The adversaries of the declarer never finesse. If 
dummy is on the player’s left there is no question about 
whether or not a trick can be won with a card which is not 
the best you have in the suit. On the other side of the 
table, dummy on the right, there is no finesse against the 
declarer that is not also against your own partner. If 
the opening lead is a small card, and third hand holds 
ace-queen, small cards in the dummy, he is not finessing 
if he plays the queen. If the declarer has the king, the 
queen is thrown away. If the leader has the king, it does 
not matter which is played, ace or queen so play the ace. 
Lone kings are sometimes caught. 

m 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


808 

The declarer finesses all the time. That is one of the 
greatest trick-winners in his game. These finesses are 
of two kinds: those made by leading from the weak hand 
to tenaces in the other hand, and those made by the 
second hand, when a suit is led through. A tenace, from 
the French word, to hold, is either the best and third- 
best of a suit, which holds the king in chancery if on the 
right, or it is the third and fourth-best, such as king-jack. 
One is major, the other minor. 

Some f nesses require two leads from the weak hand, 
others only one. The ace-queen is of the single lead type, 
as it wins or loses in one effort. An ace-queen-jack suit 
may require the weak hand to lead again, if the first 
finesse holds, showing the king on the right. Some 
finesses always require two leads to be provided for, 
even if they are not needed, such as the ace-jack-ten. If 
both king and queen are on the left, they must both make. 
If both are on the right, or divided, one honor can be 
caught. Here is a good example: 

No. 115 

S? 

❖ 

0 
❖ 

7 Q j 3 
K 9 4 

0 KQJ83 
❖ Q6 

S? 

❖ 

0 


8 7 

A J 10 7 5 2 
6 2 
K 9 7 

7 10 9 4 2 
Q 6 

0 9 5 4 

J 10 5 3 

A K 6 5 
8 3 

A 10 7 
A 8 4 2 




FOSTER ON AUCTION 


309 


Z bids no-trumps and A leads the king of diamonds. 
As Z is going to finesse the clubs, and expects to lose a 
trick to B, he must stay off the diamonds until B is prob¬ 
ably exhausted. Upon winning the third round, Z leads 
a club and finesses the ten, which loses to the queen. B 
leads up to dummy’s weakness in hearts and Z puts on the 
king. Another club, and the finesse of the jack holds, 
the ace drops the king and Z gets discards of two losing 
spades and two losing hearts, winning all the rest of the 
tricks. 

There are many situations in which a finesse may be 
taken in either hand, as when one holds ace-jack and the 
other king-ten. It is then a guess as to on which side the 
queen lies, but the usual rule is to lead one of the high 
cards on the chance that it may drop the queen. 

One of the greatest mistakes, although one may see 
it every day in almost every rubber, is leading a queen to 
an ace, under the impression that it is a finesse. If the 
second hand has the king, he will put it on the queen to 
make his own or his partner’s possible ten or jack good, 
by forcing the declarer to play two honors to win one 
trick. Leading the queen to an ace-jack suit; or a jack 
to an ace-queen suit is no better, unless the suit is so long 
that the opponents cannot make both king and ten. 
With the four honors, ace, queen, jack, and ten, the play 
is all right; but not with only two or three. 

With ace in one hand, queen or queen-jack in the other, 
the play is to lead from the ace to the queen. If the 
king is led through, both queen and ace make. If the 
king is on the left of the queen, nothing can save the 
queen. If there is no necessity to make the play, it may 
be better to wait and see if the opponents will not have to 
lead up to the queen eventually, or through it. Some 
critical games are saved or won by a knowledge of 


310 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


these finessing situations. Here is an instructive ex¬ 
ample: 

No. 116 

0 

K Q 6 2 
<£ J 10 4 
0 8 7 
K J 9 3 

<$> 

0 
❖ 

Z bid no-trump and A led the deuce of hearts. Z 
read this as marking him with only four in suit, so he won 
the trick with the jack of hearts and led a small spade. A 
passed and the queen won. Dummy returned a small 
club, on which B put the king, and led the ten of hearts. 
Z won this with the ace, as it is useless to pass while B 
has two of the suit left. Then he started the diamonds, 
and B made the ace and A made two hearts, but that was 
all, so Z went game, entirely through the proper manage¬ 
ment of two ace-queen positions. 

There are some rare positions in which there need be 
no guessing, such as five, ace-queen-ten-nine in one hand, 
king to four in the other. The possibility that one hand 
may be void must be provided against, and the rule is to 
lead one of the sure winners from the hand that holds two 
of them, such as the ace or queen in the example. If 
both sides follow suit, the rest is obvious. If either re- 



10 9 8 4 
K 7 6 3 
A 9 2 
10 5 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


311 


nounces, no matter which, his jack can be caught by 
leading through it. 

There are some second-hand plays that are practically 
finesses. With jack-small in one hand and led through 
king and others fourth hand, the jack is the best chance 
for two tricks, as anything will force the king, and the 
jack is gone next time. But with king-ten in the fourth 
hand, the jack must never be played second hand. 

With queen and one small in the second hand, ace and 
small in the other, the best chance for two tricks is to put 
the queen right on. Otherwise anything will force the ace 
and the queen is lost to the king. But if the ten is in the 
same hand as the ace, with a small one, the queen must 
never be played second hand, as two tricks are then a 
certainty, no matter how the cards lie. Many tricks and 
games are missed through the declarer’s ignorance of this 
principle. Here is an example: 


No. 117 


7 

❖ 

❖ 


S? 9 3 2 
❖ Q7 
0 K J 4 3 2 
<J> A 7 6 


8 5 

J 9 4 3 2 
A 10 5 
Q J 8 


Y 

A B 
Z 


❖ 

0 

❖ 


y A Q J 6 4 
<$> A 10 6 
0 98 
<J> K 5 4 


K 10 7 
K 8 5 
Q 7 6 
10 9 3 2 


Hearts are trumps and A leads a small club, upon which 
dummy carelessly played the queen. The king covered 



312 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


and Z won with the ace. Putting dummy in with a spade 
to lead the trumps, Z finessed the jack. Then he led a 
diamond, hoping to get dummy in again, but A put on 
the ace and led one of his equals in spades, which Z won. 
Then he got the trump finesse and caught the king, by 
putting dummy in with the king of diamonds, avoiding an 
unnecessary finesse in the diamonds. If Z plays the club 
situation correctly he not only goes game but makes a 
little slam. 

After winning the club king with the ace, a return of 
the club puts dummy in to lead the trump. Then dummy 
ruffs the third round of clubs, and leads his last trump, 
discarding a spade when Z leads the third trump and 
catches IPs king. Now if A puts up the ace of diamonds, 
second hand, Z wins whatever he leads, makes the king of 
diamonds and ruffs the next round, and dummy still has 
the ace of spades for re-entry. 


THE DECLARER’S PLAY 


In playing the combined hands, the declarer follows 
no rules for showing his partner what he holds, or would 
like led, or can ruff, or anything of that kind. But he 
should be sufficiently familiar with all those matters to 
read the messages that pass across the table in front of 
him. 

Apart from the storm warnings that he may pick up, 
he must follow a definite course, and arrange the play of 
every hand upon some precise plan. This plan must be 
thought out at the start, as soon as dummy’s cards are 
laid down. The scheme may have to be altered to meet 
unexpected developments, but the outline must be there 
to start with, or the declarer is not playing auction. 

I have always called the process of forming these plans * 
“elimination,” because it eliminates from the attention 
everything that is not essential, and leaves the mind free 
to concentrate upon the part of the play that requires | 
some degree of skill. There are many hands, for instance, 
in which there is nothing to watch but the number of 
cards discarded in a certain suit which the declarer is 
holding back for the end game. The rest of the hand plays 
itself. 

The first thing to be done, the moment dummy’s cards 
are laid down, is to count up the tricks that are sure, and 
see how many they fall short of the number necessary to 
win the game; or, if game is impossible, to make the 
contract. The next thing is to pick out the suits in which 
extra tricks might be made by certain lines of play, such 
313 


314 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


as finessing, or tricks apparently lost might be saved by 
getting the lead in a particular hand. 

It is useless to worry about suits in which nothing can 
be accomplished, either because there are no tricks to be 
made in those suits, or because all the tricks possible can 
be made at any time, without any skill whatever in their 
management. Beginners lose countless opportunities 
through allowing their minds to wander all over the hand 
when there is really only one thing to think about. The 
rest would take care of itself. As an example of elimina¬ 
tion in a no-trumper, take this deal: 

No. 118 



7 

7 6 2 




❖ 

A J 6 




0 

9 8 6 5 




<£> 

8 6 4 



K 10 9 8 4 

Y 

V 

Q 3 


7 2 

A B 

fj 

<5> 

10 9 4 3 

0 

K 2 

0 

Q 7 4 

❖ 

A 10 9 3 

Z 

❖ 

Q J 7 5 


A J 3 


❖ 

K Q 8 3 




0 

A J 10 3 



❖ 

K 2 




Z bid3 no-trump, and A leads the eight of hearts, 
Z winning the queen with the ace, as it is useless to hold 
off and be led through. Now, there is only one thing to 
think about in this hand, and that is to prevent B from 
leading through the jack of hearts or the king of spades. 
This can be done in only one way, by leading diamonds 
from dummy, and passing them up if B does not cover the 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


315 


nine. It does not matter how often A gets into the lead, 
he cannot catch the jack of hearts or the king of spades by 
leading. If B has the ace of spades and A leads that suit, 
B will get in and lead through your hearts, and nothing 
you can do will prevent it, so do not worry about it. You 
cannot win the game if that is going to be the defence, but 
you still make your contract. 

When the hand was played in this way, Z went game, 
as A cleared the hearts, Z put dummy in again with a 
second round of clubs and finessed the ten of diamonds on 
the second round of that suit. The rest is obvious. 

The players who allowed themselves to be worried 
about the spade situation, which they could not control, 
made hash of the hand in this way. They counted on 
four club tricks, three diamonds, and ace of hearts. If 
they could make a trick with the king of spades it would be 
game, even if they lost the heart jack later. They there¬ 
fore proceeded to play the hand in this way. Putting Y 
in with a club, they led a spade, hoping to make the king. 
This would allow them to put Y in again with another 
club and finesse the diamond, making A lead up to the 
‘neart. 

No matter where the ace of spades lies, this must fail. 
Suppose B has it. After making the king and losing the 
diamond finesse, A will lead a spade and make all his 
hearts. If the ace is with A, what will happen is what did 
happen. A won the king of spades and led the ten, as B 
had covered with the jack, and they made three spades 
and four hearts, setting the contract for two tricks. 
Transpose the ace and queen of spades, and Z still makes 
his contract against the best possible play, if he will only 
keep his mind on the one thing he can do—keep B out of 
the lead on clubs or diamonds. The spade situation lies 
in the lap of the gods. 


316 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Another example of elimination with a trump declara¬ 
tion, several varieties of which we shall come to later: 

No. 119 

V 

<?> 

0 
❖ 

s? K J 5 
<%> 10 7 2 
0 K Q 8 7 5 
10 2 

V 
❖ 

0 
❖ 

Z bids a spade and A leads the king of diamonds, which 
dummy wins. Now let us see how much we can eliminate 
from consideration in this hand. There is nothing further 
to be done in the diamond suit. Forget it. No play 
could win a trick in hearts. Forget that suit also. As 
either A or B must have four clubs, Z cannot afford to 
have dummy overtake either king or queen to go on with 
that suit, but must arrange to have dummy in the lead 
after Z has got rid of those high clubs. 

Then the only thing to think about in this hand is to 
postpone the trump lead until the king and queen of clubs 
have been got rid of, and then to have dummy win the 
third round of trumps, instead of either the second or 
third. Of course, this plan may fail. The second round 
of clubs may be trumped. There may be five trumps in 
one hand. But these are things over which you have no 
control. The matter over which you have control i3 the 


10 6 3 
A J 4 3 
A 6 4 
K 8 3 



9 8 7 
K Q 

10 9 3 

A Q J 6 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


317 


elimination from your plan of everything but two rounds 
of clubs and dummy’s winning the third round of trumps. 

One more example, the process of elimination in a hand 
in which there is nothing at all to think about. Such 
hands are not at all uncommon. The elimination of all 
possibilities leads to the conclusion that the adversaries 
can do the worrying. Any mistakes made will be of their 
doing: 

No. 120 

<?> 

0 

V Q8 
c£> K Q J 6 5 
0 A J 6 
982 

4 * 

0 
4 

Z bids a heart and A leads the king of clubs, which 
he follows with the jack, B overtaking it with the ace and 
leading a trump. 

The moment dummy’s cards go down it is clear that 
game is out of the question. Neither hand can give the 
other a ruff in clubs. To lead spades accomplishes noth¬ 
ing beyond establishing a spade trick for the enemy, and 
the discard of a diamond does Z’s hand no good. The 
only thing left is to lead the suit that is longest between 
the two hands, diamonds, and let the adversaries do what 
they like about the rest of it. 


9 7 5 3 
7 4 
7 5 4 
K 6 5 3 

V J 6 
4 A 10 8 3 
0 KQ8 
4 J 10 7 4 
A K 10 4 2 

9 2 

10 9 3 2 
A Q 




318 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


This simple plan leads Z to win the trump lead and play 
the deuce of diamonds. He does not care who wins it or 
what they lead next. As it happened, B won it and led 
another trump. He also won the second diamond lead 
and led a spade, and A won the third diamond and re¬ 
turned the spade, and Z made two by cards, as the fourth 
diamond was good at the end. 


PLAYING TRUMP DECLARATIONS 


There is a great difference between playing a no- 
trumper and the management of a trump suit. In the 
first the smaller cards are powerful as trick winners when 
properly supported by re-entries. In trump contracts, the 
high cards are about the only winners in three suits out of 
four. As each style of game must be studied separately, 
we shall begin with the trumps. 

The beginner is usually told to lead out the trumps the 
moment he gets in. This is a survival of the old whist 
days, when so many complained that poor players would 
not lead trumps from five, and wound up by wandering 
aimlessly and shoelessly through the byways of Europe— 
according to Clay. But whist is not auction, and there 
are at least four situations in which to lead trumps imme¬ 
diately upon getting in would be very bad play. These 
are: 

1. If there is a finesse in the trump suit, and the proper 
hand is not in the lead. 

2. If there is an opportunity to make some of dummy's 
trumps separately from the declarer's, and this must be 
done before leading trumps. 

3. If there is a chance to get rid of losing cards in the 
plain suits in either hand before leading trumps. 

4. If there is no good suit between the two hands which 
the trumps would protect, there is no reason for leading 
out the trumps, and such a course would merely protect 
the good cards in the hands of the opponents. 

Each of these can best be illustrated by hands from 
319 



320 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


actual play, and in the same connection the reader’s 
attention may be called to the manner in which the 
development of the hand is planned in advance, by the 
process of elimination already explained. Situation 
No. 4, in which there is nothing in plain suits to lead trumps 
for, is aptly illustrated in the last hand in the preceding 
chapter. The postponement of the trump lead until a 
plain suit had been unblocked was also illustrated in the 
hand before that. 

Here is an illustration of getting the right hand into 
the lead, so as to take a finesse in the trump suit that 
may secure the one extra trick necessary to win the game: 


No. 121 


❖ 

o 

❖ 


7 

❖ 

0 

❖ 

9 3 
J 10 

K Q 10 6 4 
K 10 8 2 

0 

❖ 


8 7 2 
A Q 8 

9 8 2 

J 9 7 5 

❖ 
0 
❖ 

A Q J 6 5 
K 9 6 5 
A 7 3 
4 



K 10 4 
7 4 3 2 
J 5 

A Q 6 3 


Z bids a heart and A leads the king of diamonds, which 
Z wins with the ace. Anything further in diamonds is 
impossible. The declarer does not want to weaken his 
own hand by ruffing spades. That can be done in the 
end game just as well as now. In the clubs, there is 
nothing to be done but to lead them right along to see if 
they will drop. If they do, %ur clubs are possible. To 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


321 


go game 2 needs five tricks in trumps. There is nowhere 
else for extra tricks to come from, so the plan of the hand 
is to hope the king of trumps is in B’s hand and to lead 
through it and finesse against it. As two finesses may be 
necessary, dummy must be put into the lead twice. 

This plan succeeds and the declarer goes game with 
five trumps, four clubs and the ace of diamonds. Had 
he found the king of trumps on the wrong side, or failed 
to drop the clubs, or had the second round been trumped, 
it would not have detracted in the slightest from the merit 
of his scheme for playing the hand, as those would all be 
matters over which he had no control. What he could 
control was putting the right hand in to get the finesse in 
trumps. 

Occasionally, when it is necessary to get the dummy 
into the lead twice, a good player will take long chances 
on so doing. Here is one of the best examples that ever 
came to my notice. It illustrates the possibilities of the 
game, and also the importance of a plan matured even 
before playing to the first trick: 

No. 122 

❖ 
o 
❖ 

7 9 8 

<£ K Q 9 8 4 
0 8 3 
4> Q J 3 2 

7 

0 
£ 



K 10 4 
7 5 

J 10 5 2 
A K 10 8 




322 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Hearts are trumps and A leads the king of clubs. Z 
sees that to go game he must make all five of his trumps, 
his three diamonds, and two tricks somewhere else. If 
he holds off the clubs, hoping to make both ace and jack, 
the two tricks in that suit are assured, but the five tricks 
in trumps are then impossible, as dummy cannot be 
put into the lead more than once. Z dropped the club- 
jack. 

When A followed with a small club, thinking to force 
Z’s trump hand, dummy held the trick with the ten and 
led the trump. Dummy got Y in again with the king of 
diamonds and led the trumps through B once more. 
Only three of the diamonds made, but Z went game. 

One of the most profitable results of postponing the 
trump lead is making some of dummy’s little ones first. 
There are occasions upon which both sides may trump, 
but we are considering hands in which trumps are to be 
led eventually, there being no thought of weakening the 
declarer’s hand by ruffing. Here is a typical case, in 
which only one pair went game: 


No. 123 

S? 

❖ 

o 

❖ 

7 Q72 
<$> KQJ93 
0 J 7 
4> A Q 5 

<v> 

0 

<$» 


5 4 3 
4 

A K Q 6 
10 8 7 3 2 

7 986 
<?> 10 7 6 5 
0 9 4 3 
^ 964 

A K J 10 
A 8 2 
10 8 5 2 
K J 










FOSTER ON AUCTION 


323 


Z has bid hearts on the four honors. A led the king of 
clubs. Z returned a small club and let dummy ruff it. 
Then he led a trump from dummy for the finesse and A 
won the trick with the queen and came right back with 
the trump, which saved the game, as Z lost both his spades 
at the end. 

This shows the want of planning at the start and count¬ 
ing the tricks that might be lost. The finesse in trumps 
is uncertain. The second ruff in clubs is not, unless A 
had seven to start with. Z should have won the trump 
lead with the king or ace, and ruffed dummy once more. 
Then he can lead three rounds of diamonds and let A do 
the guessing. 

There are many hands in which it is essential to get 
rid of losing cards in a plain suit before leading the trumps. 
This is particularly true of situations in which the ace of 
trumps is against the declarer, as the adversaries will very 
likely lead the weak suit. Here is an example: 


No. 124 


10 6 4 
9 8 2 

0 A Q J 9 2 
❖ 83 


❖ 

o 

❖ 


Q J 7 
K Q J 6 
8 6 5 3 
7 5 



7 

❖ 

0 

❖ 


A 8 5 3 
10 7 5 
10 7 4 
A J 2 


^ K92 
<£ A 4 3 
0 K 

K Q 10 9 6 4 




324 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Z is playing spades for trumps. A led the king of clubs 
and Z won it with the ace. If Z leads the trumps at 
this stage, B wins, lays down the ace of hearts and returns 
the club, which saves the game. Instead of that Z leads 
the diamond, overtakes it with the ace and leads three 
more rounds, over-trumping the jack and leading the 
nine of trumps. By an unexpected piece of luck dummy’s 
eight of trumps brought in the fifth diamond when Z 
trumped the club and led the six of trumps. 

It used to be an old saying in the whist days that there 
is nothing so deadly as a cross-ruff. There are many 
hands in which this is the best attack, especially if the 
declaration is in a minor suit, when a large number of 
tricks are necessary. Here is a deal on which only one 
pair went game: 


No. 125 


K 5 4 3 2 
cg> K Q 10 5 2 
0 A J 9 

S? A J 10 6 
C?> 3 
0 8 5 4 
Q J 8 7 4 

— 

<?> A 9 4 
0 K Q 10 7 3 2 
9 6 5 2 



V Q 9 8 7 
c?> J 8 7 6 
0 6 

<£> A K 10 3 


The bidding on this hand was pretty lively, Z starting 
with a diamond, A a spade, Y two hearts, B two spades 
and Z three diamonds, to deny the hearts. Z finally got 




FOSTER ON AUCTION 


325 


it at four diamonds, and at six tables he made it. At 
the other he made a little slam. 

A led the spade queen, and Y trumped it. At every 
table at which Z jumped to the conclusion that the clubs 
were solid and got out the trumps, he lost three spade 
tricks, or two spades and a club. At the only table at 
which Z counted up the sure tricks on the cross-ruff plan, 
he did not touch the trumps until he had ruffed three 
hearts and dummy had ruffed two more spades. Then 
he led the king, queen, and ten of trumps and made the 
ace, king and queen of clubs. 

There are many hands in which it is necessary to ruff 
out a suit in order to establish it. The situation usually 
presents itself under one of two aspects. The ruff may 
be made after the adversaries’ trumps have been drawn, 
in which case there must be some reentry for the suit 
outside of trumps; or, the ruff must be made before lead¬ 
ing trumps, because there is no reentry except the last 
round of trumps. This being the more difficult case, and 
the more often misplayed, it will be well to illustrate it: 

No. 126 

S? Q 9 2 
❖ 
o 

<j> 

9 10 6 5 
c?> J 9 8 
0 J 9 2 
K Q 9 6 

❖ 

0 
❖ 


A K 8 6 
10 5 




326 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Z bid a heart, and B two clubs, Z going to two hearts, 
which held. B won three club tricks and at one table led 
the fourth round, as he could stop the diamonds. At 
another table he led the spade. If the spade, Z wins. If 
the club, Z trumps with the jack, and leads the diamonds, 
trumping the third round. Now two high trumps and 
dummy wins the third round of trumps with the queen 
and gives Z two spade discards. 

When B did not bid the clubs, A led a spade, and the 
three rounds of diamonds followed by three rounds of 
trumps gave Z the game before he lost the lead. 




PLAYING NO-TRUMPERS 


In addition to the process of elimination already referred 
to, which is applicable to all classes of declarations, the 
player who has the management of a no-trumper should 
be guided by three general rules, which cover almost every 
situation that can arise in the combination of his own 
hand with the dummy’s. 

Always play for the suit that is longest between the 
two hands, as the adversaries are more likely to be short 
in it and it can therefore be more readily established. If 
the number is equal, prefer the suit that is unequally 
divided. Five in one hand and three in the other is a 
better distribution than four in each. If this is still 
equal, play for the suit that is longer in the hand that has 
reentries. It is useless to play out a suit with all the 
winning cards in it, as the weaker suit will then lose all 
the rest of the tricks. 

Play high cards from the short hand. This is a simple 
rule for unblocking. If you have ace-queen-small in 
one hand, and five to the king in the other, unless you 
play the high cards from the short hand first, you will 
block the rest of the suit, and may never make it. 

Lead from the weak hand to the strong. With four to 
the ace-queen-jack in one hand, four small cards in the 
other, lead from the four small ones. With a king in one 
hand and nothing in the other, lead to the king, never from 
it. If the ace is on your left, the king may win a trick. 
If you lead away from the king, it never will. 

Finessing has already been dealt with in the chapter 
on that subject. 


327 


328 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


One or two of these attacks may be combined in the 
same hand, and the declarer should have them all at his 
command, ready to use whichever best fits the situation, 
just as a good chauffeur carries a screw-driver and a 
hammer, as well as a wrench. Here is an example of all 
three of the foregoing principles being brought into play 
in one deal: 

No. 127 

7 8 






Q J 7 







0 

Q 9 7 5 

4 






❖ 

J 6 5 3 




7 

K 

Q 7 

6 3 

Y 


J 

10 

❖ 

10 

5 


A B 

❖ 

A 

K 

0 

8 l 

5 2 


0 

J 

10 

❖ 

10 

9 2 


Z 

❖ 

K 

7 




A 9 4 






❖ 

9 6 4 







0 

A K 3 







❖ 

A Q 8 4 





Z bids no-trump and A leads the fourth-best heart. 
Z wins the ten with the ace. He finds there are between 
the two hands, his own and dummy’s, two suits of eight 
cards, but the diamonds are the more unequally divided, 
so he plays for that suit. He also leads the high cards 
from the shorter hand, beginning with the ace and king. 

After making five diamonds, he leads a small spade 
for the finesse, avoiding the mistake of leading a jack to 
an ace-queen suit, without the ten in either hand. When 
the queen wins, he may as well make the ace, as a club 
lead would let in all the hearts. When the king drops, 
the jack of spades is good for another trick and the game. 




FOSTER ON AUCTION 


329 


Had he led the jack of spades, he would have stopped at 
two by cards, as B would have put on the king, to force 
Z to play two honors to get one trick. 

Apart from finessing, which has already been dealt 
with, the most important point for the declarer to watch 
in a no-trumper is the making or keeping of reentries. 
There is no surer sign of a good player than the care with 
which he preserves the winning cards in the hand that is 
more likely to need them for reentry purposes. Any high 
card that will bring a suit into play is called a reentry. It 
may be in the suit itself, or in another suit. The most 
easily overlooked are those in the suit itself. They are 
preserved by a process which is called “ducking.” Here 
is an example: 

No. 128 

s? 

❖ 
o 
❖ 

7 KJ5 
$ 86 
0 A Q 6 4 
A K J 2 

<?> 

0 
❖ 

Z started with a heart, which is not a sound bid on his 
cards, as the defensive element is not there, but A would 
have bid no-trumps in any event. 

Trusting his partner for some defence in hearts, Y led 
the nine. Z put on the ace and returned a spade to 


9 8 4 
Q 3 

K 10 8 5 

7 10 7 

<Q> A K 9 7 4 2 
0 9 7 2 
43 

A Q 6 3 2 
J 10 5 
J 3 
7 6 5 


Q 10 9 8 




330 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


dummy’s weakness. A won with the king and led a club, 
playing the smallest from B’s hand, without regard to Y. 
He sees that in order to go game he must make more than 
two clubs, but as one or the other of his adversaries must 
have three clubs, it is impossible to drop the queen, jack 
and ten in two leads, and the only reentry for the clubs 
is in the suit itself. 

Z won the club trick with the ten, and led a diamond, 
which A won with the ace, leading another club. If both 
players do not follow suit to this lead, the game is im¬ 
possible. If they do, it is a certainty. 

Reentries in another suit frequently depend on their 
necessity having been foreseen and provided for from the 


start. Here is a rather 

interesting example: 

No. 129 

V 

Q J 




<?> 

A 2 




0 

Q J 10 7 

5 3 



❖ 

8 6 2 



V 

10 9 8 4 

Y 


7 6 3 2 


K J 9 

A B 

❖ 

8 7 6 

0 

8 6 4 

0 

K92 

❖ 

KJ5 

Z 

❖ 

Q 9 7 


v 

A K 5 




Q 10 5 4 

3 



0 

A 




❖ 

A 10 4 3 




Z bid no-trump, and A led a small heart. The careless 
players, who did not stop to figure out the possibilities of 
the hand, let the jack of hearts hold the trick and failed 
to go game. Those who saw that two reentries would be 
necessary in Y’s hand to force out the king of diamonds 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


331 


and then to get in again to make the suit, gave up the 
king of hearts on the first trick. Then they led the ace of 
diamonds, put dummy in with the small heart, so as to 
hold the command of the club suit, and got in with the 
ace of clubs to make four more diamonds. 

Unblocking is an important part of the dealer's duties, 
and it is astonishing the number of tricks that can be lost 
by a little carelessness in this respect. One very common 
error lies in assuming that the opponents will win certain 
tricks the moment they get the chance. Here is an 
interesting example of this mistake: 

No. 130 

s? 

❖ 

0 

A 

S? 10 3 

K J 10 8 2 

o 9 8 4 

£ Q 10 7 

S? 

❖ 

0 
❖ 

Z bid no-trump and A led the ten of clubs. Assuming 
this to be from king-jack-ten, Y played the queen and it 
held. Then he led a small diamond and the king won. 
He returned the jack, and taking it for granted B would 
win it with the ace, played a small card from dummy. 
But B held up the ace, to see if Z had any more. 

This kills the diamond suit unless Z can make a second 
reentry by leading the queen of hearts and getting the 


J 8 4 
A Q 

Q 10 6 5 2 

6 4 2 

7 K 9 7 2 
<S> 9 6 4 
0 A 7 3 
£ K 9 5 

A Q 6 5 

7 5 3 
K J 

A J 8 3 




332 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


king out of the way. But B would not bite on that bait 
either, so Z led a small heart next and B won the jack 
with the king and led back the nine, to shut out the 
eight. This set the contract. 

All this trouble would have been avoided if Z had been 
careful to overtake the jack of diamonds with the queen 
and gone right along until the ace fell. Then he must win 
the game. 

This rule of high cards from the short hand is one of the 
most easily remembered, but it is constantly forgotten 
by many persons when it comes to its application in the 
play of a hand. Those who have learnt the rule for the 
adversaries of the declarer always to play the second- 
best card of their partner’s suit, when they make no 
attempt to win the trick, will see the similarity of the 
dealer’s play on his own suits. Here is a curious illus¬ 
tration of the result of forgetting this rule: 

No. 131 

❖ 
o 
❖ 

K J 10 7 2 
<$> K J 9 
0 J 9 
A 10 7 

0 
❖ 

Z is playing a no-trumper, and A leads the ten of 
hearts, which Z wins with the queen. Diamonds being 



3 2 



FOSTER ON AUCTION 


333 


the suit longest between the two hands, Z starts with the 
king, and carelessly plays the three from dummy. B won 
the trick with the ace and returned the heart. Now Z 
sees that there is no way in which he can make more than 
the odd trick, and his partner’s club take-out has driven 
him to bidding two. 

Had he been careful to unblock the diamonds by 
playing the seven, dummy’s second-best, to the first 
trick, he would have won the game by giving A his two 
hearts at the end, when A had discarded down to two 
clubs, two hearts and a spade, as A would make his two 
hearts and lose his two clubs. 






















THE LAWS OF AUCTION 


Revised to September, 1920 

Copyright, 1920, by The Whist Club, N. Y. Reprinted by permission 


How Played 

1. The game of Auction is played by four players, two against 
two playing as partners. Two partners constitute a side. 


Cards 

2 . Two packs 1 of cards having different backs are used. A 
correct pack contains four suits of thirteen cards each; one card 
of each denomination to a suit. A pack becomes imperfect when 
one or more cards are torn, soiled or otherwise so marked that 
they may be identified from their backs. 


Rank of Cards 

3. In the play, Ace is high, then King, Queen, Jack, Ten, etc.; 
Deuce being lowest. In drawing cards, Ace is low, then Deuce, 
Trey, etc.; King being highest. 


Rank of Suits 


S/.), 


- 4. In the declaration , 2 Spades are high, Hearts next, Diamonds 
next and Clubs lowest. In drawing cards, as between cards of 


equal denomination, Spades are low, Hearts next, Diamonds 
next, and Clubs highest. 

Lead 


X\ 




j 5 . The player at the left of Declarer leads 3 to the first trick 4 
and thereafter the winner of each trick leads to the next. 



1 The game may be played with one pack, legal provisions requiring two 
packs being suspended by consent. 

2 In the declaration, No Trump ranks above any suit. 

* A player leads or plays by placing one of his cards face upward near the 
center of the table. 

< The first lead of a hand, when legally made, is called the initial lead. 

335 


336 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Trick 

6. After the lead, each player in his turn to the left plays 1 a 
card. A trick consists of four cards thus played. 

Following Suit 

7. A player must follow suit, i.c., must play a card of the suit 
led if he have one. When leading, or when void of the suit led, 
he may play any card he holds. 1 

Winning the Trick 

8. A trick is won for his side by the player who, (a) if the 
trick does not contain a trump, 2 plays the highest card of the 
suit led; or who ( b ) plays the highest trump, if the trick contain 
one or more trumps. A trick once turned and quitted 3 may 
not be looked at 4 until the end of the hand. 


Odd Tricks 

9. Odd tricks are those won by Declarer in excess of six tricks. 
If Declarer fulfil his contract, his side counts the value of all odd 
tricks; otherwise nothing is counted in the trick score. 


Trick Values 

10. Odd tricks count in the trick score as follows: 


With Clubs trumps, each counts 

With Diamonds 

With Hearts 

With Spades 

With No Trump 


6 points. 

7 

8 “ 

9 

10 “ 


Doubling doubles the above 
them by four. 


values; redoubling multiplies 


1 To “refuse” is to fail to follow suit. To "renounce” (Law 55) is to 
refuse when able to follow suit. See Law 56 for “revoke.” 

s As a result of the bidding (Law 30), the hand may be played without a 
trump (i.e., "No Trump”) or with one of the four suits as the trump. Any 
trump is a winner as against any card of a plain (non-trump) suit. 

* Footnote to Law 56 (a) defines "quitted.” 

4 Law 61 (e) prescribes penalty. 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


337 


Hand 

11. A hand 1 begins with the cut a and ends when the last card 
is played to the thirteenth trick. 

Game 

12. A game is won when one side has a trick score of thirty 
(30) or more points. A game may be completed in one hand or 
more; each hand is played out 3 whether or not during it the game 
be won. 

Rubber 

13. (a) A rubber begins with drawing for partners (Law 22) 
or cutting out (Law 23) and is completed when one side has won 
two games. The side which has won two games adds a bonus of 
250 joints to its honor-score. The side having the greater num¬ 
ber of total points 4 wins the rubber. 6 

(6) When a rubber is started with the agreement that the play 
shall terminate ( i.e ., no new hand shall commence) after a speci¬ 
fied time, and the rubber is unfinished at that hour; the score is 
made up as it stands, 125 being added to the honor-score of the 
winners of a game. A hand if started must be played out. 

(c) If a rubber be started without any agreement as to its 
termination, and before its conclusion one player leave; or if, 
after such agreement, a player leave before the appointed hour 
without appointing an acceptable substitute (Law 21-a); the 
opponents have the right to consult and decide whether the score 
be canceled or counted as in (b). 

Honors 

t 

14. The Ace, King, Queen, Jack and Ten of the trump suit are 
the honors unless the declaration be No Trump, in which case 
the four Aces are the honors. Honors count in the honor-score 
of the side which received them in the deal. 

* “Hand” is also used to mean the cards held by a player. When zo used 
the sense is obvious. Also used to designate players, as in “second hand,” 
“third hand,” etc. 

2 See Law 25. 

* All points won are counted whether or not they are needed to make game. 

4 See Law 17. 

Thus a side may win two games and still lose the rubber. 




338 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Honor Values 

15. Honor vames are based on trick values (Law 10). They 
are not increased by doubling (Law 35) or redoubling (Law 36). 

WHEN THERE IS A TRUMP 

3 honors 1 between partners have value of 2 tricks. 

4 honors between partners have value of 4 tricks. 

4 honors held by one partner have value of 8 tricks. 

5 honors, held 3 by one and 2 by other partner, have value of 5 

tricks. 

5 honors, held 4 by one and 1 by other partner, have value of 9 
tricks. 

5 honors held by one partner have value of 10 tricks. 

WHEN THERE IS NO TRUMP 

3 aces held between partners count 30 points. 

4 “ “ “ “ “40 “ 

4 ‘ ‘ held by one partner count 100 ‘ ‘ 

Slams 

16. A side winning all thirteen tricks 2 scores 100 points for 
Slam. 3 A side winning twelve tricks 2 scores 50 points for Little 
Slam. 4 Slam points are added to the honor-score. 6 

Scoring 

17. Each side has a trick-score, which includes only points 
won by odd tricks; and an honor-score for all other points, includ¬ 
ing bonuses for honors, penalties, slams and undertricks. 

At the end of the rubber, the total points of a side are obtained 
by adding together its trick-score and honor-score. 6 Subtracting 
the smaller total from the greater, gives the net points by which 
the rubber is won and lost. 7 

1 “Simple honors” means 3 honors. 

2 Without counting tricks received as penalty for a revoke. 

* Also called Grand Slam. 

* When Declarer’s contract is seven and he wins six odd, he counts 50 for 
Little Slam although his contract fail. 

5 Slam or Little Slam may be scored by either side. 

* The 250 points bonus for winning two games (Law 31-a) is included. 

7 Law 13 (a) explains who wins a rubber. 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


339 


A proved error in the honor-score may be corrected at any 
time before the score of the rubber has been made up and agreed 
upon. 

A proved error in the trick-score may be corrected at any time 
before the next declaration begins (Law 29) or, if the error occur 
in the final hand of the rubber, before the score has been made 
up and agreed upon. 


Forming Tables 

18. A table consists of four, five or six members, of whom four 
are players. A complete table consists of six members. In 
forming a table, candidates who have not played rank first and in 
the order in which they entered the room. Candidates who have 
played but are not members of an existing table rank next. 
Candidates of equal standing decide priority by drawing 1 cards. 
Low wins. 


Entry 

19. Before the beginning of a rubber 2 a candidate may enter 
any incomplete table by announcing his desire to do so and such 
announcements in the order made entitle candidates to places as 
vacancies occur. In case there are more candidates than there 
are vacancies, the provisions of Law 18 apply. 

Members Leaving Table 

20. If a member leave a table, he forfeits all his rights at said 
table unless he leave to make up a table which cannot be formed 
without him and, when leaving, announce his intention of return¬ 
ing when his place at the new table can be filled. In such case, 
if he return, he has prior rights over any who have joined the 
table in his absence and may displace one of them. When a 
member 3 leaves a table to make up a new table which cannot be 
formed without him, and does not claim the right to retain his 
membership in the old table, he shall be the last to draw out of 
the new table. 

1 Method of drawing is described in Law 22. 

s Law 13 (o) stipulates that the rubber begins when any player draws either 
for partners or cutting out. 

* Should two members make up a new table, both rank ahead of the others. 


[340 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Players Leaving Tables 

21. (a) A player leaving a table may, with the consent of the 
other three players, appoint a substitute to play in his absence; 
such appointment becomes void upon return of said player or 
upon conclusion of the rubber. In any case, the substitute when 
released regains all his previous rights. 

(6) A player who withdraws from a table of four at the end of 
a rubber; or who, after availing himself of the privileges of para¬ 
graph (a) fails to return before the end of the rubber, thus break¬ 
ing up the table; cannot claim entry elsewhere as against the 
other three players from that table. 

Drawing for Partners and Deal 

22. A table having been formed, the members draw 1 cards. 
He who draws lowest becomes the dealer of the first deal and has 
choice of packs and seats. 2 He who draws second lowest is 
Dealer’s partner and sits opposite him. The third lowest has 
choice of the two remaining seats; fourth lowest takes the remain¬ 
ing one. The members, if any, who draw higher than fourth 
lowest, remain members of the table but do not play in the cur¬ 
rent rubber. 

In all cases when drawing cards, should any one show two or 
more cards, he must draw again. 

A player having made choice of packs or seats must abide by 
his decision. 

Cutting Out 

23. If at the end of a rubber a table consist of five or six 
members, the players who have played the greatest number of 
consecutive rubbers are the first to lose their places as players 
(but do not lose their standing as members). The draw (Law 
22) decides between claimants of equal standing; low wins. 

The Shuffle 

24. After drawing for partners, second hand 3 shuffles the pack 
which Dealer has chosen (Law 22) and third hand 4 shuffles the 

1 One pack is spread face downward on the table and each member draws 
one card. All draw from the same pack. 

2 A player may consult his partner before choosing. 

* The player on Dealer’s left. 

4 Third hand is Dealer’s partner. 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


341 


still pack. 1 Thereafter, at the beginning of each deal, third 
hand shuffles the still pack. 2 After being shuffled, the still pack 
is placed between second and third hands where it remains until 
the next deal. 

During the shuffle, the pack must not be held below the table 
nor so that the face of any card may be seen. 

Dealer has the right to shuffle last, but must not shuffle after 
the cut except as in 25 (6). 

The deal must not proceed until the pack has been shuffled as 
herein provided. 

The Cut 

25. (a) Dealer, immediately before the deal, places the pack 
before his right hand opponent who lifts off the top portion and 
places it beside the bottom portion, preferably toward Dealer 
who then places the bottom portion on top. This constitutes 
the cut. 4 

( b ) If the cut leave fewer than four cards in the top or bottom 
portion; or if during it any card be faced or displaced; or there 
be any doubt as to where the pack was divided; or any player 
shuffle after the cut; there must be a new shuffle and a new cut. 3 

The Deal 

26. (a) The deal begins after the cut and ends when the last 
card has been placed in proper order in front of Dealer. 

(6) After the first deal, players deal in turn to the left. A 
player may not deal for his partner if either opponent object. 

(c) Dealer gives the first card to the player on his left and so 
on until all fifty-two cards are dealt the last one to Dealer. 

(d) A player may not lock at any of his cards during the deal. 
Penalty, 25 points in the adverse honor-score. 

New Deal (Compulsory) 

27. There must be a new deal: 4 

(a) If the cards be not dealt into four distinct packets in 
accordance with Law 26 (c). 

iThe “still pack” is the one not being dealt, or used in the play of the 
hand. 

a A player may not cut or shuffle for partner if either opponent object. 

* A player may not cut or shuffle for partner if either opponent object. 

< Always by the same dealer, and with the same pack except (e) when a 
missing card is not found. See Law GQ regarding new cards. 



342 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


( b ) If, during the deal, any card be found faced in the pack 
or be exposed on, above or below the table. 

(c) If it be discovered during the hand that more than thirteen 
cards were dealt to any player. 

(d) If, during the hand, one player hold more than the proper 
number of cards and another less. 

(e) If, during the hand the pack be proved incorrect (Law 2). 
The pack is not incorrect on account of a missing card or cards 
if it or they be found in the still pack, among the quitted tricks, 
below the table, or in any other place which makes it possible 
that such card or cards were part of the pack during the deal. 
Any player may search anywhere for missing cards, including 
the still pack and the quitted tricks (face downward). See also 
Law 56 (e). 


New Deal (Optional) 1 

28. During the deal any player who has not looked at any of 
his cards may demand a new deal: 2 

(/) If the deal be out of turn, 

(g) If the pack be imperfect (Law 2), 

A new deal may be demanded by either of Dealer’s opponents * 
who has not looked at any of his cards: 

( h ) If Dealer omit the cut. 

(i) If Dealer deal with wrong pack. 

If any player, after looking at a card, make a claim under this 
law; or, if no claim be made; the deal stands as regular, and the 
player to the left deals next. In case of a deal with the wrong 
pack (i), the next dealer may choose either pack for the remainder 
of the rubber. 

The Declaration 

29. The declaration 4 begins when the deal ends and ends when 
all four players pass 5 (Law 38) their first opportunity to declare • 
or, after a bid, (Law 30) when three players in succession have 

1 A new deal may also be demanded under Laws 37 (d), 37 (e) and 54 (»). 

8 By the same dealer except as in (/), and with the same pack except as ia 
(g) and (t). 

* “Opponent” is always used in the general sense; 

"Adversary” is always an opponent of Declarer. 

* Declaration also means either bid, double, pass, or redouble. 

* The player next in turn then deals with his own pack. 

* To declare means to bid, double, pass or redouble, 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


343 


legally passed. The first legal act of the declaration is a bid or 
pass by the dealer. Thereafter each player in his turn to the 
left must pass, bid if no bid has been made previously, make a 
higher bid 1 if a bid has been made previously, double the last 
bid made by an opponent or redouble an opponent’s double 
provided no bid has intervened. 

Bid Defined 

30. A bid is made by specifying any number from one (1) to 
seven (7) inclusive, together with the name of a suit or No Trump; 
thereby offering to contract that with such suit as trump or with 
No Trump, the bidder will win at least the specified number of 
odd tricks. 


Higher Bid Defined 

31. To make a “higher bid” a player must (a) name a greater 
number 2 of odd tricks in a suit or No Trump than the number 
named in the last previous bid, or (6) name at least an equal 
number of odd tricks in a suit of higher rank (Law 4) than the 
suit named in the previous bid. 

Insufficient Bid 

32. A bid following any previous bid is “insufficient” if it is 
not “higher” according to Law 31. 

When an insufficient hid is made. 

(а) The insufficient bidder, if he do so before an opponent 
has declared or called attention to the insufficiency, may make the 
bid sufficient by changing the number of odd tricks named, in 
which case the declaration proceeds as if the bid had been suffi¬ 
cient. 

(б) When either opponent calls attention to an insufficient bid 
before it is changed, the insufficient bidder must make his bid 
sufficient by increasing the number 3 of odd tricks named; and 
if the player on the left of the insufficient bidder then pass, the 
partner of the insufficient bidder must pass and may not re-enter 
the declaration unless an opponent subsequently bid or double. 

(c) If neither opponent call attention to the insufficiency and 

1 Law 33 defines “higher bid.” 

2 Seven is the greatest number that may be named. 

* Not exceeding seven. 


344 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


the player on the left of the insufficient bidder either bid, double 
or pass, the previous insufficiency is waived. 

(d) Either opponent, after the bid has been made sufficient as 
provided in (b), may in turn make a higher 1 bid, in which case 
the declaration proceeds as if no bid had been insufficient. 


Bid Out of Turn Defined 

33. A bid is out of turn, 2 (not an illegitimate bid, Law 41): 

(a) If, before Dealer declares, a bid be made by any other 
player. 

( b ) If, after Dealer declares, any player bid otherwise than in 
: his turn. 


Bid Out of Turn Penalized 

34. After a bid out of turn: 

(а) Either opponent of the offender may cancel it. The proper 
player then proceeds with the declaration, 3 the out-of-turn bid 
being ignored, but the partner of the out-of-turn bidder must 
thereafter pass whenever his turn comes. 4 * 

(б) When the player on the left of the out-of-turn bidder de¬ 
clares before the improper bid is canceled, the out-of-turn bid is 
thereby accepted as if made in turn and there is no penalty. 

(c) When the player on the right of the out-of-turn bidder is 
the proper declarer and declares 6 without otherwise canceling 
the improper bid, such act cancels the out-of-turn bid and (a) 
applies. 


Double Defined 

35. When, during the declaration and in proper turn, a player 
doubles, it doubles the trick value (Law 10) of the last previous 
bid. Doubling does not change bidding values (Laws 4 and 31), 
nor the values of honors (Law 15), Slam or Little Slam (Law 16). 


1 t.e., Higher than the bid after it has been made sufficient. 

2 When a bid is out of turn and also insufficient (Law 32), either opponent 

may elect to apply either Law 32 ( b ) or Law 34 (a). 

* The “proper player” must pass if he is the partner of the player in error. 

* The offending player, as he has not received improper information, may 
subsequently declare in turn. 

* When he doubles, it is a double of the last legal bid. 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


345 


Redouble Defined 

36. When, during the declaration, and in proper turn, a 
player redoubles, it doubles the double (Law 35); that is, it mul¬ 
tiplies the original trick value (Law 10) by four. A redouble, 
like a double, affects only trick values (Law 35). 

Improper Doubles and Redoubles 

37. The penalties for improper doubles or redoubles follow: 

(a) A double or redouble before a bid has been made is void. 

(b) A double or redouble after the declaration ends: Law 41 
(a) prescribes the penalty. 

(c) A double or redouble made when it is the turn of the right- 
hand opponent to declare is subject to the same penalty as a bid 
out of turn (Law 34-a) unless the partner of the offender has 
passed the bid involved, in which case the double or redouble 
is void and there is no penalty. 

(d) A double or redouble when it is partner’s turn to declare 
may be accepted by the opponents, after consultation, as if it 
had been in turn; or they may demand a new deal; or call the bid 
that was doubled final and elect whether the double or redouble 
stand. Any of these penalties may be exacted even though the 
partner of the offender call attention to the error; but, if the player 
to the left of the offender declare, he thereby accepts the out-of¬ 
turn double or redouble. 

(e) A double of a double is a redouble; a redouble when there 
has been no double is a double; a redouble of a redouble is void 
and is penalized by a new deal or 100 points in the adverse honor- 
score. Doubling a partner’s bid or redoubling a partner’s double 
is penalized by 50 points in the adverse honor-score. Either 
opponent may exact any of these penalties. 

Pass Defined 

38. When, during the declaration and in proper turn, a player 
passes; the turn to declare is thereby passed to the next player to 
the left. 

Pass Out of Turn Defined 

39. A pass is out of turn: 

(а) If made before Dealer declares; 

(б) If made (after Dealer declares) by any player except in 
turn. 


346 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Pass Out of Turn Penalized 

40. After a pass out of turn: 

(a) If the opponent at the left of the offending player declare 1 
before attention is called to the erro^ the pass is accepted as 
regular. 

(b) If an opponent call attention to the error, the pass is void 
and the player whose turn it was, when the error was made, 
resumes the declaration; but the offending player may not 
thereafter bid, double or redouble unless the declaration he 
passed be over-bid, doubled or redoubled. 

Illegitimate Declarations 

41. (a) A bid, double or redouble made after the declaration 
is ended is not penalized if made by Declarer or his partner. 
But should the error be committed by an adversary, Declarer may 
call a lead from the partner of the offending player the first time 
it is the turn of said partner to lead. 

(6) When a player who has been debarred from bidding or 
doubling, either bids, doubles or redoubles, either opponent may 
decide whether or not such bid, double or redouble stand; and, 
in either case, both the offending player and his partner must 
thereafter pass. 

(c) A pass after the declaration is ended is void. 

Declaring and Changing 

42. If a player pass, bid, double, or redouble, and then attempt 
to change 2 to some other form of declaration or attempt to 
change the size of a sufficient bid, such attempted change may be 
penalized as a bid out of turn*. 

Repeated Errors 

43. When any player commits an error for which a penalty is 
provided in Laws 32, 34, 37, 40, 41, or 42 at a time when an error 

1 See footnote to Law 29, which provides that a pass in a declaration. 

8 A player who inadvertently says “ No Bid,” meaning to say “No Trump” 
or vice versa); or who inadvertently says “Spade,” “Heart,” “Diamond’! 
or “Club,” meaning to name another of these; may correct his mistake, pro¬ 
vided the next player has not declared. “Inadvertently” refers to a slip of 
the tongue, not a change of mind. 

3 Unless it be an attempt to change the third or fourth consecutive pass 
which closes the declaration (Law 29). 


347 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 

■ i 

has previously been committed under those laws, for which the 
penalty has not already been fully paid: 

(а) If the previous error was committed by the other side, the 
penalty for it (or as much as remains unpaid) is canceled and 
the side newly in error is liable for the penalty provided for the 
new offense; 

(б) If the previous error was committed by the same side, the 
opponents, after consultation, may elect which error to penalize. 

Cards Exposed During Declaration 

44. If, during the declaration, 1 any player lead or expose 2 
card, such card must be left face upward on the table and the 
partner of the player in error must thereafter pass whenever it 
is his turn to declare. 

If the player in error later become Declarer or Dummy, the 
card in question is no longer exposed; otherwise it remains an 
exposed card until played. 

If the player on the left of the player in error later become 
Declarer he may, on the first trick, forbid a lead of the suit of 
the exposed card.* 

Contract and Declarer 

45. With the completion of the declaration, the side which has 
made the highest bid assumes a contract to win at least the 
number of odd tricks 4 named in said bid: the partner of that 
side who first named the suit or No Trump specified in said bid 
is Declarer. 

For every trick Declarer falls short of his contract, the adver¬ 
saries score 50 points in their honor-score for undertricks. All 
tricks won by adversaries beyond their “book” are undertricks. 
The adversaries’ book is the number of the bid subtracted from 
seven. Declarer’s book is his first six tricks. In case of a double, 
the undertricks count 100 each; in case of redouble they count 
200 each. 

When there is a double and Declarer fulfils his contract, he 

1 Law 29 specifies when the declaration begins and ends. 

* Law 51 defines exposed cards. 

8 When two or more cards are exposed, all are subject to the provisions of 
Law 44, but the Declarer may not forbid the lead of more than three suits. 

« Law 9 provides that Declarer whose contract fails, scores nothing for 
tricks. 


348 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


counts in his honor-score a bonus of 50 points; and a further bonus 
of 50 points for each trick if any, that he wins beyond the num¬ 
ber called for by the contract. When there is a redouble, these 
bonuses are 100 points each instead of 50. 1 

The Play 

46. After the declaration, the play proceeds according to 
Law 5. Until the initial lead has been legally made, Declarer’s 
partner is not subject to any of the limitations 2 imposed upon 
Dummy. 

Dummy 

47. As soon as the initial lead is legally made, Declarer’s 
partner places his cards face upward on the table and becomes 
Dummy. 3 

Declarer plays Dummy’s cards as well as his own. Dummy 
takes no part in the play and has no rights except as provided in 
Laws 48 and 49. 

Dummy’s Rights (Unconditional) 

48. Dummy always has the right: 

(а) To call attention to the fact that too many or too few 
cards have been played to a trick, 

(б) To call attention to the fact that the wrong side has 
gathered in a trick, 

(c) To ask Declarer whether he have any of a suit he has re¬ 
fused. 4 

( d) To correct an error in the score, 

(e) To participate in the discussion of any disputed question 
of fact after it has arisen between Declarer and an adversary, 

(/) To correct an improper claim of either adversary, 

(g) To assist Declarer as allowed by Law 54 (j ). 

Dummy’s Rights (Conditional) 

49. If Dummy have not intentionally looked at a card held 
by any player, he has the following additional rights: 

* These bonuses are in addition to the increased trick-score, see Law 10. 

1 Except consultation as to the penalty provided in Law 54 (o). 

* “Dummy” is sometimes used in the obvious sense of dummy’s cards. 

* “ Refuse” is defined in footnote to Law 7. 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


349 


( h ) To claim an adverse revoke, 

(i ) To call attention to an adverse lead out of turn. 

O’) To call attention to a card exposed by an adversary, 

(Jc) To call Declarer’s attention to any right he may have under 
the laws. 

(0 To suggest playing out the hand when Declarer would 
concede any of the remaining tricks (Law 59-6). 

Dummy Penalized 

50. (m) Should Dummy call attention to any matter involving 
a right of Declarer or a penalty incurred by the adversaries, said 
matter not being covered by Law 48 paragraphs ( a ) to (g); or 
should he, after having intentionally looked at a card held by any 
player, seek to exercise any of the rights mentioned in Law 49, 
paragraphs ( h) to (l ); then such right or penalty is canceled and 
may not be exercised or exacted. 

(n) Should Dummy, by touching a card or otherwise, suggest 
a play by Declarer; either adversary may require Declarer to 
make such play (if legal) or to refrain from making it. 

(o) Should Dummy warn Declarer that he is about to lead 
from the wrong hand, either adversary may designate the hand 
from which Declarer shall lead. 

Exposed Cards 

51. The following are “exposed” cards— 

(а) Two or more cards led or played simultaneously (all are 
exposed); 

(б) A card dropped face upward on the table, even if snatched 
up so quickly that it cannot be named; 1 

(c) A card dropped elsewhere than on the table if the partner 
see its face; 2 

(d) A card so held by a player that his partner sees any portion 
of its face; 2 

( e ) A card mentioned by either adversary as being in his own 
or his partner’s hand. 

(/) If an adversary who has legally played to the twelfth 

1 If an adversary throw his cards face upward on the table, they are exposed 
(except as in 59-(a)) and liable to be called; but if the other adversary retain 
his hand, he cannot be forced to expose it. 

* The fact that an opponent sees it, does not make it an exposed card. 


350 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


trick, show his thirteenth card before his partner plays his twelfth, 
the partner’s two cards are exposed; 

( g ) A card designated by any Law as “exposed.” 

Calling Exposed Cards 

52. After a card has been “exposed” as defined in Law 51, it 
must be left face upward on the table and Declarer may “call” it 
( i.e ., require its owner to lead or play it) 1 at any time when it is 
the owner’s turn to lead or play, except when the playing of the 
“called” card would cause the holder to renounce. 

Declarer may call an exposed card any number of times until 
it may be legally played, but the owner may play it even if not 
called. 

Play of Declarer and Dummy 

53. A card from Declarer’s hand is not played or led until 
quitted. 2 If Declarer name or touch a card in Dummy he must 
play it. 3 If he touch two or more cards simultaneously, he may 
play either. 

Declarer and Dummy are not liable to the call of exposed 
cards. 4 

Leads Out of Turn and Cards Played in Error 

54. (a) After the declaration and before a legal initial lead, 
should the partner of the proper leader lead or expose a card, 
Declarer may either call a lead 5 from the proper leader or treat 
the card 6 as exposed. Declarer’s partner may call Declarer’s 
attention to the offense but, should they consult regarding the 
penalty, it is canceled. Should Declarer’s partner spread any 
part of his hand before Declarer selects the penalty, Declarer 
may not call a lead. 

(6) Should an adversary who has played a card which, as 
against Declarer and Dummy, is a winner lead another or several 
such winning cards without waiting for his partner to play; 

1 Declarer and Dummy are not liable (Law 53). 

3 A card is “quitted” when the player no longer touches it. 

8 Unless Declarer say “I arrange,” or words to that effect; or unless his 
touching the card is obviously for the purpose of uncovering a partly hidden 
one or to enable him to get at the card he wishes to play. 

* But see Law 54 (o). 

* If the player called on to lead a suit have none of it the penalty is paid. 

8 Or cards. 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


351 


Declarer may require said adversary’s partner to win, if he can, 
the first or any of these tricks, after which the remaining card or 
cards thus led are exposed. 

(c) Should the adversaries lead simultaneously, the correct 
lead stands and the other is an exposed card. 

(d) Should Declarer lead out of turn either from his own hand 
or Dummy, either adversary may direct that the error be recti¬ 
fied, but Declarer may not rectify it unless so directed. 

(e) After a lead by Declarer or Dummy, should fourth hand 
play before second hand; Declarer may require second hand to 
play his highest or lowest card of the suit led, or to win or lose the 
trick. 1 If second hand have none of the suit led, Declarer may 
call his highest of any designated suit. If second hand hold none 
of the suit called, the penalty is paid. 

(f) Should Declarer lead from his own or Dummy’s hand and 
then play from the other hand before second hand plays, fourth 
hand may play before second hand without penalty. 

( g ) Should any player (including Dummy) lead out of turn 
and next hand 2 play without claiming the penalty, the lead 
stands as regular. 

(h) If an adversary lead out of turn, Declarer may call a lead 
as soon as it is the turn of either adversary to lead or may treat 
the card so led as exposed. 

(i) If a player (not Dummy) omit playing to a trick and then 
play to a subsequent trick, Declarer or either adversary (as the 
case may be) may demand a new deal whenever the error is dis¬ 
covered. If no new deal be demanded, the surplus card at the 
end of the hand is considered played to the imperfect trick but 
does not constitute a revoke therein. 

( j ) Whenever it is suspected that any of the quitted tricks con¬ 
tains more than four cards, any player (including Dummy) may 
count them face downward. If any be found to contain a sur¬ 
plus card and any player be short, either opponent may face 
the trick, select the surplus card and restore it to the player who 
is short; but this does not change the ownership of the trick. 
The player who was short is answerable for revoke as provided in 
Law 56 (e). 

1 Except as provided in (/). 

* Declarer accepts wrong lead if he play next either from his own or 
Dummy’s hand. 


352 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Renounce 

55. When a player, having one or more cards of the suit led, 
plays a card of a different suit; his act constitutes a renounce. 1 2 

Revoke Definitions 

56. A renounce (Law 55) becomes a revoke and subject to 
penalty (Law 57): 

(a) When the trick in which it occurs is turned and quitted 1 
by the rightful winners, except as provided in Law 58 (c); 

(b) When the renouncing player or his partner, whether in 
turn or otherwise, leads or plays to the following trick; 

(c) When one side having claimed a revoke either opponent 
mixes the cards before the claimant has had reasonable opportu¬ 
nity to examine them. 

(< d ) When a player has incurred a penalty requiring him to play 
the highest or lowest of a suit, or to win or lose a trick, or to lead a 
certain suit, or to refrain from playing a certain suit, and fails to 
act as directed when able to do so; he incurs the revoke penalty. 

(e) If at any time a player be found to have less than his 
correct number of cards, and the other three have their correct 
number; the missing card or cards, if found (see also Laws 27-e 
and 54 -j), belong to the player 3 who is short and, unless he be 
Dummy, he is answerable for any revoke or revokes as if the 
missing card or cards had been in his hand continuously. 

Revoke Penalty 

57. The penalty for each revoke is: 

(а) When Declarer revokes, he cannot score for tricks and his 
adversaries, in addition to any bonus for undertricks, 4 add 50 
points to their honor-score for each revoke. 

(б) When either adversary revokes, Declarer for the first 
revoke may either score 50 points in his honor-score or take two 

1 See also “refuse,” Law 7, footnote. 

2 A trick is “quitted” when it is turned and the player no longer touches it. 

* The fact that such player made no claim of irregularity at the time of the 

deal is conclusive, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the missing 
cards were dealt to him. 

4 The fact that Declarer revokes does not permit adversaries to soore for 
undertricks, provided Declarer has won (even with the help of the revoke) at 
least the number of tricks called for by his contract. 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


353 


tricks 1 from his adversaries and add them to his own. 2 Such 
tricks may assist Declarer to make good his contract, but shall 
not entitle him to any further bonus 3 in the honor-score by reason 
of the bid having been doubled or redoubled; nor to a Slam or 
Little Slam not otherwise obtained. For each revoke after the 
first, Declarer adds 50 points to his honor-score. 

(c) The value of honors as held is the only score that can be 
made by a revoking side unless both sides revoke; if one side re¬ 
voke more than once, the other scores 50 for each extra revoke. 

Revoke Avoided 

58. A renounce (Law 55) may be corrected, and the revoke 
(Law 57) avoided, under the following circumstances: 

(a) If made by Dummy, the renounce may be corrected before 
the trick is turned and quitted. After the trick has been turned 
and quitted, whether by the rightful winners or otherwise, the 
renounce may not be corrected. In neither case is there any 
penalty. 

(b) A renouncing player, other than Dummy, may not correct 
his error (except as in c) after the trick is turned and quitted 
nor after he or his partner has led or played to the following trick. 
If the correction be made in time, there is no revoke penalty; but 
the player in error (except as in e ) may be required to play his 
highest or lowest card of the suit led. Any player, who played 
after the renounce, may withdraw his card and substitute 
another. 

(c) If, before the trick is turned and quitted, the partner of the 
renouncing player ask him whether he have any 4 of the suit 
refused, subsequent turning and quitting does not establish a 
revoke until the renouncing player has answered in the negative, 
or until he or his partner has led or played to the following trick. 

(d) If the renouncing player be an adversary and the renounce 
be corrected in time, declarer instead of calling the highest or 
lowest may treat the card played in error as exposed. 

(e) The highest or lowest may not be called from Declarer 

1 The value of the two tricks—undoubled, doubled or redoubled as the case 
may be—is counted in the trick-score. 

* Dummy may advise Declarer which penalty to exact. 

* They may enable him to win a game and, if that game end the rubber, 
give him the 250 points bonus. 

*Or none. .. a 


354 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


unless the adversary to his left have played to the trick after the 
renounce. 

(/) Should Dummy leave the table after requesting protection 
from revokes, 1 Declarer cannot be penalized, following a re¬ 
nounce, unless an adversary in due time call the renounce to his 
attention. 

( g ) The revoke penalty cannot be claimed after the next en¬ 
suing cut (Law 25); nor, if the revoke occur during the last hand 
of a rubber, after the score has been agreed upon; nor if there have 
been a draw for any purpose in connection with the next rubber 
(e.fif., as in Law 23). 

Claiming and Conceding Tricks 

59. (a) If Declarer say “I have the rest,” or any words indi¬ 
cating the remaining tricks or any number thereof are his; either 
adversary may require him to place his cards face upward on the 
table and play out the hand. Declarer cannot then take any 
finesse, not previously proven a winner, 2 unless he announced it 
when making his claim; nor may he call any cards either adver¬ 
sary has exposed. 

(6) If Declarer concede one or more tricks, and either adversary 
accept the concession before Dummy lawfully demands that the 
hand be played out (Law 49-1), such trick or tricks belong to 
adversaries even though, had the hand been played out, Declarer 
could not have lost them. 

(c) If an adversary concede a trick or tricks to Declarer, and 
such concession be accepted before the other adversary objects, 
it is binding on both adversaries. 

Penalties and Consultation 

60. Laws which give “either partner,” “either opponent,” 
etc., the right to exact a penalty do not permit consultation. 

(а) If either partner suggest or name a penalty he is deemed 
to have selected it. 

(б) If either direct the other to select a penalty, the latter must 
do so; and, if an attempt be made to refer the privilege back, 
the penalty is canceled. 

1 Sometimes called “courtesies of the table.” 

* “Proven a winner” means that the adversary who plays last to the trick 
in which the finesse is to be taken, has previously refused that suit; the fact 
that a finesse in the same suit has previously won is not enough. 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


355 


(c) If either says (in effect), “Which of us is to select the 
penalty?” the penalty is canceled. 

(d) A proper penalty once selected may not be changed. 

(e) If a wrong penalty be selected, 1 the selection must be cor¬ 
rected upon request of either opponent. 

(/) If a wrong penalty be selected and paid without challenge, 
the selection may not be changed. 

(g) A reasonable time must be allowed for the selection of a 
penalty, and the selection must be made within a reasonable 
time. 

( h ) If, instead of exacting a penalty at the proper time, either 
opponent of the side in error play or declare, no penalty may be 
exacted. 


Information 

61. (a) During the declaration, information must be given 
concerning its details up to that time, but, after it is ended, should 
either adversary or Dummy inform his partner regarding any 
detail of the declaration except the contract, Declarer or either 
adversary (as the case may be) may call a lead the next time it 
is the turn of the offending side to lead. At any time during 
the play, any player inquiring must be informed what the con¬ 
tract is. 

(6) Any player except Dummy may, before a trick is turned 
and quitted, demand that the cards so far played be placed before 
their respective players; but should either adversary, in the 
absence of such demand, in any way call attention to his own 
card or to the trick, Declarer may require the partner of the 
offender to play his highest or lowest card of the suit led, or to 
win or lose the trick. 

(c) Either adversary, but not Dummy (Law 50-o), may call 
his partner’s attention to the fact that he is about to play or lead 
out of turn; but if, during the play, an adversary make any unau¬ 
thorized reference to any incident thereof, or to the location of 
any card, Declarer may call the next lead when it becomes an 
adversary’s turn. 2 

(d) If before or during the declaration a player’give any unau- 

1 If the “penalty" selected be something not described in the Laws, no 
penalty may be exacted. 

2 Any such reference by Dummy, may be similarly penalized by either 
adversary. 


356 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


thorized information concerning his hand, his partner may be 
barred from subsequent participation in the declaration. 

(e) The penalty for looking at quitted tricks (except where the 
Laws permit examination) is 25 points in the adverse honor-score 
for each offense. 


New Cards 

62. One new pack must be produced to replace an incorrect 
one (Law 27-e) or an imperfect one (Law 28 -g ). Otherwise, when 
new cards are demanded, two packs must be furnished and the 
opponents of the player demanding them have the choice unless 
the demand be made at the beginning of a rubber, in which case 
Deal.er has the choice. 

Except under Laws 27(e) and 28 (g), new cards may not be 
introduced during a deal. (See Law 26-a.) 

THE ETIQUETTE OF AUCTION 

In the game of Auction slight intimations may convey im¬ 
proper information. To offend against etiquette is more serious 
than to offend against a law; for in the latter case the offender is 
subject to prescribed penalties; in the former his opponents are 
without redress. 

1. Declarations should be made in a simple manner, thus: 
“one Heart,” “one No Trump,” “pass,” “double”; they should 
be made without emphasis. 

2. Except by his legitimate declaration, a player should not 
indicate by word, manner or gesture the nature of his hand, nor 
his approval or disapproval of a play, bid, or double. 

3. If a player demand that the cards be placed, he should 
do so for his own information and not to call his partner’s atten¬ 
tion to any card or play. 

4. An adversary should not lead until the preceding trick has 
been turned and quitted; nor, after having led a winning card, 
should he draw another from his hand before his partner has 
played to the current trick. 

5. A card should not be played in such manner as to draw 
attention to it, nor should a player detach one card from his hand 
and subsequently play another. 

6. A player should not purposely incur a penalty nor should 
he make a second revoke to conceal a first. 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


357 


7. Conversation which may annoy players at the table or at 
other tables in the room should be avoided. 

8. Dummy should not leave his seat to watch his partner play 
nor call attention to the score. 

9. If Declarer say, “I have the rest,” or any words indicating 
that the remaining tricks, or any number thereof, are his, and an 
adversary exposes his cards, Declarer should not allow any 
information so obtained to influence his play. 

10. A player having been cut out of one table should not seek 
admission in another unless willing to cut for the privilege of 
entry. 



INDEX TO LAWS 


Abiding by decision, 22. 

Ace(s). 

— as honors, 14, 15. 

— high in play, 3. 

— low in drawing, 3. 

Adversary (ies). 

—’s book, 45. 

— claim or concede tricks, 59(6), 59(c). 

— correct renounce, 58(c). 

— exposes cards, 51(6), 51(f). 

“—” is opponent of declarer, 28. 

— lead simultaneously, 54(c). 

— leads out of turn, 54(6.). 

— leads several winning cards, 54(6). 

— revokes, 57(6). 

—’s undertricks, 45. 

Agreement to terminate rubber, 13(6). 

Appointing substitute, 21(a). 

Asking partner, 58(c). 

Auction, how played, 1. 

Bid. 

Changing—, 42. 

“ Declare ” includes “—,” 29. 

Higher — defined, 31. 

—, how made, 30. 

Insufficient—. See Insufficient Bid. 

— made after declaration ends, 41(a). 

— made when under compulsion to pass, 41(6). 
“ no—” changed to “ no trump,” 42. 

— out of turn. See Bid Out of Turn. 

Seven the highest possible —,31. 

— ing, values, 31, 35, 36. 


358 




FOSTER ON AUCTION 


359 


Bid out of turn. 

— also insufficient, 33. 

— defined, 33. 

— penalized, 34, 41, 42. 

Bonus(es). 

— counted in honor-score, 17. 

— for doubled and redoubled contract, 45. 

— for game, 13(6). 

— for revoke, 57. 

— for rubber, 13(a), 57(6). 

— for undertricks, 45. 

Book. 

Adversaries’ —, 45. 

Declarer’8 —, 45. 

Breaking up a table, 21(6). 

Calling. 

— a lead, 41(a), 50(»), 54(a), 54(6), 61(a), 61(c). 

— exposed cards, 44, 52, 54(6), 54(c), 54(6), 58(d), 59(a). 

— highest or lowest cards, 54(e), 58(6), 58(d), 58(e), 61(6). 
Candidate (s). 

— for entry at table, 18, 19. 

Priority among —, 18, 19. 

Card(s). See also Pack. 

Adversary leads several winning —, 54(6). 

Calling exposed —. See Calling. 

Calling highest or lowest —. See Calling. 

Choice of —. See Choice. 

— dealt into four packets, 27(a). 

Declarer plays Dummy’s —, 47. 

— displaced in the cut, 25(6). 

Drawing —. See Draw(ing). 

— dropped, 51(6), 51(c). 

— exposed. See Exposed Cards. 

Exposed —. See Exposed Cards. 

— faced in the cut, 25(6). 

— faced in the deal, 27(6). 

— faced in the declaration, 44. 

Four — in cut, 25(6). 

— improperly dealt, 27, 28. 

Kind of — used, 2. 


360 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Card(s). See also Pack. 

Laying down —, 47-59. 

— led or played simultaneously, 51 (o), 64(c). 

— looked at during deal, 26(d). 

Marked —, 2. 

Missing —, 27(e), 54 (j), 56(e). 

Mixing the — when revoke is claimed, 56(c).. 

More than thirteen — held, 27(c). 

New —. See New. 

One — of each denomination to a suit, 2. 

One or two packs of — used, 2. 

Placing —, 61(6). 

— played in error, 44, 54, 55. 

Player holds too few or too many —, 27(c), 27(d), 540'). 
56(e). 

Quitted trick contains too many or too few—, 54 (i), 540) 
Rank of — in drawing, 3. 

Rank of — in play, 3. 

Soiled —, 2. 

Substituting —, 58(6). 

Thirteen — to a suit, 2. 

Too many or too few — played, 48(a), 54(7). 

Tom —, 2. 

— touched by Declarer, 53. 

— touched by Dummy, 50(n). 

— touched simultaneously, 53 
Two packs of — used, 2. 

— withdrawn following renounce, 68(6) 

Changing declaration, 42. 

Choice. 

— of cards. See — of Packs. 

— of packs, 22, 62. 

— of seats, 22. 

Claiming “the rest,” 59. 

Club(s). 

Rank of —,4. 

— tricks count six, 10. 

Complete table, 18. 

Conceding tricks, 59. 

Consultation. 

— in general, 60. 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


361 


Consultation. 

— regarding choice of packs and seats, 22. 

— regarding improper double, 37(d). 

Contract. 

— bonus for double and redouble, 45. 

— defined, 30, 45. 

Failing to make —, 45. 

Giving information regarding —, 61(a). 

— lost by revoke, 67(a). 

Odd tricks and —, 9. 

Slams and —, 16. 

Winning —, 9, 45. 

— won by revoke, 57(6). 

Correct pack (see also Incorrect), 2, 62. 

Cut. 

Deal begins after —, 26(a). 

— described, 25. 

Hand begins with —,11. 

Improper —, 25(6). 

Must — four cards, 25(6). 

New —, 25(6). 

No shuffle after —, 24, 25(6). 

— omitted, 28(6). 

Partner must not —, 25. 

Cutting for deal and partners. See Drawing. 
Cutting out. 

— at beginning of rubber, 13(a). 

— at end of rubber, 23. 

Deal. 

— after cut, 26(a). 

— after shuffling, 24. 

Cards faced or exposed in —, 27(6). 

— described, 26(c). 

Drawing for —, 22. 

Looking at cards during —, 26(d). 

New —. See New deal. 

New cards during —, 62. 

— out of turn, 2 8(f). 

Partner may not —, 26(6). 

Players — in turn to left, 26(6). 


362 FOSTER 0^ AUCTION 

Deal. 

When — begins and ends, 26(a). 

— with wrong pack, 28 (i). 

Dealer. 

— completes cut, 25(a). 

— deals out of turn, 28(f). 

— deals with wrong pack, 28 (i). 

First —, how selected, 22. 

—’s partner may not deal, 26(6). 

—’s partner shuffles, 24. 

Same — deals, 27, 28. 

— shuffles last, 24. 

Decision, abiding by, 22. 

Declaration. (See also Declare.) 

Cards exposed during —, 44. 

— changed, 42. 

— described and defined, 29. 

First legal act of —, 29. 

Giving information regarding —, 61(a). 

Illegitimate —, 41. 

“—” includes “bid,” “pass,” “double” and “redouble,” 29. 

— made when under compulsion to pass, 41(6). 

Rank of suits in —, 4. 

When — begins and ends, 29. 

Declare(s). (See also Declaration.) 

— ing and changing, 42. 

— defined, 29. 

“—” includes “ bid,” “ pass,” “ double ” and “ redouble,” 
29- 

Declarer. 

“ Adversary ” is —’s opponent, 28. 

— and contract, 45. 

— and Dummy, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 53, 59, 60. 

—’s bonus for double and redouble, 45. 

—’s book, 45. 

— claims or concedes tricks, 49(0, 59. 

— condones lead out*of turn, 54 (g). 

— defined, 45. 

— leads out of turn, 54(d), 54(/). 

— makes contract by adverse revoke, 57(6). 

— makes contract by own revoke, 57(a). 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


363 


Declarer. 

— may not forbid lead of more than three suits, 44. 

— not liable for exposed cards, 53. 

Only — scores for tricks, 9. 

—’s partner exposes hand, 54(a). 

—’s partner not subject to Dummy’s limitations, 46 
Partner who first names suit is —, 45. 

— plays Dummy’s cards, 47. 

— plays out of turn, 54(d), 54(/). 

— revokes, 57 (a). 

— scores slam on losing contract, 16. 

— takes two tricks or 50 points for first revoke, 57(6). 

— taking finesse, 59(a). 

— touching card, 53. 

When — counts odd tricks, 9. 

Definitions. 

Adversary, 28. Auction, 1. Bid, 30. Bid out of turn, 33. 
Book, 45. Contract, 30, 45. Correct pack, 2. Cut, 25. 
“ Cutting,” 22. Cutting out, 23. Deal, 26. Dealer, 
22. Declaration, 29. Declare, 29. Declarer, 45. Double, 
35. Double out of turn, 37. Drawing, 22. Dummy, 47. 
Exposed cards, 51. Following suit, 7. Game, 1, 12. 
Hand, 11. Higher bid, 31. Honor-score, 17. Honors, 
14. Illegitimate declaration, 41. Imperfect pack, 2. 
Insufficient bid, 32. Lead, 5. Member, 18. Net points, 

17. No trump, 8. Odd tricks, 9. Opponent, 28. Part¬ 
ners, 1. Pass, 38. Pass out of turn, 39. Plain suit, 8. 
Play, 1, 5. Player, 18, 22. Quitted card, 53. Quitted 
trick, 56(a). Redouble, 36. Redouble out of turn, 37. 
Refuse, 7. Renounce, 55. Revoke, 56. Rubber, 13. 
Shuffle, 24. Side, 1. Slam, 16. Still pack, 24. Table, 

18. Total points, 17. Trick, 6. Trick-score, 17. Trump, 
8. Undertricks, 45. Winning rubber, 13. 

Deuce low in play, 3. 

Diamond (s). 

Rank of —, 4. 

— tricks count seven, 10. 

Displacing other players, 20, 21. 

Double. 

— after declaration ends, 37(6), 41(a). 

— before a bid is made, 37(a). 


364 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Double. 

Bonus for —d contract, 45, 57(6). 
Changing a —,42. 

“Declare” includes “—”, 29. 

— defined, 35. 

— doubles trick values, 10, 57(6). 

Honor values not changed by —, 15. 

— of a —, 37(e). 

— of partner’s bid, 37(e). 

— when turn of partner, 37(d). 

— when turn of right opponent, 37(c). 

— when under compulsion to pass, 41(6). 
Draw(ing) 

All— from same pack, 22. 

— for cutting out, 23. 

— for deal, 22. 

— for entry, 18, 19. 

— for partners, 22. 

Rank of cards in —,3. 

Rank of suits in —, 4. 

— two cards, must draw again, 22. 
Dummy. 

Declarer plays —’s cards, 47. 

— defined, 47. 

— lays down cards too soon, 54(a). 

— leaving table, 58(f). 

—’s limitations begin after initial lead, 46. 

— not liable for exposed cards, 44, 53. 

— not liable for revoke, 58(a). 

— penalized, 50. 

—’s rights (conditional), 49. 

—’s rights (unconditional), 48. 

“—” sometimes means “—’s cards,” 47. 

— suggests “ playing it out,” 49 (l), 59(6). 

— takes no part in play, 47. 

— touching cards, 50 (n). 

Touching cards in —,53. 

Entry at table, 18, 19, 20, 21. 

Error. 

Cards played in —, 44, 54, 55. 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


365 


Error. 

— in dealing, 27, 28. 

— in declaring, 32, 33, 37, 39, 41, 42, 43. 

— in doubling and redoubling, 37. 

— in honor-score, 17. 

— in trick-score, 17. 

Repeated —s, 43. 

Exposed cards. 

— after the declaration, 54. 

Calling —. See Calling. 

— cannot force renounce, 52. 

Declarer and Dummy not liable for —, 63. 

— defined, 51. 

Dummy may call attention to —, 490). 

— during deal, 27(6). 

— during declaration, 44. 

— may be called several times, 52. 

Faced cards. See Cards. 

Failing. 

— to play as directed, 56(d). 

— to return to table, 21(6). 

Finesse must not be taken, 59(a). 

First. 

— dealer, 22. 

— legal act of declaration, 29. 

— in room, 18. 

— to play, 18, 22. 

— to withdraw, 19, 20, 21, 23. 

Following suit, 7. 

Forming tables, 18, 19. 

Game(s). 

All — points counted, 12. 

— bonus, 13(6). 

—, defined, 1, 12. 

—, how played, 1. 

—, how won, 12. 

Thirty points to a —, 12. 

Two — win rubber, 13(a). 

—, when completed, 12. 

— won by revoke, 57(a), 57(6). 


366 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Giving information, 61. 

Grand Slam. See Slam. 

Hand. 

— begins with cut, 11. 

— defined, 11. 

Each — played out, 12, 13(6). 

Laying down — . See Cards. 

One — or more to a game, 12. 

Third — shuffles, 24. 

Heart(s). 

Rank of —,4. 

— tricks, count eight, 10. 

High. 

— card in drawing and play, 3. 

— suit in declaration and drawing, 4. 

Higher bid. 

Bid, if not —, is insufficient, 32. 

— defined, 31. 

Highest or lowest. See Calling. 

Honor (s). 

— based on trick values, 15. 

— count as dealt, 14 

— count in the — score, 14. 

— described, 14. 

— not affected by double, 15, 35. 

— not affected by redouble, 15, 36. 
Only — scored by revoking side, 57(c). 

— score, 17. 

Slams counted as —,16. 

Undertricks counted as —, 45. 

— values, 15, 35, 36. 

“ I arrange,” 53. 

Illegitimate declarations, 41. 

Imperfect pack. 

— causes new deal, 28 {g). 

— defined, 2. 

“ Inadvertently” defined, 42. 

Incorrect pack. 

— causes new deal, 27(e). 

— defined. See Correct. 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


367 


Information, 61. 

Initial lead, 5. 

Insufficient bid. 

— also out of turn, 33. 

Bid after—, 32(c), 32(d). 

— corrected by maker, 32(a). 

— corrected by opponent, 32(6). 

— defined, 32. 

— penalized, 32. 

— waived, 32(c). 

King high in drawing, 3. 

Laying down cards, 47, 59. 

Lead. 

Adversaries — several winning cards 54(6). 

— by partner of proper leader, 54(a). 
Calling a—. See Calling. 

— defined, 5. 

*— during declaration 44. 

Initial —, 5. 

— of several winning cards, 54(6). 

— out of turn. See Lead out of turn. 

— simultaneously, 54(c). 

Which player —s, 5. 

Lead out of turn, 44, 54. 

Leaving table, 13(c), 20, 21, 58(f). 

Little Slam. See Slam. 

Looking at cards, 26(d), 28, 49. 

Looking at quitted tricks, 8, 61(e). 

Losing rubber, 13(a). 

Low. 

— card in drawing and play, 3. 

— suit in declaration and drawing, 4. 

Making up tables, 18, 19. 

Marked cards, 2. 

Members. 

— draw for partners and deal, 22. 

— leaving tables, 20. 

— of table, 18, 23. 

Six — make complete table, 18. 


368 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Missing cards, 27(e), 540), 56(e). 

Net points, 17. 

New. 

— cards, 27(e), 28(^), 62. 

— cut, 25(6). 

— deal. See New deal. 

— pack. See — cards. 

— shuffle, 25(6). 
lew deal. 

Compulsory —, 27. 

— for cut omitted, 28(6). 

— for deal out of turn, 28(/). 

— for dealing with wrong pack, 28 (i). 

— for faced card, 27 (6). 

— for illegal double or redouble, 37(d), 37(e). 

— for imperfect pack, 28(0). 

— for improper number of cards dealt, 27(c). 

— for improper number of cards held, 27(d). 

— for incorrect pack, 27(e). 

— for irregular deal, 27(a). 

— for omitting cut, 28(h). 

— for omitting playing to trick, 54 (i). 

Optional, 28. 

No trump. 

“—” changed to “no bid,” 42. 

— defined, 8 

— honors, 15 

Rank of — in declaration, 4 

— tricks count ten, 10. 

Odd tricks. 

— defined, 9. 

— not counted when contract fails, 9. 

—, values, 10. 

—, when counted, 9. 

—, where scored, 10, 17. 

Opponent, 28. 

Out of turn. See Bid out of turn, Lead out of turn. 

Pack(s). (See also Card.) 

All draw from same —, 22. 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


369 


Pack(s). (See also Card.) 

Choice of —, 22. 

Correct —. See Correct pack. 

Cutting the —, 25. 

Imperfect —. See Imperfect pack. 

Incorrect —. See Correct pack. 

New —. See New. 

One or two —s used, 2. 

Perfect —. See Imperfect pack. 

Same — used, 27, 28. 

Still —. See Still pack. 

Wrong — dealt, 28(0. 

Partner(s). 

Consulting —, 60. 

Dealer’s — shuffles, 24. 

— defined, 1. 

Drawing for —, 22. 

— first naming suit is Declarer, 45. 

— may not cut, deal, shuffle, etc., 24, 25, 26(6). 

— of proper player leads, 54(a). 

Two — constitute a side, 1. 

Pass. 

“ Declare ” includes “—”, 29. 

— defined, 38. 

Four players — in succession, 29. 

— made after declaration ends, 41(c). 

— out of turn, 39, 40. 

Third consecutive — ends declaration, 29. 

Penalty. 

— and consultation, 60. 

— applied. See Penalty applied. 

— counted in honor score, 17. 

Reasonable time for selecting —, 60(0). 
Selecting wrong —, 60(e), 60(f). 

Penalty applied. 

Bidding errors, 32, 34, 41, 42. 

Breaking up table, 21(6). 

Consultation, 60. 

Contract failure, 9, 45. 

Cut omitted, 28(h). 

Cutting wrong, 25(6). 


370 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Penalty applied. 

Dealing errors, 27, 28. 

Declaration errors, 32, 34, 37, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44. 
Doubling errors, 37, 41. 

Dummy penalized, 50. 

Exposed cards, 52 

Failure to play to trick, 54 (i). 

Improper information, 61. 

Insufficient bid, 32. 

Leaving table, 13(c), 20, 21. 

Looking at card during deal, 26(d). 

Looking at quitted tricks, 61(e). 

Pass out of turn, 40, 41(c). 

Redoubling errors, 37, 41. 

Repeated errors, 43. 

Revoke, 57. 

Shuffling errors, 24. 

Wrong number of cards held, 27, 56(e). 

Perfect pack. See Imperfect. 

Placing still pack, 24. 

Plain suit, 8. 

Play. 

— described, 1, 5, 46. 

Failing to — as directed, 56(d). 

Fourth hand —s before second, 54(e). 

—ing highest or lowest. See Calling. 

—ing out of turn, 54. 

—ing out the hand, 49(0, 59(6). 

—ing to a trick, 5. 

— of Declarer and Dummy, 53. 

Rank of cards in —,3. 

Terminating — by agreement, 13(6). 

Player(s). 

— cutting out, 13(a), 23. 

— defined, 18, 22, 

Four — in game, 1. 

— leaving tables, 13(c), 20, 21. 

Priority among —,21, 22, 23. 

Points. 

All game — counted, 12. 

Net — in rubber, 17. 


FOSTER ON AUCTION ' 


371 


Points. 

Scoring —, 17. 

Thirty — to game, 12. 

Total — in rubber, 13(a), 17. 

Priority. 

— among candidates, 18, 19. 

— among members, 20. 

— among players, 21, 22, 23. 

“ Protection from revokes,” 58(f). 

Quit(ted). 

“— card” defined, 53. 

Looking at — tricks, 8, 61(e). 

Missing cards in — tricks, 27(e). 

Searching — tricks, 27(e), 540‘), 56(c). 

Too few cards in — tricks, 54(f). 

Too many cards in — tricks, 540). 

— tricks and the revoke, 56(a), 58. 

“ — tricks ” defined, 56(a). 

Rank of candidates and players, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23. 
Rank of cards. 

— in drawing, 3. 

— in play, 3. 

Rank of suits. 

— after double or redouble, 35, 36. 

— in declaration, 4. 

— in drawing, 4. 

Redouble. 

— accepted, 37(d). 

— after declaration ends, 37(6), 41(a). 

— before a bid, 37(a). 

Bidding values not increased by —, 36. 
Contract bonus and —, 45. 
u Declare ” includes “—”, 29. 

— defined, 36. 

— doubles double, 36. 

Honors values not increased by —, 15, 36. 
Improper —s, 37. 

— multiplies trick values by four, 10, 36. 

— of —, etc. 37(e). 


372 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Redouble. 

— of partner’s double, 37(e). 

— out of turn, 37. 

Penalties for improper —, 37. 

Revoke and —, 57(6). 

Slam values not increased by —, 36. 

Undertricks and —, 45. 

-— when under compulsion to pass, 41(6). 

Refuse (d). 

— defined, 7. 

Dummy calls attention when Declarer has —, 48(c). 

Suit — and partner “ asks,” 58(c). 

Renounce. 

— becomes a revoke, 56. 

— corrected, 58. 

— defined, 7, 55. 

Dummy calls attention to —, 48(c), 49(6). 

Repeated errors, 43. 

Returning to table, 20, 21. 

Revoke. 

Adversaries take penalty for —, 57(a) 

Adversary —s, 57(6). 

— avoided, 58. 

Both sides —, 57(c). 

Declarer —s, 57(a). 

—ing Declarer cannot score tricks, 57(a). 

Declarer takes two tricks or 60 points for first —, 57(6). 

— defined, 56. 

Dummy and —, 48(c), 49(6), 54O'). 

— helps to win contract, 57(a), 57(6). 

Dummy not liable for r—, 58(a). 

— on account of card short, 540)> 56(e). 

Only honors scored by —ing side, 57(c). 

— penalty, 57. 

— penalty does not gain slam, 16, 57(6). 

— penalty not increased by doubling and redoubling, 57(6) 
u Protection from —58 (/). 

Renounce becomes —, 56. 

Searching tricks for —, 540), 56(c). 

Time limit of —, 58(g). 

— when following trick is led to, 56(6), 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


373 


Revoke. 

— when opponents mix cards, 56(c). 

— when player fails to play as directed, 56(d). 

— when trick is quitted, 56(a). 

Room, first in, 18. 

Rubber. 

Bonus for —, 13(a), 57(6). 

Cutting out at end of —, 23. 

— defined, 13(a). 

Net points of —, 17. 

Not starting — after specified time, 13(6). 
Scoring unfinished —, 13. 

Total points of —, 13(a), 17. 

Unfinished —,13. 

When — begins and ends, 13(a). 

— when won, 13. 

“ Winning a losing —,” 13(a). 

Same dealer and pack, 27, 28. 

Scoring. 

error in —. See Error. 

— honors, 15-17. 

— revoke, 57. 

— rubber, 13, 17. 

— slams, 16, 17. 

— tricks, 9, 10, 12, 17. 

— undertricks, 45. 

— unfinished rubber, 13. 

Searching quitted tricks, 27(e), 54Q')> 56(c). 

Seats, choice of, 22. 

Shuffle. 

— after the cut, 25(6). 

— before deal, 24. 

Cutting after —, 24. 

Dealer may — last, 24. 

— described, 24. 

New —, 25(6). 

Partner may not —, 24. 

Side. 

Either — scores slam, 16. 

Net points of —, 17. 


374 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Side. 

Total points of —, 13(a), 17. 

Two partners constitute a —, 1. 

Which partner of — is Declarer, 45. 

— wins rubber, 13(a). 

Simple honors, 15. 

Slam(s). 

— count as honors, 16, 17. 

Declarer scores — on losing contract, 16. 

— defined, 16. 

— not affected by double, 35. 

— not affected by redouble, 36. 

— not earned by revoke penalty, 16, 57(5). 

— scored by either side, 16. 

Value of —, 16, 35, 36. 

Soiled cards, 2. 

Spade(s). 

Rank of —,4. 

— tricks count nine, 10. 

Specified time, stopping at, 13(6). \ 

Still pack. 

— defined, 24. 

-, how shuffled, 24. 

Missing cards found in —, 27(e). 

Stopping rubber at specified time, 13(6). 

Substitutes, 13(c), 21(a). 

Substituting cards, 58(6). 

Sufficient (bid). See Insufficient bid. 

Suit(s). 

Each — has thirteen cards, 2. 

Following —, 7. 

Four — in correct pack, 2. 

No trump regarded as —,4. 

Only three — may be forbidden, 44. 

Plain —, 8. 

Rank of — in declaration, 4. 

Rank of — in drawing, 4. 

Rank of — not affecting by doubling or redoubling, 35, 36. 
Table (s). 

Breaking up a —, 21(6). 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


375 


Table (s). 

Candidates at —, 18, 19. 

Complete —,18. 

Cutting out of —, 23. 

Entry at —, 18, 19, 20, 21. 

Leaving —, 13(c), 20, 21. 

Making up —, 18, 19. 

Returning to —, 20, 21. 

Six members make complete —, 18. 

Termination of rubber at specified time, 13(6). 

Torn cards, 2. 

Total points. 

Greatest — wins rubber, 13 (o) 

—, how reckoned, 17. 

Touching a card, 50(n), 53. 

Trick(s). 

Claiming and conceding —, 59. 

— defined, 6. 

— gained by revoke, 57(a), 57(6). 

Giving information regarding winner of —, 61(6). 
Leading to —, 5. 

Looking at quitted —, 8, 61(e). 

— not played to, 54 (i). 

Number of — in book, 45. 

Odd —. See Odd tricks. 

Omitting playing to —, 54 (t). 

Order of playing to —, 6. 

Playing to — makes revoke, 56(6). 

— quitted, 56(a). 

Quitted — containing fewer than four cards, 54 (i). 
Quitted — containing more than four cards, 54 (J). 
Quitting — establishes revoke, 56(a). 

— required to be won or lost. See Win or lose trick. 

— score, 9, 10, 12, 17. 

— scored only by declarer, 9. 

Searching —, 27(c), 540'), 56(c). 

Slams and —,16. 

Trumping a —,8. 

Under —. See Undertricks. 

— values, 10, 35, 36. 

When — quitted makes revoke, 56(a), 58(6). 


376 


FOSTER ON AUCTION 


Trick (s). 

Who leads to —, 5. 

Winning a —, 8. 

Trump (s). 

— defined, 8. 

No —. See No Trump. 

— values, 10. 

— wins trick, 8. 

Undertricks. 

— counted as honors, 17, 45. 

— defined, 45. 

Score for —, 45. 

Unfinished rubber, 13. 

Vacancies at tables, 19, 20, 21. 

Values. 

Bidding —, 31, 35, 36. 

Honor —, 15, 35, 36. 

— of suits. See Rank. 

Slam —, 16, 35, 36. 

Trick —, 10, 35, 36. 

Win or lose trick, 54(6), 54(e), 56(d), 61(6). 
Winning. 

— contract, 9, 45. 

— game, 12. 

“■— losing rubber,” 13(a). 

— rubber, 13. 

— “ the choice,” 22. 

— the trick, 8. 

Withdrawing from tables, 13(c), 20, 21. 
Wrong. 

— dealer deals, 28(f). 

— pack dealt, 28 (i). 

— penalty, 60(e), 6Q(/), 




GENERAL INDEX 

Note. The figures refer to the serial numbers of the hands that 
illustrate the point indexed. 

POINT ILLUSTRATED HAND8 

Ace-jack-ten finesse.1,115 

Ace-queen finesse. 116 

Ace-queen-jack finesse. . . 127 

Ace-queen-jack-ten finesse. 8 

Ace-queen, second hand. 130 

Ace-ten 4th hand, queen small 2d hand. 117 

Acknowledging weakness of a take-out. 37 

Against no-trumpers, sit tight and lead. 61 

Allow for having overbid forced declarations. 55 

Anticipating a bid by asking a lead. 82 

Asking a lead, 3d hand, after two passes. 21 

Asking a lead, 4th hand, at no-trump..67, 85 

Asking a lead, when 2d hand doubles. 84 

Asking a lead, while it is cheap to do so. 82 

Asking if take-out is strong or weak.36, 37 

Assist, in spite of intervening bid. 56 

Assist a forced bid, with more than average. 55 

Assists always show tricks outside trumps. 46 

Assisting a forced bid once only. 51 

Assisting more than once, if strong enough. 57 

Assisting on length in trumps. 59 

Assisting on more than average values. 54 

Assisting on outside tricks. 49 

Assisting secondary bids.92,94 

Assisting three times, if strong enough. 57 

Avoid discarding weak suits at no-trump. 107 

Avoid double meaning in down-and-out echo. 103 

Avoid driving no-trumpers into safer bids.52, 86 

Avoid establishing winners in dummy. 100 

Avoid leads from tenace suits.23, 98 

Avoid singleton leads, with four trumps. 99 

Avoiding premature trump leads. 123 

377 


































378 


GENERAL INDEX 


POINT ILLTJSTHATED HANDS 

Bidding suits 2d hand against no-trumps. 52 

Bidding for attack only, without defence.17,18 

Bidding higher ranking of two equal suits. 23 

Bidding on length, without the tops.16, 17, 18, 20 

Bidding supporting suits on 2d round... 47 

Bidding two, with six of the suit. 45 

Bidding two no-trumps, instead of doubling. 81 

Bidding weak suits, with strong side cards. 15 

Blocking re-entries by the eleven rule. 114 

Bluff doubles and redoubles. 71 

Bluff doubles, to frighten opponents. 40 

Border-line no-trump bids by dealer. 33 

Borrowed tricks, for forced bids. 55 

Building up a bid that should have been shut out.11,12 

Coaxing a cover by 2d hand and not getting it. 21 

Come-on signal, by the 3d hand. 103 

Concentrating upon certain suits in the play. 118 

Cover and honor with an honor. 110 

Cross-rufBng an entire hand.3,125 

Danger of doubling one-trick bids on average.. 68 

Danger of opponents building up a bid. 11 

Deduct for short trumps, in assisting bids. 58 

Defence shown by bids in minor suits. 5 

Defenceless-suit bids deceive the partner. 10 

Defensive bids on hands below average. .. 80 

Defensive bids, 3d hand, to indicate a lead. 83 

Defensive bids, 3d hand, after a double. 84 

Defensive bids, 3d hand, after two passes. 21 

Deny a suit first, then assist on side tricks. 58 

Deny partner’s suit with any sure-trick suit. 26 

Denying alternate suits by partners... 30 

Denying two suits to try a third. 41 

Denying assistance for a forced bid. 29 

Denying both no-trumps and a suit. 37 

Denying major-suit take-outs.36, 37 

Denying minor suits with minor suits. 28 

Denying partner’s suit with two small only. 24 

Denying a suit and also the take-out... 27 








































GENERAL INDEX 379 

POINT ILLtTSTBATED HANDS 

Difference between denying and greater strength. 25 

Difference between original bids of one and two.45, 46 

Difference between warning and strength. 25 

Directive discards at no-trump. 109 

Discarding best protected suit at no-trump.107,108 

Discarding losers before leading trumps. 124 

Discarding weakness at no-trumps. 108 

Distinguishing strong take-out from weak. 14 

Down-and-out echo against a trump contract. 102 

Double use of the double, to encourage partner. 68 

Doublers are responsible for the outcome. 66 

Doubles with a double meaning. 69 

Doubling after assisting, to show stoppers. 70 

Doubling after bidding, to show stoppers.40, 58, 64 

Doubling to force the partner to declare. 63 

Doubling original bids of two. 66 

Doubling original bids of three. 73 

Doubling to bluff opponents into another bid.40, 71 

Doubling suit that overcalls partner’s no-trump. 60 

Doubling a suit asked for by 4th hand, no-trump. 67 

Doubling twice, if partner does not answer first double.63, 67 

Doubling when partner has passed is dangerous.72, 77 

Ducking the first round of a suit. 128 

Each partner denying the other’s suit. 27 

Eleven rule for the 3d hand. 113 

Eleven rule in connection with the bids. 114 

Elimination of unessentials at no-trump. 118 

Establishing the 4th card of a weak suit. 120 

Establishing suits by ducking first round. 128 

Establishing suits by ruffing them out.98, 117, 126 

Finding the right suit by denying others. 37 

Finesse, by placing the lead in proper hand. 121 

Finessing with ace-jack-ten. 115 

Finessing with ace-queen. 116 

Finessing with ace-queen-jack. 127 

Finessing with ace-queen-jack-ten. 8 

Forced bids, on hands below average. 80 

Forced bids are borrowed tricks; deduct later.53, 55 








































o80 


GENERAL INDEX 


POINT ILLUSTRATED HANDS 

Forcing partner to bid a suit. 10 

Forcing the strong trump hand. 4 

Forcing better than shifting suits. 59 

Foster echo at no-trumps.104, 105, 106 

Fourth-best lead and the eleven rule.113, 114 

Fourth hand asking a lead at no-trumps.67, 85 

Fourth hand bids on the bidding.87, 88 

Fourth hand refusing to ask a lead at no-trumps. 86 

Free bids must have defensive values.89, 90 

Getting one hand into the lead twice. 122 

Getting partner in, to come through declarer.,. 100 

Getting rid of losers, before leading trumps. 124 

Getting suit established by ruffing. 126 

Hands that are too strong to pass. 15 

High cards from hand shorter in the suit.119, 127,131 

Higher of two, 3d hand, inviting a force. 102 

Higher ranking suit selected for first bid.9, 41 

Holding high trump for 3d round, as re-entry.27, 111, 126 

Holding up command of opponent’s suit. 130 

Holding up command by eleven rule... 113 

Honor on honor, when led through. 110 

Importance of denying partner’s suit, if weak. 26 

Importance of play on first trick.122,129 

Importance of position for finessing. 122 

Increased value of hand when assisting. 24 

Indicating a lead, in anticipation of a bid.82, 84 

Indicating a lead, 3d hand, after two passes. 21 

Inferring outside tricks in rebid hands. 48 

Inferring weakness of bids against no-trumps. 74 

Inferring where support lies in partner’s hand. 47 

Intervening bids disregarded in denying suits. 41 

Intervening double disregarded in denying suits. 41 

King led, to show ace or queen, or both. 97 

Leading correctly from high combinations. 97 

Leading fourth-best and eleven rule.113, 114 





































GENERAL INDEX 


381 


POINT ILLUSTRATED HANDS 

Leading from ace to queen for a finesse. 116 

Leading from the weak hand to the strong. 127 

Leading queens to aces, without jack or ten. 116 

Leading short, to get a ruff. 61 

Leading through denied suits.30, 36, 44 

Leading through strength in dummy.109, 110, 113 

Leading to weakness in dummy.104, 113, 115 

Leading trumps up to declarer, first trick.32, 98 

Leading trumps only after discards. 124 

Leading trumps only after ruffing dummy. 123 

Leading up to declared stoppers at no-trump. 85 

Length, without tops, no excuse in free bids.19, 92 

Length in trumps adds nothing to assists. 59 

Length, without the tops, deceives partner. 18 

Locating the weak suit in a no-trumper. 9 

Longest suit between the two hands.120,127 

Losing cards got rid of before leading trumps. 124 

Losing little slam, through not being warned. 35 

Major-suit bids on four cards only.6, 41 

Major-suit take-outs from weakness. 35 

Major-suit take-outs from strength. 43 

Making trumps separately.3, 62, 123 

Minor over major, to support the other major. 79 

Minor suits bid on high cards, not length. 5 

Minor-suit bids are one trick only. 8 

Minor-suit bids of two tricks, for no-trumps. 9 

Minor-suit bids of two, to force partner’s bid. 10 

Minor-suit bids of three or four. 6 

Minor-suit bids of five, to go game.11,13 

Minor-suit bids show assistance for better bids. 5 

Minor-suit take-outs of no-trumps are warnings.31, 32, 33, 34 

Minor-suit take-outs on strength are wrong. 31 

Never assist a no-trumper when overcalled. 60 

No-trumpers denying support for take-out. 34 

No-trumpers that are weak in one suit. 9 

No-trumpers that will stand a take-out. 39 

No-trumps bid against a no-trumper. 39 

No-trumps at 10, better than hearts at 8. 43 










































382 


GENERAL INDEX 


POINT ILLUSTRATED HANDS 

Original bids of two, to show length. 45 

Original bids must show defence. 5 

Overbidding hands that need assistance. 59 

Overbidding on account of honors. 44 

Overbidding on account of outside tricks.44, 53 

Overbidding, to distinguish from denial. 25 

Overbidding a take-out, with great length. 42 

Overcalling no-trumpers 2d hand, with a suit.52, 75, 76 

Overcalling no-trumpers 2d hand, with major suits.61, 62, 74 

Overcalling no-trumpers, with the lead.32, 34, 35 

Overcalling a suit prevents its denial. 44 

Partner’s minor suits a help for no-trumpers. 7 

Partner’s silence, after a rebid. 96 

Penalties or game?. 74 

Placing the lead to start a suit. 119 

Placing the lead for a finesse. 121 

Postponed bids on secondary suits. 93 

Postponed bids do not deceive the partner. 19 

Postponing the trump lead, to ruff dummy. 123 

Postponing the trump lead, to discard losers. 124 

Possible two-trick bid in a minor suit... 26 

Preventing a lead through declarer. 118 

Promoting powers of high cards. 1 

Protective discards at no-trumps.107,108 

Putting one hand into the lead twice. 122 

Queen and one small, 2d hand. 1 21 

Queen and small, 2d hand; ace-ten 4th hand. 117 

Rebidding alter an assist. 51 

Rebidding without waiting for partner.49, 53, 55 

Rebids always indicate outside tricks.45, 46, 48, 50 

Redoubling the best defence to the double.63, 65 

Redoubling to get out of a double. 71 

Redoubling forces 4th hand to bid. 66 

Redoubling a no-trumper, to indicate strength. 64 

Redoubling to show weakness in the suit. 65 

Reduced value of denied suits.24 27 

Re-entries made on first trick.122, 129 







































GENERAL INDEX 


383 


POINT ILLUSTRATED HANDS 

Re-entry only in the suit itself. 128 

Refusal to rebid, shows nothing but the suit. 57 

Refusing to overcall no-trumpers, 2d hand. 75 

Refusing to lead up to declared stoppers.29, 77 

Refusing to rebid forced bids.53, 55 

Refusing to rebid, even after assist.54, 57 

Refusing to rebid two-trick bids. 66 

Refusing to bid, with the lead, at no-trumps.40, 74, 75 

Refusing to take out no-trumps in major suits. 43 

Return to no-trumps, after denying take-out.36, 38 

Reverse discard at no-trumps. 109 

Ruffing dummy, before leading trumps. 123 

Ruffing out suits to establish.98, 117, 126 

Second-best, 3d hand, at no-trump.104, 105, 106 

Second bidder overcalling no-trumpers. 32 

Secondary bids distinguished from free bids *.89, 90, 92 

Secondary bids do not deceive partner. 19 

Secondary bids need not be denied. 92 

Secondary suit bids, when first is denied... 41 

Secondary bids following free bids. 91 

Selecting the suit of higher rank. 6 

Separating the trumps, when dummy can ruff. 62 

Separating trumps by a cross ruff. 125 

Setting up a suit before leading trumps.37, 126 

Shift bids, to push up a no-trumper. 60 

Shifting from a suit to no-trumps.'_ 48 

Short-suit bids to show sure tricks. 7 

Short suits bid to show defence. 6 

Showing partner what to lead for defence. 5 

Showing secondary suit in a no-trumper.36, 37, 38 

Showing where there is support for a suit. 40 

Showing support by doubling another suit. 40 

Showing support is unnecessary in suit bids. 46 

Shut-out bids in the major suite. 12 

Shut-out bids in the minor suits. 11 

Shut-outs useless if not afraid of a suit. 14 

Silence of the partner, after a rebid.».. 96 

Silence of partner may mean two things.95 

Singletons add nothing to declarer’s hand.2, 16, 17, 18, 20 










































384 


GENERAL INDEX 


POINT ILLUSTRATED HAND* 

Singletons indicated by avoiding suits bid. 99 

Singletons in dummy add a king value. 3 

Singletons are bad leads with four trumps.4, 99 

Sporty no-trumpers, not as good as strong suits. 13 

Strength in dummy should be led through.109, 110, 113 

Suit bids always safer than no-trumps. 42 

Suit bids after a no-trumper is abandoned. 40 

Support partner first; then bid a big suit. 25 

Supporting suit never named in suit bids.46, 47 

Taking a one-trick sting to save game. 46 

Third-hand caution when dealer has passed. 22 

Third-hand defensive bids, after two passes. 21 

Third hand may reopen the bidding for dealer. 21 

Third-hand play against no-trumps.104, 105, 106 

Third hand winning tricks cheaply. 101 

Too late to force. 112 

Too strong to pass up certain hands. 15 

Too strong for a major-suit take-out. 43 

Trump leads, postponed by declarer. 3 

Unblocking; high cards from the short hand. 131 

Unblocking by overtaking. 130 

Undeclared major suits probably split up. 88 

Unequally divided suits the best to play for. 127 

Unnecessary increase of bid by partner. 23 

Unsound free bids deceive the partner. 90 

Unsound free bids induce unsafe doubles. 20 

Values necessary for doubling. 68 

Warning an opponent who bids no-trumps.52, 86 

Weak “rescues” in the major suits.35, 39, 41 

Weakness of secondary bids allowed for in assists. 94 

When game is safe, let them play the hand. 78 

Winning last round of trumps in a certain hand...119, 126 

Winning tricks cheaply, third hand...... lot 


3k77~3 




































































































































